Introduction
In
October 1999, the Pentagon put in
to effect the SIOP-00 (the
"Single Integrated
Operational Plan"), the
latest in a long line of periodic
nuclear war plan updates. This
plan also represents the
culmination of nearly a decade of
redesigning the entire U.S.
nuclear war planning system,
upgrading existing nuclear forces
to post-Cold War challenges, and
incorporating new guidance to
broaden targeting in China and
take on new enemies armed with
Weapons of Mass Destruction. SIOP
and several Theater Nuclear
Options range from a
demonstration attack with a
single weapon to a half-hour
spasm of more than 600 missile
strikes, delivering almost 3,000
warheads.
This
design does not reflect the
world's political changes as they
occurred in the 1990s, nor did it
come about mainly because the
President has revised the concept
of deterrence. Instead, it is the
product of a major reform of
nuclear planning system and vast
improvements in computer
processing that allow
near-instant re-targeting of far
more accurate and flexible
weapons (which were first
introduced in the 1980s). By
eliminating unnecessary targets
and outdated software and
hardware products, war planners
have been able to more finely
focus on enemy decapitation.
Much of
this reform, however, is unknown
to the public and the disarmament
community that has largely
focussed on the implementation of
Cold War-type arms control
treaties. Yet, as nuclear arms
control finds post-Cold War force
levels and the disarmament
process grind to a halt to
preserve enduring stockpiles
indefinitely, it is in the
nuclear planning reform that the
characteristics of nuclear
deterrence in the 21st Century
are to be found.
The
challenge that the world changes
presented U.S. nuclear planners
with was not merely how to reduce
the number of nuclear weapons and
update the war plans accordingly.
It was the daunting task of
converting a massive-scale,
bulky, nuclear warfighting
machine, directed by relatively
uniform guidance for fighting
World War III with the Soviet
Union, and instead transforming
it into to a flexible, trimmed
and adaptive deterrence apparatus
suitable for use in a wide
variety of scenarios and capable
of responding to continuous
change in guidance and policy.
This conversion required a reform
of nuclear planning that could
endure still deeper reductions in
the number of nuclear weapons
while expanding deterrence and
warfighting requirements so that
planners could "go
global" in pursuit of
enemies and targets. From the
planner's perspective the world
changed from a weapons rich to a
target rich environment.
In
reviewing this development, this
paper takes a two-tract effort:
one that looks at the predominant
driver in U.S. nuclear planning
-- Russia; and another that
reviews the increasingly
prominent influence from China
and the "rogue" states
armed with Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
A.
The Russian Focus
The latest
war plan is the result of a
reform process that began in
1989, when Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney ordered a review of
nuclear targeting. In 1986, SIOP
forces had been assigned 16,000
individual Soviet targets,[1]
and even at the end of the Cold
War the number remained at
12,500. Increased "damage
expectancy" and the demands
of promptness had resulted in a
constant cry for more weapons and
improved capabilities. As a
result of that review, in January
1991 Cheney directed a reduction
in the number of warheads to be
included in various attack
options, and he called for
targets to be reduced by 2,500 to
some 10,000.
Even so,
Cheney's directive was virtually
obsolete by the time it was
issued, outpaced by a series of
fast-moving events. All the
targets in Eastern Europe had
evaporated, and in 1991 President
George Bush had announced
significant unilateral
initiatives, to which the Soviets
had responded in kind. When
SIOP-93 was rushed into effect on
June 1, 1992,[2]
targets had been reduced by
nearly 40 percent. Meanwhile,
Gen. Lee Butler, then commander
of U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), began his own
unilateral review process.
Applying "nodal" or
network analysis, STRATCOM was
reducing targets by the hundreds,
shifting the focus of attack to
the interlinked capabilities of
communications, electrical power,
and other networks, rather than
to their individual elements. It
was a reform specifically
intended to reduce the gross
number of targets without a
change in national guidance.
As 1993
came to a close, war planners
focused on how to respond to
Russia's arsenal of mobile
missiles (road-mobile SS-25s and
rail-mobile SS-24s). The
difficulty in locating Iraqi Scud
missiles during the 43-day Gulf
War had convinced the planners
that the best solution was to
destroy mobile targets before
they had an opportunity to
disperse. And it demanded
survivable weapons able to be
rapidly retargeted as
intelligence identified new
locations. A lengthened World War
III was born which will continue
to influence and drive nuclear
planning in the years to come as
more mobile missile systems
become available around the
world.
It was
virtually an incantation at this
point that no more reductions
could be made and still meet the
requirements of "the
guidance." Nor did the
Clinton administration seem
particularly interested in
revising U.S. deterrence policy,
which demanded a grandiose
guaranteed destruction of
Russia's nuclear forces, command
and control, industry, and
conventional forces. But many,
such as General Butler, still
thought that the war plan could
be made more rational through
planning reform. In November 1992
Butler had directed the formation
of an internal STRATCOM Strategic
Planning Study Group. Its goal
was to reduce the time needed to
develop new war plans and to make
planning "responsive and
flexible to meet current and
future planning needs."
According to the STRATCOM
history, the group would focus on
the postCold War need "to
adapt the war planning process to
rapid modifications in
guidance."
Outside
STRATCOM, few people had a clear
understanding of what strategic
nuclear war planning was all
about. Creating the various war
plans with their choreography of
nuclear war-fighting was so
complex that few outside
STRATCOM's Omaha headquarters
were in a position to challenge
its claims about
"required" readiness,
synergy, or military capacity.
And by staying firmly in control
of all the analytical tools,
STRATCOM could deflect any of
Washington's proposed changes.
Despite
efforts within the office of the
Secretary of Defense to better
understand the SIOP, STRATCOM
charged ahead with its
modernization. It mapped and
charted and consolidated
functions and designed new
systems to comprehensively
modernize a process that had
become inefficient over the
years. At the core of this effort
was a complete modernization of
the Strategic War Planning System
(SWPS), a name for the
compilation of facilities and
capabilities that are used to
analyze targets, assign warheads
to targets and deliver the
weapons. The main innovation of
the modernization was the
recommendation that a
"living SIOP," a less
rigid and more adaptable system,
be created.
Until
recently, updating the SIOP was a
major task, taking 14-18 months
to complete. Even SIOP- 94,
completed in Spring 1993 after
significant reductions in target
numbers following the break-up of
the Soviet Union and the demise
of the Warsaw Pact, took nearly
17 months.[3]
The living SIOP, by
contrast, is based on continuous
analysis of guidance, forces and
target changes, rather than a
fixed plan, reducing the time for
complete overhaul of the SIOP to
six months.[4]
Wholesale revision of an attack
plan for a new enemy will now be
possible in months. According to
the group's final declassified
report, the new plan "would
be maintained on a daily basis in
response to changes to targets,
forces, and . . . guidance."
