From npr@igc.apc.org Wed Feb 1 13:48:40 1995 Return-Path: Received: from mail.igc.apc.org by netcom18.netcom.com (8.6.9/Netcom) id NAA22927; Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:48:36 -0800 Received: from igc2.igc.apc.org (igc2.igc.apc.org [192.82.108.39]) by mail.igc.apc.org (8.6.9/Revision: 1.57 ) with SMTP id NAA08792 for ; Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:49:24 -0800 Received: (from npr) by igc2.igc.apc.org (8.6.9/Revision: 1.7 ) id NAA09287 for nautilus@netcom.com; Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:49:22 -0800 Date: Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:49:22 -0800 From: Nautilus Institute Message-Id: <199502012149.NAA09287@igc2.igc.apc.org> To: nautilus@netcom.com Subject: Rosen (energy) Status: O HEADLINE: TESTIMONY January 19, 1995 MORRIS ROSEN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SENATE ENERGY NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT BODY: The U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Hearing on the North Korea Nuclear Framework Agreement January 19, 1995 Testimony FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 Some Safety Considerations Morris Rosen Assistant Director General for Nuclear Safety International Atomic Energy Agency It is a pleasure to attend this hearing on the North Korea Nuclear Framework Agreement. While the International Atomic Energy Agency is involved with both non-proliferation and international safety matters, as the Assistant Director General for Nuclear Safety I will confine my comments solely to considerations concerning the safety of the proposed nuclear power plants to be built in the DPRK. The Framework Agreement's commitment to supply these plants raises three keysafety questions - questions which would in fact be common to any project calling for construction of a large nuclear power facility in a developing country. The first addresses safety standards; How will internationally accepted safety standards be integrated in the design, construction and FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 eventual operation? A second question speaks to the regulatory situation; How will a competent and strong regulatory or oversight mechanism be established? And a third speaks to actual operations; How will the DPRK develop the technicalcapability to operate and maintain a large modem nuclear facility? In dealing with these questions it will become clear that the countries associated with the Framework Agreement must have a major role in promoting safety, undoubtedly by providing various forms of technical support and assistance to the DPRK. The IAEA, as the only global intergovernmental body in the field of nuclear safety, has developed internationally accepted safety standards and various safety assistance activities which could be of value, particularly the many safety review services which are heavily used by its Member States. Additionally over the long term a new international instrument, the Convention on Nuclear Safety which is now open for signature, should have a significant role in ensuring safety, and I will turn to this point first. International Nuclear Safety Agreements Currently, there are a number of binding international agreements covering nuclear facilities. These include the Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in international transport, the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Following Incidents, and the Notification and Assistance FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 Conventions for serious nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies. There isalso an incident reporting procedure calling for detailed reporting on significant nuclear power plant events and an international nuclear event scale for communicating the severity of operational events to the public. The DPRK has signed in 1986 the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions but has not yet ratified them. It is not a party either to any of the other conventions mentioned. It would be desirable for the DPRK to adhere to the currently existing international agreements before operating its nuclear power plants and also to become a party to the new Convention on Nuclear Safety. The new Convention is the first legal instrument to directly address the safety of nuclear power plants worldwide. It embodies an international accord on the major factors needed to provide a high safety level. It has already beensigned by over 50 countries including virtually all those with nuclear plants and it is expected to enter into force within the next two years. The IAEA is the Secretariat for the Convention. The Convention expressly assigns the responsibility for safety to the individual countries with nuclear facilities and obligates them to establish andmaintain legislative frameworks having an independent regulatory body with a system of licensing, inspection and enforcement. It requires each country to FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 provide sufficient financial and human resources for its activities and to provide radiation protection of workers and the public along with tested emergency plans. It further requires comprehensive safety assessment and verification activities throughout the lifetime of the installation as well as the reporting and analyses of safety events. Central to the Convention is a requirement for each country to demonstrate its compliance through written reports submitted to periodic review meetings. The review meetings will identify problems, concerns, uncertainties and omissions in national reports. It is through this process that concerns would be dealt with through international discussions with the likelihood that a serious safety situation would subsequently be corrected. A document addressingthe safety issues and the general conclusions would be made available to the public. The first review meeting will be held within two and one- half years after the Convention's entry into force and then at least in three year intervals. Extraordinary meetings can be convened at any time. Unquestionably,by becoming a party to the Convention the DPRK will demonstrate its intention tomeet international standards of regulation and operation. In addition, the DPRK by signing the convention will be required to ensure that procedures exist for consulting other Contracting Parties in the vicinity of their nuclear power plant if they could likely be affected by that FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 facility, such as the ROK, China and Japan. They will be required to provide, upon request, the necessary information to the Contracting Parties in order to enable them to evaluate and make their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their territory of the nuclear facility. Let me turn now to the three questions I introduced earlier. These questions in essence deal with meeting international nuclear safety standards, with assuring an effective regulatory oversight mechanism and with ensuring the technical capability for operations. Meeting International Standards It will of course be the prime contractor and the Korean Energy Development Organization located in New York, that will be responsible for building the DPRKreactors in compliance