Northeast Asia is one of the most dynamic and diverse regions
of the world. It contains one of the richest and most highly developed
countries of the world, Japan, as well as some of the poorest
and most backward areas in North Korea and rural China. It contains
regions of extremely rapid growth in population, economic development,
and industrial productivity: South Korea and Shanghai, for example.
Millions are living in relative luxury; millions are near starvation.
As the poorer regions strive to catch up to the more developed
ones, the environment is often ignored or given only cursory attention.
It often seems that national wealth is a prerequisite for pollution
control. But in a region like Northeast Asia, where the rich live
and work alongside the poor, all share the burden of environmental
degradation. Increasingly, the need for regional cooperation in
solving environmental problems becomes apparent. And none more
so than with air pollution and acid rain, where the problems do
not respect physical or geopolitical boundaries.
For the purposes of this paper, Northeast Asia is defined to include
Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Northeast China. It is inappropriate
to include all of China in Northeast Asia, so a region called
Northeast China has been established, bounded on the West by the
provinces of Inner Mongolia (eastern half), Shanxi, Henan, Anhui,
and Zhejiang. The major sources of emissions that influence the
Korean peninsular and Japan are located within this part of China.
Although Chinese sources outside this region also exert some influence,
as do sources as far away as Southeast Asia under certain large-scale
cyclonic wind patterns, their effects are generally small and
diminish rapidly with distance.
Figure 1 identifies the constituent regions of Northeast Asia
used in this paper. Though some early parts of this paper refer
to all of China (in discussions of population growth and economic
growth, for example), the energy and emissions calculations specifically
relate to Northeast China, as highlighted in Figure 1. Mongolia
is not included in this analysis. That portion of the Russian
Far East bordering the Sea of Japan is discussed only briefly,
and no analysis of its impact is presented due to lack of data.
Figure 1 The Northeast Asia Region
The quantitative portions of this paper use results from the RAINS-Asia
model described below. The Northeast Asia region precisely encompasses
23 RAINS-Asia "subregions." These include 16 geographical
areas that are either individual or combinations of provinces
and prefectures and seven major municipalities: Beijing, Pusan,
Seoul-Inchon, Shanghai, Shenyang, Taiyuan, and Tianjin. The RAINS-Asia
identification codes for each of the 23 subregions are shown in
Figure 1 and in Table 1.
The RAINS-Asia model is a comprehensive analytical tool constructed
by an international team of experts and sponsored by the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (Bhatti et al., 1992;
Foell et al., 1995; World Bank, 1995). Its purpose is to
trace the causes of acid deposition in Asia--from population,
economic development, energy use, and emissions, through atmospheric
transport and deposition, to effects on sensitive ecological receptor
systems. The computer model covers 23 countries of Asia, including
all countries east of Afghanistan. The entire region is disaggregated
into 94 subregions, of which 24 are large metropolitan areas.
As indicated above, 23 of these subregions have been amalgamated
into Northeast Asia for the purposes of this paper. The RAINS-Asia
model provides the capability to examine the effects of alternative
energy pathways and emission control strategies on emissions to
the atmosphere, and it is this capability that is used in the
present analysis to provide a quantitative framework within which
to discuss the energy and emission issues facing Northeast Asia.
When no citation is given, data were developed by the author using
the RAINS-Asia model, Version 7.01.
|Table 1 Regional Summary of Emissions (mt/y)|
Results are presented primarily for the base year of 1990 and
a single future year, 2020. The thirty-year time horizon is chosen
to give a long-term view of pathways for energy and the environment
that dramatically illustrate the potential consequences of present-day
practices. Because the region is changing so rapidly, however,
the results for 2020 are subject to a high degree of uncertainty
and should be viewed simply as potential endpoints for different
kinds of policy decisions. They are not meant to be definitive,
"crystal-ball" predictions of the future. Where space
permits, results for 2010 are also presented to add a mid-term
It needs to be emphasized that much of the data needed to create
emission inventories for Asian countries is unreliable. In many
countries there are no administrative bodies charged with collecting
national statistics on such parameters as energy production, fuel
characteristics, and combustor types. Only for Japan can such
data be considered to be comparable with western data. Some of
the more sophisticated data needed to convert emissions into air
quality--such as point-source stack heights, diurnal emission
variations, and plume rise--are simply unavailable. Within the
RAINS-Asia model, some data are derived from Asian experience
and some are extrapolated from western experience, as fully documented
in the final project report (World Bank, 1995).