Until the need for an entirely
new plan was identified, the
existing plan would be
re-optimized continuously, with
no prescribed revision date. If a
new national guidance had to be
issued, a totally new SIOP could
be "rolled forward . . .
eliminating the need for and time
involved in replanning."[5]
As General
Butler explained in 1993, the
basis for the living SIOP was
"adaptive planning," a
flexible process that used
"generic targets, rather
than identifying specific
scenarios and specific enemies,
and then crafting a variety of
response options to address these
threats." To maintain the
war-fighting choreography called
for under various levels of
alert, another innovation --
called the "stable
nucleus" -- was introduced.
This was defined as "a core
set of targets and special
attacks that do not change
substantially over time, thereby
eliminating the need, and the
time involved, in making major
changes." The stable nucleus
was, of course, the same old
"counterforce" targets
-- Russia's strategic nuclear
forces and leadership. Reductions
could now be accommodated as long
as the stable nucleus was not
threatened.
General
Butler approved the living SIOP
concept in July 1993. Over the
next year, STRATCOM worked to
develop the new system, and by
December 1994, the process was
sufficiently in place to propose
an actual model war plan to
replace SIOP-95.[6]
Who could argue with greater
flexibility and adaptability?
This
happened at the same time that
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
began. Proclaimed as the most
comprehensive review of U.S.
nuclear policy in decades,
STRATCOM anticipated and headed
off any idea of true reductions
and thwarted any attempts by the
NPR to eliminate the triad of
forces. The NPR process was
headed by Assistant Secretary
Ashton Carter and at STRATCOM
there were concerns about the
negative feelings
Carter had demonstrated in the
past toward nuclear weapons.
STRATCOM's background check on
Carter indicated a
less-than favorable long-term
outlook for nuclear weapons
and long-term visions of
complete
denuclearization. These
were not popular views to a
command whose very existence
relied on nuclear weapons.
Persuading such policy makers of
a continued need and wider
role for nuclear weapons
would be, STRATCOM feared,
an uphill battle.[7]
STRATCOM
had already decided what the
broad lines of the NPR outcome
should be and used its
considerable resources to
influence it. Two years earlier,
after the June 1992 Washington
Summit Agreement, STRATCOM
produced a study of future force
postures that analyzed the
numbers and combinations of
forces required for START II
implementation and beyond and
compared them with the ability to
fulfill military and White House
guidance. The top-secret
"Sun City" study
focused on the amount of
capability and war-fighting
flexibility that would be lost at
different levels. It looked at
nine different force structure
options, six at the START II
limit of 3,500 accountable
warheads, and three "well
below" 3,500 weapons
(essentially various START III
models).[8]
The
study's core assumption was that
an unchanging counterforce
capacity was required. A
"penalty for capability
lost" was assigned to
various lower force structures,
and those options were then
deemed unacceptable. The force
with the highest capability and
flexibility became the only
choice. It is not surprising that
STRATCOM's "preferred"
force structure, the one that had
already been approved for the
Living SIOP, was
eventually recommended by the
Nuclear Posture Review.
Getting
More With Less
It was not
just with regard to force
structures that the war planners
got their way. STRATCOM also
lobbied successfully for programs
that would continue to heighten
the capability of U.S. nuclear
forces. For instance, when funds
for the Minuteman III propulsion
replacement were cut from the
1994 budget, STRATCOM claimed
that the cut would jeopardize
"continued Minuteman
reliability." But the issue
actually concerned the
"age-out" of a small
portion of Minuteman IIIs during
a six-year period after the year
2003. By accelerating propulsion
replacement, the entire missile
force, not merely 7080 percent,
could stay on alert. When
completed in 2008, the year after
START II is scheduled to take
effect, the Minuteman III
forces life will have been
extended through 2020.
War
planners also maneuvered a $2.7
billion "Phase 2"
guidance improvement effort to
increase Minuteman missile
flexibility and attain
"Peacekeeper accuracy"
for the older missile. Phase 2
anticipated calls for
de-targeting by introducing
"dormant" and
"semi-dormant"
operational modes, making it
possible to electronically stand
down the Minuteman III force yet
retain the ability to go
instantly to alert and launch.[9]
STRATCOM also led efforts to fund
MX upkeep to insure 100 percent
readiness right up to the
missile's mandated START II
retirement date, and it opposed
ending production of the Trident
II missile for the strategic
nuclear submarines.
Bogged
down in bureaucratic and personal
quagmires, the Nuclear Posture
Review failed to redefine the
role of nuclear weapons after the
Cold War. In the end, according
to an internal STRATCOM report,
the NPR "reaffirmed the
benefits of ambiguity in existing
nuclear weapon declaratory
policy." In other words, any
presidential de-targeting
initiatives or other
confidence-building measures
could be accommodated, because
U.S. policy could say one thing
and do another, and new systems
increasingly allowed nearly
instant shifts back to the core
targeting that Washington had
agreed was beyond change.
The
NPR also blessed another of the
Cold Warriors
schemes -- keeping the
"hedge," an extra
supply of non-deployed warheads
that provided a non-survivable
upload capability. U.S. nuclear
forces were not only improved
over pre-1990 capabilities, but
the United States would retain
the capability to fight a
protracted nuclear war, at least
on paper. President Clinton's
approval of the NPR in September
1994 confirmed the war planners'
views. They had avoided any
significant postCold War change
and even prevailed in the most
recent Pentagon force structure
review from 1997 -- the
Quadrennial Defense Review --
which concluded that
"nuclear weapons remain
important as a hedge against NBC
proliferation and the uncertain
futures of existing nuclear
powers." Therefore, the
review concluded, the United
States will "continue to
need a reliable and flexible
nuclear deterrent - survivable
against the most aggressive
attack, under highly confident,
constitutional command and
control."[10]
The Cold War-like assumptions and
conclusions of the Nuclear
Posture Review remain the basis
for U.S. nuclear strategy today
as we enter the twenty-first
century.
U.S.
and Russian Strategic Forces,
Today and Tomorrow
What
does this development mean for
deterrence and the composition of
the nuclear arsenals in the
U.S.-Russian relationship? For
the past three decades, nuclear
planners have taken comfort in
the notion of mutually assured
destruction. That is, both the
United States and the Soviet
Union (now Russia) have the
ability to destroy the other with
nuclear weapons, no matter who
struck first. Despite certain
right-wing delusions in the 1970s
and 1980s, neither the Soviet
Union nor the United States ever
had the ability to strike first and
survive. Retaliation would be
massive. Given that, nuclear
stability reigned, even in times
of high tension.
