1980s: Origins of Nuclear Safeguards.
On 12 December 1985 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
On 10 April 1992 the NPT Safeguards Agreement entered into force
(INFCIRC/403). Before that, in 1977, the country had concluded an
INFCIRC/66 type Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/252) for two nuclear research
facilities (the IRT research reactor and a critical assembly).
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Two-Phased Programme.
Two phases are to be distinguished in the DPRK's nuclear programme.
The first started at the end of the fifties and was set up with Soviet assistance.
In that period a nuclear complex was constructed at Nyongbyong, where in the 1960s a
number of facilities were built. The second - indigenous - phase started in 1979
with the construction of a 5 MW(e) natural uranium, graphite moderated reactor
in Nyongbyong. In the same period an ore processing plant and a fuel rod fabrication
plant were built. By the time the 5 MW(e) reactor became operational in 1986,
construction of the first of two larger gas-graphite reactors began and around 1987,
also in Nyongbyong, the construction of a Radiochemical Laboratory with a sizeable
reprocessing capacity started.
1990s: IAEA Safeguards Inspections. After the DPRK had submitted its initial report to
the IAEA under its Safeguards Agreement in May 1992, inspections began. Shortly
thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the DPRK's initial declaration and the
Agency's findings, centring on a mismatch between declared plutonium product and
nuclear waste solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested
that there existed in the DPRK undeclared plutonium. In order to find answers to the
inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of
the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information
and to two sites which seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste. The DPRK,
however, refused access to the sites.
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Special Inspection.
Thereupon, the Director General invoked in February 1993 the special
inspection procedure provided for in the Safeguards Agreement.
The request for a special inspection was refused by the DPRK and the Board of
Governors on 1 April 1993 concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with
its Safeguards Agreement and, in line with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute,
referred this non-compliance to the UN Security Council. On 11 May 1993,
the Council called upon the DPRK to comply with the Agreement.
In parallel with these developments, on 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced
its decision to withdraw from the NPT, but in June 1993 "suspended
the effectuation" of that withdrawal.
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Prelude to Security Council Action. During 1993 and 1994 the IAEA was permitted
by the DPRK to conduct safeguards activities with a limited scope only (containment,
surveillance and maintenance) with the sole purpose of ensuring, as the DPRK phrased it,
the "continuity of safeguards" versus "full implementation" demanded by the Agency.
The Director General reported as early as December 1993 to the Board that the kind of
limited safeguards permitted by the DPRK could no longer be said to provide any meaningful
assurance of the peaceful use of the DPRK's declared nuclear installations. Based on
the Director General's report, the UN Security Council, on 31 March 1994, again called
upon the DPRK to enable the inspectors to complete their required activities.
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June 1994 IAEA Board Resolution. In the context of the special inspection
request it was vital for the Agency to ascertain whether the core of the DPRK's 5 MW(e)
Experimental Nuclear Power reactor was the first core as claimed by the DPRK. However,
in May 1994, the DPRK hastily discharged the fuel from the 5 MW(e) reactor in such a
way that the IAEA was not able to conduct the verification activities that could have
clarified the history of the core. On 30 May 1994, in his statement, the President of
the Security Council called for immediate consultations between the DPRK and the
Agency in connection with the further discharge of the core, and, on 10 June 1994,
the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which concluded that "the DPRK is
continuing to widen its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement by taking actions
which prevent the Agency from verifying the history of the reactor core and from
ascertaining whether nuclear material from the reactor had been diverted in past years".
The Board also decided to suspend all non-medical technical assistance to the DPRK.
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DPRK Withdraws IAEA Membership. On 13 June 1994, the DPRK, which had been an
IAEA Member State since 1974, withdrew from its membership in the Agency. Although
the withdrawal did not affect the DPRK obligations under its Safeguards Agreement,
which in the Agency's view remains binding and in force, the DPRK took the position
that it was in a special position with regard to the Safeguards Agreement and that it
was no longer obliged to allow
the inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards Agreement.
US-DPRK Agreed Framework. The mid-1994 crisis was defused by the
visit of former President Carter in June 1994 and in the subsequent negotiations
that led to the Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK on 21 October 1994.
Under the Agreed Framework the US commits itself to make arrangements for the
provision of a LWR generating capacity of approximately 2000 MW(e) in exchange for
a DPRK "freeze" and ultimately the dismantlement of its graphite-moderated reactors
and related facilities. The arrangements for the LWR project led to the creation, in 1995,
of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).
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IAEA Monitoring of the Freeze.
The Agreed Framework stipulates that the IAEA will be allowed to monitor the freeze.
At the request of the Security Council (in a statement by the President of the Council
of 4 November 1994), and as authorized by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1994,
the IAEA has maintained a continuous presence in Nyongbyong to verify the freeze.
In the Agency's view, the activities under the Agreed Framework are a subset of
activities to be performed under the Safeguards Agreement. The facilities subject
to the freeze are the 5MW(e) reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing),
the fuel fabrication plant and the partially built 50 and 200MW(e) nuclear power plants.
IAEA-DPRK Technical Talks. Notwithstanding the continuing
difference between the Agency and the DPRK as to the status of
the Safeguards Agreement, regular technical meetings, about twice
a year, have taken place since 1994 in Vienna and the DPRK to
resolve outstanding issues. Initially the discussions focussed
on preserving the relevant information. However, despite 17 rounds
of technical consultations, no progress has been achieved on key
issues. After the Secretariat had determined, in September 2000,
that it would need 3 to 4 years to carry out all the activities
required to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial
report, the focus has shifted to obtaining full DPRK cooperation
to carry out these activities. So far the DPRK has not agreed
to even discuss such a programme of work. The last technical meeting
was held in November 2001. Repeated efforts in the course of 2002
to convene a technical meeting with "verification of the correctness
and completeness of the initial report" on the agenda have not
yet been successful.