Socioeconomic Driving Forces
The roots of the acid rain problem can be traced back to human
activities. People need to produce and consume energy in order
to meet their basic needs. If that energy is provided in the form
of uncontrolled combustion of fossil fuels, then contamination
of the atmosphere occurs through the release of a variety of chemical
species. In this paper, the focus is on those species that lead
to acid deposition: sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen
oxides (NOx). Clearly, the more people there are, the
more energy is needed, and the greater the atmospheric pollution.
Northeast Asia is one of the most densely populated regions of
the world. In 1990, the populations of the countries of the region
were as follows: Japan (124 million), South Korea (43 million),
and North Korea (22 million). The total population of China was
about 1.17 billion, though the breakout for Northeast China is
not readily available. Large populations, high population density,
and high population growth rates are all well-known characteristics
of the Asian situation. In broad terms, it is projected that the
population of Asia will continue to grow at a fast pace, but gradually
decelerate after the turn of the century. The RAINS-Asia study
assumes annual average population growth rates over the entire
continent of 1.66% (1990-2000), 1.47% (2000-2010), and 1.33% (2010-2020).
By 2020, the population of Asia is projected to reach 4.6 billion,
an increase of 55% over 1990 levels.
Population growth is by no means uniform across the region, however.
The more highly developed countries are expected to achieve the
lowest population growth rates, commensurate with present-day
levels in the West. Thus, Japan's population is expected to be
127 million in 2020, essentially stable after the turn of the
century. The population of South Korea is expected to grow to
about 51 million by 2020, representing an annual average growth
rate of about 0.5%. North Korea is expected to grow faster (1.8%
between 1990 and 2000, 1.2% between 2000 and 2010, and 0.9% between
2010 and 2020), reaching 32 million by 2020. Despite its historically
high population growth rates, China has instituted strong population
control measures that will curb growth after the turn of the century
(1.2% between 1990 and 2000, 0.9% between 2000 and 2010, and 0.5%
between 2010 and 2020).
Northeast Asia has experienced phenomenal economic growth since
the end of the second World War. Japan and South Korea sustained
annual average economic growth rates of between 8% and 10% for
long periods in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In the last decade,
China has joined the ranks of the booming Asian economies. Nevertheless,
there remains considerable variation in economic strength across
the region. Gross Domestic Products of the four countries in 1990
were Japan ($2,400 billion), China ($320 billion), South Korea
($250 billion), and North Korea ($28 billion)--all in 1990 U.S.
dollars. On a per capita basis, the GDP disparity is even
more marked: Japan ($19,400), South Korea ($5,900), North Korea
($1,300), and China ($270). Typical values for western countries
in 1990 were $15,000-20,000.
Economic growth is expected to continue in the region at a fast
pace, as Japan and South Korea strive to maintain their economic
competitiveness with the West, China seeks to strengthen its economic
base, and North Korea struggles to combat the dire economic straits
in which it presently finds itself. After the turn of the century,
as the countries of the region mature and evolve into more highly
developed nations, the economies are expected to cool down. The
RAINS-Asia study forecasts annual average economic growth rates
of 6.5% (1990-2000), 3.9% (2000-2010), and 3.7% (2010-2020) Asia-wide.
These levels of growth will quadruple the 1990 continental GDP
by the year 2020.
Japan's GDP is expected to grow relatively slowly compared to
the other countries, reaching a level of $7,400 billion by 2020--an
annual growth rate of about 2.6% after the turn of the century.
South Korea's economy is expected to grow at a faster pace (4-5%
after 2000), reaching $1,200 billion by 2020. Similarly, China
will continue its rapid rate of growth (5-6% after 2000), growing
eight-fold to $2,400 billion by 2020. The economy of North Korea
is projected in the RAINS-Asia study to continue to be troubled
by internal problems and an inability to penetrate western markets,
maintaining a stable 2% per year GDP growth rate and reaching
a value of $51 billion by 2020. The per capita GDP estimates
for 2020 signify greater prosperity in all parts of the region
except North Korea: Japan ($58,200), South Korea ($24,300), North
Korea ($1,600), and China ($1,500).