But
since the demise of the Soviet
Union, the United States has
acquired more of a theoretical
first strike capability. That is
a function of numbers of weapons,
their accuracy, and reliability
-- and most important, the number
of targets ("targets"
principally mean weapons of
intercontinental range.) If
present trends continue, the
number of first-strike targets in
Russia will so diminish under
START II that the United States
could launch a preemptive first
strike with high confidence. It
may be hard to imagine any
scenario in which the United
States would chose to launch a
first strike, but it is just as
ridiculous to sit with such a
posture in place. Not only is it
a recipe for disaster, but the
unchanging force undermines any
incentive for Russia to ratify
START II. Some of the estimates
that can be drawn from the
current trend are:
Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missiles
U.S.
intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) have been
reduced from 1,000, armed with
2,550 warheads, to 550 missiles
with 2,050 warheads, a reduction
of just 19 percent. When the 50
MX missiles are retired under
START II, the ICBM force will
shrink to 500 Minuteman III
missiles upgraded with MX
warheads and reentry vehicles.
This will provide
"Peacekeeper accuracy"
for these older missiles through
at least the second decade of the
twenty-first century.
On the
Russian side, ICBMs have declined
from 925 missiles armed with
5,575 warheads to 755 missiles
with 3,590 warheads, a warhead
reduction of 36 percent. After
eliminating SS-18 and SS-24 heavy
ICBMs (64 percent of the existing
force), and retiring all but 170
SS-19s, Russia will have no more
than 500600 missiles, of which
more than half will be mobile
SS-25s. As a result, the number
of Russian ICBM hard-targets will
decline from 1,400 at the end of
the Cold War to about 270.
Ballistic
Missile Submarines
At sea,
the nuclear forces have been
affected less than any other
category of strategic weapons.
The U.S. ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) force has been
reduced from 32 submarines armed
with 584 missiles and 5,024
warheads to 18 submarines
carrying 432 missiles with 3,456
warheads. In 1990, 23 of those
subs -- or more than 70 percent
-- dated from the 1960s. In
contrast, today's fleet consists
entirely of modern Ohio-class
submarines. Even before START II,
the number of SSBNs may drop to
14, and medium-term Navy plans
foresee a force of 10 submarines.
The Trident I missile, upgraded
to provide a "moderate"
hard-target kill capability, is
being replaced entirely by
Trident II D5 missiles, which are
capable of destroying the
"full spectrum" of
targets. Navy plans envision
funding of a follow-on to Trident
II, designated D-5A, somewhere
around 2005. Trident IIs will be
armed with 384 W88 high-yield
warheads, but even with the older
W76 warhead, they are still
highly capable. The portion of
hard-target warheads will
increase three-fold from eight
percent in 1990 to 26 percent
under START II. This year, the
United States resumed production
of a limited number of the
high-yield W88 warhead at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory.
The
Russian SSBN force, never an
equal leg of the Soviet triad, is
currently estimated at 26
submarines armed with 440
missiles and 2,272 warheads. The
number of missiles has been
reduced by half, but the number
of warheads has decreased only 16
percent. However, Russian
submarines are at an all-time low
in terms of readiness, spending
most of their time in port.
Russia will likely maintain 15
modern boats in the coming
decade, eventually replacing the
last Delta IIIs, built in the
mid- to late-1970s, with the new
Borey-class. Yet the force will
probably shrink to less than 10
boats in 2008.
Strategic
Bombers
The
U.S. operational bomber force
consists of 92 aircraft armed
with 1,800 modern warheads and
cruise missiles. The old fleet of
B-52H bombers is expected to fly
for another 30 years, the modern
B-2 production has stopped at 21
aircraft although the
production-line is kept open just
in case. The B-1 bomber was
removed from nuclear planning in
1997 with SIOP-98, but can be
re-nuclearized on relatively
short notice if necessary.
In
comparison, despite recent
show-off deployments of bombers
off Iceland, none of Russia's 113
bombers, wherever located, is
believed to be in a state of
day-to-day readiness. When not on
alert, the Russian bomber and
strategic submarine force
probably present less than a
dozen targets. There is no known
bomber modernization program.
Altogether,
at current alert levels, the
United States maintains a robust
short-warning first-strike
capability. When current
reductions and upgrades are
completed under START II (in the
2007 timeframe), the United
States will retain 900 warheads
with hard-target kill capability.
In comparison, the Russian force
in its START II day-to-day
configuration will likely
represent some 300 targets. Even
adding supporting command and
storage, there will be fewer than
500 targets for U.S. nuclear
planners to aim their 3,500
accountable START II warheads at.
Such a level of overkill
capability -- potentially seven
highly accurate warheads per
target (if ignoring China) -- is
of Cold War proportions and
difficult to justify even for the
most hardened cold warrior. Other
reasons for the overkill in the
U.S. enduring arsenal must be
found outside Russia, primarily
in China but increasingly also in
rogue states.
B. The
Role of China
One of the
most significant developments in
recent years has been
Chinas growing role in U.S.
strategic nuclear posturing. This
development follows half a decade
of U.S.-Chinese bickering over
Taiwan, proliferation, nuclear
spying and human rights issues.
Most important in this context,
however, has been Chinas
modernization of long-range
nuclear missiles. As the
estimated range increased, albeit
of a comparatively very limited
number of missiles, U.S. nuclear
planners began arguing that China
should again be the subject of
routine nuclear targeting under
the SIOP.
China
was removed from the SIOP in 1982
and a new separate war plan was
prepared for nuclear war with
that country. Initially, B-52
bombers were also exclusively
earmarked for that plan, but
because bombers were removed from
alert in 1991, SSBNs took on a
more central role vis-ą-vis
China. One rationale for this
choice, according to one source,
was that the use of U.S. ICBMs to
target China would necessitate
flight-paths over the
pole in the direction of
Russia in order to hit Chinese
targets. In order to avoid Russia
thinking it was under attack if
U.S. ICBMs were launched against
China over Russian territory,
SSBNs were seen as a better
choice to engage China
independently.[11]
During the
Nuclear Posture Review in 1994,
certain Pentagon officials and
planners argued that it was
necessary to increase nuclear
deterrence of China. They were
unsuccessful in getting China
back into the SIOP, but China
nonetheless featured prominently
in the Sun City
Extended force
structure study STRATCOM prepared
in support of its NPR position. A
total of 13 pages in the study
were dedicated to various
"China Scenarios," and
one page specifically identified
two US/China adversarial
scenarios. The first involved a
limited attack on China in
connection with a conflict
involving North Korea. The second
involved a direct
"China/Continental United
States confrontation" and
identified that a major-attack
response plan had to be written
up:
1st
Scenario: A US/North
Korea/China Excursion.
