"Mininuke," the secret bomb

By Herve Kempf
Le Monde
November 20, 2001
[unofficial translation; posted with permission]

The latest weapon of the American arsenal, the "mininuke", is 
light, powerful, full of plutonium, and ideal for destroying 
bunkers. Should it be used in Afghanistan? Only a few members of 
the Congress think so. But this nuclear weapon exists.

It is a bomb: slender -- 3.59 meters long and 34 centimeters in 
diameter, light -- 315 kilograms, powerful -- it is the equivalent 
of 300 tons to 340 kilotons of TNT. Released at a very high 
altitude, its hardened "nose" enables it to penetrate into the 
ground up to 6 meters deep, and then explode. It is ideal to 
destroy bunkers or the buried chemical factories. Characteristics: 
B61-11 is a nuclear bomb containing plutonium. It is the only 
nuclear weapon to have entered the American arsenal since 1989. 
Operational in 1997, carried by the "stealth" B-2 bomber, which 
also has been operational for nuclear missions since April 1997.

It is called "mininuke", because its lower yield of 300 tons TNT 
appears tiny compared, for example, with the 13 kilotons of the 
Hiroshima bomb. Could this nuclear weapon be used in Afghanistan? 
The question remains for now theoretical, but it is considered to 
be acceptable by a majority of Americans. According to a survey 
published on November 7th by Zogby International, 54% of the 1,000 
people questioned think that the use of nuclear bombs would be 
effective in the war against terrorism. This sentiment echoes some 
American elected officials. On October 21, a representative of the 
State of New York, republican Pete King, suggested on WABC radio: 
"I would not exclude the use of the tactical nuclear weapons if I 
thought that it was necessary."

October 17, Steve Buyer, republican representative of Indiana, 
expressed the same opinion, if the anthrax epidemic could be 
linked to Bin Laden: "Drop a small atomic device [on the caves of 
the terrorists] and seal them up for a thousand years." At the end 
of September, senator Jon Kyl, of Arizona, also suggested the use 
of nuclear weapons: "If a weapon of massive destruction is used 
against us, the perpetrator should expect a similar response from 
us." Do these declarations from congressmen have limited 
influence? Undoubtedly, but the use of these small nuclear weapons 
is not completely excluded by specialists.

In the September 8 edition of the National Journal, before the 
attacks against the United States, Paul Robinson, director of 
National Sandia Laboratories (one of the laboratories of design of 
the nuclear weapons), explained: "We need nuclear weapons with low 
yield, which could be used if the US decides." To be clear: "At 
the time of the war with Serbia [1999], we attacked the 
underground targets with conventional weapons which had very 
little effect."

The Bush administration, without insisting on this possibility, 
does not want to rule it out entirely. It is the rule of 
dissuasion: do not say specifically what you will never do, but 
known that you are able to do it. On September 28, the 
international Committee of the Red Cross (CIRC) sent a memorandum 
to the opposing sides in the emerging conflict in Afghanistan. 
This step, which is usual in the event of war, aims at reminding 
the combatants about the importance of human rights. In its 
memorandum, the CIRC stated: "the nuclear weapon is incompatible 
with humane international law." The American representation in 
Geneva immediately protested, demanding that this sentence be 
removed. His argument: international law does not prohibit the use 
of nuclear weapons.

In fact, this point is not clear: in an "opinion" issued on July 
8, 1996, the International Court of Justice could not decide among 
itself on the matter, seven judges considering that nuclear weapon 
use is legal, seven others were of a contrary opinion. Even so, on 
October 5 the CIRC issued a new memorandum, which did not mention 
nuclear weapons. At the time of the Gulf War, the CIRC sent a 
similar memorandum to the combatants, mentioning that the nuclear 
weapons should not be used. At that time, the text did not provoke 
a reaction from the United States.

In this conflict, the doctrine for the tactical use of the nuclear 
weapons has evolved. Hitherto, American presidents have maintained 
the pledge issued by Jimmy Carter in 1978, vowing not to use 
nuclear weapons against states who do not possess nuclear weapons. 
But, with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the military concern 
of Washington has shifted towards the "rogue states" considered 
capable of using "weapons of mass destruction," not only nuclear. 
Several reports point to the utility of tactical nuclear weapon, 
i.e. battlefield use.

