

China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term

The unfolding international crisis concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons program has focused global attention on China's relations with its rogue neighbor. President George W. Bush and other world leaders have personally sought the Chinese government's influence and pressure on Pyongyang, only to be given the nebulous reassurance that China seeks a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and that the problem must be solved peacefully. China's position is indeed central to resolving the crisis, but governments and analysts alike seem vexed to understand China's assessment of the situation, opaque positions, and apparent unwillingness to use its presumed leverage in tandem with others.¹

Understanding China's calculus requires, at the outset, recognition that North Korea has been a long-standing headache for China. This is not the first time since the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949 that they find themselves in a difficult international quandary over the behavior of their erstwhile comrades in North Korea. Ever since Kim Il-sung's forces invaded the South in 1950, China has repeatedly found its own national security interests affected and compromised by the provocative and confrontational policies pursued by the Kim dynasty and Pyongyang regime.

It is true that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its North Korean counterpart have had long-standing ties and that the late Kim Il-sung was educated in China and was once a member of the CCP. It is also true that the two countries once had a formal alliance and mutually described their relationship as one of "lips and teeth." And it is true that China probably has bet-

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China's preferred future for the DPRK is regime reform.

ter relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) than any other country on Earth. Despite these facts, however, the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang has been severely strained for many years, particularly since Kim Jung-il succeeded his father in 1995. Thus, from Beijing's perspective, the current crisis over North Korea's withdrawal from the 1994

Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the DPRK's resumption of its nuclear weapons program, is only the latest chapter in a half-century of North Korean brinkmanship brought on by domestic desperation and disregard for its neighbors' interests and preferences.

Beijing considers the latest crisis an extremely serious situation, but permanently short-circuiting Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions is only a piece of a larger and more complicated puzzle for China. Despite China's strong and long-stated policy in favor of a nonnuclear Korean peninsula (both North and South), halting North Korea's nuclear program is not the ultimate end that China hopes to achieve. China's calculations, interests, and goals are more long term and more complicated. The United States and other involved nations must understand these perspectives and complexities if they are to effectively attain China's cooperation.

China's Endgame

China's policy calculus toward the DPRK—both in general and in the current crisis—involves a hierarchy of several interrelated interests:

1. DPRK regime survival;
2. DPRK regime reform;
3. maintaining and developing more comprehensively robust relations between China and South Korea;
4. establishing China's dominant external influence over the Korean peninsula (North and South);
5. integrating North and South, through economic and social means, leading to political unification over time; and
6. unprovocative and responsible North Korean behavior on security issues ranging from its nuclear weapons program to proliferation of other weap-

ons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery to the deployments of DPRK conventional forces.

It is important to recognize that this hierarchy does not mean that China accepts the status quo on the peninsula. Although some analysts, particularly in the West, assume that China prefers the status quo to regime change, this is not in fact the case. China may favor the status quo over regime collapse, but China's preferred future for the DPRK is regime reform. China does not believe that the current situation on the peninsula or in the DPRK is stable or conducive either to regional stability or China's own national security, economic growth, or other national interests. For Beijing, enhancing stability is critical.

Consequently, China advocates a comprehensive policy package that would help set North Korea on the path to real reforms that involve the DPRK intensively with all its neighbors in Northeast Asia as well as the United States. For China, the issue is not simply whether the DPRK develops a nuclear weapons capacity or whether it will have a soft or hard landing from its current catastrophic state; the question is whether North Korea can embark on a sustained and comprehensive path of reform à la China. This is Beijing's positive vision for North Korea. (A less positive vision involves more incremental reform.) Understanding this long-term vision or goal is central to understanding the elements of China's strategy and tactics, or Beijing's "hierarchy of calculus."

REGIME SURVIVAL

Most fundamentally, Beijing seeks to avoid the implosion or collapse of the DPRK regime and nation-state. Preventing collapse is Beijing's bottom line because collapse would have enormous tangible human and economic consequences for China, not to mention the intangible political impact of another failed Communist state. DPRK regime collapse could also potentially harm China's security.