Regional as opposed to global
concern
Calls for an adaptively planned
response against North Korea -
not a full scale attack against
China
DPF, non-strategic nuclear
forces, or conventional
(CALCM/TALM-C) response more
appropriate solution.
2nd
Scenario: Scenario focuses on
a China/CONUS Confrontation.
Implies a need for a major-attack
response plan.[12]
STRATCOM's
preference was clear enough and
although it didn't get the
go-ahead to draw up a major
attack option against China in
1994 the planners at Offutt Air
Force Base in Nebraska continued
to fine-tune the various China
scenarios. Intelligence reports
about Chinese missile
modernizations soon turned the
tide in support of STRATCOM's
recommendation, so when President
Clinton signed PDD-60 in November
1997, it was almost inevitable
that the new guidance directed
the planners to broaden the scope
of targeting in China. Although
the details remain unclear, the
language was vague enough to
allow STRATCOM to formally bring
China back into the SIOP with the
completion of SIOP-99 in October
1998. As a result, the SIOP now
includes a small number of
Limited Attack Options devoted to
China, involving small numbers of
strategic weapons.[13]
C. The
"New" Enemies
The third
category of drivers in U.S.
nuclear strategy involved the
so-called "rogue"
states, that is smaller nations
generally in opposition to U.S.
policy and attempting to acquired
weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). During the 1990s, planners
at STRATCOM and the policy makers
at the National Security Council
and the Office of Secretary of
Defense have been busy
incorporating language relating
to these countries into U.S.
doctrine and strategy as a new
justification for nuclear
deterrence. These efforts have
included not only drawing up
specific deterrence and targeting
scenarios against countries like
North Korea, but also ensuring
that such scenarios are
prominently reflected in White
House guidance.
Planning
nuclear war against
"rogue" states should
not be understood as a formal
part of the SIOP, which as a rule
of thumb until recently included
only Russia. Instead, attack
options against these smaller
nations involve what is called
the Strategic Reserve Force, a
pool of some 1,000 warheads on
bombers and submarines intended
to ensure that no other nuclear
power can coerce the United
States following a major exchange
with Russia. Targets in
"rogue" states may
involve hundreds of targets and,
according to one source, might
approach a thousand.[14]
To complicate things even
further, STRATCOM planning not
only involves nuclear but
increasingly also non-nuclear
weapons, that are finding their
way into regional planning -- and
even into SIOP planning --
creating a dangerous blur between
nuclear and conventional warfare.
The
concept of targeting
proliferators with nuclear
weapons is relatively new to U.S.
nuclear doctrine. Proliferation
as such was not a prominent
driver for U.S. nuclear planning
prior to the 1990s, although the
United States did target some
non-Soviet countries as a matter
of course in the late 1980s. This
was done, however, as part of a
global plan against the Soviet
Union and its potential allies to
insure against a third country
trying to take advantage of the
depletion of U.S. arsenals during
a major nuclear war. Now,
however, proliferating countries
are being independently targeted
as proliferators of WMD.
Soon
after STRATCOM was created in
1992, General Butler explained
that the United States already in
1989 "abandoned global war
with the Soviet Union as the
principle planning and
programming paradigm for the U.S.
armed forces. The result
was a complete revisit of
nuclear weapons policy and the
SIOP target base which not
only resulted in the widely
reported reduction of targets in
the SIOP, but also expanded the
geographical scope of targeting.
The former evil
empire was still the focus,
but nuclear war planners saw that
a new series of threats had
begun to emerge on the
horizon, and began to
devote more and more attention to
potential targets outside Russia
and China. The post-Cold War
target base would consist of
fewer but more widespread
targets.[15]
Very
little was said in public about
this expansion of nuclear
planning, but a couple of hints
were given. In March 1991, the
JCS suggested in the Joint
Military Net Assessment that
non-strategic nuclear weapons
could assume a broader role
globally in response to the
proliferation of nuclear
capability among Third World
nations. The report
reiterated, however, that nuclear
proliferation in general
necessitated an upgrade of the
command, control, and
communication capabilities of
U.S. forces, and identified the
MILSTAR satellite communications
system, designed to provide
secure global command and control
capabilities for nuclear war
fighting, as an example of such
an upgrade.[16]
Likewise, in February 1992,
Secretary Cheney stated in the
Defense Departments annual
report, the possibility
that Third World nations may
acquire nuclear capabilities has
led the Department to make
adjustments to nuclear and
strategic defense forces and to
the policies that guide
them. U.S. nuclear
strategy, Cheney said, must
now also encompass potential
instabilities that could arise
when states or leaders perceive
they have little to lose from
employing weapons of mass
destruction.[17]
When
General Butler testified before
Congress in April 1992, he
explained the role of nuclear
weapons in missions against
rogue nations.
A U.S. nuclear deterrent
force encourages
non-proliferation, albeit within
limits bounded by rational
calculations, Butler said,
and added, Some contend
that deterrence is not applicable
outside the classic Cold War
paradigm - especially when such
weapons are in the hands of
seemingly irrational leaders. In
my view, the very fact that such
leaders pursue nuclear capability
implies a certain lethal
rationality.[18]
Later the same month, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force John
J. Welch told Congress that
the emphasis of the
deterrence equation has been
shifted from just deterring the
development or use of nuclear
weapons by the Soviet Union, to
deterring the development or use
of nuclear weapons by other
countries, as well.[19]
This
was the situation even before the
Nuclear Posture Review had begun.
