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In today's Report:
1. PRC Response to Gingrich Visit
Reuters ("CHINA TO US: SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON TAIWAN", Beijing,
4/3/97) and the Associated Press ("CHINA CONFUSED BY GINGRICH
WORDS", Beijing, 4/3/97) reported that PRC Foreign Ministry
spokesman Shen Guofang Thursday urged the United States to speak
with a single voice on the PRC, pointing to "contradictions in the
words of US leaders, including leaders of Congress." In commenting
on US House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich's visit to the
PRC and Taiwan, Shen stated that "we have seen that the words of
the US government including some leaders of other departments are
different from their promises." He added that Beijing does "not
wish to see all the departments of the US government carrying out
different foreign policies. That would be laughable."
Kevin Sullivan reported in the Washington Post ("GINGRICH, IN
JAPAN, PLAYS UP MILITARY TIES, MUTES TRADE DISPUTE", Tokyo, 4/2/97)
that Gingrich is spending two days in Japan "viewing the cherry
blossoms and saying nothing too harsh about anyone." Gingrich
lauded the Japan-US military alliance as the "cornerstone" of US
Asia policy and dismissed trade disputes as an "irritant" in
bilateral relations. He repeated his weekend statement that the US
would "defend Taiwan" if attacked by the PRC, but noted that his
comments were "not made in a provocative way." Sullivan described
the US House Speaker as sounding "more like President Clinton's
emissary than his chief rival" in his praise of Clinton's DPRK
policy as "pretty rational."
Reuters ("NEW BLOW TO US MILITARY IN JAPAN ASSAULT CASE", Tokyo,
4/3/97) and CNN Interactive ("US SAILOR SUSPECTED OF BEATING
JAPANESE WOMAN", Tokyo, 4/3/97) reported that a US sailor was under
arrest at Yokosuka Naval Base near Tokyo on suspicion of assaulting
his Japanese girlfriend. Police emphasized that there was no
evidence of rape. Reuters described the incident as a threatening
"new blow to the image of the US military both at home and abroad."
The incident became public as the Japanese cabinet approved
measures to force Okinawa landowners to renew US military base
leases. The bill was sent to the Diet for likely passage. PM
Ryutaro Hashimoto hopes to enact the bill before he departs for an
April 25 summit with US President Bill Clinton. The Associated
Press ("JAPAN MULLS US BASE USE BILL", Tokyo, 4/3/97) noted that
upon approval, the bill will strengthen Tokyo's legal position on
the land issue before thousands of leases expire May 14.
The Associated Press ("BEIJING TO BAN LEADED GASOLINE", Hong Kong,
4/3/97) reported that Beijing will ban the sale of leaded gasoline
beginning July 1 in an effort to curb car and truck pollution,
according to the China News Agency. The city will convert 299
service stations to unleaded-service only in the initial stage, and
beginning in 1998, will ban all vehicles using unleaded gasoline.
Xiang Baiqin of the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau
observed that 65 percent of the lead in Beijing's air comes from
leaded-gas vehicle exhaust.
In his departure statement in Taipei April 2, House Speaker Newt
Gingrich said that the United States encourages a resumption of
cross-Strait dialogue and remains committed to the principle of
peaceful, voluntary reunification of Taiwan with the PRC,
consistent with the "one-China" policy. However, he added that in
the event that the PRC seeks "...to reunify Taiwan with the
mainland by force or intimidation, the United States will use all
means necessary to prevent it." Gingrich said that Hong Kong's
reversion to Chinese sovereignty is a very important test "...of
whether or not Beijing is capable of having in fact a more open
society with freedom of the press and with free elections."
Gingrich also said he favored consideration of Taiwan on its own
for accession to the World Trade Organization. USIA Transcript:
Gingrich 4/2 Departure Statement in Taiwan ("US COMMITTED TO
PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION," Washington, 4/3/97)
The announcement of permission for private-sector-led rice aid to
the DPRK Monday was the first step toward further food aid to the
DPRK. Following the announcement, ROK government officials at the
Ministry of National Unification yesterday said that the Seoul
government will allow international relief agencies to buy foreign
rice with its contributions and send it to the DPRK. Fearing
possible diversion of rice for military purposes, the ROK
government had banned international agencies from providing rice to
the DPRK with the money it contributed to them since September
1995. Concerning the possibility of government assistance, the ROK
government reiterated that it will discuss government-level
assistance, such as provision of agro-technology, equipment and
machinery, when the DPRK comes to the four-party talks. The
government does not yet allow domestically produced rice to be
shipped to the DPRK, saying that foreign rice is cheaper than
domestic rice and that the domestic supply is insufficient.