China's aim to sustain the DPRK regime in no way suggests that Beijing likes the regime in Pyongyang. Quite to the contrary, Chinese officials and North Korea analysts in Beijing and Shanghai sometimes speak with disdain, despair, and heightened frustration when discussing the DPRK and China's relations with it. These critics deplore the sycophantic cult of personality surrounding the Kim dynasty, the Stalinist security state, the command economy, the poverty of the populace, the use of scarce resources for military purposes, the mass mobilization techniques of the regime, the autarkic paranoia about the world beyond its borders, and so forth. China's Korea analysts draw explicit parallels to Maoist China (particularly during the

Great Leap Forward) and argue that North Korea's only viable option to avoid national suicide is to follow China's reformist example. They also recall anecdotal accounts of North Korean condescension toward visiting Chinese officials and confrontations with them.

As part of its regime survival strategy, Beijing believes that it must deal with the DPRK government and extends it aid in the form of foodstuffs and

Preventing North Korea's collapse is Beijing's bottom line.

energy supplies to alleviate public suffering in North Korea. The exact amounts of this aid are not known, but estimates are in the range of 1 million tons of wheat and rice and 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil per annum since 1994. This estimate accounts for 70–90 percent of North Korea's fuel imports (and nearly 100 percent since the cutoff of U.S. heavy-fuel oil in December 2002) and about

one-third of the DPRK's total food imports. Trade between the two countries, while minimal (amounting to \$740 million in 2001 and approximately one-quarter of the DPRK's entire foreign trade), does supply needed consumer durables, energy supplies, and transport infrastructure. For a nation with negative economic growth, a paltry per capita income of \$714, stagnant industrial production, an agricultural wasteland, and teetering on the verge of famine, China's aid and trade has been keeping the North Korean economy from total ruin and human calamity.

High-level Chinese visits to Pyongyang are infrequent, although visits by DPRK officials to China are on the rise. Military exchanges occur between People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers from the Shenyang Military Region and their North Korean counterparts across the border and occasionally between military personnel at higher levels. Such meetings usually note the "friendship cemented in blood" between the two countries, but the sheer propagandistic pabulum that accompanies such visits and the relative paucity of such exchanges are indications of the formality and frostiness of the ties between the two governments.²

Another irritating issue in the relationship has been cross-border migration, which has received international attention over the past year as North Korean migrants have made brazen attempts to enter diplomatic compounds in China to seek diplomatic asylum in South Korea or other countries. The refugee influx into China peaked in 2000 at approximately 200,000 by one estimate but has fallen to 100,000 or fewer since the Chinese government began a crackdown and forced repatriation in 2001.³

The vast majority of migrants seeks work in the cross-border area, while a smaller minority has filtered south in search of work in Beijing and other

large cities or attempted to emigrate to South Korea through diplomatic compounds. The approximately 130 migrants who have infiltrated embassies and consulates in Beijing and Shenyang have embarrassed the Chinese government internationally (particularly in the few instances when the Chinese People's Armed Police violated international law by entering some compounds to apprehend the intruders). Yet, before the 2001 crackdown, China had a hand in facilitating the cross-border migration, probably because Beijing recognized that it was a kind of social safety valve for the Pyongyang regime and because the Chinese government chose to ignore the smuggling rings and bribery which operated openly in the border region.

The majority of migrants (particularly those of ethnic Korean-Chinese origin) work in Chinese factories in the adjacent Jilin and Liaoning provinces, where they are paid a fraction of the wages paid to Chinese laborers (which are not high to begin with), thus increasing the profit margin of the Chinese enterprise. Many female migrants have also been sold into prostitution or to Chinese husbands. The provincial Chinese governments in Jilin and Liaoning also put many refugees into small resettlement camps, soup kitchens, and other halfway-house accommodations before they could be employed, resettled, or repatriated.

Prior to March 2001, when the crackdown began, those migrants who were apprehended were returned to North Korea, but most (even multiple offenders) were simply subjected to a 30-day reeducation program rather than harsh treatment. Since then, however, there is substantial evidence of a stricter Chinese policy aimed at apprehending and returning the migrants to North Korea, who often "meet execution, prison, torture, and detention in labor camps."⁴ Chinese motivation for the crackdown appears threefold. First, the break-ins to diplomatic compounds proved to be an international embarrassment to China and forced the Chinese government to increase security around embassies and compounds substantially—a financial cost absorbed by the Chinese government. Second, China recalled the precedent set by Hungary opening its borders to East German migrants in 1989, who then entered West Germany and helped trigger the downfall of the Communist regime. China feared a similar mass exodus and result in North Korea. Third, the DPRK government was demanding the return of the refugees—something Beijing could not ignore.

