A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued the following statement Monday after the close of another round of the six-party talks in Beijing on June 26 after it started from June 23 for the settlement of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S.: Unlike the previous talks each party advanced various proposals and ways and had a discussion on them in a sincere atmosphere at the talks. Some common elements helpful to making progress in the talks were found there.

This time the U.S. side said that it would take note of the DPRK's proposal for "reward for freeze" and seriously examine it.

An agreement was reached on such issues as taking simultaneous actions on the principle of "words for words" and "action for action" and mainly discussing the issue of "reward for freeze". This was positive progress made at the talks.

The talks, however, could not make a decisive breakthrough towards breaking the present deadlock as there existed big differences between the DPRK and the U.S.

What merits a serious attention is that substantial negotiations could not start among the parties concerned for the settlement of the issue as the DPRK and the U.S. failed to wipe out the bilateral mistrust and misunderstanding.

At the talks the DPRK side advanced once again a bold and flexible proposal which requires a big political decision for making a breakthrough towards breaking the present deadlock between the DPRK and the U.S. over the nuclear issue and making the talks fruitful, prompted by its sincere wish to contribute to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia and the rest of the world.

The DPRK delegation at the talks clarified details concerning its nuclear freeze on the premise that the U.S. withdraws its demand for CVID. It made it clear that the DPRK would freeze all the facilities related to nuclear weapons and products churned out by their operation, refrain from producing more nukes, transferring and testing them and the freeze would be the first start that would lead to the ultimate dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program.

It also clarified its stand that the nuclear freeze should be accompanied by reward and the period of the freeze would be decided according to whether reward is made or not under any circumstances.

The reward which the DPRK delegation called for should include such issues as
the U.S. commitment to the lifting of sanctions and blockade against the DPRK, the energy assistance of 2,000,000kw through the supply of heavy oil and electricity, etc.

The DPRK's proposal for "reward for freeze," the first-phase action for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions, is the only way of seeking a step-by-step solution to the nuclear issue as it took into consideration the present conditions in which there is no confidence between the DPRK and the U.S.

That was why all the parties to the talks except the U.S. positively supported and sympathized with the DPRK's flexible proposal and clarified their stance to participate in making reward for freeze.

The DPRK delegation had exhaustive negotiations with the U.S. side for nearly two and half hours on the sidelines of the talks.

The U.S. side recognized the reward for the freeze and advanced what it called "landmark proposal."

It is noteworthy that the U.S. put forward such proposal nine months after the talks began.

And it was fortunate that the U.S. did not use the expression of CVID but accepted the principle of "words for words" and "action for action" as proposed by the DPRK.

A scrutiny into the U.S. "proposal" suggests that, to our regret, it only mentioned phased demands for disarming the DPRK.

Its real intention was to discuss what it would do only when the DPRK has completed the unilateral dismantlement of its nuclear program.

A particular mention should be made of the fact that in its proposal the U.S. raised the issue of "period of three months' preparations" for dismantling the nuclear program but it could not be supported by anyone as it totally lacked scientific and realistic nature.

As far as the period is concerned, it depends on how the U.S meets the demands for reward.

It is by no means fortuitous that the participants in the talks termed the U.S. "landmark proposal" a complicated and unclear one and an unfair one as it lacked any U.S. commitment to implement the principle of "words for words" and "action for action".

The U.S. "proposal" could not convince the participants in the talks nor could it
be considered as a way of settling the issue as it was away from the principle of simultaneous action and based on its demand that the DPRK dismantle its nuclear program first.

If the U.S. seriously studies the DPRK proposal "reward for freeze", drops its unreasonable assertion about an enriched uranium program and the like, commits itself to renounce its hostile policy toward the DPRK according to the principle of "words for words" and "action for action" and directly takes measures for the reward for freeze in the future as its delegation had promised at the talks, this will help solve the nuclear issue and meet its interests.

The DPRK will closely follow the U.S. future attitude, pushing forward as planned the work to increase its capability for self-defence to cope with the threat of aggression from outside forces.

Source: http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/SPT0406.htm