In January 1993, General Butler
told The New York Times
that our focus now is not
just the former Soviet Union but
any potentially hostile country
that has or is seeking weapons of
mass destruction.[20]
Butler set up a new Joint
Intelligence Center to
assess from STRATCOMs
operational perspective the
growing threat represented by the
global proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.[21]
Three months later, in April
1993, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
published the first version of
the Joint Nuclear Doctrine (3-12)
which formerly incorporated WMD
into U.S. nuclear doctrine.[22]
The
Role of Adaptive
Planning
As
is the case with nuclear planning
against Russia, the revolutionary
concept of the "living
SIOP" also profoundly
impacted the capability to engage
WMD proliferators on a global
scale. The planners soon realized
that Cold War nuclear forces were
ill-suited for nuclear war
against "rogue" states
because the old Cold War focus on
the Soviet Union and China meant
that hardware and software had
typically been configured
for the Northern Hemisphere
only. Key target data
processing technologies
currently have no
capability south of the
equator, STRATCOM concluded
in March 1992, and recommended
development of a global
capability by the late
1990s.[23]
Furthermore,
with more potential enemies on
the radar screen the expansion of
nuclear deterrence to smaller and
more diverse regional WMD
contingencies meant that that
guidance were likely to change
more frequently than when Russia
and China were the main focus.
The old war planning system was
built to handle updates over a
matter of years, but nuclear
deterrence in the post-Cold War
era would demand changes on a
monthly - sometimes even daily -
basis. General Butler described
the scope of the modernized war
planning system in an interview
with Janes Defense
Weekly in the spring of 1993:
Planning
requirements examined for
adaptive planning went well
beyond the core SIOP to include
items like crisis planning and
non-strategic nuclear forces. The
modernized war planning system
achieved initial operations
capability in late 1998,
coinciding with the completion of
SIOP-99. Full operational
capability is expected in 2003,
which will vastly expand the U.S.
capability to incorporate the
routine processing of WMD targets
outside Russia.[25]
Moreover,
in order to encompass all types
of nuclear planning, the
modernized SWPS erases the
traditional distinction between
strategic and tactical nuclear
planning. Already in 1992, SAC
Commander General Butler
emphasized that he wanted to see
a simplified process that
makes no distinction between
strategic and tactical mission
planning, and one of the
requirements in the new SWPS is
that the process be able to
plan for nonstrategic nuclear
force employment.[26]
The modernized SWPS achieves a
preliminary theater support of
non-strategic nuclear weapons
planning by January 1998 and the
goal is optimized adaptive
planning within all the
theaters.[27]
So
the race is on for rapid
retargeting capabilities to allow
planning for limited nuclear
operations like those in regional
contingencies against
rogue nations in a
much shorter time. Work underway
at the Air Forces Rome
Laboratory a few years ago aimed
at providing planners with the
capability to plan critical
nuclear options in the SIOP
within days rather than
months and limited SIOP
re-planning options in less
than 30 minutes.[28]
Capabilities envisioned in what
was previously called the
Survivable Adaptive Planning
Experiment (SAPE), for example,
aimed at allowing SIOP generation
in less than 24 hours and
re-targeting of up to 1000
relocatable targets per day.[29]
While the numbers and names for
such projects continue to change,
the trend is that nuclear
planning must be able to provide
for a greater number of smaller,
more flexible, adaptive attack
options on a relatively short
notice.
The
Nuclear Posture Review
The
Nuclear Posture Review from 1994,
which reaffirmed the role of
nuclear weapons and approved
STRATCOM's preferred force
structure as described above,
also endorsed the expansion of
nuclear deterrence beyond Russia
and China to "rogue"
nations. Of the six working
groups that were created to
review U.S. nuclear policy and
force structure, one was
specifically tasked to look at
the relationship between
alternative U.S. nuclear postures
and counterproliferation policy.
The group condoned, although
initially somewhat halfheartedly,
STRATCOMs inclusion of
regional WMD contingencies into
nuclear war planning.
During
the working group meetings,
Ashton Carters special
assistant and former professor at
the University of Maryland, Dr.
Steven Fetter, argued repeatedly
that nuclear weapons could only
deter nuclear use or acquisition,
although the effect on
acquisition was hotly
debated. No meaningful
contribution, Fetter argued, was
likely to come from nuclear
weapons in deterring chemical and
biological weapons of mass
destruction.[30]
Eventually, both Fetter and
Carter were outmaneuvered by
STRATCOM and the regional
commanders. Even a suggestion by
the Office of the Secretary of
Defense that chemical weapons
should be viewed as a more
important threat than biological
weapons was strongly opposed by
the military representatives.[31]
It was all or nothing if
deterrence was to be seen as
credible.
The
documents from the group's
meetings provide interesting
insight into STRATCOM's thinking
on the role of nuclear weapons
against proliferating nations. In
response to questions asked by
the working group STRATCOM
explained that while nuclear
weapons may not directly affect
Third World countries acquisition
of WMD, maintaining nuclear
weapons could support U.S.
political aims. This would be
accomplished, STRATCOM said,
through demonstrating
intent by maintaining an arsenal
and continuously providing war
plans to support regional CINCs
[Commanders-in-Chief]... Within
the context of a regional single
or few warhead detonation,
classical deterrence already
allows for adaptively planned
missions to counter any use of
WMD, STRATCOM elaborated.[32]
Asked about the U.S. response to
WMD use, STRATCOM answered:
Unlike
the military officials, Carter
correctly suspected that a stated
nuclear deterrence role in WMD
scenarios could have negative
impact on the NPT regime,
regardless of whether the U.S.
was legally bound by its Negative
Security Assurances. He therefore
instructed the drafting groups to
suggest possible political,
economical and conventional
deterrence options that could
complement the U.S. nuclear
posture.[34]
This was to no avail, however,
and in the end the
counterproliferation working
group largely sided with
STRATCOM. Not only did it accept
STRATCOMs broad nuclear
deterrence vision, but it warned
that deep reductions in U.S.
nuclear weapons might influence
proliferators negatively to
decide to match U.S. numbers or
allies under U.S. protection --
such as Japan and Germany -- to
go nuclear.[35]
Indeed, within the
counterproliferation group there
was group consensus that
[the] full range of nuclear
options is desirable to deter
proliferant nations, and
the majority wanted the
unique contribution of
nuclear deterrence to
counter-proliferation to be
stated more
forcefully.[36]
In
addition to the declaratory
policy, the group also agreed
that nuclear weapons remain the only
method of destroying certain
types of targets including deeply
buried facilities.[37]
Only on one issue, the question
of deterring terrorist use of
WMD, did the group see a
limitation in the role of nuclear
weapons: nuclear deterrence
should only apply to
state-sponsored terrorism,
because non-state actors would
not be deterred by the U.S.
nuclear posture.[38]
Despite this fundamental
conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff nonetheless included
non-state actors as potential
targets for U.S. nuclear weapons
in their Joint Theater Nuclear
Doctrine publication from early
1996.[39]
This
expansion in nuclear targeting
was probably aided by the U.S.
decision to eliminate its
chemical and biological weapons.
