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Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network DAILY REPORT For Friday, September 18, 1998, from Berkeley, California, USA |
1. DPRK Satellite Launch
US Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon ("PENTAGON REGULAR
BRIEFING, SEPTEMBER 17, 1998," USIA Transcript, 09/17/98) said that US
analysts have not determined exactly what happened to the satellite that
was launched by the DPRK on August 31. Bacon stated, "First of all, as I
understand it the only way we have to trace the debris of this missile is
through radar tapes, and there is considerable disagreement within our
own intelligence community as to how to interpret these tapes. We are
continuing, our analysts are continuing, to meet to try to reach a
consensus position on this and other questions stemming from that August
31st missile launch." He added, "I don't think whether it went X or X
plus 1,000 kilometers is really relevant. What's relevant here is what I
stressed last Tuesday and what the State Department has stressed as well,
is that that three stage missile with a solid fuel third stage was an
advance that shows they have greater capability to fire payloads over
longer distances." Bacon said that the dispersion of the debris is not
necessarily an indication of the reach of the missile, noting that the
reach would be dependent on the amount of fuel it carries, the weight of
the missile, and the weight of the payload.
2. DPRK-Japan Relations
Agence France-Presse ("NORTH KOREA WARNS JAPAN THAT ROCKET LAUNCH
SANCTIONS WILL BRING REPERCUSSIONS," Tokyo, 09/18/98) reported that the
DPRK's official Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) on Friday warned Japan
against reacting too harshly to its August 31 rocket launch. KCNA
stated, "If the Japanese authorities misjudge the situation and continue
acting rashly, they will entirely be held responsible for the ensuing
catastrophic consequences." It added, "We have so far lived and will
live in the future, too, without normalizing the relations with Japan.
We do not beg for the normalization of the DPRK-Japan relations, leaving
our pride and independence hurt. We will live our own way." KCNA also
quoted an editorial of the Rodong Sinmun newspaper as saying that Japan,
"groundlessly claiming that the launch of an artificial satellite is that
of a missile, are engaging themselves in a frantic anti-DPRK campaign.
We cannot allow it at all." The editorial added, "We are entitled to
make Japan pay dearly for its past crimes. We are determined to do so
with any conceivable means. The Japanese reactionaries are afraid of
that determination, to the extreme."
3. Implementation of Agreed Framework
Reuters (Adam Entous, "U.S. HOUSE APPROVES $16.2 BLN TO FUND AID
PROGRAMS," Washington, 09/17/98) reported that the US House of
Representatives on Thursday voted to cut off US funding to the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization. The decision came in a vote
of 255-to-161 approving a US$16.2 billion foreign aid package.
4. DPRK Economy
The Associated Press ("NORTH KOREA SAYS NO TO REFORM," Seoul, 09/18/98)
reported that the DPRK's ruling Workers' Party reaffirmed Friday that
juche will continue to be the backbone of the country's economic policy.
An article in the party's newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, argued, "It is a
foolish daydream to try to revive the economy by introducing foreign
capital, not relying on one's own strength." Rodong Sinmun described the
article as the policy of Kim Jong-il. The article warned that
capitalistic economic reforms would only cause catastrophic results, as
shown in some former Soviet-bloc countries. It stated, "We will ... set
ourselves against all the attempts to induce us to join an 'integrated'
world. We have nothing to 'reform' and 'open.'" The article admitted
that the DPRK was facing serious economic difficulties, but said that
under Kim Jong-il, the country will revitalize its economy "one sector
after another as ants gnaw a piece of bone."
5. ROK Political Prisoners
The Los Angeles Times (Valerie Reitman, "PRISONERS WON'T SHED
CONVICTIONS," Seoul, 09/18/98) reported that ROK President Kim Dae-jung's
administration devised a questionnaire which political prisoners were
required to fill out in order to receive amnesty. The questionnaire
asked three questions: "What are you in prison for? How will you support
yourself? How will you obey the law and the constitution if freed?"