Officials said that Seoul will respond to an expected third
international appeal for food aid to the DPRK by the Humanitarian
Affairs Department of the United Nations. (Korea Herald,
"GOVERNMENT TAKES FIRST STEP TOWARD FURTHER FOOD AID TO NORTH
KOREA; TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES TO BUT FOREIGN RICE
AND SEND IT TO NORTH," Kim Ji-soo, 04/01/97)
The Korea National Red Cross (KNRC) said Wednesday it has delivered
relief goods worth some 2 billion won ( US $2.22 Million) to the
DPRK, since its first aid package of 5,000 blankets in November
1995. In a report on its flood relief activities at the Seoul Press
Center, the KNRC said that it has thus far sent 10,000 blankets,
2,924 tons of wheat flour, 84 tons of powered milk, 187,000 liters
of cooking oil, 100,000 packages of instant noodles (ramyon) and
35,000 pairs of socks in its 13 shipments of aid to the communist
country. A KNRC official said the organization will deliver its
14th shipment to the DPRK Thursday consisting of 1,650 tons of
potatoes, 10 tons of powered milk and 11,200 kilograms of radish
and cabbage seeds worth a total of one billion won. Welcoming the
governments recent allowance of civil and economic organizations to
send aid to the DPRK, the KNRC asked more enterprises and civilians
to take part in the aid programs from a humanitarian standpoint.
(Korea Times, "KNRC DELIVERS RELIEF GOODS TO NORTH KOREA,"
04/03/97)
Rep. Tony Hall of the U.S. House of Representatives will enter the
DPRK tomorrow for a three-day visit aimed at assessing the severity
of the DPRK's food shortages, an official here said yesterday.
Hall, a Democrat from Ohio, will fly from Tokyo to Pyongyang on a
chartered U.S. military plane. No U.S. administration official will
accompany the congressman, but a few reporters from the US media
will travel with him, said the official. By permitting the entry of
a US congressman, the DPRK seems to be making good-will gestures
toward the US and trying to form a favorable atmosphere for food
aid to the impoverished Communist state. An ROK Foreign Ministry
official said Seoul will consult with Washington and Tokyo on the
amount of additional aid to the DPRK when U.N. relief agencies make
a third round of appeals later this month. But he said he has no
knowledge of a reported U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNDHA) plan to appeal for $117 million in aid for the DPRK, three
times the amount requested in the second round of appeals last
year. (Korea Herald, "U.S. CONGRESSMAN HALL TO ENTER NORTH KOREA
TOMORROW," 04/03/97)
3. DPRK Conducts Military Exercise
The DPRK, in an effort to control its population, conducted joint
military-civilian exercises across the country for about 10 days
ending Sunday, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported Wednesday.
"The exercises seemed rather intended to suppress the public
resentment over worsening food shortages and the defection of North
Korean Workers party secretary Hwang Jang-yop than aimed at
provoking the south," the JCS said. During the exercises, senior
party and government officials were given emergency calls, civil
anti-air raid drills were conducted and paramilitary units
mobilized. Regular troops undergoing winter exercises had
intensified night-time field drills. "In 1995 and last year,
similar military exercises were carried out in some parts of the
North. As they were unusually conducted across the country this
time, however, our military reinforced surveillance," a senior JCS
officer said. (Yonhap) Korea Herald, "N. KOREA CONDUCTS JOINT
MILITARY-CIVILIAN EXERCISES," 04/02/97)
More than 500 DPRK citizens are believed to have been publicly
executed last year, a DPRK expert has claimed. Former vice national
unification minister Song Young-dae, in a recent lecture to the
Hyundai Economic Research, said, "North Korea, in a bid to maintain
its system, is drastically reinforcing its control of the
population." Song, chairman of the Central National Unification
Council, reportedly told the meeting that public executions in the
DPRK last year were mostly carried out against those arrested for
trying to escape to the PRC, stealing food from warehouses or
committing "anti-state" crimes. (Korea Times, "OVER 500 NORTH
KOREANS EXECUTED IN PUBLIC LAST YEAR: NK EXPERT," 04/02/97)
5. DPRK Prepares Military Parade
The DPRK is preparing for a major military parade in its capital in
April, ROK watchers of the communist state said Monday.
Preparations for the annual April 25 parade in Pyongyang marking
the founding of the Korean People's Army have started earlier than
usual this year, said Naewoe Press, the ROK agency that monitors
DPRK media. Soviet-made jet fighters screamed over rows of DPRK
soldiers marching through a Pyongyang plaza in a rehearsal last
Wednesday, Naewoe said, quoting Russian media reports and other
sources. This year's parade comes amid reports that the DPRK's
armed forces were growing irritated over massive food shortages.
