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Nautilus Home Publications Globalization Papers Globalization Program Table of Contents Abstract I. Environmental Issues in Northeast Asia II. Environmental Regimes in Northeast Asia III. Critical Issues |
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Environmental Issues and Regimes in Northeast Asia
Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky
International Environmental Affairs Vol. 6 #4, Fall 1994 Fall, 1994
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Abstract
Northeast Asia is an excellent region in which to study environmental conflict and cooperation. As a "latecomer" to environmental cooperation, the states of Northeast Asia have the opportunity to learn from prior regional experience. Northeast Asia also poses many challenges to paradigms of environmental cooperation derived from other regions. As regimes are forming only now, it is possible to study them at an early stage to compare their structure, content, and driving variables with environmental regimes found in other areas such as South Asia and the Mediterannean. In Northeast Asia, there is almost no "habit of dialogue" on which to draw for environmental cooperation, or even consensus on what constitutes the region. The "region" itself contrasts with other regions in that it contains the world's three greatest powers (the United States, China, and Russia), as well as an economic superpower (Japan), and two small powers (the two Koreas). Indeed, the states in the region that have been long standing antagonists during the colonial era, World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War and regional hostilities continue in spite of the end of bipolar confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union. In addition, there are significant environmental problems in Northeast Asia at a regional level (transboundary acid rain); environmental problems and management issues that straddle one or more borders; as well as radical differences in national institutional, economic and technological capabilities with which to respond to national and international regional imperatives. In section I, we describe these environmental problems. In section II, we describe and analyse the emerging regimes that address this issues. These include UNEP's Northwest Pacific Action Plan or NOWPAP, the IOC WESTPAC, the ESCAP/UNDP Northeast Asian Environment Programme, and the UNDP Sub Regional Programme. These emerging regimes are driven partly by environmental imperatives; partly by bureaucratic competition, and partly by leadership aspirations for geopolitical or geoeconomic leadership, especially by smaller states such as South Korea. There is no single regime at this time, but rather, a series of emerging, overlapping regimes with different styles and institutional implications.
In section III, we addess five critical issues which arise from consideration of these
evolving environmental problems and emerging, partial regimes in Northeast Asia,
namely: I. Environmental Issues in Northeast Asia
In this section, we present brief profiles of critical environmental issues which are
amenable to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. These are:
1.1 Transfrontier Air Pollution
Transfrontier air pollution at a regional level in Northeast Asia refers primarily to the
"routine" atmospheric transport and deposition of particulate matter emitted mostly in the
course of energy production, known as "acid rain.",
High levels of sulphur emissions from coal burning power plants and factories in
China, North Korea and elsewhere in the region are the main sources of acid rain. One
study of China's largest coal-fired power plant showed that sulphur dioxide
concentrations
frequently exceed the State's permissible releases because the coal that is burned contains
more than two percent sulphur. However, even low sulphur coals can result in absolutely
and relatively high levels of sulphur dioxide emissions when the coal is burned in
inefficient
plants. This acid rain may decrease biomass productivity and thereby reduce its carbon
uptake, and degrade existing forests (and thereby cause the recipient country's carbon
emissions to increase).
Many scientists believe that the Korean Peninsula and Japan suffer from transfrontier
acid rain originating upwind from Manchurian China. Some have also noted that
Mongolia
may receive acid rain originating over its northwestern border with Russia. Depending
on
the time of year, some countries may be originators and recipients of acid rain, especially
North Korea.
The precise scale and impact of transfrontier acid rain deposition remains unclear, in
part due to the lack of monitoring stations and ecological studies. Initial studies indicate,
however, that the levels of acid rain may be on a par with Europe. China itself has noted
the possibility that acid rain may be transmitted long distances and has seriously affected
areas of China. In the area adjacent to the Yellow Sea, Chinese industry has been
estimated to emit about 700,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide per year, some of which could
be
transported across the Yellow Sea to Korea by the predominantly northwesterly winds.
In winter (January), the air flows are generally from the Asian land mass to the
ocean, while in summer (July), the opposite is the case. The Asian Development Bank
has
mapped the likely geographical distribution of acid rain by using regional sulphur dioxide
emissions and regional atmospheric circulation as proxies to suggest where acid rain may
occur. Acid conditions (that is, low pH values such as 4.5) occur in Japan and southern
China; elsewhere, pH values are much higher., The ADB-supported regional
investigation
of acid rain suggests that Northeast China, Japan and the two Koreas are relatively
vulnerable to acid rain deposition, especially in winter, due to the combination of high
deposition, and sensitive soils, vegetation, and materials.
Fortunately, the problem is amenable to technological controls at source, at a cost. A
modern power plant with glue-gas desulphurisation equipment can remove more than 90
percent of the emissions with ease.
Also, countries in the region are moving to establish the requisite monitoring of acid
rain deposition. South Korea, for example, maintains a network of 65 acid rain
monitoring
sites and is opening new sites on the southwest coast and on Cheju Island in the near
future.
The National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan has convened a number of
regional
workshops on acid rain (the last one was held in January 27-29, 1993 in Tsukuba City
and
was to estimate an inventory of pollution and to determine regional monitoring protocols
for
acid rain, especially for SOx and NOx. Much remains to be done in terms of establishing
common monitoring methodologies, comprehensive baseline monitoring, and ecosystem
impact studies.
1.2 Marine Pollution
Marine pollution occurs in an area of overlapping and contended maritime
jurisdictions, hindering and complicating joint environmental management. East Asian
seas
are also semi-enclosed and therefore particularly subject to the effects of chemical
pollutants
including hydrocarbons, heavy metals, industrial and agricultural chemicals,
radionuclides,
sewage, heat wastes, and many other materials. The resultant ecological and economic
damage includes commercial losses from fisheries and aquaculture, destruction of flora
and
fauna, tourism, red tides, etc. For reasons of brevity, we focus here on just one area of the
region's seas, the Sea of Japan.
Undoubtedly, the most important sources of marine pollution in the Sea of Japan are:
The projected economic growth of Northeast Asia implies that all of these sources could
grow exponentially, while the assimilative capacity of the ocean may be stretched to its
limit-
-or beyond. In the future, exploitation of seabed minerals may increase the stress on
marine
environments. In this section, we will address only two dimensions of chemical
pollution,
namely, the radioactive and oil-related pollution issues in the Sea of Japan.
1.2.1 Radioactive Waste Dumping: In early 1993, Russia admitted that the former
Soviet Union had dumped civilian and military radioactive wastes for decades in the Sea
of
Japan, in contravention of domestic and international laws.
The total quantity of radioactive materials involved in this activity was relatively
small compared with other radioactive pollution in the same period. However, the
Russian
activity was significant because it related to legal precedent and the integrity of the
London
Dumping Convention which precludes signatories from engaging in such wanton
dumping. It
also highlighted the possibility of additional uncontrolled radioactive pollution of the Sea
of
Japan arising from Russia's military and reactors operating in the Far East.
Russia's nuclear submarines lack funds and facilities to remove old fuel rods, let
alone install new rods. Russia's military forces are unable to deal with the radioactive
legacy of the Cold War. It is urgent to remove the nuclear reactors and fuel from
decommissioned nuclear powered warships, especially submarines, for safe storage and
disposal. To end Russian dumping of low- and high-level wastes at the four sites in the
Seas
of Japan (and Okhotsk), interim storage facilities on Russian territory must be located and
constructed. Other states in the region have complementary capabilities. Japan, for
example,
has significant experience in decommissioning its former nuclear powered ships.