In the logic of deterrence,
removing those types of weapons
from the arsenal meant that the
United States could no longer
rely on a tit-for-tat response to
attacks by chemical and
biological weapons to deter
rogue nations from
using such weapons. Other than
the overwhelming conventional
capability, the only big
stick left in the U.S.
arsenal was the threat from
nuclear weapons. One of the
studies produced for STRATCOM
during the NPR warned that the
dynamics of deterring regional
WMD threats were far from clear.
Yet the paper nonetheless
embraced that very role:
Then
Commander-in-Chief of STRATCOM,
Admiral Chiles, later commended
the study group for the document
which he said was
particularly
effective in preparing the
NPR.[41]
In sum, STRATCOM probably could
not have hoped for stronger
backing from the NPR. When the
results were briefed to Congress
in September 1994, nuclear
weapons featured prominently in
counter-proliferation roles such
as to deter WMD acquisition
or use. But these
conclusions were largely absent
from the spin the Clinton
Administration gave on the NPR in
public, which instead portrayed
the NPR as a continuation of the
disarmament process and a further
"reduction" of the role
of nuclear weapons in U.S.
national security policy.
Implementing
the New Deterrence
After NPR
was completed, STRATCOM continued
to refine the role of WMD in the
U.S. nuclear posture. In April
1995, one of the primary advisory
groups to the head of STRATCOM
completed an in-depth review of
deterrence against Third World
proliferators. The review
provided "Terms of
Reference" to be used as a
baseline to expand the
concept of Deterrence of the Use
of WMD.
The
review, Essentials
of Post-Cold War Deterrence
bluntly criticized the pledge
given by President Clinton not to
use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states parties
to the NPT. It is easy to
see the difficulty we have caused
ourselves, the review said,
by putting forward
declaratory policies such as the
Negative Security
Assurances which were put
forward to encourage nations to
sign up for the Non-proliferation
Treaty. The review warned
that, if we put no effort
into deterring these [WMD]
threats, they will be
undeterrable by
definition. Threatening
what an adversary values most is
essential, the review stressed,
and here is the anecdote it used
to demonstrate it:
- The
story of the tactic
applied by the Soviets
during the earliest days
of the Lebanon chaos is a
case in point. When three
of its citizens and their
driver were kidnapped and
killed, two days later
the Soviets had delivered
to the leader of the
revolutionary activity a
package containing a
single testicle - that of
his eldest son - with a
message that said in no
uncertain terms,
never bother our
people again. It
was successful throughout
the period of the
conflicts there. Such an
insightful tailoring of
what is valued within a
culture, and its weaving
into a deterrence
message, along with a
projection of the
capability that be
mustered, is the type of
creative thinking that
must go into deciding
what to hold at risk in
framing deterrent
targeting for
multilateral situations
in the future.
The review
strongly recommended ambiguity in
U.S. nuclear deterrence and used
President Bushs warning to
Saddam Hussein in January 1991
against using chemical weapons as
an example of the value of this.
But it added another twist to the
equation, warning that in
threatening nuclear destruction
the United States must not appear
too rational and cool-headed.
Indeed, that some elements
may appear potentially out
of control can be
beneficial to creating and
reinforcing fears and doubts
within the minds of an
adversarys decision-makers.
This essential sense of fear, the
review concluded, is the working
force of deterrence. That
the U.S. may become irrational
and vindictive if its vital
interests are attacked should be
part of the national persona we
project to all adversaries.
Although
STRATCOM later downplayed the
status of this review when it was
first disclosed in the press in
1998, it used the deterrence
review in a test on a potential
WMD adversary. In the fall of
1995, shortly after the crisis
over North Korea's threat to
withdraw from the NPT, Chief of
STRATCOM Admiral Chiles directed
that the deterrence review be
tested on North Korea. Although
the details of that experiment
remain classified, it
demonstrates that
rogue states were
brought into the mainstream of
U.S. nuclear strategy. When
President Clinton put his
signature on the PDD-60 in
November 1997, he not only
ordered the nuclear planners to
reduce targeting in Russia and
broaden the scope of targeting in
China, he also identified
specific regional contingencies
(such as the Persian Gulf and the
Korean Peninsula) where U.S.
nuclear forces could be directed
against opponents armed with WMD.
This was
the situation when Germany and
Canada in late 1998 proposed that
NATO (and thus the United States)
should be reviewed and adopt a
no-first-use policy. The United
States completely rejected a
review but instead of referring
to the need to deter the enemies
that had the most nuclear weapons
pointed against the United
States, it was rogue
states armed with chemical and
biological weapons that were used
as the justification for
maintaining status quo. In his
dismissal, U.S. Defense Secretary
William Cohen stated in what
almost looked like a excerpt from
one of STRATCOMs
submissions to the Nuclear
Posture Review working group in
1994:
- We
think that the ambiguity
involved in the issue of
the use of nuclear
weapons contributes to
our own security, keeping
any potential adversary
who might use either
chemical or biologicals
[sic] unsure of what our
response would be. So we
think it's a sound
doctrine. It was adopted
certainly during the Cold
War, but modified even
following and reaffirmed
following at the end of
the Cold War. It is an
integral part of our
strategic concept and we
think it should remain
exactly as it is.
D.
Deterrence or Warfighting
The
situation of Russias
dwindling nuclear might on the
one hand and the increasing
prominence of other
enemies in U.S. nuclear strategy
on the other hand, has created
several paradoxes:
First:
despite the thaw is U.S.-Russian
relations, significant reductions
in the nuclear arsenals, and the
publication of several new
directives and reviews changing
U.S. nuclear planning in the
post-Cold War era, nuclear
advocates and unreformed Cold
Warriors managed to manipulate
nuclear policy, codifying a more
flexible and adaptable nuclear
war plan, one that now
accentuates some of the most
threatening and destabilizing
aspects of nuclear forces.
Second:
while the end of the Cold War has
permitted a dramatic reduction in
the number of targets in Russia
and thus U.S. nuclear weapons,
the shift from a weapons rich to
a target rich environment with
fewer but more widespread
targets[42]
has created inherent obstacles to
deep nuclear reductions. As the
number of weapons in the U.S.
arsenal has declined, the value
and role of each weapon has
increased. This creates a need
for "effective
deterrence" which in turn
drives force modernization,
stockpile stewardship, robust
planning capability,
threat-warning and survivable
forces.
Third:
while Russia remains the
predominant focus of U.S. nuclear
planning and the target for the
vast majority of U.S. nuclear
warheads, it is China and
"rogue" states that are
mainly pointed to when the U.S.
nuclear posture is defended.