Kim Jong Il, the DPRK's de facto leader, may appease the military
by staging a larger parade this year despite the food and fuel
shortages, said Naewoe analysts. Kim has promoted generals in the
government hierarchy and devoted most of his public activity to
visiting military units, acknowledging that the military is an
important power broker in the DPRK especially during his ascension
to power. In a related development, the North's Central People's
Committee, or Cabinet, has introduced a new medal for soldiers on
the occasion of this year's military parade, Pyongyang's official
Korean Central News Agency reported Monday. (Korea Times, " NK
MILITARY PREPARING FOR MAJOR PARADE IN PYONGYANG," 04/02/97)
[The following "DPRK Report" is a joint project of the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International
Studies, Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary
International Problems (ICIP, at the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow,
Russia). It is funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation
and is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP.]
THE DPRK REPORT (No. 5, January-February 1997)
Commenting on Mr. Hwang's defection, Russian analysts described him
as "a staunch supporter of Juche-ism and a loyal party
functionary." He never betrayed any traces of dissent from the
official line.
The defection has led Russian analysts to reappraise the situation
in the DPRK leadership. Kim's showering of subordinates with
privileges and decorations, at first believed to be successful,
could not outweigh the negative impact of the deteriorating economy
and the spreading famine. Instead of concentrating efforts on
overcoming these negative phenomena, Kim Jong-il has continued
hostile actions against the ROK, whipped up war hysteria, and spent
almost all resources on military preparations.
The disparities between real life in the country and the official
slogans finally became so great that even the old guard of the
regime, the theoretician of Juche ideas and member of the inner
circle of the young leader, lost patience and presented an open
challenge to Kim Jong-il.
As some Russian analysts now predict, this move by Mr. Hwang may
cause others to try to follow Mr. Hwang's example by defecting
abroad or to start requesting changes in the country and its
foreign policy. Internal pressures on Kim Jong-il are bound to
increase.
The Hwang affair will seriously undermine the DPRK's relations with
the PRC. Beijing on many occasions advised Pyongyang to launch
reforms: instead, an unrepentant North Korea has created more and
more problems not only for itself but for China. It has become an
embarrassment for the PRC and an obstacle to its profitable
cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK).
Moreover, if Mr. Hwang settles in Seoul and starts denouncing
Pyongyang's regime, the DPRK's relations with the ROK will be
adversely affected. The revelations of Mr. Hwang will further
tarnish the Kim junior's image in the United States, Japan, and the
world community at large.
Under these circumstances, Kim Jong-il faces two possible courses
of action. The first one is to continue the unrelenting resistance
to change. This line will soon require purges in the leadership and
a new wave of terror in the DPRK at large. This would result in a
worsening of conditions and perhaps even a civil war. The other
option, however, is to enact certain economic and political
changes, shifting the emphasis from the unworkable Juche system,
the cult of personality, and hostility towards the South to an
open-door policy and internal reforms. Although the reforms may
mean the end of Kim's rule, Russian observers point out that this
option offers a better choice for Kim junior than the hard-line
approach mentioned above. Indeed, Russian observers do see some
signs that Kim Jong-il might be preparing for changes (for details
see "The DPRK Report," November-December 1996).
2. "Information Deprivation" in the DPRK
The DPRK propaganda machine is a unique instrument playing a very
important role in keeping the present regime in power.
Information in the country is totally monopolized by the party and
state. The DPRK's secret services keep a day-to-day vigil over the
implementation of the leadership's information strategy and
tactics. The larger part of historical and fictional literature and
even dated national periodicals have been transferred to "special
collections," where only authorized persons, having special
assignments, can get acquainted with selected materials. Ordinary
citizens are completely barred from such collections, to say
nothing of foreign newspapers and magazines. Even conversations
with foreigners may lead to severe punishments, including
imprisonment in "reeducation" (read: concentration) camps.
Although there are exceptions, most DPRK citizens still blindly
believe that their society is the most just and prosperous in the
world, and that their motherland is about to be invaded by
imperialist and other enemies. However, even if reforms are finally
launched, the social transformation will be a painful one. This is
due in no small degree to the brainwashing of the DPRK population.
Authorities have perfected a specific system of "ideological work
among the masses." Teaching of Juche ideas starts in kindergartens.
In secondary schools, stories about the two Kim's and their
teachings are studied in all details and are supposed to be the
most important subject. At the college level, Juche-ism dominates
the curriculum and requires thousands of hours of class work and
homework. At factories and offices, the work day is extended by two
hours in order to conduct mandatory training lessons.
The information flow in the DPRK is designed, disseminated, and
controlled by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the
Central Committee (CC) of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP). Lately,
the Chief Political Directorate (CPD) of the Korean People's Army
has gained a certain level of independence from the CC's Propaganda
and Agitation Department. Now, it is more common that key
political directives originate instead in the Defense Committee
(rather than in party organs) and are subsequently disseminated by
the army's CPD. However the CC's Propaganda and Agitation
Department is generally still in charge of the propaganda field.