Amnesty International Secretary-General Pierre Sane said that Kim's
"government's failure to stop abuse of the National Security Law, to
release political prisoners and engage in meaningful dialogue with local
human rights organizations, is fast eroding confidence and trust in this
reform program." James Feinerman, chairman of Asian legal studies at
Georgetown University Law Center, stated, "It's not surprising in light
of what other nations have done, including Korea, but it's a little
shocking to hear they are still doing that under Kim. You punish someone
when, and if, they violate the law, but you don't make it a condition of
their release that you promise not to violate the law." However, Poet
Park No-he, who served eight years of a life sentence for organizing a
Socialist workers league, said that he signed the questionnaire because
he did not want to detract from the greater good of Kim's reform efforts.
You Jong-keun, economic advisor to the president, argued, "Kim Dae-jung
has long struggled for human rights, but he also must deal with political
reality." Park Joo Son, Kim's chief legal advisor, stated, "How can you
free somebody who doesn't promise he will keep the law?" Justice
Ministry chief prosecutor Moon Sung Woo added, "South Korea and North
Korea embrace completely different ideologies. If a member of society
cooperates with North Korea and not South Korea, how can we not prosecute
him?" However, Kim Hye-jung, whose husband, Min Kyong-woo, is serving a
3 1/2-year sentence for breaching the National Security Law, argued, "We
consider North Koreans our brethren, our fellow citizens. We are not for
the North and not for the South. We are for Korea. It's not treason--
it's patriotism."
6. PRC-Taiwan Economic Relations
Dow Jones Newswires (Y.H. Sun, "TAIWAN GOVT MULLS ALLOWING FIN SECTOR TO
INVEST IN CHINA," Taipei, 09/18/98) reported that Taiwan Vice Economic
Affairs Minister Lin Yi-fu said Friday that the government will consider
allowing financial institutions and insurance companies to invest in the
PRC. Lin added that it is the right direction for Taiwan and the PRC to
divide labor, with Taiwan making high-end products while the PRC produces
low-end goods, and Taiwan designing products while the PRC becomes more
of a manufacturing base. He also said that the government is concerned
about the difficulties Taiwanese companies face in the PRC. Over 20,000
Taiwan companies have invested in the PRC since the Taiwan government
started to relax control on exchanges between the two sides in the late
1980s, and many companies have called for setting up Taiwanese bank
branches in the PRC to assist them with loans or foreign exchange.
7. Alleged US Technology Transfers to PRC
The New York Times (Eric Schmitt, "CONGRESS MOVES TO REVERSE CLINTON'S
SATELLITE-EXPORT PROCEDURE," Washington, 09/18/98, A1) reported that US
House of Representatives and Senate negotiators agreed Thursday to shift
the control over exporting US satellites back to the State Department
from the Commerce Department. William Reinsch, the undersecretary of
commerce for export administration, said that his boss, Commerce
Secretary William M. Daley, would again urge President Bill Clinton to
veto the bill. However, White House spokesman David Leavy stated, "We've
made no decision whether to recommend whether the president veto the
bill."
The Associated Press (Tom Raum, "PENTAGON DENIES AIDING CHINA ICBMS,"
Washington. 09/17/98) reported that Franklin Miller, principal US deputy
assistant secretary of defense, told the Senate Commerce Committee
Thursday that the PRC is unlikely to have enhanced its intercontinental
ballistic missile program, even marginally, from US technology transfers.
Miller stated, "I do not believe that there has been any improvement to
Chinese ICBM capability." Committee Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz.,
challenged Miller's assertion, citing testimony by other experts and an
Air Force intelligence analysis.
8. Russian Nuclear Safety
The Washington Post (David Hoffman, "RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR FORCE SINKS WITH
THE RUBLE ECONOMIC CRISIS ERODES STRATEGIC ARSENAL," Moscow, 09/18/98,
A01) reported that Russia's economic crisis threatens to erode its
strategic nuclear weapons complex. The article said that recent public
disclosures suggest that thousands of workers in the atomic arsenal are
not being paid for months at a time and that there have been major
setbacks in Russia's plans to modernize its weapons systems. It added
that Russian President Boris Yeltsin recently signed a top-secret
strategic weapons review that envisions continued shrinkage of Russia's
strategic arsenal into the next century. A recent US Congressional
Budget Office said that Russia's satellites, designed to spot missile
launches, provide coverage of US missile sites for only 17 hours day, and
perhaps "significantly less." The report added that a second group of
satellites in geostationary orbits "cannot detect ballistic missiles
launched from large areas of the Earth's oceans." Sergei Rogov, director
of Russia's Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, stated, "There
is very little resistance in Russia today to arms control.... It's not
the question of controlling the arms, it's the question of the collapse
of the remnants of the Soviet military machine because of budget reasons.