1.2.2 Oil Pollution: The monitoring of chemical pollution such as oil in the Sea of
Japan is conducted at an existing network of stations which measure pollution three times
(or
more) per year. Standard techniques are used which establish the distribution of
pollutants
and their relationship to hydrometeorological conditions. This joint monitoring effort has
been underway since 1989, and involved joint North Korean-Soviet expeditions into the
Sea
of Japan in 1989-90.
On the basis of one measure of oil pollution--average levels of dissolved
hydrocarbons--the open areas of the Sea of Japan contain about 1.5-1.8 more oil than that
of
the surface waters of the northwestern Pacific ocean. In coastal regions of the Sea of
Japan,
the level of pollution is much higher, often at 2.5 times the level of unpolluted ocean
waters,
and even exceeding maximum permissible concentrations on a permanent basis (for
example,
at the Russia's Golden Horn Bay). Another measure of oil pollution--the concentration of
tarballs in the ocean water--ranges from 0.15-1 mg/m3. The concentration is high along
sealanes, especially south of Honshu. The prevailing winds concentrate the tarballs in
different parts of the Sea of Japan, depending on the season. Japan reports that overall,
tar
balls drifting or cast ashore since 1975 has fallen since 1985, but increased in 1990 in
areas
of southern Honshu, Sea of Japan, and western Kyushu.
The rate of marine oil spills appears to be increasing. South Korea, for example,
reports a near doubling in the spill rate and a near tripling in the spill volume for recorded
spills along its coast (see Table 1.1). Major oil spills have occurred, including the sinking
of
a tanker in February 1988 which damaged 2,000 hectares of marine aquaculture at
Youngil
Bay; and a tanker collision in July 1990 which released 1.5 million liters of bunker C oil.
In August 1993, a tanker collided with another ship off Pusan and spilled 225 tonnes of
bunker oil in a nine mile long slick that threatened South Korea's most popular beaches.
Models of oil pollution dispersal show that oil slicks in the Sea of Japan could move
onto adjacent coastal regions or move out into the open seas, depending on tides and
winds.
Data is needed on estimated spill rates and number of spills per volume of oil produced or
handled, and mean or median size of spills for the East Asian region and Sea of Japan to
facilitate analysis of the risks of oil pollution, whether from offshore oil production,
coastal
refining facilities and ports, or from tankers in sea lanes. Research is also needed on 1)
the
physical fate of oil on surface waters, in the water column, and on bottom sediments; 2)
the
biological effects on fish, shellfish, seabirds, shorebirds and waterfowl; on seasonal
primary,
secondary and benthic productivity; and 3), on economic damage including cleanup costs.
Prevention of marine pollution is not yet a major environmental issue in the littoral
states for the Sea of Japan. However, cooperation to reduce and control marine pollution
could foster a dialogue on the overarching issue of managing holistically an oceanic
ecosystem between parties who disagree on territorial boundaries and who are divided
over
the best way to manage fisheries stocks on a sustainable basis.
These latter problems can hinder the development of collaborative approaches to
reducing marine pollution because the legal status of semi-enclosed oceans remains
ambiguous under customary law and the Law of the Seas. As Mark Valencia puts it:
The multiple environmental problems that afflict the Sea of Japan--all of which involve
multiple economic sectors and overlapping jurisdictions, and all of which are linked to
marine pollution--entail a complex cooperative management scheme with very wide
scope.
A first step must be to obtain scientifically valid data on pollution levels. Achieving
this goal requires the use of sophisticated research equipment. As it is available in
sufficient
amounts and quality only in Japan and South Korea, the first step to controlling marine
pollution in the Sea of Japan must be a joint effort to achieve a comprehensive and
complete
regional monitoring program to determine its ecological status. Valencia has argued that
regional cooperation would be useful to intercalibrate measuring methods; to determine
indicator species; to study the biogeochemical flows of pollutants at the river/ocean,
water/sediment, and air/water interfaces; to monitor dump sites for dredged materials; and
to
automate the collection and analysis of data.
Russia has proposed that a regional center be established to expand the marine
pollution observation system, to conduct joint research expeditions in the Japan and
Yellow
Seas, and to set up a data base on marine environmental quality, a proposal which the
Republic of Korea has also made. The Republic of Korea has also suggested that an
international agreement for prevention of marine pollution in the region should be
concluded
and that a regional oil spill contingency plan be established to respond to accidental
releases.
Sources: UNEP, "Environmental Problems of the Marine and Coastal Area of Korea
(National Report)," Second Meeting of Experts and National Focal Points on the
development of the North-West Pacific Action Plan, United Nations Environment
Programme, Beijing, October 26-30, 1992, p. 17; "National Report (Japan)," Second
Meeting of Experts and National Focal Points on the development of the North-West
Pacific Action Plan, United Nations Environment Programme, Beijing, October 26-30,
1992, Table 3; T. Grigalunas et al, "Adaptation of an Integrated, Ocean
Systems/Economics Damage Assessment Model to Korea: Some Preliminary Results," in
J. Marsh, Resources and Environment in Asia's Marine Sector, Taylor and Francis,
London, 1992, p. 338.
In this section, we describe the basic dilemmas involved with joint management of
migratory fish and bird species in East Asia. For reasons of space, we do not address the
issue of trade in endangered species, nor the preservation of critical habitats (especially
transborder areas) although these are all important environmental priorities for regional
action.
1.3.1 Migratory Fish: In terms of tonnage produced, the north Pacific is the most
important fishing region in the world. In 1984, for example, 32 per cent of the world
catch
came from the north Pacific, of which almost 90 percent was caught in the northwest
Pacific.
Regional states are highly dependent on this produce. Japan and the two Koreas derive
about
90 percent of their respective catches from the region, and Russia and China about 30 and
10
percent respectively. An acute problem associated with high seas fisheries in the
northwest
Pacific and East Asian seas is that of straddling and highly migratory stocks, that is,
species
such as tuna and many kinds of groundfish and pelagic fish which migrate between the
high
seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of states, and between EEZs. Indeed, the
majority of the fish now exploited by countries adjacent to the East Asian Seas are shared
stocks.
A regional approach may be appropriate for jointly managing the fisheries of the
enclosed seas of Japan and Okhotsk and adjacent coastal areas. Fishery agreements are
bilateral and exist between Russia and Japan, and Russia and North Korea on the one
hand;
and between Japan and South Korea, and Japan and North Korea on the other. (A number
of
these agreements are non governmental). The agreements establish a delicately balanced
set
of reciprocal fishing rights with catch quotas, and specify that scientific and technical
consultations should be held. In some cases, joint regulatory zones are prescribed as to
number and size of trawlers, types of gear, dates of operation, and catch.
None of these agreements is region-wide and no regional fora exist in which to
discuss allocation of catch. Thus, the management regime does not correspond to the
inherently widely distributed and mobile fisheries resource. Consequently, a number of
stocks are severely depleted. Unilateral actions to exploit or to manage the fishery stocks
have even increased tensions between states--as occurred most recently between Russia,
Japan, Poland and South Korea over the pollock stocks in the Sea of Okhotsk. Nor have
larger regional or global agreements proven adequate to the task, as membership of the
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission is limited to Japan, Canada and the
United
States.