With populations and economies growing so rapidly in Northeast
Asia, one might expect energy consumption to skyrocket in the
21st century. However, there are several ways in which energy
growth can be decoupled from economic and population growth. For
example, economic growth will not be equally apportioned across
economic sectors. It is expected that the highly energy-intensive
industrial sector will grow at a slower rate than the services
sector, which has relatively light energy demands. Thus, for example,
between 2000 and 2010, the services sector of China is expected
to grow at an annual rate of 8.4%, while the industrial sector
grows by 6.2% and the agricultural sector by 3.0%. A similar situation
is projected in Japan, though industrial growth is still expected
to dominate the South Korean economy. Sectoral shifts such as
these can help to moderate growth in energy demand, as, of course,
can other things such as improvements in energy intensity.
Total energy consumption in Northeast Asia was 43 EJ (exajoules
or 1018 joules) in 1990. This represents almost exactly
half of all energy use in Asia. This was distributed among the
countries of the region as follows: Northeast China (45%), Japan
(42%), South Korea (8%), and North Korea (4%). Table 2 shows the
base-year energy consumption estimates by country. Note again
that these energy figures (and those that follow) refer specifically
to Northeast China, not all of China. As Table 3 shows, energy
was principally consumed in the industrial sector (45%) in 1990,
with lesser amounts going to power generation (19%), domestic
use (16%), and transportation (10%).
|Table 2 Energy Consumption in Northeast Asia by Country (EJ)|
Coal was the principal fuel used to meet these energy demands,
supplying 48% of primary energy needs (see Table 4). Smaller contributions
were provided by heavy and medium fuel oils (20%), light fuel
oils and gasoline (15%), natural gas (7%), and nuclear (7%). This
heavy reliance on coal is a major contributing factor to the high
levels of emissions.
|Table 3 Energy Consumption in Northeast Asia by End-Use Sector (EJ)|
|Industrial Fuel Combustion||19.3||36.0||28.7||45.0||33.9|
|Other (Conversion and Loss)||2.3||4.7||3.6||5.9||4.1|
|Table 4 Energy Consumption in Northeast Asia by Primary Fuel Type (EJ)|
|Heavy and Medium Oil||8.7||15.1||11.8||19.3||13.3|
|Light Fuel Oil||6.6||10.6||8.8||12.6||9.2|
In order to understand the potential for acid-rain damage in Asia
in the future, it is necessary to project future energy consumption.
One of the major drivers of energy consumption is economic growth,
as discussed above. Another important factor is the rate at which
energy will be consumed in meeting the demands of economic growth.
In many parts of the Asian economy, energy is presently used very
inefficiently. Therefore, if energy efficiency can be improved,
energy consumption need not grow as fast as economic productivity.
This decoupling of energy and economy will be an important component
of any regional policy to protect the environment.
In 1990, the industrial energy intensity in Japan was about 4.8
GJ/$103 US. This is comparable with the best values
observed in the West. In South Korea, the value was 12 GJ/$103
US. In North Korea and China, however, industrial energy intensity
values were extremely high at 86 GJ/$103 US and 110
GJ/$103 US, respectively. This means that it takes
China 20 times as much primary energy to produce a dollar of economic
product as it does Japan. Some of this difference can be attributed
to the type of economic good produced; for example, China tends
to produce basic materials that inherently require large amounts
of energy as input, such as steel and cement, whereas Japan produces
a lot of finished goods with lighter energy demands. Nevertheless,
inefficient equipment and outmoded practices contribute much to
high energy intensity in China and North Korea.
Energy intensity is improving all the time in the developing nations
of Asia. China, in particular, has made tremendous strides in
the past decade to reduce its energy needs in the face of rapid
economic growth. Thus, the RAINS-Asia project forecasts that industrial
energy intensity in China will have improved to 44 GJ/$103
US by 2020. With similar levels of improvement occurring in other
sectors of the Chinese economy, energy consumption growth can
be moderated in comparison with economic growth. However, this
same type of improvement is not expected for North Korea, where
industrial energy intensity may actually worsen in the future.
