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CINCPAC



COMMAND HISTORY

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CINCPAC Political/Military Group

(U) The CINCPAC Political/Military Review Group (PMRG) was established on 15 May 1974 to review military activities in the PACOM that might have an adverse impact upon political/diplomatic events occurring during the same time frame. The group was chaired by a CINCPAC officer, with CINCPAC staff and Service component membership. Potential problem areas surfaced by the group were forwarded on a continuing basis to the Chief of Staff, with an analysis of the impact of military activity in regard to political-diplomatic considerations, to include recommendations regarding revising, postponing, or cancelling such military activities. The first monthly meeting was held in June. Automatic Data Processing support was provided; immediate development of Phase I of such support provided a data base and programs to automatically generate a monthly message to announce the next meeting of the group and provide a list of events to be considered at that time.²

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Airborne Command Post Activities

(S) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), called BLUE EAGLE, continued in a ground alert status as it had since 1 January 1970 when continuous airborne alert was cancelled. New in 1974, however, was a deployed ground alert concept, in which the CINCPAC ABNCP initiated random 24-48 hour ground alert watch periods in conjunction with bi-monthly WESTPAC deployments. Also, as noted below, while BLUE EAGLE continued its series of no-notice alert exercises to prepare for or to actually launch the aircraft, the results of operations with selected nuclear ballistic submarines, aircraft carriers, Naval Communications Stations, and TACAMO aircraft are reported in more detail in the material that follows. (TACAMO was the nickname for airborne Very Low Frequency radio broadcasting done from Navy C-130 aircraft.)

(C) In the alert timing exercises for the aircraft to taxi to a runway hold area or to actually launch on a local flight, average response times for

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1. J335 HistSum Jun 74; CINCPAC 090215Z Jul 74.
 2. J33 HistSum May 74; J335 HistSum Jun 75; CINCPACINST 5820.2, 15 May 74, Subj: Recognition of Potential Conflicts of Political and Military Events Within PACOM.

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the year 1974 were well within the prescribed 15 minutes. In the first type of exercise, called BLUE EAGLE #2, the average time for the 64 exercises was 7 minutes, 24 seconds; for the launch, called BLUE EAGLE #4, the 24 exercises had an average time of 8 minutes, 39 seconds.¹

(8) The concept of ground alert had been developed to augment TACAMO Pacific's declining Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) alert role in 1974-75 when the TACAMO resources were temporarily reduced. ABNCP ground alert periods were randomly scheduled among Clark Air Base in the Philippines; Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan; and Kadena (Okinawa) and Yokota in Japan. From those locations, which bordered the submarine patrol areas, the ABNCP could rapidly enter an operational orbit within Very Low Frequency (VLF)/Low Frequency (LF) and High Frequency (HF) range with the capability to relay SIOP emergency action messages to the submarines. By April 1974 the ABNCP had performed deployed alert at the bases selected. By the end of 1974, 20 such deployments had been conducted to assume periods of deployed ground alert, as well as to provide CINCPAC with a survivable command center while airborne and to exercise the PACOM Command and Control System.²

(8) Testing of the ABNCP VLF/LF operations had begun in February 1973. In March 1974 the results of tests to PACOM SSBNs from the commencement of the program through January 1974 were presented to CINCPAC. There had been 21 total test missions flown, but only 16 reports had been received from the submarines at the time of this study. The 40 SSBN reports analyzed indicated that they had received and could copy 21 emergency action messages (receiving on either continuous wave (CW) or teletype). The overall success rate from the ABNCP to the submarines was 52.5 percent. Best reception was in a range up to 1,200 nautical miles.³

(8) Throughout the year testing continued, usually with about three operations a month to selected SSBNs, aircraft carriers, and Naval Communications facilities in Guam, Japan, and the Philippines. Operations usually included CW and secure teletype transmissions. Throughout the year the success rate stayed about the same as it had in the earlier test.⁴

(8) The ABNCP participated in various other tests throughout the year. For example, the Operations Facility on the ground at Hickam Air Force Base and a deployed airborne team enroute to the Western Pacific monitored an

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1. J3310 HistSum Dec 74.
 2. J3310 HistSums Sep, Dec 73; Apr, Nov, Dec 74.
 3. J33115 HistSum Mar 74.
 4. J33115 HistSums Apr-Dec 74.

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operational test of the Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS) nicknamed GIANT MOON 6 on 23 October. The missile had been launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The test was monitored on two frequencies. The ground facility at Hickam maintained valid (5"x5") reception of the JCS WHITE DOT ONE message for 22 minutes and on the other for 14. Both of these frequencies were also 5x5.¹

(U) During the summer of 1974, certain newly assigned personnel arrived without proper security clearances, which reduced the number of active Battle Staffs from five to four for a period.²

(S) The Alternate Command Authority program consisted of a series of briefings and an optional orientation flight. It was designed to prepare designated general and flag officers to assume interim command of the PACOM for SIOP operations during an airborne alert posture. The program had been temporarily discontinued, and was resumed in November. By the end of the year four CINCPAC staff officers (the Directors for Security Assistance and Communications-Electronics and the Director and Deputy Director for Operations), two CINCPACAF officers, and the 5th Air Force Vice Commander had completed the program. It included briefings on ABNCP staffing and operations, the CINCPAC Continuity of Operations Plan, the PACOM Alert System, and the General War Plan.³

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Inspector General Activities

(U) Throughout the year the Inspector General conducted surveys, investigations, and other studies in the PACOM.⁴ Conclusions or findings were retained in reports in that office. In 1974 the following occurred:

- On 4 January a report of the Review of Defense Department Activities in the Greater Manila Area, which had been conducted during December 1973, was submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff.⁵

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1. J3310 HistSum Oct 74.
 2. J3310 HistSum Jun 74.
 3. J3310 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 220115Z Aug 74.
 4. IG HistSums Jan-Dec 74.
 5. These studies of Defense Department activities were part of a CINCPAC-sponsored plan to have the Department authorize a single U.S. military coordinator in each country. See Chapter I of this history, "U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries (USDR)."

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