Some experts have proposed a Northwest Pacific approach relating to the Seas of
Japan and Okhotsk that would avoid finalising the jurisdictional issues raised by the Law
of
the Seas and other territorial disputes, but would incrementally modify existing
arrangements;
create regional non governmental arrangements; and establish a regional scientific
organisation. Although it would require some leadership--possibly by Japan or Russian
fishery organisations--such an approach would build on existing bilateral agreements to
secure information on coastal fisheries, especially in relation to collection of statistics,
scientific research, depicting shared stocks, and identifying overfishing. An informal,
consultative regional forum on fisheries issues along with related fields of maritime
ecology,
pollution, law, and security may also be productive.
1.3.2 Migratory Birds: The wetlands of Northeast Asia support over 150 species of
waterbird., including ducks, geese, and cranes. Twenty seven of these are listed as
threatened in the IUCN Red Data Book, and some are nearly extinct.
Pressures on these birds include the loss of wetland habitats for nesting, feeding, and
migratory stopover to urban, agricultural and coastal development, hunting, and
pollution.
In Japan, for example, nearly 40 percent of its 32,170 km of coastline have been modified
heavily. The total area of mudflats (beaches, estuaries, and lagoons) fell from 82,621 to
53,856 hectares between 1945 and 1989.
Migratory cranes symbolize these exterminative pressures. They migrate over a
variety of routes in and across Northeast Asia. White-naped cranes, for example, have
been
tracked by satellite flying from Izumi in Japan, to stopover points in South Korea, on the
Korean DMZ, North Korea, Russia, and China.
In both Koreas, planned reclamation of estuaries, shallow bays, and inter-tidal
mudflats threaten huge areas of highly productive coastal habitat. One study for South
Korea
anticipates the loss of 65 percent of total coastal wetlands if development plans are
implemented. Massive coastal reclamation and river modification is also underway in
North
Korea, with little consideration to the impact on migratory species.
Non governmental organisations and official research institutes have created a strong
network of projects to band and to monitor the annual migration of birds such as the
cranes.
The Wild Bird Society of Japan, for example, has worked closely with Chinese and
Russian
counterparts; and attended a DPRK-Japan symposium on migratory bird conservation in
1987
during which both countries agreed to participate in banding projects on Chinese Egrets.
Multiple bilateral treaties between countries in Northeast Asia have been signed and
implemented in the past decade. In 1994, South Korea proposed a regional, multilateral
treaty to protect migratory birds and their habitats for consideration by the six states
engaged
in the Northeast Asia Environmental Program.
1.4 Sustainable Forest Development
Within the parameters of the Northeast Asian region lie the world's most extensive
remaining forests--and some of the largest and fastest-growing appetites for timber.
Extending from the Urals to the Pacific coast and from the Chinese and Mongolian
borders
to the Arctic, Siberia cover 1280 million hectares, which is about 30% larger than the
continental United States. About half of this area is covered with forests, covering about
20% of the world's forested area and nearly 50% of the world coniferous area.
The forests of Siberia offer not only potential for human economic development; they
also provide important ecological services to Russia, the Northeast Asian region and the
world as a whole. These services include habitat for flora and fauna, many of which are
endemic. The Far Eastern regions of Primorski and Khabarovski Krais contain a bio-
diversity
"hot spots" which contain a rare combination of flora and fauna species found in northern
and southern regions of the earth. The Siberian tiger, for example, is the only tiger found
in
a northern climate. Another global service is carbon sequestration. According to one
estimate, 40 billion tons of carbon are stored in Siberian forests, providing a safeguard
against global warming.
The Far Eastern part of Siberia contains some of the most valuable and, until
recently, least accessible and utilised of Siberia's forest resources. In 1988, the Russian
Far
East accounted for 65% of Soviet forest land, 66% of the nation's mature and over-mature
timber, and 80% of the unstocked forest land. Until recently, however, much of the area
was
considered inaccessible for timber use. About 53% of Far Eastern timber was considered
to
be currently or potentially accessible in 1988.
With little domestic processing capability, Russia's forest exports center primarily on
raw logs. The primary exports markets are in Asia, especially Japan and China and
increasingly South Korea. With a large, domestic timber processing industry, Japan is the
world's largest importer of raw logs. In 1989, Japan accounted for 52% of total world
imports of saw and veneer logs, up from 43% in 1965. Russia's forest product exports are
primarily logs and Japan is its largest market. Nearly 55% of total Soviet Union log
exports
were to Japan in 1988. With China accounting for another 26%, Northeast Asian
countries
were the destination for 81% of Soviet log exports. South Korea is also increasing its
demand for Russian Far East timbers, suggesting an even greater role for regional
markets.
Russian forests, including in the Far East, suffered poor management practices during
the Soviet era, creating waste of forest resources. One study published in 1988 found that:
...the best stands are cut, the rest are left in a confusing array of cut
and uncut stands unprofitable for further exploitation, trimmings and trunks
are ignored, scrap suitable for processing is burned needlessly, and logging
enterprises are prematurely shutdown. Of the 400 million cubic meters harvested
annually, 160 million cubic meters are lost in various stages of production;
only 51 percent reaches the consumer and only 8 percent of the remainder (scrap)
utilised anywhere.
Poor management practices, including insufficient reforestation, undermined the
longterm ecological sustainability of the forest eco-systems and therefore, of the forest as
an
economic resource. In the cold and humid climate of the Russian Far East, forest stands
grow and regenerate slowly and ecosystems are not highly resilient to change. Without
careful and selective cutting and adequate reforestation efforts, cut forest-lands can
become
swamplands. In drier parts of the world, excessive or inappropriate logging can generate
or
exacerbate a process of desertification. In the Russian taiga, the analogous process is one
of
"swampification."
Clearcutting was the primary form of logging during the Soviet era. Moreover,
reforestation rates were too low to support regeneration. Natural regeneration was
insufficient due to "inappropriate logging methods destroying the undergrowth,
inadequate
assistance of natural regeneration, and inefficient forest fire protection." While some
reforestation were undertaken, the overall rate of reforestation was low. According to one
estimate, reforestation rates in Siberia should be 20-50 percent greater than the level of
the
early 1990s.
The period of the Russian Federation has not improved either logging practices or
reforestation rates. Indeed, the collapse of central authority, the economic crisis in the Far
East, and the new openness to foreign investment, including in the forestry sector, have
worsened the prospects for sustainable forest development in the Far East. In a highly
contentious and internationally known case, the South Korean company Hyundai was
confronted by a coalition of environmentalists and indigenous people seeking to stop
clearcutting in the Bikin River Watershed area. Despite promises to do so, Hyundai
apparently undertook no reforestation efforts. It also conducted clearcutting rather than
selective logging operations.
Rapid growth in China is fuelling increased demand for Siberian forest timbers. The
total trade to China is not fully accounted for in national statistics, since timber is sold via
South Korea traders based in the United States. Demand from Japan and South Korea is
also increasing as traditional timber sources in the Northwest of the United States are
reduced for conservation reasons. One detailed study of Russian timber sources both
concluded and predicted that the forest industry in the Russian Far East "must in addition
to
domestic and other internal demand...also meet the export requirements of the Pacific
Basin."