On balance, China has been a critical actor in keeping the North Korean regime afloat and the North Korean population from a full-fledged and catastrophic famine. The Chinese government calculates that it is in its national interests to do so—both because a regime implosion would put a far heavier burden on China and because doing so is a half-step toward China's preferred strategy: real reform in North Korea.

REGIME REFORM

Since the early 1990s, Beijing has probably been the strongest external advocate of extensive economic and social reform to North Korea's autarkic *juche* policy. China calculates that, if managed carefully, reforms do not necessarily bring about the collapse of Communist regimes, as was the case in the USSR and Eastern Europe, but can strengthen the ruling party's base of support.

Kim Jong-il may be listening. He has visited China at least three times since May 2000 and may have made other secret visits. He has been shown the Zhongguancun computer district in Beijing, the skyscrapers and shopping centers of Shanghai, and export industries in Shenzhen. He has also received extensive briefings from Chinese officials and economists and has reportedly demonstrated a relatively sophisticated knowledge of various matters and asked astute questions.

Further exchanges to explore reforms have taken place at lower levels between the CCP's International Liaison Department (ILD) and its counterpart in the Korean Workers Party. (The ILD's annual almanac lists exchanges of between one and two dozen delegations annually in recent years.) Of course, the most noteworthy sign of Pyongyang's move down the Chinese reform path was the establishment of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region near the Chinese border and the appointment of China's wealthiest businessman, Yang Bin, as the "governor" of the region. Before Yang Bin could take up his appointment, however, Chinese security officials arrested him on charges of tax fraud and other unspecified economic crimes.⁵

While advocating economic and social (and implicitly political) reform, China realizes that reform in North Korea is a gamble—one that could easily exacerbate many of North Korea's dilemmas. Nevertheless, Beijing believes that pursuing reform is the best option and one in which China would play a significant economic role.

RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA

The third element of China's policy calculus is deepening already robust ties with South Korea—both in their own right today as well as in anticipation of eventual unification of the two Koreas. Over the past decade, the relationship between China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has completely transformed; it is now one of the strongest in the East Asian region. A kind of "China fever" has swept across South Korea, or at least the business community.

In 2001, China became South Korea's largest trading partner, surpassing the United States; South Korea is China's third-largest trade partner. Two-

way trade in 2001 was approximately \$40 billion and probably grew by 30 percent in 2002. The ROK is now the fifth-largest foreign investor in China, investing \$830 million in 2001 and a projected \$1 billion in 2002, and more than 8,000 South Korean companies now operate in China and employ hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers (particularly in the rust belt in the northeastern part of the country, where the Chinese government is trying to restructure and retool traditional heavy industries).⁶ South Korean firms are also very active in developing China's border region adjacent to North Korea. A dense network of transport links connecting the ROK with northeastern China and the Shandong peninsula facilitates the movement of goods, capital, and people.

In 2000, approximately one million South Koreans visited China and more than 60,000 were long-term residents in China (including 13,000 students).⁷ In 2001, almost 450,000 Chinese visited South Korea.⁸ Diplomatically, a series of presidential, ministerial, and subministerial visits take place annually, with the two governments having proclaimed a "comprehensive, cooperative partnership" in 2000. Military exchanges between central-level officers, individual services, and region-level commands are also quite extensive; and in 2001 the two navies exchanged their first official port calls.

This relationship has become extremely important to Beijing as well as to Seoul, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not about to sacrifice it to placate Pyongyang in any way. (Needless to say, the PRC-ROK relationship now dwarfs PRC-DPRK relations.) Indeed, China's robust relations with South Korea act as a form of leverage with North Korea.

China's strategy for building ties with the South is born not only of economic motives but also of strategic calculations. Since the rapprochement more than a decade ago, Beijing has realized that it would have little leverage in shaping the eventual outcome of the divided Korean peninsula if it did not enjoy strong ties with South Korea. Such ties would also serve to offset any potential threat from the U.S.-ROK alliance and from U.S. forces on the peninsula. A close relationship would also serve to undercut or offset Japanese attempts to gain a stronger foothold on the peninsula. Beijing's strategy has been a net success, but both sides have reaped the benefits.