with not only international standards but also, and more importantly, in compliance with the standards used for the similar reference plant, the Korean Standard Power Plant. It is common practice that exported facilities meet the standards applied in the country of origin. The Korean Standard Power Plant contains advanced safety features and is nota one of a kind reactor. The ambitious nuclear power programme of the ROK envisions using this plant concept for new domestic units in the coming FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 decade. The plant design draws on more than 25 years of Korean nuclear experience which has seen a unique diversity of light water reactors supplied bytwo US designers Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering - and by France along with heavy water reactors supplied by Canada. The ROK is no novice in the nuclear field. It has currently 9 reactors in operation, 6 in various stages ofconstruction and an additional 12 planned. Eleven developing countries currently operate plants built by foreign contractors. These plants were built under difficult conditions, many of which are common to large construction projects in countries lacking the necessary supporting technical, financial and governmental infrastructures. Many of the difficulties which may be encountered in the DPRK project have been successfullydealt with before. What is essential is a strong project management with an effective quality assurance and control mechanism and a safety culture which promotes adequate attention to safety. Barring some unusual or unforseen factors, such as severe political or economic instability, there should be no major hinderance to completion of the units to international safety standards. In fact the planned project in the DPRK may encounter fewer of the problems associated with developing country construction projects. It may be that the DPRK is further advanced technically than some countries which have previously introduced nuclear power. Although little is known about its industrial FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 infrastructure it has demonstrated a technical capacity to build and operate a nuclear research reactor since 1965 and it was engaged in the construction of two power facilities. Of course the demands presented by modern large and complex industrial undertakings will present new challenges, but the basic elements of a nuclear technical infrastructure exist in the country. Additionally, the physical proximity of the country supplying major plant components, with a common language and culture, should remove some of the usual logistic and communication problems encountered in such undertakings. It is not uncommon to be concerned about a developing country's capacity to operate a large modern industrial facility. With nuclear power projects, the construction period is usually used for intensive training of staff for plant operation. The commercial contract normally contains provisions for such training. Trainees come from staff of institutes operating research reactors and from staff of fossil power plants. Such individuals can be found in the DPRK. Training simulators and extended stays at utilities operating similar plants are important instructional components. Key plant operational staff are also required to pass an examination administered by the regulatory authority before receiving the necessary license to operate. These examinations must of course meet international requirements. It is also usual for the supplier to provide technical support for operation and maintenance during the initial operating period. FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 Regulatory Oversight Let me turn now to the regulatory oversight question. An IAEA Radiation Protection Advisory Team (RAPAT) mission visited the DPRK in October 1989 and itfound that general regulations and a radiation protection infrastructure did exist, but not to a satisfactory level. The Department of Radiation Control of the Ministry of Nuclear Energy acts as the national regulatory authority with a separate group of inspectors for the control of installations. The development of a legal and regulatory infrastructure for nuclear power in the DPRK is at an early stage. The ensuing few years before construction begins in earnest would provide sufficient time to secure the foundation of a satisfactory framework forsafety. Safety standards and relevant regulations could be adopted from the suppliercountry as was done in the ROK where for the US, French and Canadian plants the supplier country's requirements were adopted. Internationally agreed safety recommendations are also available and in fact the IAEA's Nuclear Safety Standards were accepted as the basis for safety requirements and regulations in China. Naturally, a well trained regulatory staff is required to perform the necessary inspections and safety assessments to assure that safety standards FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 are met. Development of a regulatory staff will certainly require the support and assistance of the countries associated with the Framework Agreement and alsoof the international community. I will shortly conclude my remarks by turning to some of the available assistance mechanisms. IAEA Assistance My concluding comments will briefly address some IAEA safety services which have been actively used by Member States. They cover all aspects of the development of a nuclear power program including site selection, design, construction, commissioning and operation. They include assistance in training and peer reviews by international experts of operating organizations, regulatorybodies and specific safety issues. The services have been of special value to developing countries in the construction and operation of their nuclear power plants. The various Agency safety services are well known to the countries involved with the Framework Agreement. At the invitation of the ROK we have sent Operational Safety Review Teams (OSART) to conduct 3 week comprehensive reviews of the many aspects of safe design and operation to each of its four reactor sites. Japan as well as the US have also invited these review teams. In the ROK we have provided direct assistance to the Regulatory body to improve its FDCH Congressional Testimony, January 19, 1995 capability to carry out safety responsibilities such as to perform safety assessments and on-site inspection activities. In the early stage of development of its nuclear programme a long term IAEA technical expert was assigned to Korea and numerous visits of international safety experts have been provided in the subsequent years. Although the DPRK itself is no longer a Member State of the IAEA, mechanismsmay be available to permit the Agency to assist in providing access to similar services. Of most importance would be mechanisms to allow the DPRK to benefit from the international nuclear community's technical knowledge and experience innuclear safety. The IAEA would be available to further discuss how it could contribute to the bilateral efforts which will be undertaken to promote the safety of the reactors to be built in the DPRK. May I thank you again for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. LANGUAGE: ENGLISH