To meet the development demands of the region while maintaining the integrity of the
forest eco-system, a sustainable forest management regime must be created in Northeast
Asia. Regional cooperation is needed in three broad areas: i) to help build administrative
and
regulatory capacities in the Russian Far East; ii) to create regional Forest Codes of
Conduct
for foreign investors in forest operations; and iii) to manage and reduce the growth in
regional timber demand. Cooperation would also help to transfer better forestry
technologies
and to manage forest fires, including across the China-Russia and China-Mongolia
border.
1.5 Regional Economic Integration and the Environment
The countries of Northeast Asia are increasingly interested in prospects for regional
economic cooperation. Interest stems from three sources. First, the end of the Cold War
has
softened bilateral hostilities and nurtured bilateral commercial relations, including
between
China and South Korea, China and Japan, and Russia and all its Northeast Asian
neighbours.
Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union abruptly cut off the supply line to the Russian
Far
East from European Russia. Economic necessity sparked a new Russian openness to trade
and investment by Chinese, Korean and Japanese firms and families. Third, the national
economies of the region are characterized by differing and potentially complementary
economic capabilities. Japan and South Korea have technological and financial strengths,
China has a large and literate labor force, and Mongolia, the Russian Far East, and North
Korea have a large base of primary resources, including forests and minerals.
Political and economic factors are generating momentum toward regional economic
integration. Intra-regional trade apparently increased steadily throughout the 1980s and
early
1990s. The precise extent of intra-regional trade cannot be ascertained, since data are hard
to
obtain and are unreliable. According to one estimate, the (money) value of intra-regional
trade among five Northeast Asian nations increased by 225 percent between 1981 and
1989,
while the volume of world trade increased by only 160 percent. Increasing trade between
China and South Korea and China and Russia in the past three years suggest even more
rapid growth. Intra-regional trade accounted for 10.8 percent of total world trade in 1989.
Although the absolute level of trade interdependence is still low, it is growing. Most
important, it is growing despite the lack of government agreements or policies of the sort
that
promoted European economic integration. In this, it resembles the rest of Asia-Pacific,
where economic integration has been driven by markets, national policies, and bilateral
agreements, rather than regional policies.
Intra-regional trade figures mask the importance of several bilateral trade relationships
in the region, especially between Japan-South Korea and Japan-China. Exports to Japan,
for
example, accounted for 14.5% of all Chinese exports in 1992, while imports from Japan
comprised 17.9% of total imports. South Korea is likewise heavily integrated with Japan:
imports accounted for 23.8% of total South Korean imports in 1992, while exports to
Japan
comprised 15.1% of total exports. Indeed, Japan is by far the most important trading
power
in the region, with its trade with South Korea and China accounting for almost 70% of the
total trade in Northeast Asia. Trade between China and South Korea is also significant
and
growing, although it remains unofficial and thus unaccounted for.
Intra-regional trade figures are typically derived from national trade statistics. A more
meaningful gauge of regional economic integration would be obtained by data
disaggregated
at the provincial level. According to one Chinese study, the Northeast provinces of China
including Heilongiang, Jilin, Liaoning and Tianjin export 44% of their total exports to
other
countries in Northeast Asia. In the Russian Far East, Chinese imports of textiles have
surged since borders were relaxed in the early 1990s. According to a leading Russian
economist, living standards Russia's Khabarovskii Krai would drop by 30% if imports
were
cut off.
Economic integration suggests that there are benefits in regional cooperation in
managing links between trade and environmental policy and more broadly between
economic
and environmental policy. It also suggests that there are both environmental and
economic
costs in not doing so. The costs stem from two directions. On the economic side, a
patchwork of national environmental policies increases the transactions costs of trade.
Exporters, importers and investors must spend time and money first gaining information
about second conforming to different national regulations. Costs of enforcement are also
likely to be higher with a variety of national regulatory frameworks, especially if there are
fundamental differences of philosophy and social objectives.
On the environmental side, regional trade integration accelerates economic growth,
increasing demands for resource inputs and ecological services. China's GNP, for
example,
is growing at the rate of around 12% per year. Unless accelerated growth occurs within
resource management policies which internalize environmental costs and stay within
absolute
ecological limits, it will accelerate environmental degradation and resource depletion.
Except
for transboundary open-access resources, such policies could be left to national
governments
alone. If all nations undertook sound national environmental management, there would be
no
problems of resource-depleting growth or the cross-border issues, such as air pollution,
which flow from it.
Economic integration, however, both reflects and intensifies pressures to be
competitive in regional markets. Intense competition for export markets, resources and
foreign investment can lower or retard the raising of environmental standards. In
Northeast
Asia, a "pollution haven" or "resource extraction haven" strategy may be especially
attractive
to nations seeking to woo Japanese companies facing increasingly stringent domestic
environmental regulations (as well as rising labor costs); or seeking foreign investment in
the exploitation of forest, mineral and ocean resources. Common regimes also enhance
the
strength of monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations.
The need to promote environmentally sound regional trade patterns does not
necessarily suggest the retardation of processes of trade liberalization and regional
integration. Trade openness itself can help to improve environmental management, in part
because trade and foreign investment act as a transmission belt for regulatory standards,
as
well as technology transfer. Countries with the largest markets, most advanced
technologies,
and foreign investment funds (and foreign aid) tend to be the pace-setters for the
regionally
integrated countries. If product standards are low in the large-market country, they will
pull
regional standards down. On the other hand, if environmental standards in the region's
largest markets are high, trade will pull national standards up.
Japan is by far the largest market and source of foreign investment in Northeast Asia.
South Korea and Taiwan are also important investors and traders. All three countries tend
to
s high sanitary and health product standards for imports. However, the region's most
important regional environmental problems stem not from the use of products from the
processes of their production or harvesting. Countries do not regulate foreign production
processes of imported products. Indeed, they are barred by GATT from doing so.
Establishing common environmental process and product standards would reduce the
transactions cost of trade and set a common floor for environmental management.
However,
the countries of the region differ greatly in terms of types and demands on ecosystems,
levels
of economic development, political systems, and (potentially) social preferences.
Ecological
diversity suggests that appropriate standards be set at the ecosystem level, rather than
regional, national or even provincial.
The primary challenge facing Northeast Asia, or any other region undergoing a
process of economic integration, is two-fold: first, how to develop a common regional
framework for environmental management in the face of ecological and social diversity at
national and sub-national levels; second, how to manage specific issues arising from
trade-
environment links in the context of broad regional trade-environment agreements.
Three innovative approaches to regional trade-environment cooperation could help to
meet the challenge: i) harmonizing standard-setting methodologies; ii) enacting
Environmental Sectoral Agreements; and iii) developing common Environmental
Guidelines
for Development Planning.
Standard-Setting Methodologies: The need for diversity-within-commonality might be
approached by seeking to harmonize not environmental standards per se but the
methodologies by which standards are set. Examples are Environment Impact
Assessment
systems and Health and Environmental Risk Assessment and Ordering Methodologies.
Environmental Resource Agreements: The need to manage specific trade-environment
issues
could be addressed by developing Sectoral Environmental Agreements, especially for
primary
resource-intensive sectors such as agriculture, tourism and forest products. Such
Agreements
would aim not to manipulate prices but to establish common policy frameworks. In
agriculture, for example, common policies could be developed to govern the use of input
subsidies, zoning regulations, reporting and labelling requirements, including for
pesticides,
crop rotation requirements, etc. Another innovation might be a Farm Licensing System:
farmers would need to show that they had a Sustainable Management Plan as a condition
for
obtaining a license to farm. Such a system would allow for diversity not just between
nations
but between individual farms. While broad guidelines and principles would be specified,
farmers would be able to implement them according to the particular conditions of their
own
farm/locale.