In this sense, there is a consensus in Russia we need something like
1,000 nuclear weapons." William M. Arkin, an independent consultant,
said that the prospects for Russian plans to shift about half its nuclear
warheads to its submarine force are doubtful.
9. South Asian Nuclear Tests
The United States Information Agency (Rick Marshall, "REPORT URGES INDIA,
PAKISTAN TO CAP NUCLEAR CAPABILITY," Washington, 09/17/98) reported that
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Brookings Institution
issued a special report Thursday on the consequences of India and
Pakistan's nuclear tests. The co-chairs of the report were Richard Haass
of Brookings and Morton Halperin of the CFR. The report called for both
India and Pakistan "to adopt policies that will help stabilize the
situation in South Asia by capping their nuclear capabilities at their
current levels." It also urged the US Congress "to provide broad waiver
authority to the President so that sanctions and incentives can be used
to support, rather than thwart, U.S. diplomacy." It said that while
Kashmir remains the most dangerous point of contention between India and
Pakistan, "the dispute is not ripe for final resolution. It is not even
ripe for mediation by the United States or anyone else." The report
added, "US foreign policy should not sacrifice its many interests in
South Asia in order to promote unrealistic aims in the nuclear realm. In
particular, a complete 'rollback' to a non-nuclear South Asia is simply
not a realistic near- or even medium-term policy option for the United
States."
10. Clinton Trip to South Asia
The Associated Press (George Gedda, "CLINTON WEIGHS INDIA, PAKISTAN
TRIP," Washington, 09/18/98) reported that US officials said that
President Bill Clinton's decision on whether to travel to India and
Pakistan in November will hinge on the tone and substance of the speeches
the prime ministers of the two countries make next week to the UN General
Assembly. Regarding ongoing US talks with both countries, National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger said, "I think there has been some
movement, but I think so far it's been insufficient." Officials said
that Clinton plans to meet with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in
New York. No meeting with Vajpayee is planned because he will not be in
New York when Clinton is there.
1. Implementation of Agreed Framework
The Nikkei Shimbun ("US AND ROK URGE JAPAN TO SIGN COST-SHARING FOR
LIGHT-WATER REACTOR PROJECT," 09/18/98) reported that both the US and the
ROK began to urge the Japanese government to separate the issue of the
DPRK's alleged missile test from the light-water reactor project of the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and sign a cost-
sharing agreement for the project.
2. Japanese-ROK Relations
The Yomiuri Shimbun ("PRIME MINISTER MEETS WITH ROK LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC
FEDERATION PARTY (LDFP) PRESIDENT," 09/18/98) reported that Japanese
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and ROK LDFP President Pak Te-chun met in
Tokyo on September 17 and agreed that, with regard to the issue of the
DPRK's alleged missile test, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation
among the US, Japan and the ROK. Pak stated, "We understand Japan's
tough stance on the DPRK," but also stated, "The north wind alone cannot
make (the DPRK) take off its coat," stressing that the ROK will continue
its "sunshine policy" toward the DPRK. As for the issue of suffrage for
Korean residents in Japan in local elections, Pak asked Obuchi to do his
best to solve the issue. Obuchi responded, "I understand the issue, but
it is still being debated in Japan. It is necessary to further discuss
it."
3. Japanese-Russian Relations
The Yomiuri Shimbun (Tetsuya Harada, "RUSSIA WILL RESPOND TO ISSUE OF
DELIMITATION OF NORTHERN TERRITORY WHEN OBUCHI VISITS RUSSIA," Moscow,
09/17/98) reported that former Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow on September 17 and
pledged to resume their efforts to realize the January, 1997 Krasnoyarsk
Agreement to conclude a peace treaty between Japan and Russia by 2000.