A document from US Strategic Command (Stratcom) from 1995 
("Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence"), and revealed by a 
disarmament specialist Hans Kristensen (of the Nautilus Institute, 
in Berkeley) under the terms of Freedom Act Information Act, is 
explicit: it affirmed that the nuclear option was to remain open 
whomever the attacker. "It is undesirable to adopt declaratory 
policies such as 'no first use' which serve to specifically limit 
U.S. nuclear deterrence goals without providing equitable 
returns," the report from Stratcom indicated, which is the 
operational authority for managing and directing American nuclear 
forces.

In November of 1997, Bill Clinton, in the presidential directive 
No. 60 revealed by Washington Post on December 7, 1997, permitted 
the use of nuclear strikes in response to chemical or biological 
attacks.  The same year, the military considered whether such a 
strike would be justified against a chemical factory built by 
Libya in Tarhunah, which they suspected was involved in the 
manufacture of chemical weapons.

The same year, B61-11 entered service. Does it reflect a true 
technical requirement? The challenges of destroying underground 
targets first appeared after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990. The American administration then considered that the 
bombs it had would not be enough to demolish the underground 
bunkers of Iraqi command. At that time they launched a program to 
develop a "penetrating" bomb capable of carrying out the task. In 
record time, the GBU 28 was developed by adapting existing 
munitions and delivering them in February 1991: a device using a 
modified "traditional" explosive weighing 2 tons and measuring 
5.72 meters and 37 centimeters in diameter.

Two GBU 28 were dropped F-111 aircraft in Iraq. They are said to 
have hit their targets, but little is known about the 
effectiveness. In the following years, Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory began its development of the B61-11, although it 
appears that the project was launched in 1989.

In a field where, by definition, the data and technical 
discussions are not very open, it is difficult to evaluate the 
military interest in the penetrating "mininuke" compared to its 
rival type GBU 28, but the differences stand out. The "mininukes" 
are lighter: about 300 kilograms versus 2 tons. The difference is 
particularly striking for the explosive power: the GBU 28's 306 
kilograms of explosive corresponds to approximately 385 kg of TNT. 
Nearly thousand times less than B61-11, whose lowest yield is 
about 300 tons of TNT!

The directive issued by Bill Clinton in 1997 has not been 
modified. In January 2001, a report of the National Institute for 
Public Policy, a "think tank" specializing in the strategic 
questions, reaffirmed the utility of small nuclear weapons: "In 
the future, the United States will need to deploy simple nuclear 
weapons, with low yield and precision guidance for possible use 
against reinforced targets such as underground factories of 
biological weapons."

If conventional weapons can only damage the access to underground 
hiding places, "one or more nuclear weapons could be necessary to 
destroy the installation itself." Several authors of the report 
are now in high level positions within the Bush administration: 
Stephen Hadley, which is now the assistant of Condoleezza Rice, 
the adviser of Mr. Bush for the national security; Robert Joseph, 
special assistant of the president for proliferation issues, and 
Stephen Cambone and William Schneider, who have close relations 
with Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.

The question of low yield nuclear weapons was raised officially 
for the first time on September 13 during the Senate confirmation 
hearing for Chief of Staff Richard Myers. "Do you support the 
development of new low yield nuclear weapons? In which 
circumstances would support you the use of such weapons?," he was 
asked by the armed services committee members, for whom, as for 
many decision makers in Washington, the question is not taboo. The 
general eluded the question, saying only: "We already have a 
certain number of weapons with low yield."

However, there is no indication that the Bush administration is 
responsive to the arguments of the nuclear hawks. An article in 
Japan Times on September 20 stated that, according to a non-
specified diplomatic source, the Defense Department considered the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons as an option for retaliation to 
the terrorist attacks of September 11. But, explains a French 
expert, "it is normal that in the event of war the armed services 
present the president with the entire spectrum of conceivable 
options. In so far as I could include/understand it from my 
contacts in Washington, the nuclear option was resolutely rejected 
by Bush ". Hans Kristensen confirms: "I think that no responsible 
person in Washington envisions using nuclear weapons in the 
present situation in Afghanistan. The only possible scenario would 
be if the United States is convinced that somebody is on the verge 
of launching a nuclear or biological weapon from a known position, 
and that the only means of preventing it would be to nuke the 
installation." But, continues Kristensen, "the real question is 
this: since no responsible person in charge seriously considers 
using nuclear weapon at the current level of hostilities, why does 
the current nuclear policy consider it nonetheless?"

It is that no option can be closed. As stated in the 1995 Stratcom 
report, "It hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and 
cool-headed. The fact that some elements may appear to be 
potentially 'out of control' can be beneficial to creating and 
reinforcing fears and doubts thin the minds of an adversary's 
decision makers."

Link: http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3230--246208-,00.html