



COMMAND HISTORY

(VOLUME II)

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Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia

(TS) In response to a JCS request,¹ CINCPAC submitted on 10 November 1965 an outline plan for the defense of Mainland Southeast Asia. After this plan was considered by the JCS, CINCPAC was requested to revise an existing plan or develop a new plan for Mainland Southeast Asia for two contingency situations:

1. An increase in NVA-Viet Cong forces with limited Chinese intervention; or

2. Chinese intervention in₂ force in South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries.

(TS) As a result of this JCS request, an unnumbered plan was developed along the lines of CINCPAC's OPLAN 32. It incorporated the latest concept of operations for South Vietnam and the JCS-specified contingencies. Also included were a force requirements annex, a concept of operations, and a statement of prior logistic actions necessary for force deployment and disposition.

(TS) This plan was submitted on 28 July.³ After review, the JCS stated that it was generally responsive to the guidelines on which it was prepared and noted that they contemplated no further action on the plan.

(TS) The JCS also noted that OPLAN 32-64, on which the Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia plan was patterned, was largely overtaken by events because of the intensity of activity in South Vietnam and Laos, insurgency in parts of Thailand, and the level of force deployments to Southeast Asia. Accordingly, it was requested that CINCPAC prepare a numbered plan to supersede portions of OPLAN 32. Two cases of aggression were to be dealt with: Case I involved the introduction of four to six Chinese communist divisions into Southeast Asia; and Case II in which the Chinese intervened with maximum capability. In both cases it was assumed that Chinese air and naval forces attacked friendly forces.⁴

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1. JCS 5172/272327Z Oct 65
 2. JCS 2083/200010Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 260913Z Oct 65
 3. CINCPAC Itr ser 000308, 28 Jul 66
 4. SM-1000-66, 23 Dec 66, GPRS 000888-66