Environmental Guidelines for Development Planning: Environmental guidelines for
development planning aim to provide a framework in which to manage economic growth.
Guidelines could encompass issues such as integrated land use planning; infrastructure
requirements for projected growth in local industries and population, including energy,
water
and sewage; and integrated industry mix/eco-system planning.
Regional cooperation in establishing such Environmental Guidelines would promote
learning and build management capacities among member countries. Setting the
Guidelines in
common would help to reduce cross-border pollution and act to provide a higher common
floor for environmental management in the region.
Plans for joint development of the Tumen River area may offer a pilot project for
developing regional Environmental Guidelines. The UNDP-sponsored Tumen River Area
Development Project calls for infrastructure and industry development along the Tumen
River delta area extending from Chongjin, North Korea to Vladivostok, Russia and inland
to
Yanji, China (see Map 3.1). The Project has five members: China, the Russian
Federation,
Mongolia, South Korea, and North Korea. Still in a formative stage, the vision for the
Project is reflected in a recent "master plan" report to the UNDP:
Member countries have agreed to a set of Environmental Principles as guideposts for
the design of the Tumen River project. In October 1992, a preliminary environmental
assessment was presented to the Programme Management Committee's second meeting.
The
report stated that the hinterland, deltaic and adjacent coastal areas were ecologically
fragile,
and noted the paucity of environmental and resource data for the area.
In May 1993, the third meeting of the Programme Management Committee reviewed
a draft set of "Environmental Principles" with the following objectives:
A draft Preliminary Environmental Study completed in May, 1994 constitutes the first
stage of environmental assessment. The UNDP-commissioned study concludes that the
TREDA spans a region of "globally significant biodiversity values" and "includes a wide
range of ecosystems, many of which are themselves regionally or globally significant." It
also suggests that the wetlands and marine environment of Posiet Bay in the center of the
coastal area of the zone are highly to pollution. While existing levels of population and
industry are apparently not degrading this ecosystem, their expansion, the report
concludes,
"may not be compatible with maintenance of the ecological, tourism and mariculture
values."
Most significantly, the draft Environmental Study concludes that an environmental
assessment of the Tumen River Project is not "possible or appropriate at this stage in the
project because of the nature of the project, the preliminary level of project definition and
the
lack of coherent and reliable background information" (our emphasis). The Study makes
two
recommendations. First, that regional strategic environmental planning be undertaken "to
identify appropriate and inappropriate activities in specific environments." Second, that
institutional and human resource capacities be strengthened to "meet the challenges that
will
be generated by TRADP." These include environmental quality control, enhancement of
environmental assessment capabilities and procedures, and ecosystem and species
management
II. Environmental Regimes in Northeast Asia
In this essay, we describe four emerging regional environmental management regimes
in Northeast Asia. These include UNEP's Northwest Pacific Action Plan or NOWPAP,
the
IOC WESTPAC, the ESCAP/UNDP Northeast Asian Environment Programme, and the
UNDP Sub Regional Programme.
2.1 Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP)
The UNEP Regional Seas Programme was initiated in 1974 as a global program
implemented through regional components. At present, it comprises of ten regions; three
more regional programs (including NOWPAP) are under development. Over one
hundred
and forty coastal states and territories participate in the program. The divisions of the
Cold
War combined with the non-membership of United Nations of the two Koreas blocked
UNEP
from implementing a regional program in the Northwest Pacific.
In May 1980, at the initiative of states bordering the semi-enclosed seas of the
Northwest Pacific, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) Governing Council decided
to
prepare new action plans for seas not yet covered by UNEP's Regional Seas Programme.
In
response, the littoral states promptly nominated National Focal Points to develop the
NOWPAP. Officials from the six concerned states met informally in Nairobi in May
1991
at which time they reaffirmed their governments' willingness to initiate the NOWPAP.
Due
to the wide range of early suggestions as the content of the Action Plan, UNEP convened
an
early formal consultative meeting in Vladivostok in October 1991 in conjunction with the
Center for International Projects and Pacific Oceanological Institute. Experts from five
national delegations (North Korea did not attend) reported on aspects of the marine
environment. The Japanese report addressed marine pollution monitoring in adjacent
seas of
Japan and water quality management; the former Soviet, Chinese, and South Korean
reports
dealt with fundamental and applied marine pollution studies, pollution-related marine
ecological problems, and regional maritime pollution monitoring.
The participants agreed that National Focal Points henceforth would prepare national
reports for future meetings. These reports are to cover the status of the marine
environment
and coastal areas; national policies and measures to deal with marine pollution; and
proposals
for steps to be taken in a Regional Action Plan. They noted that regional cooperation in
response to a pollution emergency would be appropriate for joint activities in the future.
At the second meeting of experts and National Focal Points, held again in Beijing in
October 1992, all six countries were represented. At this meeting, a consultant presented
a
draft Regional Action Plan which was reviewed, and in some important respects,
modified
(at the insistence of Japan, for example, that the section on Biodiversity and Ecological
Resources be deleted, which was agreed except for the section on wetland reserves and
genetic resources).
The geographical area to be covered by the Action Plan is not entirely clear. At the
first meeting, the majority view was that it would cover initially the marine environment
and
coastal areas of the Japan and Yellow Seas, without prejudice to its possible future
extension
to cover additional marine environment and coastal areas of participating states. The
delegates have also reserved their right to call the Sea of Japan by different names. The
1993 meeting formally endorsed the following definition of scope:
The fulcrum of regional programs is the Action Plan. The draft Action Plan
discussed at the November 1993 NOWPAP meeting in Bangkok. Most fundamentally,
the
NOWPAP states committed themselves to:
The strategy for regional coastal and marine environmental management accepted in
Bangkok
has five elements: the monitoring and assessment of environmental conditions; creation
of an
efficient and effective information base; integrated coastal area planning; integrated
coastal
area management; and establishment of a collaborative and cooperative legal framework.
The draft NOWPAP Action Plan therefore concentrates on the short and medium-term
assembling the basic information needed for regional management of coastal and marine
resources. To that end, five objectives were adopted for implementation upon finalisation
of
the Action Plan:
(ii) To collate and record environmental data and information to form a
comprehensive database and information management system which will serve as a
repository of all relevant, available data, act as the sound basis for decision-making,
and serve as a source of information and education for specialists, administrators, and
others;
(iii) To develop and adopt a harmonious approach towards coastal and marine
environmental planning on an integrated basis, and in a pre-emptive, predictive and
precautionary manner;
(iv) To develop and adopt a harmonious approach towards the integrated
management of the coastal and marine environment and its resources, in a manner
which combines protection, restoration, conservation and sustainable use;
(v) To develop and adopt a regional framework of legislative and other agreements
for mutual support in emergencies, collaboration in the management of contiguous
bodies of water, and cooperation in the protection of common resources as well as in
the prevention of coastal and marine pollution.
The activities and tasks contained in the Action Plan reflect these objectives and focus on
information gathering, resources and environmental quality surveys, collation and
exchange
of information, and collaborative research.