Using detailed assumptions about economic growth and sector-specific
technology development, the RAINS-Asia project developed energy
forecasts out to the year 2020. These are detailed below for the
Northeast Asia region. Under a base-case forecast (BAS), total
energy consumption in Northeast Asia is projected to grow from
43 EJ in 1990 to 111 EJ in 2020 (see Tables 2-4 and Figure 2).
This increase is largely taken up by an expansion in coal use
from 21 EJ to 59 EJ. All other forms of energy supply grow as
well, but from small bases. Japan shows only a modest (61%) growth
in energy demand over the 30-year period, whereas the other three
regions grow by factors of 3-4. Thus, for example, Northeast China's
share of regional energy use in 2020 climbs to 55% (Table 2).
There is growth in energy consumption in all economic sectors
(see Table 3), but most noteworthy are the transportation sector,
which grows from 4 EJ in 1990 to 16 EJ in 2020 as demand for private
vehicles grows and restrictions on vehicle ownership are lifted;
and the power generation sector, which grows from 8 EJ to 24 EJ
as electricity penetrates increasingly remote rural areas and
ownership of electrical appliances grows rapidly in urban areas.
The energy scenario developed above represents the base-case (BAS)
projection of the RAINS-Asia study. Its premise is that energy
development and energy efficiency improvements will continue in
accordance with official energy projections made by the countries
themselves, but that no special measures will be undertaken to
improve the quality of the environment by instituting additional
energy efficiency measures or fuel substitution measures intended
to steer away from the profligate use of fossil fuels in large
power and industrial facilities.
Figure 2 Total Energy Consumption for Northeast Asia
In order to simulate the effects of a stronger effort to protect
the environment, an alternative energy pathway was constructed,
which is termed here the Higher Efficiency Forecast (HEF). Under
this scenario, energy consumption in 2020 is expected to reach
82 EJ. Figure 2 illustrates the differences between the BAS and
HEF pathways. The HEF scenario considerably moderates the expected
increase in energy consumption, but does not prevent it. Growth
between 1990 and 2020 is 91% under the HEF scenario, compared
with 160% under the BAS scenario. Most of this improvement is
achieved by a reduction in 2020 coal use from 59 EJ to 40 EJ (see
Table 4). This is obtained through reduced energy demand and a
concerted effort to replace coal use in power generating facilities
by additional hydro, nuclear, and natural gas.
Coal Use in Northeast Asia
If the additional energy required in Asia between 1990 and 2020
were to be supplied by nuclear power or renewable energy sources,
there would be no great threat to the atmospheric environment--though
these alternative energy sources come with their own sets of environmental
and economic problems. However, the fact is that coal will be
called upon to supply the majority of future energy needs. Moreover,
demand for liquid fuels will predominantly be met by various types
of refined oil products, including gasoline, all of which release
acid-rain precursors in one form or another.
Coal will continue to be the dominant fuel for energy supply in
Asia because it is readily available, easy to extract and use,
and relatively cheap. This is particularly true of Northeast Asia.
China has extensive coal supplies in the Shanxi/Hebei/Shandong
area, amounting to something in excess of 700 GT (Walker, 1993).
This coal is very variable in sulfur content, ranging from about
0.3% to more than 3%. In Heilongjiang Province are an estimated
40 GT of coal reserves averaging about 0.4% sulfur. Inner Mongolia
is the next big coal field to be exploited. China's coal industry
has expanded rapidly in recent years to where it is now the leading
coal producer in the world, producing about a billion tons annually,
mostly for domestic needs. Production levels are expected to level
out at about 2.2 billion tons during the next century, because
of lack of capital to further expand production, transportation,
and utilization facilities (Siddiqi et al., 1994). Nevertheless,
the coal needed for Northeast Asia out to 2020 is not expected
to be limited by physical or economic factors. Table 5 summarizes
the regional coal picture for 1993, with projections made for
2010 by Intarapravich et al. (1996).
|Table 5 Summary of Regional Coal Trade (mt/y) in Northeast Asia|
|aA positive value indicates net exports; a negative value indicates net imports. Not all exporters and importers are included in this table: only the four major countries of Northeast Asia and the major exporters to Northeast Asia. Source: Intarapravich et al., "Asia-Pacific Energy Supply and Demand to 2010," Energy, 21, 1017-1039, 1996.|
Japan has limited coal reserves in the northern island of Hokkaido
and the southern island of Kyushu. Total resources are estimated
to be about 10 GT, with recoverable reserves less than 1 GT. Although
the coal is of high quality, the Japanese coal industry is on
a long decline, and almost all future needs will be met by imports.