Beijing and Seoul consult with and support each other about strategy toward the DPRK. Both governments favor engagement with the North, a reformist North Korea, and eventual peaceful unification. The PRC and the ROK both oppose a punitive approach based on sanctions, and neither seems

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to endorse the Bush administration's policy of tailored containment. Both governments strongly oppose Pyongyang's WMD development, withdrawal from the Agreed Framework and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program, and otherwise belligerent behavior. When ROK president Kim Dae-jung paid a state visit to Beijing in November 2002 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, both sides reiterated the desire to maintain the Agreed Framework and to keep the peninsula free of nuclear weapons and other WMD.⁹

In sum, China's entire approach to South Korea over the past decade has been motivated by four main factors: as a hedge against regime collapse in the North and/or potential unification of North and South Korea; as an astute economic investment; as a key component of its proactive peripheral diplomacy; and as a strategic ploy to gain long-term influence over the Korean peninsula.

DOMINANT EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

Although never publicly articulated, China tends to view the Korean peninsula as its natural sphere of influence—much as the United States views Latin America and Russia views Central Asia (and previously viewed the Baltic states and eastern Europe). Over the long term, geography will determine a great deal of the balance of power in Northeast Asia. China's proximity and growing interdependence will become, China hopes, the determining factor in the strategic orientation of both Korean states. This does not necessarily mean that China is looking to establish a new form of tributary vassal state (such as the one it maintained for several centuries), nor will it necessarily evolve into an asymmetrical patron-client relationship. The relationship will be deferential, however, and will likely mean that China will become more important to the Koreans than Japan, Russia, or the United States. At least, that is China's strategic calculus.

The outlines of this reconfigured relationship between China and the Koreans are already evident in the manner in which Seoul and Beijing now deal with each other. Not only is the relationship fully institutionalized, but both governments defer to each other's preferences (which are nearly identical when it comes to policy and strategy toward North Korea). Furthermore, China has been able to exploit South Korea's antipathy toward Japan to its advantage.

Any consideration of a dominant Chinese influence on the Korean peninsula must include the role of the United States and the presence of U.S. forces. How will China react to the alliance between the United States and the ROK and to U.S. military forces stationed on the peninsula following (presumptive) unification? Personal discussions with civilian analysts, For-

eign Ministry officials, and military officers in China suggest that China's strong preference is that U.S. military involvement would no longer be an issue following unification and that the alliance would be naturally dissolved and troops withdrawn.

The logic underlying this option is China's view that alliances require declared adversaries as a rationale for their existence; thus, because an adversarial relationship between North and South Korea would no longer exist (and indeed the two Koreas would by definition no longer exist), there would be no continuing reason for the alliance and presence of U.S. troops. An unarticulated but crucial element of this line of thinking is that the China-Korea relationship would, by this time, be fully normalized, cooperative, and one of good neighbors. Hence, a rationale for the presence of U.S. troops and an alliance based on a possible perceived threat from China would not be realistic, and Beijing would question Seoul's sincerity should South Korea seek the continuation of the U.S. alliance and troop presence. Such reasoning already resonates in South Korea, where U.S. suggestions of a "China threat" ring hollow. South Korean scholar Jae Ho Chung has succinctly summarized the position in which Seoul would find itself: "China's growing influence over the Korean peninsula is real. The bottom line for Seoul is not to antagonize China; in this regard, South Korea being sucked into a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan or elsewhere must be avoided."¹⁰

China is also opposed to a hasty integration of North and South Korea.

If this is an accurate analysis of Beijing's vision of how the issue would play out, it is helpful to consider a series of variations by Chinese officials, analysts, and PLA officers that have been articulated over the past two years. The official position, of course—as reiterated by China's ambassador to the ROK on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of ties—is that China opposes the stationing of foreign troops abroad (although Ambassador Li Bin did not go so far as to denounce the generic existence of alliances *per se*).¹¹ Some PLA officers have privately voiced the view that under no circumstances could China tolerate the continuation of U.S. forces on its border. Other PLA officers, however, have offered the opinion in personal interviews that, as long as the forces were stationed below the thirty-eighth parallel and not "aimed against China," then China (and presumably the PLA) could live with them. Another position frequently heard from Chinese Foreign Ministry officials is that whether to maintain the U.S. alliance and the presence of U.S. troops is a sovereign decision to be made by a newly unified Korea and that, as long as the situation did not threaten any other nation, the decision is one to be worked out between the Korean and U.S. governments.