Given the pre-existing hostilities in Northeast Asia, the adoption and full realisation of
these objectives would be an extraordinary achievement. As an interim step, participating
states agreed that UNEP would coordinate implementation of the final Action Plan until a
regional coordinating secretariat is established within the region. Meanwhile, national
capabilities running in parallel are the institutional foundation of the Plan.
A related regional project overlaps with the short-term objectives of the NOWPAP.
The project, titled Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in East Asia Seas, is
a
proposed $8 million activity over five years funded by the Global Environment Facility
and
implemented by the UN Development Program. The scope is broader than that of
NOWPAP as the GEF project includes ASEAN states (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), Cambodia, China, North Korea, and
Vietnam.
The project was formulated in two expert missions that travelled to the region in
December 1992 and February/March 1993. The general approach focuses on developing
national institutional and legal capacities for integrated coastal zone management and
control
of marine pollution arising from international conventions, primarily by provision of
technical assistance, developing regional collaboration via a network of collaborating
institutions, conducting environmental monitoring and evaluation, and increasing public
awareness. The project will use national demonstration projects to exemplify
methodologies used in relation to each of these components. In the area of integrated
coastal
zone management, for example, comprehensive planning and management will be
undertaken
in the harbor and surrounding area at Xiamen in China, and in the Batangas Bay in the
Philippines. Thus, the GEF project is intended to move beyond mere monitoring of and
reactive response to the problems of marine pollution to innovative, proactive, and
practical
management measures commensurate with the rapidly growing problem.
2.2 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC/WESTPAC)
The IOC was established in 1960 as a functionally autonomous body within UNESCO
and is charged with basic oceanographic research. Under the IOC's rubric, a Cooperative
Study of Kuroshio and Adjacent Regions had been conducted between 1965-77. In this
case,
the study area was the Kuroshio current which spans the East China Sea, the Southern
Sea of
Japan, the Eastern Philippines Sea, and (later) the South China Sea.
The IOC's Sub Commission for Western Pacific (WESTPAC) was established in
1989. Given that the earlier effort on the Kuroshio had relied on the scientific efforts and
contributions of only a few countries (and that Southeast Asian developing countries had
minimal participation due to lack of scientific and technical resources), the WESTPAC
program was designed from the outset to increase local human and technical capabilities
in
the course of fundamental research into ocean climatic and food resources variability, and
improved understanding of geological processes which affect the economies of the
western
Pacific states.
The Secretariat is to be established in Bangkok which hosted the second session of the
Commission in January 1993 (the next session is planned for 1996 and will likely take
place
in Tokyo). Due to the vast WESTPAC area (which encompasses the Pacific west of a
line
following the Emperor Trench from Kamchatka Peninsula, to Wake Island, along the
Tuamotu Archipelago, and back to Antarctica south of New Zealand), WESTPAC
adopted a
sub-regional approach to implementing its research program (see Table 2.1 for
membership).
IOC itself notes that the current program involves much greater cooperation among states
of
the Northeast Asian region.
South Pacific sub
region:
Australia, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Western Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, USA
Central and East
Asian sub region:
Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, UK (Hong Kong), Vietnam
North-western
Pacific sub region:
China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan,
Republic of Korea, USSR/Russia
International Oceanographic Commission, A Review of IOC Activities in the
Western Pacific Since the Establishment of WESTPAC, IOC/INF-733,
Paris, May 31, 1989, p. 29.
WESTPAC identified nine projects to achieve these general objectives at its first meeting
in
Hangzhou, China, in February 1990, and adopted a Medium Term Plan (1991-1995).
These
nine projects are:
Marine Pollution Research and Monitoring:
Ocean Dynamics and Climate
Ocean science in relation to non-living resources
Obviously, there may be some overlap in activities envisaged to occur under the
rubrics of WESTPAC and NOWPAP. Moreover, many of the WESTPAC activities are
conducted in the South Pacific and in East and Southeast Asian oceans (thus overlapping
UNEP's East Asian and Southwest Pacific Regional Action Plans rather than NOWPAP).
The IOC Secretariat believe, however, that WESTPAC will have to draw on the stronger
national marine scientific and technological capabilities in Northeast Asian states if it is
to
succeed.
Moreover, WESTPAC's SEAWATCH program may be helpful in the implementation
of NOWPAP. Also, work by Northeast Asian members of WESTPAC (which includes
all
six states that participate in NOWPAP) on continental shelf circulation, ocean dynamics,
paleogeographic mapping, tectonics and coastal zones, and on musselwatch and harmful
algal
blooms, are all either more active in Northeast Asia than in East or Southeast Asia, or are
implemented on a western Pacific-wide basis without sub regional focus. The IOC
Secretariat suggest that a mechanism may need to be set up to coordinate with NOWPAP,
as
has occurred already via the Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA)
farther
south. WESTPAC anticipates, for example, conducting training in the field of modelling
of
coastal circulation in order to predict and control accidental oil spills. It is also
developing a
WESTPAC Action Plan as follow-up to UNCED, both of which appear to be similar to
concerns raised at NOWPAP.
2.3 Northeast Asian Environment Programme (ESCAP/UNDP)
The Northeast Asian Environment Programme initiative arose out of a symposium
held in Seoul in September 1992 which had supported the development of an informal
environmental network; and preceded by an earlier joint memorandum of understanding
between Russia and South Korea calling for the creation of a regional environmental
forum.
The first Northeast Asian Conference on Environment was held in Niigata, Japan the
following October, and was organised jointly by the Japanese Environment Agency and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Delegations from China, Russia, and South Korea attended
(not
North Korea due to sensitivities on the part of Japanese foreign affairs officials although
participants suggested that it should be invited to the next meeting which was held in
Seoul in
mid-September, 1993).
The first Conference sought to promote a frank policy dialogue on environmental
problems "of common concern to the region as a whole." To this end, the participants
agreed to convene the Conference regularly (in principle, annually), to be hosted by
different
countries of the region. In addition to emphasising the role of local government in
regional
cooperation, the participants suggested the following possible priority areas for regional
cooperation
This mandate led to the convening of the Meeting of Senior Officials on Environment
Cooperation in Northeast Asia, organised by the regional UN commission ESCAP in
cooperation with UNEP and UNDP. The meeting took place in Seoul in February 1993
and
was attended by the same five states (not North Korea). The participants considered a
consultant's report which gave an indicative list of possible areas of collaboration, and
emphasized energy-related air pollution, and capacity building as important cross sectoral
themes. They also suggested that only one or two substantive issues be concentrated
upon at
the outset in order to demonstrate the utility of cooperation, and that these activities be
expanded incrementally. Although they cautioned against an overly ambitious program,
they
also recognised that identifying priority areas also necessitated the adoption of an overall
strategy for regional environmental cooperation and a support arrangement.
The following areas for regional cooperation were canvassed:
The following priority areas within which specific projects for regional cooperation
could be developed were adopted:
The meeting concluded that coastal and marine pollution issues should be addressed
within the UNEP NOWPAP framework.