Japanese coal imports are expected to grow from about 111 mt/y
in 1993 to 149 mt/y in 2010 (Intarapravich et al., 1996).
Australia is the largest supplier at present, with Canada, the
United States, and other countries supplying lesser amounts; this
situation is expected to continue. South Korea has few natural
energy resources, and its coal reserves are limited, of poor quality,
and difficult to extract. Like Japan, the bulk of future coal
supplies will be provided by imports from the same suite of countries,
led by Australia. It is likely in the future that both Japan and
South Korea will increase their coal imports from China.
North Korea has rather larger coal reserves, estimated at 12 GT,
with some indications that still larger reserves may be awaiting
discovery. Information about the coal industry in North Korea
is difficult to obtain. It is believed that the general economic
woes that have hit the country in recent years also plagued the
coal industry, with domestic production perhaps being cut in half
in the early 1990s. With the industry in present disarray, it
is hard to predict its future. If foreign companies can be persuaded
to invest in extraction of the better quality coals, attracted
by the country's very low labor rates, North Korea could become
a significant exporter in the next century. Otherwise, the country
will likely drift along on domestic production, with some small
exports to China and imports of coking coal (Daniel, 1995).
A new player in the Northeast Asian energy market is the Russian
Far East. According to Tang and Khartukov (1996), this region
may become a marginal supplier of coal and oil products early
in the next century. More significantly, however, it is likely
to have a large, sustainable surplus of natural gas for export
to Asian markets by the year 2000. If some of this natural gas
could be used to replace coal in the power sector or industrial
sector, it could drastically reduce atmospheric emissions of sulfur
dioxide. If the Russian Far East becomes a serious supplier of
energy to the region, it will alter both the political and environmental
balance. An urgent need is to develop emission estimates for this
region and incorporate them into analytical models such as RAINS-Asia.
The problems caused by extensive uncontrolled combustion of coal
in Northeast Asia are by no means underappreciated in the region.
There is extensive work in progress to develop appropriate technologies
for China. Many research and development groups in China, Japan,
and other countries are working cooperatively on such technologies
as coal cleaning, briquette manufacture, more efficient small
boilers, low-cost emission controls with moderate-to-good removal
Emissions of Sulfur Dioxide
With knowledge of the quantities of fossil fuels burned, their
sulfur contents, and the amounts of sulfur retained in ash, it
is possible to calculate uncontrolled emissions of sulfur dioxide.
Only Japan had any stack-gas control technology in place in 1990
and this is reflected in the RAINS-Asia date base. Thus, 1990
estimates of sulfur dioxide emissions are presented by country
in Table 6 and for each of the 23 subregions in Table 1.
Total emissions of sulfur dioxide in Northeast Asia in 1990 are
estimated to be 14.7 million metric tonnes (mt). Northeast China
was responsible for 11.9 mt (81%), South Korea 1.7 mt (12%), Japan
0.8 mt (5%), and North Korea 0.3 mt (2%). The use of large amounts
of fossil fuels by Japan is offset by the widespread deployment
of emission controls. The majority of sulfur dioxide emissions
comes from the industrialized regions of China: the Northeast
Plain, Hebei-Anhui-Henan, and Jiangsu/Shanghai. The locations
of these emitting sources are conducive to transboundary flow
across the Korean peninsular to Japan and the Northern Pacific
|Table 6 Emissions in Northeast Asia by Country (mt/y) under BAS Scenario|
|N.A. = Values not calculated by van Aardenne (1996).|
Under the BAS energy scenario, emissions would rise to 31.3 mt
in 2010 and 40.5 mt in 2020. Recall that this scenario assumes
continuation of current energy policies and no additional environmental
controls beyond those required under existing regulations. In
essence, this means that only Japan requires any post-combustion
flue-gas treatment on major coal-burning facilities. In 2020,
Northeast China would emit about 32.5 mt, maintaining its 80%
share of the total. Emissions become increasingly concentrated
in the industrialized areas of Northeast China. Emissions in South
Korea are also expected to increase significantly from 1.7 mt
in 1990 to 5.6 mt in 2020, driven by extensive coal-based industrial
Under the HEF energy scenario, which increases energy efficiency
and encourages fuel substitution away from fossil fuels, sulfur
dioxide emissions grow to "only" 24.7 mt in 2010 and
28.8 mt in 2020. Even so, emissions would still double in the
next 30 years. This situation is in stark contrast to the situations
in Europe and North America, where sulfur dioxide emissions are
projected to decline from 24 mt in 1990 to about 17 mt in 2020
(North America) and from 37 mt in 1990 to about 16 mt in 2020
(Europe). In both cases, recognition of the acid rain problem
has triggered environmental action and associated emission restrictions.