After their meeting, Hashimoto told reporters that Yeltsin also promised
to respond to Hashimoto's proposal of delimitation of the Northern
Territories at the time of Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's visit
to Russia, slated for November. Hashimoto also said that he told Yeltsin
that the Obuchi Administration will continue the three principles of
Japan's policy toward Russia--confidence-building, mutual benefits, and a
long-term perspective. He added that Yeltsin agreed to build confidence
with Obuchi on a personal basis. As for the Russian economy, Yeltsin
stated, "We will survive the critical situation sooner or later," while
Hashimoto said, "We are sure that Russia will develop independently, but
we will continue to support it."
1. US Sanctions on DPRK
[Ed. Note: The following analysis of US sanctions policy on the DPRK was
written by the American Friends Service Committee's Karin Lee and John
Feffer. It appeared in The Progressive Response, Vol. 2, No. 30,
09/18/98. The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In
Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the
Institute for Policy Studies. For more information send email to
irc1@zianet.com with "Progressive Response" in the subject line.]
*** Sanctions Against North Korea: Seriously Dated ***
by Karin Lee and John Feffer, American Friends Service Committee
The United States is missing a golden opportunity to end the cold war.
But the cold war ended nearly a decade ago you say? Not on the Korean
peninsula, it didn't.
North and South Korea remain squared off on the most militarized patch of
land in the world. Once a strong country, North Korea is now facing a
large-scale food crisis compounded by a general economic collapse. It
has tried to put the best face on a bad situation--by testing missiles,
dispatching submarine missions, and threatening to restart its nuclear
weapons program. The North Korean government believes that only by
remaining a credible threat will it be taken seriously by its neighbors
and by the United States.
The United States and its allies are missing the chance to engage North
Korea positively now instead of paying the high economic and military
costs of confronting a more desperate North Korea in the future. The
1994 Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to suspend its nuclear
weapons program in exchange for heavy fuel oil and two light-water
nuclear power plants, is currently in jeopardy. North Korean leaders
have clearly indicated that the 1994 agreement was just the first step in
a process of improving relations with the United States. The U.S.
government, however, has not taken any further steps.
Since 1994 the United States has fallen behind in its promised oil
shipments. It has continued to tout North Korea as a major threat to
U.S. security and one of the key reasons to maintain a military budget at
unsustainable cold war levels. It has stepped up military exercises with
South Korea and beefed up its military alliance with Japan. It is no
surprise that North Korea responded with military actions of its own.
In 1995 the U.S. lifted sanctions against North Korea in a very few
specific areas such as telecommunications and credit cards.
Comprehensive economic sanctions imposed nearly fifty years ago remain in
place and have confined the flow of aid, business, and cultural exchange
between the United States and North Korea to the barest of trickles.
In June 1998, new South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung made the unprecedented
statement that his country would no longer stand in the way of lifting
these sanctions. The Clinton administration has yet to respond to this
historic gesture despite recent moves by Congress to question the overall
effectiveness of sanctions.
Some U.S. politicians expect North Korea to collapse any day now. While
the current economic crisis is very severe, the regime itself shows few
signs of deterioration. Moreover, were North Korea to collapse, the
consequences would be devastating for the region -- a massive outflow of
refugees, an enormous economic burden on cash-strapped South Korea, and a
destabilizing power vacuum in the very heart of Northeast Asia.
The easing of U.S. sanctions will boost North Korea's efforts to
modernize its economy and increase trade and communication. This would
strengthen the position of those in the country who are inclined to
engage with the outside world.
For many years the U.S. government argued that its position was
constrained by South Korean policies. That has changed. Sanctions are
anachronistic and counter-productive. It's time for the cold war to come
to an end.
1. DPRK Famine Prayer Vigil
The Institute for Strategic Reconciliation is sponsoring a Prayer Vigil
for the hungry children and elderly of the DPRK on Sunday evening,
September 20, at 7:30 p.m., at the Global Mission Church, 13421 Georgia
Avenue, Silver Spring, MD. The evening prayer vigil will include a photo
exhibit of the DPRK food crisis and a display of reports of famine
assessment by the US Congressional mission to the DPRK, the UN World Food
Program/Food and Agriculture Organization assessments of the DPRK's food
supply and need, and other reports by international NGOs working in the
DPRK. RSVPs are required for this program as seating is limited. Please
contact the Institute for Strategic Reconciliation by e-mail or by phone at 301-570-3948 no later than Saturday, September 19th.
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