Fourth:
although defense planners point
to the need to maintain ambiguity
about the likely U.S. response to
a chemical or biological weapons
attack, such a policy may be not
only inconsistent but inherently
dangerous because the United
States cannot make its nuclear
threat credible without also
increasing the likelihood that a
U.S. president will feel
compelled to use nuclear weapons
if deterrence fails. Moreover,
explicit or implicit U.S. nuclear
threats might also increase
adversaries' fears of U.S.
attacks that directly target
their central political leaders
in their command bunkers by
encouraging them to pre-delegate
authority to use weapons of mass
destruction to lower level
military officers.[43]
Fifth,
while part of the objective of
the latest Presidential guidance
(PDD-60) was to allow the U.S.
posture to accommodate
anticipated reductions under a
START III treaty Russia, the
order to plan nuclear
contingencies against
"rogue" states armed
with WMD immediately created
inherent obstacles to further
reductions in the future. In the
study of post-Cold War deterrence
from 1995, STRATCOM discovered
that expanding the target base
globally collided with nuclear
weapons reductions. Basically,
there would not be enough
operational nuclear weapons in
the arsenal to cover Russia and
China, as well as half a dozen
regional troublemakers.
STRATCOM's internal review of the
pros and cons of reducing the
number of nuclear warheads below
the START II level of 3,500
recommended against deeper cuts
partly to maintain enough nuclear
weapons for a broader base
to address WMD. Once an
addendum to nuclear war planning,
targeting WMD proliferators had
become a prominent driver and
obstacle to deep cuts.
This
development is very different
from the description Clinton
Administration and Pentagon
officials have provided about the
changes in the U.S. nuclear
posture in the first post-Cold
War decade. They talk about
reducing the numbers and role
of nuclear weapons but also of
reaffirming and maintaining
nuclear deterrence as a
centerpiece of U.S. national
security in the foreseeable
future. The main spin they gave
on the PDD-60 was that the United
States had now removed all
requirements that U.S. nuclear
forces must prevail in a
protracted nuclear war -- a
"prudent step" it was
said given the changes in the
World. The new guidance almost
attained an aura of harmony; of
being the latest step in the
Clinton Administration's plan to
reduce further the position of
nuclear weapons in U.S. military
strategy toward -- eventually --
disarmament.
The role
of PDD-60, however, seems to have
been to fine-tune arms control
objectives with the enduring U.S.
nuclear posture. The war-fighters
had already designed a flexible
force and a planning process that
would seem to accommodate
whatever guidance might issue
from the Presidential pen. For
nine years, as each new
commitment to arms control
reduced warhead numbers, the
war-fighters had been happily,
and in some cases unilaterally,
stripping the Cold War plan of
its obvious excesses.
PDD-60 may
have removed some references to
prevailing in a protracted
nuclear war, but it maintained
the requirement for a
counterforce strategy that
continues planning to take out --
in a warfighting manner --
Russian and other opponent's
weapons of mass destruction
facilities. Although protracted
nuclear warfighting may no longer
take the form of NATO and Soviet
armies throwing large numbers of
nuclear weapons at each other on
the European battlefield, the
U.S. nuclear posture after PDD-60
is still much more than a
retaliatory capability, requiring
nuclear forces to be upgraded and
exercised in pre-, trans- and
post-nuclear exchange in the full
range of scenarios ranging from a
limited pre-emptive strike to
major attack options.
Had the
President's new guidance
unambiguously directed war
planners to structure U.S. forces
so they would be secure enough
merely to deliver a retaliatory
blow rather than perpetuate
nuclear warfighting capabilities,
it would have meant real
postCold War change. Instead,
the nuclear reform that occurred
in the 1990s has ensured that
nuclear disarmament seems as
distant as ever.
Endnotes
1. Bruce
G. Blair, "Global Zero Alert
for Nuclear Forces,"
Brookings Occasional Papers, The
Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 73. [back]
2. US
Strategic Command, History
of the United States Strategic
Command 1 June 1992-31 December
1992, November 5, 1993, p.
80. Top Secret. Partially
declassified and released under
FOIA. [back]
3. US
Strategic Command,
Strategic Planning
Study, Final Report, 1
October 1993, p. 3-1. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
SIOP-94 changes compared with
SIOP-93 included approximately
250 SLBM sortie changes, 116 ICBM
changes, and 20 aircraft sortie
changes resulting in 20 cruise
missile sortie changes. Ibid., p.
3-32.
4. Ibid.,
pp. 3-30. Also see: USSTRATCOM,
Briefing by Lt. Col. George Beck,
SWPS Program Manager,
Strategic War Planning
System, 6 September 1997,
slide 11. This document was
previously available at the
STRATCOM Web Site but has since
been removed. [back]
5. US
Strategic Command,
Strategic Planning
Study, Final Report, 1
October 1993, p. 3-35. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
6. US
Strategic Command, History
of the United States Strategic
Command, 1 January 1993 - 31
December 1993, Top Secret,
pp. 178, 180. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
7. US
Strategic Command, History
of the United States Strategic
Command, 1 January 1994 - 31
December 1994, Top Secret,
[n.d.] 1995, p. 42. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
8. US
Strategic Command, Sun
City, 1993, p. 2. Secret.
Partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
9. US
Strategic Command, History
of the United States Strategic
Command, 1 January 1993 - 31
December 1993 (U), Top
Secret, [n.d.] 1994, p. 62.
Partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
10.
William S. Cohen, U.S. Secretary
of Defense, "Report
of the Quadrennial Defense Review,"
May 1997, n.p. [Section III
(Defense Strategy)]. [back]
11.
William M. Arkin and Robert S.
Norris, Nuclear Alert after
the Cold War, Natural
Resources Defense Council, NWD
93-4, October 18, 1993, pp. 6, 11
(footnote 38). See also: Bruce
Blair, Global Zero Alert
for Nuclear Forces,
Brookings Occasional Papers, the
Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1995, p. 7. [back]
12.
US Strategic Command, ""Sun
City Extended: A USSTRATCOM Study
of Future Force Structure Studies,"
February 1, 1994, slide 39.
Secret/WNINTEL. Partially
declassified and released under
FOIA. [back]
13.
I am indebted to Bruce Blair at
the Brookings Institution for
bringing my attention to this
development. [back]
14.
Bruce G. Blair, "Global Zero
Alert for Nuclear Forces,"
Brookings Occasional Papers, The
Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. 6-7.
[back]
15.