Without the same steps in Asia, reversal of the global pattern
of emissions will occur, and Asia will become the dominant emitting
Sulfur Dioxide Emission Reduction Scenarios
The BAS projection is best viewed as an upper bound on future
emissions, presuming that the countries of Northeast Asia will
value the environment no more in the future than they do today.
This is a pessimistic forecast. Countries such as China and South
Korea are beginning to establish regulations to curb emissions
in the regions of highest emissions or where ecosystems are most
sensitive. Japan has had such regulations for many years. And,
as discussed earlier, advanced technologies with improved performance
are starting to penetrate the energy supply market.
A lower bound on future emissions can be established by assuming
that all major point sources (existing and new, industrial and
power) install state-of-the-art flue-gas desulfurization (FGD)
systems and that all other users of fossil fuels switch to lower-sulfur
fuels. The RAINS-Asia study terms this the Best Available Technology
(BAT) scenario. Under these assumptions, 1990 emissions in Northeast
Asia would be reduced by 69% to a 2020 value of 4.6 mt. This scenario
also has an air of unreality about it; the capital is simply not
available to implement such a stringent level of control over
such a wide region.
Thus, the pathway for future sulfur dioxide emissions in Northeast
Asia can realistically be bounded by the BAS and BAT scenarios,
as illustrated in Figure 3 for the year 2020. This broad range
of possible emission futures represents an enormous opportunity
and a challenge to policymakers in the countries of the region,
as they weigh options for investment in economic development and
Two intermediate levels of control are simulated in the RAINS-Asia
study: an advanced control technology (ACT) scenario, in which
FGD is applied to all new power plants (not existing ones) and
a moderate level of fuel switching is achieved in the industrial,
domestic, and transportation sectors; and a basic control technology
(BCT) scenario, in which more modest pollution control systems,
such as limestone injection, are applied to new power-generating
facilities in China, but ACT controls are used in other countries
and sectors. The limestone-injection technology achieves only
50% reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions, compared with 95% for
the flue-gas desulfurization (FGD) technology assumed in the BAT
and ACT scenarios. Table 7 summarizes the 2020 emission forecasts
for each of these scenario options; Figure 3 illustrates them.
Figure 3 Alternative Future SO2 Emission Scenarios
The ACT scenario results in a 40% increase in sulfur dioxide emissions
over 1990 levels by 2020 (to 20.7 mt); the BCT scenario results
in a 73% increase by 2020 (to 25.4 mt). These two scenarios are
equally effective in curbing emissions in the nonpower sectors,
but the ACT scenario greatly increases the reduction in emissions
from major power plants. Note that both of these emission control
scenarios are more effective than the HEF scenario, which permits
a 95% increase in emissions by 2020. Of course, combinations of
additional energy efficiency improvements and pollution controls
are possible and can be simulated with the RAINS-Asia model.
Table 8 shows how the 2020 emission reductions would be distributed
among the countries of the region. Emissions in Japan are relatively
unaffected by the control scenarios, because current regulations
are at least as stringent; it is only the BAT scenario that forces
additional emission reductions in Japan. The effect of the scenarios
on emissions in Northeast China is the major determinant of total
regional emissions. Even in China, it is clear that the control
of major new power plants and industrial plants is limited in
its effectiveness, because of the increasing number of small industrial
emitters and the growth of the domestic and service sectors. Either
a radical realignment of industrial production or the rapid penetration
of advanced technology is necessary to control environmental pollution.
Emission Control Costs
The costs of emission control technologies are high. This is discussed
in greater depth in a subsequent paper. Only Japan had significant
expenditures for pollution controls in 1990, estimated at $2.1
billion per year. Table 9 summarizes the costs of each scenario.