KEDO Nuclear Plant Project. Factors relevant to the DPRK
position are its relations with the US and the progress in the
KEDO Project. The conclusion of an internal US review in June
2001 was that improved implementation of the Agreed Framework
should be sought. The Agreed Framework aimed at the completion
of the first reactor in 2003, but the project has suffered delays
for a number of reasons. However, since the start of the construction
phase in February 2000, the project has been on schedule. The
concrete for the first reactor was poured on 7 August 2002. According
to the Delivery Protocol to the 1995 KEDO-DPRK Supply Agreement,
which was handed over to the DPRK (and brought to the attention
of the Agency) at the end of April 2002, the first key nuclear
components will be delivered in mid-2005. This is relevant to
the Agency because the Agreed Framework specifies that the DPRK
has to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement
before key nuclear components can be delivered.
October 2002 Disclosures. A new phase started on 16 October
2002 with the announcement by the US that the DPRK side had acknowledged,
in talks with Assistant Secretary Kelly in early October that
it had a "programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons". Subsequently
in a number of statements, by the US, by the US together with
Japan and the Republic of Korea (28 October 2002), and by KEDO
(14 November 2002), the conclusion was drawn that the DPRK's programme
was a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the DPRK-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the North-South
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
In light of those violations the KEDO Board decided to suspend
heavy oil deliveries as of the December shipment.
November 2002: IAEA Seeks Clarification, Talks. The IAEA,
in faxes of 17 and 18 October, requested information about the
alleged programme and offered "to dispatch a senior team
to the DPRK or to receive a DPRK team in Vienna, to discuss recent
information and the general question of the implementation of
IAEA safeguards in the DPRK". No reply to these faxes was
received. On 29 November the Board of Governors adopted a resolution
without a vote in which the Board insisted that the DPRK should
reply and cooperate with the Agency. The Board recognized that
the programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons "or any other
covert nuclear activities, would constitute a violation of the
DPRK's international commitments, including the DPRK's safeguards
agreement with the Agency pursuant to the NPT".
December 2002: Exchanges of Letters. In his reply to the
IAEA Director General (dated 2 December, received 4 December)
the DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun expressed his disappointment
about the Agency's unilateral and unfair approach. The DPRK Government
could not accept the resolution, he said. On 12 December the Director
General received a further letter, from Mr. Ri Je Son, Director
General of the General Department of Atomic Energy in the DPRK,
conveying the DPRK decision on that day to lift the freeze on
its nuclear facilities as of 13 December in light of the US suspension
of the heavy fuel oil supply pursuant to the Agreed Framework.
The Director General replied the same day urging the DPRK not
to take unilateral steps related to seals or cameras and to agree
to an urgent meeting of technical experts to discuss practical
arrangements involved in moving from the freeze to normal safeguards
operations. However, on 22 December the DPRK started to cut seals
and disable surveillance cameras. On 27 December it ordered the
IAEA inspectors to leave the country.
January 2003: New Resolution, North Korea NPT Withdrawal.
In light of developments, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted
a resolution 6 January 2003 that called upon North Korea to cooperate
fully and urgently with the Agency. The Board affirmed that unless
the DPRK takes all required safeguards measures, it would be in
further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT effective as
of 11 January 2003. No agreed statement on the matter has been
issued by the NPT States Parties, or by the NPT depositary States
(Russia, UK and USA), or by the UN Security Council. (Article
X.1 of the NPT says that a State Party in exercising its national
sovereignty has the right to withdraw from the Treaty ... it shall
give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance
... [and] shall include a statement of the extraordinary events
it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.) The IAEA
is not a party to the NPT and hence it is not in the position
to determine the status of any State Party's membership of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. NPT States Parties' comprehensive safeguards
agreements with the IAEA provide that such agreements would remain
in force as long as the State is party to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
February 2003: IAEA Refers Issue to Security Council. Expressing
"deep concern" over North Korea's actions, the Board
of Governors adopted a resolution 12 February declaring North
Korea in further non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations,
and referring the matter to the UN Security Council, as the IAEA
is required to do in such circumstances under its Statute. The
Board called upon North Korea to remedy urgently its
non-compliance, and fully cooperate with the Agency. It also stressed
its desire for a peaceful resolution.
April 2003: Security Council Expresses Concern. Following
consultations 9 April, the UN Security Council expressed its "concern"
over the situation in North Korea and said it will keep following
developments there. UN Secretary-General Annan additionally has
appointed a Special Advisor on the North Korea issue.
No Complete Picture. The Agency has never been able to
verify the completeness and correctness of the initial report
of the DPRK under the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Since 1993 it
has drawn the conclusion that the DPRK is in non-compliance with
its obligations under the Agreement. In other words, the Agency
has never had the complete picture regarding DPRK nuclear activities
and has never been able to provide assurances regarding the peaceful
character of the DPRK nuclear programme. Between 1994 and 2002,
the Agreed Framework has been a tool that was aimed at bringing
the DPRK into compliance with its safeguards obligations. However,
the reports about a clandestine uranium enrichment programme,
the end of the freeze pursuant to the Agreed Framework,
and the expulsion of the IAEA inspectors have brought this phase
to an end.
Commitment to Solution. As IAEA Director General ElBaradei
stated to the Board 12 February 2003, the IAEA remains committed
to continuing to work with the DPRK and all concerned parties,
with a view to securing full safeguards compliance by the DPRK
through peaceful means.
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