Chances range from very doubtful to nil that Beijing will go along with tailored containment.

The common denominator of all these views, of course, is the configuration and orientation of the troop deployments and the nature of the alliance after unification, but the broader issue is the state of Sino-U.S. relations at that time. If relations between the United States and China are troubled or antagonistic, with prominent persons in the United

States arguing that there is a China threat, then China would undoubtedly judge the presence of U.S. forces in Korea as a U.S. measure oriented against China and as front-line forces for intervention in Taiwan. If the United States and a unified Korea were to renegotiate the terms of the alliance and status of forces following unification, it is highly likely that China would seek some kind of assurance from Seoul that such forces could not be de-

ployed in any U.S. conflict with China, especially in the instance of a flare-up in the Taiwan Strait.

PHASED INTEGRATION

Concomitant with China's aversion to the DPRK's sudden implosion is its opposition to a hasty integration of North and South Korea. Chinese analysts estimate that rapid unification would inevitably be both unmanageable and disruptive, making the burdens of German unification pale in comparison. A substantial part of the human, financial, energy, and environmental costs would ultimately fall on China.

Beijing prefers to pursue a gradual, phased integration (*tonghe*), which will eventually lead to formal unification (*tongyi*). A German *Ostpolitik* model (or in the case of the ROK, a *Nordpolitik* model) is deemed the best way to proceed. This would involve a phased program of gradually increasing family, cultural, social, professional, and sports exchanges; direct transport links including rail links across the demilitarized zone (DMZ); commercial interchange, investment, and aid; intergovernmental exchanges; and a series of military confidence-building measures (CBMs) on both sides of the DMZ (one interesting model for these might be the CBMs that China and the Central Asian republics negotiated in the mid-1990s through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Once in place over several years, these various interactive measures would build the trust and confidence the two sides need to move toward discussions about formal political unification.

A MORE RESPONSIBLE NORTH KOREA

The last of China's goals is somehow to persuade Pyongyang to halt its roguish behavior when it comes to weapons proliferation as well as its WMD development. North Korea's conventional military deployments are also a concern, but they are secondary to issues of nuclear proliferation and WMD development. To this end, China advocates a complete return to the Agreed Framework.

Although containing North Korea's nuclear program is a high Chinese priority, it is not by any means the first issue on Beijing's agenda. China sees these issues as part and parcel of the broader set of policy goals outlined above. There certainly exists exigency at present, and it must be addressed, but China's longer-term vision for North Korea goes well beyond WMD issues.

China's Role in Resolving the Current Crisis

Beijing's basic approach to the current crisis is to seek a package deal, concluded multilaterally, which trades North Korea's abandonment of WMD for a clear road map that will:

- set North Korea on the path to real reform,
- initiate a phased integration of North and South Korea, and
- help normalize relations between the United States and the DPRK.

Chances range from very doubtful to nil that Beijing will go along with Washington's new strategy of tailored containment or participate in a collective, sanctions-based punitive policy toward Pyongyang. This is simply not the way China prefers to deal with the problem. Ever since the 1994 crisis, China has been very clear that it firmly believes that a strategy of coercion and isolation not only will be counterproductive to gaining Pyongyang's cooperation but also is likely to prompt the North Korean regime to take desperate and potentially catastrophic actions.

The obsessive and singular focus on the issue of a nuclear buildup misses the broader environment that China wishes to foster on the Korean peninsula. At a minimum, from China's perspective—as clearly articulated by Chinese president Jiang Zemin and Russian president Vladimir Putin at their December 2002 summit meeting—the nuclear issue must be linked to “normalization” of U.S. relations with the DPRK.¹² (In this context, at least, “normalization” does not necessarily imply diplomatic recognition; rather, it

implies the kind of Liaison Office arrangement that the United States and China had between 1972 and 1979.) Beijing's bottom line is that there must be a package deal linked to a range of initiatives to help alleviate North Korea's chronic economic and social crises and to bring the DPRK into the international community.