The BAT scenario, which achieves the greatest emission reductions,
would require the phenomenal expenditure of $35.5 billion annually
by 2020 (levelized capital and operating expenses). The more modest
ACT scenario would incur annual costs of about $14.1 billion by
2020. The BCT scenario costs are anomalously high at $14.2 billion.
Although the capital costs of the assumed BCT technologies are
significantly lower than in the ACT case, larger quantities of
solid wastes are generated, and the model assumes waste disposal
costs that are typical in western countries. In Northeast Asia,
it is likely that the costs for disposing of these wastes would
be considerably less, pricing the BCT scenario in the more likely
region of $8-10 billion per year. This aspect of the RAINS-Asia
methodology is presently under review.
Abatement costs under the HEF scenario decline to $1.7 billion
in 2020. This is a reflection of decreased demand for energy and
the need to construct fewer new generating facilities. Note that
neither this paper nor the RAINS-Asia study estimates the cost
of the additional energy efficiency improvements and fuel substitution
measures embodied in the HEF scenario.
|aDoes not include the cost of the additional energy efficiency measures, only the cost of the pollution abatement equipment.|
The question remains as to whether these scenarios are "affordable"
by the emerging economies of Northeast Asia, which have so many
demands placed on them. The intervention of international lending
organizations will almost certainly be required. This might also
be an area in which the more highly developed economies (Japan
and South Korea) could subsidize pollution controls in the other
two countries (China and North Korea), especially because they
would be the recipients of benefits in terms of reduced deposition.
Note that under the ACT scenario, for example, annual abatement
costs in Northeast China are projected to increase from zero in
1990 to $6.3 billion in 2020; on the other hand, annual abatement
costs in Japan would increase from $2.1 billion in 1990 to $3.5
billion in 2020, a relatively small increment.
Clearly, the cost effectiveness of emission control actions, measured
in terms of dollars per ton of pollutant removed, varies widely
across the region. Table 10 summarizes the cost effectiveness
of emission reductions under the BAT scenario--essentially very
stringent emission reductions in all sectors in all regions. The
cost effectiveness of such reductions in Japan is estimated at
$3,600 per ton of sulfur dioxide reduced in 2020. This high value
is a reflection of the stringency of current regulations in Japan
and the need to apply additional controls chiefly to small, dispersed
facilities--an expensive proposition. In North Korea, the cost
effectiveness is estimated to be $2,400 per ton. This is relatively
high, perhaps because of the lack of large point sources where
emissions control is most cost effective. In South Korea, the
value is $760 per ton, and throughout Northeast China the value
is in the range of $400-800 per ton. In both South Korea and China,
the number of large point sources, both existing in 1990 and projected
to be built before 2020, offers the most cost-effective control
|Table 10 Cost Effectiveness of SO2 Emission Reductions in Selected Regions|
Because of the variation in cost effectiveness across the region,
there are likely to be significant economic benefits to the region
as a whole of coordinating emission control strategies and achieving
the emission reductions where they would cost the least and have
the greatest environmental benefit. This variation also suggests
that a market-oriented approach, such as that recently introduced
in the U.S., would achieve overall economic benefits. In either
case, cooperation among the countries of the region would be necessary
to secure the economic benefits.
Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides
Thanks to the work of van Aardenne (1996), preliminary estimates
of nitrogen oxides emissions are available under base-case conditions.
He has introduced NOx emission factors for each of
the fuels and utilization sectors in the RAINS-Asia model. Table
11 summarizes NOx emissions by country and sector for
1990 and 2020. Table 1 provides the complete summary for each
of the 23 subregions.
Emissions of nitrogen oxides in Northeast Asia in 1990 are estimated
to be 11.1 mt. This is about three-quarters of the corresponding
value for sulfur dioxide. In general, emission factors for nitrogen
oxides are lower than for sulfur dioxide, but this is counterbalanced
by the fact that combustion of oil and natural gas releases much
more NOx than SO2. Thus, the sectors that
use these fuels assume relatively more importance for NOx:
the transportation and domestic sectors, especially. It is clear
that the more highly developed countries and regions of Northeast
Asia, such as Japan, Seoul-Inchon, and Shanghai, which have more
extensive transportation systems and more western-style residential
areas, have greater contributions to NOx emissions
than the heavily industrialized areas of the region. For these
reasons, Japan's share of total regional NOx emissions
in 1990 was 23%, compared with 6% for sulfur dioxide.
|Table 11 Sectoral Growth in Nitrogen Oxides Emissions (mt/y) under BAS Scenario|
By 2020, under BAS conditions, emissions of nitrogen oxides are
projected to increase to 38.9 mt, 3.5 times the 1990 value. This
is an even more rapid growth than for sulfur dioxide, primarily
because of the very large projected growth in transportation in
the region. In 2020, Northeast China will be responsible for 69%
of total NOx emissions, South Korea 13%, Japan 12%,
and North Korea 6%. Thus, Northeast China's growing power and
transportation sectors will outstrip Japan's in the next 30 years.