US Strategic Command,
History of the United
States Strategic Command, 1 June
1992 - 31 December 1992,
Top Secret, [n.d.] 1993, pp. 13,
66. Partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
16.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991
Joint Military Assessment,
Washington, D.C., March 1991, pp.
7-1 (box), 11-12. [back]
17.
Dick Cheney, US Secretary of
Defense, Annual Report to
the President and the
Congress, Washington, D.C.,
February 1992, p. 59. [back]
18.
Gen. George Lee Butler,
Commander-in-Chief, US Strategic
Air Command, in US Congress,
Senate, Committee on
Appropriations, Defense
Subcommittee, Hearings on
Department of Defense
Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1993, Part 2, 102nd Cong., 2nd
sess., 9 April 1992, p. 796. [back]
19.
John J. Welch, Jr., Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition), and Lt. Gen. John
E. Jaquish, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary
(Acquisition), Presentation
to the Committee on
Appropriations Subcommittee on
Defense. Subject: Air Force
Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, 29 April 1992,
p. 4; in US Congress, House,
Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on the Department of
Defense, Hearings on Department
of Defense Appropriations for FY
1993, Part 6, 102nd Cong., 2nd
sess., 1992, p. 318.
In response to congressional
questions about why US concern
over accidental or unauthorized
launches of nuclear weapons had
not prompted the government to
sign an agreement with the
Commonwealth of Independent
States to take most or all
strategic weapons off alert,
Director of the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization
Ambassador Henry Cooper stated:
In addition to ballistic
missiles of the former Soviet
Union and China, we are concerned
about those that may be acquired
by other countries in the
future. Ambassador Henry
Cooper, Director, Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization,
in US Congress, Senate, Committee
on Appropriations, Defense
Subcommittee, Hearings on
Department on Defense
Appropriations For Fiscal Year
1993, Part 4, 102nd Cong., 2nd
sess., 2 April 1992, p. 346. [back]
20.
Eric Schmitt, Head of
Nuclear Forces Plans for a New
World, The New York Times,
25 January 1993, p. B7. [back]
21.
Gen. George Lee Butler, Commander
in Chief, US Strategic Command,
Statement before the Senate
Armed Services Committee,
22 April 1993, p. 3. [back]
22.
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
"Joint Nuclear
Doctrine," J-3-12, April
1993. [back]
23.
US Strategic Command, Final
Report of the SWPS Modernization
Road Map Team (SM-RT)(U),
Secret, August 1992, pp. 3-6,
3-49. Partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
24.
Barbara Starr, Targeting
Rethink May Lead To Non-Nuclear
STRATCOM Role, Janes
Defence Weekly, 22 May 1993, p.
19. [back]
25.
US Strategic Command,
Strategic Planning
Study, Final Report, 1
October 1993, p. 3-9. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
26.
US Strategic Command,
History of the United
States Strategic Command, 1
January 1994-31 December
1994, [n.d.] 1995, p. 64.
Top Secret; US Strategic Command,
History of the United
States Strategic Command, 1
January 1993-31 December
1993, [n.d.] 1994, p. 165.
Top Secret. Both documents
partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
27.
US Strategic Command, Briefing,
J5 Warfighting Vision -
Strategic War Planning
System, 6 September 1996,
slides 8. This document was
previously available at the
STRATCOM Web Site but has since
been removed. [back]
28.
Rome Laboratory (US Air Force),
Thrust #3: Command and
Control Goals, 30 November
1997. Available on the Rome
Lab Web Site.
[back]
29.
Rome Laboratories (US Air Force),
Rome Lab Technologies
Supporting Operational
Capabilities, 30 November
1997. Available on the Rome
Lab Web Site.
[back]
30.
US Strategic Command/J51
Memorandum, NPR Report #8,
Working Group #5, 4 November
1993, p. 2. For Official Use
Only; US Strategic Command
Memorandum, NPR Report #5,
Working Group #2, 16 November
1993, p. 2. Both documents
partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
31.
US Strategic Command/J51
Memorandum, NPR Report #69,
Working Group #5, 9 February
1994, p. 1. Secret. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
32.
Department of Defense,
"Listing, Group 5 -
Relationship Between US Nuclear
Postures and Counterproliferation
Policy, Formal STRATCOM Answers
as of 22 November 1993," pp.
12, 13. Secret. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
33.
Department of Defense,
"Listing, Group 5 -
Relationship Between US Nuclear
Postures and Counterproliferation
Policy, Formal STRATCOM Answers
as of 22 November 1993," p.
14. Secret. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act.
Emphasis in original. [back]
34.
US Strategic Command, Nuclear
Posture Review Slides, Update
Briefing, 4 March 1994, slide 3.
Secret. Partially declassified
and released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
35.
US Strategic Command/J51
Memorandum, NPR Report #90,
Working Group #5, 7 March 1994,
p. 1. For Official Use Only.
Partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
36.
US Strategic Command/J51
Memorandum, NPR Report #86,
Working Group #5, 2 March 1994,
p. 1. Secret. Emphasis added; US
Strategic Command Nuclear Posture
Review Slides, Update Briefing,
25 March 1994, slide 3. Secret;
US Strategic Command/J51
Memorandum, NPR Report #92,
Working Group #5, 9 March 1994,
p. 1. Secret; US Strategic
Command, Nuclear Posture Review
Slides, Update Briefing, 11 March
1994. Secret. All documents
partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
37.
US Strategic Command, Nuclear
Posture Review slides, Update
Briefing, 3 December 1993, slide
7. Secret. Partially declassified
and released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
38.
US Strategic Command/J51,
Memorandum, NOR Report #80,
Working Group #5, 23 February
1994, p. 2. Secret. Partially
declassified and released under
the Freedom of Information Act. [back]
39.
This document is still in effect
as of March 2000 and is available
online.
[back]
40.
US Strategic Command,
Nuclear Forces; Post
1994, 12 July 1994, p. 2.
Released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
41.
US Strategic Command,
Minutes of the Fifty-Second
United States Strategic Command
Strategic Advisory Group Meeting
(U), 27-28 October 1994, Offutt
AFB, Nebraska, 27 January
1995, pp. 10, 17, 18. Secret.
Partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
42.
US Strategic Command,
History of the United
States Strategic Command, 1 June
1992 - 31 December 1992,
Top Secret, [n.d.] 1993, pp. 13,
66. Partially declassified and
released under the Freedom of
Information Act. [back]
43.
These points are thoroughly
discussed in Scott D. Sagan,
"Should the United States
Use Nuclear Threats to Deter
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Attacks?," International
Review (forthcoming, early 2000).
Cited with permission from
author. [back]
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