Moreover, despite the strains in relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, China is simply not going to allow North Korea to implode. The Chinese

government will do whatever it can to alleviate human suffering and to keep the North Korean regime on life support. If worst came to worst, however, and the regime did peacefully collapse, Beijing believes that it holds a very strong hand in exercising its influence over a unified Korea.

China's current close relations with Russia also strengthen Beijing's influence. The solidarity on the North Korea issue that Jiang and Putin demonstrated at their De-

cember 2002 Beijing summit has sent a strong signal that the two governments do not wish to pursue a coercive and confrontational policy toward Pyongyang in an effort to resolve the current nuclear crisis. Even though the call to return to the Agreed Framework is probably unrealistic, the two leaders clearly signaled a preference for a multilateral and comprehensive solution to the nuclear problem.

China seems to have a long-term perspective and road map for the Korean peninsula

China's Influence on Current U.S. Policy

Although some U.S. China analysts believe that the current crisis offers China a real opportunity to prove its credentials as a responsible power by siding with the Bush administration's tough approach to North Korea, it's actually the other way around. China seems to have the well-reasoned position based on a long-term perspective and road map for the Korean peninsula. Most importantly, China's position coincides with that of the other major powers and involved parties (South Korea, Russia, Japan, and the European Union). It is the United States that has struggled to find its footing on policy toward North Korea since the Bush administration took office in January 2001. The issue is not so much that Beijing should exercise its presumed influence or leverage over Pyongyang, as China does not have a great deal of influence in the first place and, in any event, does not choose to exercise it in an overtly coercive manner. China has constructively offered to host direct U.S.-DPRK talks in which Beijing could play an important facilitating role.

The Bush administration is still trying to satisfy its own conflicting impulses. On one hand, it is inclined to play hardball with the hard-line North Korean regime; on the other hand, the administration recognizes that only a multilateral and comprehensive approach will solve the problem. Only time will tell whether the Bush administration's dual approach will work or whether the United States will have to join China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, the EU, and other actors in recognizing that only a comprehensive solution that starts by acknowledging that a reforming and outwardly engaged DPRK is the ultimate solution to the problem.

Washington is not seeing the forest for the trees if it continues to believe that the issue of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program is the primary or only issue that needs to be resolved. It is also mistaken to believe that an explicit security guarantee to Pyongyang will be a sufficient trade-off. If the Bush administration continues with this myopic approach, it not only will fail to resolve the crisis but also will cause deep fissures with key allies and major powers. The United States will then potentially have the worst of all possible worlds: a nuclear-capable North Korea and severely strained relations with key nations that the United States needs on a range of other critical issues. Washington would be well advised to recognize this linkage sooner rather than later.

It is the United States that has struggled to find its footing on policy toward North Korea.

To be sure, Beijing has a variety of good reasons to work with the United States to halt Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Agreed Framework—not the least of which is that the existence of a nuclear North Korea is likely to prompt South Korea, Japan, and possibly Taiwan to follow suit. This development would change the entire balance of power in Northeast Asia—and not to China's advantage. Thus, China finds common cause with Washington, Seoul, Moscow, Tokyo, and Brussels to seek a permanent halt to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Such cooperation will be most successful, however, if all key parties work with a common vision of a North Korea on the road to reform.

Notes

1. See John Tkacik, "China's Korea Conundrum," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, December 2, 2002; Jasper Becker, "China's Influence Is Limited," *International Herald Tribune*, January 10, 2003; Philip Pan, "China Treads Carefully around North Korea," *Washington Post*, January 10, 2003.
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4. Ibid.
5. "Don't Get Too Capitalist Comrade," *Economist*, October 12, 2002.
6. James Brooke, "China 'Looming Large' in South Korea as Biggest Player, Replacing the U.S.," *New York Times*, January 3, 2003.
7. Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemmas," *Asian Survey* 41, no. 5 (September–October 2001): 781.
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9. "China Committed to Peninsular Peace: Jiang," *People's Daily* (internet edition), November 21, 2002, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/20>.
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11. Kim Ji-ho, "China's Envoy to ROK: U.S. Troops Must Not Pose Threat to Neighbors," *Korea Herald*, August 21, 2002, in FBIS/East Asia, August 21, 2002.
12. "Jiang Joins Putin in Leaning on Pyongyang," *International Herald Tribune*, December 3, 2002.