Increasing NOx emissions also indicate an increase
in generation of ozone, which will place an added burden on human
health and the environment, especially in urban areas.
The situation regarding growth in nitrogen oxides emissions is potentially more serious than for sulfur dioxide. Emissions come from a wider variety of sources, the sources tend to be smaller and more dispersed, and emission control technologies are relatively less well developed. In addition, there is little experience of the performance of NOx emission control technologies in Asian situations, except in Japan, which has been one of the world leaders in the development of such technologies. Because of the absence or the uncertainty of available data, no analysis has yet been performed of the cost or effectiveness of additional emission controls to reduce NOx emissions. Performance is so sensitive to combustion conditions and type of combustion system, that field testing in the region is really the only way to know how effective NOx reduction techniques will be.
Undoubtedly, there are a lot of cheap emission reductions possible
through improved burner technology and firing conditions. How
much and at what cost is presently unknown. Higher levels of reduction
(on a percentage basis) would be available through selective catalytic
reduction (SCR) or selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR) technologies.
Japan, South Korea, and some western countries have begun to transfer
these more sophisticated technologies into China, but present
experience is extremely limited. In view of the projections made
in this paper, high priority needs to be given to investigation
of NOx emission reduction possibilities. Of course,
one of the advantages of higher energy efficiency approaches,
such as those embodied in the HEF scenario, is that they are effective
at reducing emissions of both sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides
The prospects for acid rain and its detrimental effects on human
health and the environment in Northeast Asia are serious. With
the economies in the region growing rapidly, energy consumption
is expected to increase significantly after the turn of the century.
Coal is expected to supply the bulk of the additional energy needs,
leading to an increase in emissions of the acidifying pollutants,
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. In the absence of additional
control measures, sulfur dioxide emissions are projected to increase
from 14.7 mt in 1990 to 40.5 mt in 2020. Emissions of nitrogen
oxides are projected to increase from 11.1 mt in 1990 to 38.9
mt in 2020.
Various possibilities for curbing these increases are available.
They include a stronger effort to improve energy efficiency, shifting
away from fossil fuels wherever possible, reducing the sulfur
content of fuels used, and requiring emission controls on the
larger energy and industrial facilities. For sulfur dioxide, the
use of emission controls is effective but expensive. For nitrogen
oxides, the use of emission controls is less effective, expensive,
and largely untested in the Asian situation.
Emissions are concentrated largely in the major industrial regions
of China, in the form of large coal-burning power plants and industrial
manufacturing facilities. No emission controls are presently used,
though regulatory initiatives have begun in China to identify
acid-rain control zones where controls on new sources would be
required in the future. Because of the location of these facilities
and the prevailing meteorological conditions, they are primarily
responsible for deposition throughout the Northeast Asian region.
They also represent the most cost-effective sources to control.
Where there is a large difference in cost effectiveness of emission
controls across a region, there are benefits to be gained by coordinated
emission control programs. It may be, for example, that Japan
would find that it could obtain greater incremental environmental
benefit by spending one million yen in China than spending one
million yen in Japan. There are precedents for this, such as Sweden's
financing of emission controls in Poland. Certainly, it will be
in the interests of all countries of the region to investigate
cooperative solutions to the acid-rain threat. With other countries
outside the region, such as the United States, interested in helping
to alleviate problems through supply of low-emitting energy technologies,
pollution control technologies, and low-sulfur fuels, a broader
constituency can be developed.
Strategies that might be considered by a regional consortium include:
All of these strategies are, to one degree or another, being tested
in Northeast Asia, but the scale is small and the pace is slow.
The biggest obstacles to progress in this area are the cultural
and institutional barriers to regional cooperation. Establishment
of a regional forum, analogous to the Economic Commission for
Europe, at which debate on these matters could begin, would be
perhaps the single biggest step forward. Perhaps the U.N. Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) could perform
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