In mid-September 1993, the Ministry of Environment in South Korea convened the
Second Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation at the ministerial
and/or
deputy ministerial level accompanied by high level technical experts to discuss common
problems, experiences with various economic instruments, harmonising monitoring of
pollution, etc. The major topics considered at the Seoul meeting were:
The follow-up meeting to the February 1993 Meeting of Senior Officials is to be held
in Beijing in early 1994. As chair of the Meetings and the lead UN agency for the
ongoing
program, ESCAP lends a more representative flavor to the deliberations which suits
foreign
affairs ministries, and is less apt to take a proactive role to defining a technical basis for
political consultations than would be UNEP or UNDP and some national environmental
agencies. A consultant is to prepare a review of candidate proposals for joint projects
under
the priority areas listed above for presentation to the next intergovernmental meeting in
Beijing.
2.4 Sub-Regional Technical Cooperation and Development Programme (UNDP)
In addition to UNEP and UNESCO, the United Nations agency for technical
cooperation, the UN Development Programme, has mediated and facilitated cooperation
at a
regional level. UNDP is instrumental in the Tumen River Area Development Programme
which has a joint environmental component. It has also obtained agreement on two
regional
projects under the Global Environment Facility with developing countries of the region--
one
on greenhouse gases, and a second on marine pollution. In addition, UNDP has
developed
a sub-regional programme of cooperation between six regional states on themes
pertaining to
sustainable development, albeit at a relatively low level of activity. These include:
As we noted earlier, the Tumen River Area Development Project may establish
important legal and political precedents that will bear on other regional environmental
agreements. To the extent that the Commission established to run the project keeps open
the
possibility that it will enhance economic cooperation in Northeast Asia as a whole--and
keeps
open the possibility of admitting non-riparian states such as Japan to membership--the
Tumen
River project may become the nucleus for Northeast Asia's first economic and
environmental
institution
In conclusion, we point to five critical issues that arise from the preceding discussion.
These are: 1) capacity building; 2) spillover effects between environmental issues
(especially
from climate change); 3) monitoring and enforcement issues; 4) financing; and 5), the
importance of non governmental organisations and public awareness. We conclude with
a
series of questions for further research and analysis.
3.1 Capacity Building: The initial emphasis in the various regional initiatives that are
underway is to build on capacity at a national level. Given the uneven, and in some
cases,
undeveloped technical and organisational capabilities found in the region, this emphasis
is
entirely appropriate.
Capacity building, however, is not simply training at the national level and the
creation of an environmental oversight capability. It also refers to the ability to bring
together the different stakeholders (non governmental, official, business, and academics)
in a
policy dialogue; to inform all relevant actors; to make effective use of that information; to
introduce and use economic and regulatory instruments for environmental management;
and
to have the institutional capacity to coordinate the many components and activities at all
different levels and across all sectors of the society and economy. In short, capacity
building
is a corollary of a broad based program of social and institutional development, especially
in
economies-in-transition or in developing countries.
In addition to these challenges at the national level which are prerequisites of effective
national participation in a regional programme, regional programs for environmental
cooperation also entail developing regional capacities in the medium and long-term.
3.2 Regional Dimensions of Global Issues: Many global concerns such as ozone and
climate change may be dealt with best in global fora. Some global issues, however, may
interrelate with regional issues in ways that cannot be ignored. Climate change, for
example, may redistribute regional atmospheric circulation and precipitation patterns and
thereby affect concerns such as transfrontier pollution, ecosystem management, and
desertification, at a regional level.
In particular, the impact of climate change may be a productive area for regional
collaboration. This issue is also one that concerns all states in the region, yet (in contrast
to
acid rain) does not arise from or within any specific state or group of states within the
region.
At this time, global circulation models offer poor resolution for the northeast region,
let alone for a nation. Participants in the study therefore can only pose qualitative
scenarios
of climate change at this stage, with consequent uncertainty with regard to the range of
possible costs and benefits of climate change.
A regional scientific approach to developing a regional climate model is therefore an
urgent priority. Such a project should draw on existing Global Circulation Models
(GCMs)
and attempts to nest a regional model within the global models, rather than attempting the
extremely costly exercise of building a GCM for use within the region or starting a
regional
exercise from scratch. The choice of regional climate modelling parameters, the data
requirements to validate the model, the interpretation of the model's results etc are all
items
that require a regional rather than a national approach.,
The proposed Global Change Regional Research Network for Temperate East Asia
under the START program and known as TEACOM will address this imperative. This
project proposes to:
Although the Regional Research Network will address global change issues, it will
also include the regional response to global climate change, land use patterns, and land-
ocean
interactions in the coastal zone.
In addition to scientists from the standard six countries of Northeast Asia, the
program proposal suggests that the academy based in Taipei (China) might also be
invited to
participate. It might be, therefore, a suitable scientific rubric under which to house a
regional effort to define climate change impacts and regional responses to these impacts.
3.3 Monitoring, Verification, and Non-Coercive Enforcement: All institutions based
on
international cooperation face free riding by signatories who obtain the benefits of an
international agreement while avoiding the costs by non-compliance. The likelihood that
signatories to regional environmental agreements might try to avoid meeting their
commitments poses the question of monitoring, verification and enforcement of
compliance.
Fortunately, there are important precedents for monitoring and verifying international
atmospheric agreements, at the regional level in Europe, and globally in ozone depletion
convention. This experience provides some signposts for how binding regional
environmental agreements in Northeast Asia might be monitored, verified, and enforced.
Verification is the international control of compliance with agreed measures and
behaviour by means of tools and procedures agreed upon in an instrument of international
law--for example, a protocol on compliance to a long range air pollution control
convention.
Verification can be defined as having different densities depending upon the level of
distrust
between parties to the agreement and the technical difficulty of obtaining information
with an
adequate level of confidence on the other.
A regional verification procedure would be multilateral rather than bilateral in
implementation (although it may rely heavily on national/unilateral monitoring and
verification capabilities such as satellite systems). Assuming that all parties will be
accorded
equal treatment in the protocol, it is reasonable to suppose that all parties also will be
subject
to monitoring and verification by an implementing organisation established under
regional
conventions.
Anthropogenic sources of many pollutants vary greatly with respect to characteristics
that affect greatly their suitability for monitoring and verification. Some are stationary,
emit
copiously and continuously, and are suitable for direct, quantified monitoring. Power
stations and large factories exemplify this type of emitter. Other sources are stationary
and
numerous but only emit intermittently very small quantities of gas. There are also very
many mobile point sources that are sporadic emitters such as vehicles and livestock.
Finally,
there are very diffuse sources such as farmers whose fertiliser may end up in rivers that
pollute semi-enclosed oceans. Thus, the monitoring problem is complex.
As only the first "large" category is suitable to direct monitoring and verification,
most verification will be done indirectly by using national and UN statistics for many
production and consumption balances for items that would be of concern in regional
environmental conventions. Parties to a regional Convention must agree on the types of
data, required disaggregation and detail, and common reporting rules for national reports.
This data can be analysed and verified by the implementing organisation which is thereby
relieved of the onerous task of collecting information from scratch.
The history of the verification of international agreements offers some important
lessons for environmental verification systems. First, environmental costs and benefits
may
not accrue as fast as in the areas of arms control and the stakes are not perceived as
central
to the immediate security of the state nor (usually) to regime survival in that state.
States may therefore be less demanding of a verification system for environmental
agreements than in other domains. Moreover, when states coordinate because of self
interest, there is little reason to defect or cheat and little or no verification or enforcement
is
needed. If the costs of many environmental measures are low, then verification measures
are
needed mostly to build confidence in the regime rather than to raise the question of non
compliance and enforcement.
