North Korea Crosses the Rubicon by Peter Hayes June 3 (Tokyo)--The DPRK has deconstituted the physical evidence from the reactor core that would have allowed the IAEA to determine at a later date whether the DPRK had removed (and by implication, reprocessed) more fuel rods than it had declared. this action is irreversible, as much for political as for technical reasons. The DPRK crossed the Rubicon in full knowledge that there is no return from Hades. Having broken irrevocably with the rules of the NPT, the DPRK has left the international community with no alternative but treat it as a nuclear-capable, pariah state. As such, it will be treated as the exception to the NPT that proves its rule. The DPRK will now be punished rather than rewarded until it either complies in full, or is crushed eventually by economic or military pressure. Some believe that China may still pull a rabbit out of a hat. Or that Russia's proposal to hold a multilateral conference to resolve the issue may hold the key to opening the door and persuading the DPRK to walk back into the international community. In reality, just the opposite is the case. The DPRK's actions manifest the fact that neither China nor Russia were able to persuade or compel it to conform to international non- proliferation norms. The North Korean leadership chose defiance and confrontation rather than compliance and cooperation. Maybe they were blinded and lost in their own blizzard of tactics at the brink, and fell over. Maybe they expect to get more security or carrots by negotiating from a position of greater strength--including nuclear arms--than they anticipated obtaining by devaluing their nuclear leverage at this time by striking a package deal. Maybe they overestimated the political will and stamina of the Clinton Administration to absorb North Korea's body blows on the IAEA, and to continue the dialogue rather than move to sanctions. Maybe internal battles between pragmatists and ultraconservatives led its leaders to accelerate the refueling of the reactor core in spite of the IAEA and UN Security Council's demands. In short, the precise combination of factors that led them to overplay their hand is unknowable and irrelevant at this stage. Having fallen or flung themselves over the proliferation precipice, no one is now going to throw them a lifeline and haul them back up. Henceforth, the nuclear issue will be much more dangerous for North Kora and everyone else. Until recently, the policy pendulum in Washington swung between diplomatic dialogue with the DPRK versus multilateral sanctions. Now, the range of options has switched and narrowed to multilateral sanctions versus unilateral military containment of the North Korean nuclear threat. The possibility lurks in the background of a full-scale war escalating from an unlikely but conceivable U.S. decision to cap the DPRK's nuclear weapons program at 8-10 nuclear weapons by destroying its nuclear facilities and thereby halting the expanded production of fissile material. Ironically, so long as the DPRK did not cross the rubicon, U.S. policy circles were undecided about what to do about the DPRK. The very nature of American democracy--its multiple branches of government and the free play of contending policy currents-- fragmented the American response to the DPRK's negotiating tactics. While it appeared still possible that the DPRK could be walked back from the nuclear brink, Americans were divided among themselves as to what to do. With no consensus on what to do emerging from within the executive branch, Clinton remained largely uncommitted and aloof from the public debate that slowly shifted to the right. The DPRK was able to play on this weakness of American democratic decision making and to string out the process, all the while trying to provoke an American response to its proposal for a package deal. Once unified, however, American democracy has enormous resilience and strength. Only months of strategic indecision and a series of tactical blunders by the DPRK, compounded by its latest fundamental error, could have forged the emerging bipartisan unity that now exists and confronts the DPRK on the nuclear issue. This achievement is remarkable, even for North Korea. It provides the domestic basis for building a strong international coalition to confront North Korea. Nonetheless, the United States will have a hard time imposing sanctions quickly on the DPRK. In particular, China will drag its feet, having obtained already MFN status. China does not want a confrontation that would strengthen the US position in East Asia. If pushed, China may abstain from a sanctions vote, squeeze the DPRK economically to implement sanctions de facto, but not strangle the DPRK's jugular vein for oil imports from China. For its part, Russia will extract a price for signing onto sanctions, namely, that it be given a greater regional role in promoting multilateral diplomacy on security issues. Japan will urge further discussions with the DPRK before imposing sanctions. But Japan is ready to stop the flow of hard currency from the pro-DPRK Korean community in Japan. Indeed, many pro- North Korean businessmen in Japan would be delighted at being relieved of this obligation. Moreover, Kim Il Sung's ability to activate his "Korean card" in Japan is limited by the Korean communities desire to avoid friction with the hegemonic Japanese society in which it has found a social and economic niche. This community fears increasing anti- Korean social pressure due to escalating tensions between Japan and the DPRK. Any attempt to use this community to pressure the Japanese government would only increase this pressure. The result if North Korea tried this tactic would be ever tighter controls on remittances to the DPRK and a strengthening of Japanese sanctions. Being on the line, South Korea is in perhaps the most difficult position as tensions increase. After a year of stop-start, unproductive negotiations between the United States and the DPRK the ROK has not engaged the DPRK on its own and has little leverage over the bilateral or multilateral fora in which basic policy toward the DPRK will be conducted henceforth. If sanctions are imposed quickly, then the ROK will support them strongly. But if the debate drags on and no international unanimity emerges, then the ROK's leaders will be forced to judge whether they can afford to let the situation in the North deteriorate to the point where the regime may collapse or lash out against the South. This turning point will be reached in the early northern hemispheric autumn. The pressure in Pyongyang on the leadership is now tremendous. It is impossible to predict where faultlines might appear and which ones might slip as stress builds up. Pragmatic reforms in relation to North Korea's external economic relations are now indefinitely on hold due to the international tensions. the same is probably true domestically in spite of the desperate economic situation. The collapse of the internal distribution system reportedly is forcing some labor units to make direct deals with food producing units in the provinces. But there are limits on how far such practical agreements can go before Pyongyang's authority is eroded unacceptably. Undoubtedly, the confrontation will cause some senior North Koreans to lose confidence in the wisdom and judgment of the Great and Dear Leaders. Committing political suicide in full view of the international community is a poor way to build a secure and prosperous future. This cannot have escaped the notice of many influential North Koreans.