NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** September 1, 1999 The following is the executive summary of "The Politics of Famine in North Korea," a Special Report by Andrew Natsios, former Senior Fellow of the US Institute for Peace (USIP). The full report is available on the USIP website at: http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990802/sr990802nb.html ------------------------------- 8 Aug 1999 The Politics of Famine in North Korea Andrew Natsios Because of the withdrawal of USSR and Chinese food subsidies in the early 1990s and the cumulative effect of collective farming, food availability in North Korea declined steadily and then plummeted between 1995 and 1997 when flooding followed by drought struck the country. From 1994 to 1998, 2-3 million people died of starvation and hunger-related illnesses, and the famine has generated a range of social and political effects. Beginning in 1994, the central authorities appear to have triaged the northeast region of the country by shutting down the public distribution system. In 1996, they appear to have begun selective food distributions to people in the capital city, workers in critical industries, and party cadres, leaving the rest of the population to fend for itself in the private markets. Refugees report that the famine has undermined popular support for the current political leadership. In 1995, a planned coup by military officers was uncovered by secret police in Hamhung, the city most devastated by the famine. Public anger is more typically reflected in growing corruption, black market activities, and other antisystem behavior. International food aid has stimulated private markets, reduced the price of food in the markets 25-35 percent, and undermined central government propaganda concerning South Korea and the United States. Those who have died or suffered most during the famine have been those unable to adjust to the economic reality of these new markets either by growing their own food or by producing some other marketable product, labor, or service to exchange for food. Reduced purchases of Chinese maize in 1999 will force higher prices in the private markets. Given the fragility of the private food system, and absent international aid, this situation may plunge the mountainous regions of the country into a new round of famine-related deaths. Conclusions and Recommendations North Korean military incidents against Japan, the United States, and South Korea may be an effort by Kim Jong Il to focus the attention of his military, whose loyalty he doubts, on an external threat that he himself regularly provokes. Kim Jong Il opposes economic and agricultural reforms needed to end the famine because he sees the threat these reforms pose to his control and the threat he feels from his own military as greater than the consequences of the famine. Donor governments, UN agencies, and humanitarian organizations have been too willing to accept the geographic distribution plans of the central government, even though it is increasingly clear that they have been based on political, not humanitarian, objectives. Donor governments should insist that their food be distributed where it is most needed, particularly to the mountainous regions of the country. Given the lack of reliable information coming from inside the country, donor governments should provide support for more studies of the famine based on refugee and defector interviews. Central Questions for U.S. Policymakers Will Kim Jong Il exercise power in a ruthless enough manner to restore his control over the population, the military, and the cadres to ensure his own survival following the chaos of the famine? The regime is attempting to reimpose order and control after a period of chaos. Political indoctrination campaigns will yield fewer and fewer results because growing numbers of families have watched loved ones die and the continued suffering of survivors has embittered the population. Public cynicism toward the regime is irreversible and is reflected in growing corruption, sabotage, an expanded black market, and other antisystem activities. Central authorities will be forced to rule exclusively by terror and repression, a fear expressed by Kim Jong Il (December 1996). Has the famine peaked and is now receding, having killed off the most vulnerable population, or is it migrating to other areas of the country? The famine may be migrating from the northeastern mountainous provinces to the rice-growing regions to the southwest (merchant and refugee interviews, September 1998). The fragile new food security system may be easily disrupted by price fluctuations, market failure, or the inability to barter or purchase food in these new private markets. International food aid, however distorted its distribution has been, has had several beneficial consequences that would be lost if it were terminated. Donor governments should consider expanding the food program by initiating a food monetization program in port cities, particularly on the east coast. WFP would sell food aid on the informal markets to reduce prices to an affordable level, but not so low that they would discourage increased production by farmers. The local currency generated could be used for mass employment programs in industrial cities and mining areas to increase urban worker income. Expatriate monitoring of food sales in urban markets, assisted by expatriate translators, should be a required part of the program. Donor governments should avoid using the public distribution system because it is no longer functional in most of the country and serves purposes other than simply feeding the population. Even if reducing or terminating international food aid caused the regime to collapse, would the resulting chaos from such a collapse improve or diminish the prospects for a peaceful transition to a unified Korea? The chaos resulting from a collapse of the regime would threaten far more lives than those the famine has thus far claimed and could create an unpredictable military situation as well. Population movement to South Korea or China could prove explosive as both countries simultaneously take military measures to restore order, increasing the risk of conflict between them. The collapse of the regime may be superficially attractive, but it is a dangerous risk. About the Report This report analyzes the North Korean food crisis, which began in 1994 and evolved into a major famine with high death rates. The report considers the causes of the famine, the central government's response to it, and the popular reaction to the government's inability to stem the steady collapse of the old system, as well as the convulsive effects of the famine on North Korean society, political system, and military. The international humanitarian aid response to the famine has had the unintended affect of weakening the central government's control over the society and has stimulated irrevocable changes in the economy. The report argues that much of the regime's external behavior is driven by the famine and considers the implications of the famine for the future of the country. Andrew Natsios wrote this report while in residence as a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace in 1998-99. He is currently Secretary of Administration and Finance for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. From 1989-93, he served in the Bush Administration as Assistant Administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Bureau of Food and Humanitarian Assistance. He is the author of the book "American Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies" and of numerous articles concerning complex emergencies and foreign policy.