Second, it is inevitable and proper that enforcement responsibility will be lodged
primarily at the same level as implementation responsibility, that is, within nation states.
The bulk of the monitoring and verification for regional environmental agreements
should be
conducted at this level, rather than at the regional level. Environmental agreements
should
strive also for maximal transparency and openness, including a strong role for non-
governmental organisations in monitoring compliance.
In addition to the standard repertoire of political pressure, sanctions etc. against non-
complying states, alternatives to coercive enforcement have emerged. In some instances,
states have recognised each other's licensing rather than ceding licensing powers to an
international authority. Such reciprocal recognition schemes operate in many areas
including
phytosanitary certificates for exports, shipping oil pollution prevention certificates,
marine
waste disposal permits, hazardous materials trade, and trade in endangered species.
States
also harmonise standards and standard setting laws and procedures, often by adopting
models
from overseas. (For example, the environmental impact assessment, green labelling and
pollution taxes).
Many states have also committed themselves outside of treaties to providing early
warning and notification, for example, with respect to banned chemicals exchange of
standards, or adjustments to trade-controlled items (such as endangered species).
Regimes
also create transnational networks of lower level "operational" national officials who
short
circuit hierarchical communications across boundaries, or who communicate directly with
international organisations that may then reintroduce environmental information at much
higher political levels in the same nation state. Such structures can defuse and even
prevent
disputes arising in the first place.
Non adversarial techniques have also developed to resolve international disputes from
escalating to interstate conflicts. Local legal challenges have been mounted across
borders
thereby achieving settlement without involving the states themselves. (In Europe and
North
America, this technique requires that legal systems grant status to foreign parties in local
judicial or administrative procedures). The filing of complaints and the launching of
infringement hearings are two other techniques that have been used (in the former, in the
Montreal Protocol; in the latter, in the European Economic Community).
Reporting requirements are also an important means of imposing national "discipline"
on treaty parties, especially when combined with international expert auditing and public
debate in committees or annual conferences. Such procedures are already well developed
in
the occupational health and safety agreements administered by the International Labour
Organisation. Similar procedures are used by the International Monetary Fund and
multilateral funding agencies also conduct national and sectoral audits as preconditions
for or
requirements of development loan agreements. Environmental auditing, however, has a
weak
tradition although the Montreal Protocol requires substantial reporting to permit
monitoring
of compliance and administration of various aspects of the agreement.
3.4 Financing: The issue of who will pay for the costs of regional environmental
cooperation is central. Donor states must recognise that obtaining the benefits of
cooperation require to achieve regional sustainable development, including the
environmental
benefits, necessitates investment in creating a regional institutional framework. The
donor
community has a critical role to play in providing additional resources, especially in
capacity
building for regional environmental management. In the long term, national and regional
institutions should become self financing.
Donors, especially the Asian Development Bank, should ensure that environmental
conditionalities are an integral part of project and structural adjustment lending for all
recipient countries in the region. In short, both bilateral and multilateral financing should
be
restructured to directly address the environmental dimensions of sustainable
development.
Third, donor agencies should be reformulating their own programs to develop a
research and analytical capacity to identify regional as well as national benefits of
sustainable
development and to incorporate these in lending activities. In particular, they should
invest
resources in identifying complementarities and synergies of environmental and economic
measures in Northeast Asia.
3.5 Non Governmental Organisations and Public Awareness: In conclusion, we stress
that
without active participation by civil society, many environmental policies are doomed to
failure. Regional efforts are no less subject to this imperative than local, national or
global
activities.
Non governmental organisations have already played an important role in paving the
way to regional environmental cooperation. The various meetings convened by scholars
at
the East West Center on regional oceans management, the PECC Fisheries Taskforce, or
the
regional Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific environmental fora convened by the Asia
Foundation in 1992 and 1993, and the East Asian Parliamentarians for Environment are
leading examples. In addition to providing a backchannel for the exchange of ideas and
proposals for regional management of environmental problems, non governmental
organisations can mobilise popular support for these initiatives at a grass roots level. As
Agenda 21 states:
It is crucial, therefore, to involve non governmental organisations in regional
deliberations
and activities in Northeast Asia at the outset rather than as an afterthought.
3.6 Further Research and Analysis: A variety of theoretical frameworks can be applied
to
the processes of integration, and to categorise different types of regional activities. These
theoretical approaches encompass very different modalities of interstate behaviour and
structural circumstances. Two two basic models exist for regional cooperation on
environmental issues, namely, collaboration whereby a common resource is managed by
two
or more states, versus cooperation between states over a range of environmental issues.
In
this essay, we discovered that states in Northeast Asia are engaged in extensive albeit
incipient environmental cooperation in spite of the existence of enormous asymmetries of
military and economic power within the region; and that such cooperation is found with
respect to a common resource (marine issues), a shared environmental threat
(transboundary
air pollution) and a range of bilaterally contentious environmental issues (such as the role
of
environmental concerns in regional trade and investment flows). States in Northeast Asia
seem to have little concern about theoretical consistency or institutional neatness in
approaching environmental issues, but have been driven to adopt pragmatic approaches
consistent with overarching political and security constraints.
Given this evidence, the following questions arise for further comparative research on
regional environmental cooperation:
Are regional environmental problems and demands on nation-states a new form of
functional imperative leading in turn to new regional institutions and political
communities?
Do regional environmental institutions provide the political "space" for new types of
political mobilisation with implications for personal and group identities that transcend
national loyalties?
Do states cooperate with each other at a regional level primarily on environmental
issues
of local rather than national or global nature? Or are they driven to cooperate more by
transboundary pollution, crossborder environmental issues, or regional demands posed by
global environmental deterioration?
Is the sequence of adoption by which local-national versus regional and transboundary
issues an important determinant of the success of a regime?
How do environmental issues interrelate with political-military and economic
integration
at a regional level? Is environmental cooperation driven in part by geopolitical and
geoeconomic objectives of nation states in search of political or economic advantage?
And
do environmental issues motivate closer military or economic ties between states facing
"environmental aggression" or "environmental discrimination" by external adversaries or
competitors?
To what extent are successful regional environmental regimes grounded in the search
for
economies of scale and learning opportunities for building national environmental
management capacities, versus ameliorating or avoiding environmental insults which
cross
borders?
Does the existence of a regional "giant" or dominant state facilitate regional
environmental regimes? Or do overly-symmetrical power relations within a region block
such regimes?
Do differing political cultures which prevail in different regions affect the pace, scope,
and content of regional environmental regimes? In particular, do sub-regional
cooperation
programs in Asia follow an "Asian" set of diplomatic and operational codes that contrast
with
Ango-European approaches to conflict avoidance and resolution?
Do regional environmental regimes follow "functional form?" Or is the scope and
organisation of the regime unrelated to the eco-geographical "shape" of the environmental
problem?
Is the performance of environmental regimes best measured by political and
institutional
indices? Or do objective ecological criteria exist against which to test the success of
regimes,
especially on a comparative basis?
Are international organisations integral to the successful initiation and implementation
of
regional environmental regimes? Or have bureaucratic interplays between such agencies
hindered more than helped states develop regional regimes?
What is the relationship between sub-regional environmental regimes of the type
considered in this essay with "macro-regional" environmental cooperation such as is
found
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, or the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation
consultative process?
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