The ideological chiefs in all of these ministries rival the heads
of the ministries in power and influence.
A number of new features have emerged in DPRK propaganda after the
death of Kim Il-sung. A new interpretation has been given to the
problem of interactions between the masses and the supreme leader.
Contrary to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, DPRK propaganda
claims now that "only under an outstanding leader's guidance can
the masses fulfill their role as history's moving force." It is
also stated in Pyongyang that in the 21st Century Juche-ism will
become the universal ideology of mankind: the basis of morality,
politics, economics, social life, and culture.
Summing up, it can be stated that the psychological impact of Juche
propaganda is very negligible abroad, but it is quite strong inside
the DPRK. Long years of impenetrable isolation and massive
brainwashing via the channels of the state, the ruling Party,
enterprises, schools, and even the family have succeeded in their
task--a considerable portion of DPRK society has lost the ability
to perceive reality objectively, is exhausted to its limits not
only physically (as a result of material deprivation) also
psychologically by fear of the emergence in its thoughts of ideas
"alien" to the official ideology and the ruling regime.
3. The Fighting Spirit of the North Korean Armed Forces
According to Russian military experts, despite the DPRK's current
economic and social difficulties, its armed forces still maintain a
high fighting spirit. Soldiers are supposedly disciplined,
patriotic, respectful to each other, physically tough and prepared
to "sacrifice their lives for the motherland."
According Russian experts, this high level of preparedness in the
DPRK armed forces is achieved through strict discipline, intensive
indoctrination, the lack of independent sources of information,
fear, and enjoyment of better living conditions than those of
civilians. Activities of the U.S. and ROK military commands
presumably help to consolidate loyalty in the ranks of North Korean
servicemen. Pyongyang, as well as its military men, are--in the
words of Russian experts--"genuinely afraid of an attack from the
South as an extension of regular military maneuvers." As one DPRK
general complained to his Russian counterpart: "You never know if
it is another training session, or if this time American-South
Korean marines will actually land on the DPRK's coast."
4. Russian Appraisals of U.S. Policy towards North Korea
The steps of the Clinton Administration aimed at improving
relations with the DPRK create a certain apprehension in the ruling
circles of Russia. The Agreed Framework, KEDO activities, and the
four-power talks initiative are perceived as detrimental to
Russia's interests. As officials complain in private conversations,
the United States is getting the upper hand and pushing Moscow
aside in a country on which the Soviet Union spent so much time,
money, and effort.
The United States is criticized not only for damaging Russian
interests in the DPRK, but for what one analyst calls "consistent
attempts to destroy an independent republic." At various political
and scholarly fora and in the media, the following interpretation
of American motives and actions is given:
a. After the collapse of the USSR and the termination of Soviet aid
to the DPRK, Washington expected its early collapse due to the
shortage of electricity. However, the DPRK wisely concentrated its
efforts on producing electricity with the help of nuclear stations.
b. To block such efforts, the Americans unleashed what one Russian
analyst calls a "propaganda campaign which invented the story of a
DPRK atomic bomb." Using the nuclear pretext the United States
hoped to strangle the DPRK with international sanctions.
c. But these accusations were completely groundless. If the DPRK
wanted to it could have created a military nuclear potential long
ago. But there was no reason to acquire such a capability: the
DPRK's missiles cannot reach American soil anyway, while bombing
its own brothers in South Korea with nuclear weapons was seen as
ridiculous.
d. Thus, American strategy failed completely. North Korea responded
with strong countermeasures, including departure from Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Faced with Pyongyang's toughness, the
Americans got scared and made numerous concessions.
This line of Russian "analysis" concludes with suggestions that
Moscow should learn from the DPRK experience and respond to the
expansion of NATO and other unfriendly policies of the United
States with strong countermeasures. The Kremlin is advised to
abandon all arms control agreements, conclude military alliances
with friendly Arab regimes, and preserve a strategic partnership
with the DPRK.
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NOTE: From March 24 through April 6, the Daily Report will be on an
abbreviated schedule. There will be three reports the week of March
24 and two reports the week of March 31, while our regular NAPSNet
staff is out of the country at a conference. Your understanding is
appreciated.
1. PRC Response to Gingrich Visit
II. Republic of Korea
2. Gingrich Japan Visit
3. US Japan Base Issue
4. Beijing Leaded Gas Ban
5. Gingrich's Visit to Taiwan
1. ROK Sends Food Aid to DPRK
III. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
2. US Congressman Visits DPRK
3. DPRK Conducts Military Exercise
4. Executions in DPRK
5. DPRK Prepares Military Parade
1. Hwang Jang-yop's Defection
2. "Information Deprivation" in the DPRK
3. The Fighting Spirit of the North Korean Armed Forces
4. Russian Appraisals of U.S. Policy towards North Korea
I. United States
II. Republic of Korea
III. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
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