Bush's Bipolar Disorder and the Looming Failure of Multilateral Talks With North Korea Peter Hayes, Arms Control Today, October 2003.
Many U.S. experts and the Bush administration believe
that the United States came out of the August 2003 six-party talks
aimed at halting North Koreas nuclear weapons program in a
stronger position than it went innot least because the D.P.R.K.
(North Korea) upset the other states, particularly Russia and China,
by threatening to test nuclear weapons while the United States lined
up with the other states to advocate a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.
Unfortunately, these pundits and the White House are wrong. A more
nuanced assessment of the talks indicates that the outcome may be
far less favorable to the United Statesand for nonproliferationthan
the Bush administration asserts. Rather than shore up Chinese support
for the U.S. position, the talks drove a wedge between Washington
and Beijing. These discussions also served to highlight the disarray
in U.S. policy toward Pyongyang.
Contrary to the blithe talk of hard-liners, the lack of the progress
to date and the poor prospects for future talks have revealed the
limits of political and military coercion to achieve nonproliferation
goals in Korea. They also point to the failure of U.S. policymakers
to exploit North Koreas economic dilemmas in ways that increase
mutual security and reduce and eventually eliminate the proliferation
threat. Unless the United States shifts gears and develops a more
practical and realistic set of proposals for a verifiable end to
the North Korean plutonium and highly-enriched uranium programs,
Kim Jong Il is likely to walk free with nuclear weapons before the
end of President George W. Bushs current term.
U.S. Policy Disputes
Unfortunately, U.S. policy is hamstrung by the presidents
unwillingness to resolve the relentless internal policy turmoil
that pits hardliners who want to squeeze Kim Jong Ils regime
with undeclared sanctions until it falls against those who favor
pragmatic engagement and bargaining.
Indeed, the Bush administration suffers from bipolar disorder. The
administrations erratic swings from limited diplomatic engagement
one day to personal statements by Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton prefiguring
the collapse of North Korea the next, and then back to engagement
the day after that reveals a real lack of strategic coherence on
the Bush administrations part. However, recent trends favor
engagementpartly because the hard-liners have been forced
to pull in their horns by the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Nonetheless,
it is evident that the Bush White House is not yet ready to accept
any answer from North Korean, short of complete surrender. Certainly
it would take presidential leadership to do soas former North
Korea negotiator Ambassador Jack Pritchard emphasized when he resigned
on the eve of the six-party talks.
Underlying these contending policy currents are very different views
on the nature of the political-economic processes underway in North
Korea. Rather than standard strategic calculi relating to deterrence
and compellence1, the pivot of the Korean nuclear issue
turns on economic rather than military power, a reality lost on
many pundits.
Many hard-liners in Washington doubt the plausibility of any scenario
whereby North Korea ultimately relinquishes its nuclear weapons
as part of a trade-in scenario. They appear to believe the following.
· The Kim Jong-Il clique is irrevocably
committed to its corrupt economic base and to obtaining nuclear
weapons at any cost, even of having an economy. Therefore, the
only U.S. policy options (embodied in the Proliferation Security
Initiative) are either to induce a coup, squeeze it to collapse,
or ratchet up sufficient pressure to force outright capitulation.
· The more the North Koreans play
with nuclear fire, the more it will hurt itself by alienating
its vital economic partners China and Russia.
· If North Korea goes nuclear,
then the United States, allies, and friends will contain North
Korea until it disarms or collapses.
· The only way to contain North
Korea is for other states to share the burden and to maximize
U.S. leverage over Pyongyang by building a global coalitionthe
construction of which will require much time and effort. This
edifice would be built on principles of anti-terrorism, elimination
of criminal exports (drugs, arms), nonproliferation, human rights,
etc. Until it is built, which principle or set of principles
will lead to multiple agreements between North Korea and external
powers (including the United States) remains unknown.
Far from preparing to engage, therefore, the hard-liners have maneuvered
furiously to block pragmatic moves by the Department of State, specifically
those that would engender an urgent bilateral deal (for example,
putting a refreeze of plutonium activities first, followed closely
by a declaration and freeze of enrichment activities).
Economic Transition or Stasis?
The hard-liners view of North Korea stems from a fundamentally flawed
analysis of the North Korean economy and Kim Jong Ils motivations.
The North Korean economy may be at rock bottom now, but it is slowly
on the way up. In the meantime, Kim Jong Ils most important
dilemma is maintaining momentum and political-military control of
his territory and populace. In particular, the conventional North
Korean military wants a growing economy in order to modernize. An
unhappy conventional military does not serve Kim Jong Ils
rule.
The most important recent development in North Korea has not been
Pyongyangs bluster about its nuclear arsenal but quiet moves
priming the North Korean economy for future growth and insulating
it from any international sanctions or quasi-sanctions. First, many
rural, provincial, and border communities have shifted to a local
make-shift economy from whatever resources they can mobilize. Second,
the big nationalsthe cities, the national leadership, and
the militaryrely on extracting a surplus from these local
make-shift economies and on external supportespecially from
China. Third, these players also charge rent on trade, investment,
and financing arrangements with third parties such as Taiwanese
and South Korean firms, labor exports to Russia, subvention from
overseas Koreans in Japan, etc. The Bush administrations Proliferation
Security Initiative2 can chase missile-carrying airplanes or ships
around the world, but it cannot make a dent in these fundamental
dynamics.
Relatedly, the marketization of the North Korean economy,
at least at the local level, and the breakup of state monopolies
and creation of proto-markets and competition between national agencies
is underway. The combination of thousands of
local survival initiatives and the national dynamics of institutional
reform ensure the permanence and irreversibility of the present
economic transition. So long as absolute living standards do not
crash again, increasing productive efficiency suggests that Kim
Jong Ils totalitarian pyramid of power will be politically
stable for the foreseeable future. It is anticipated that this trend
will accelerate over the coming years as the North Korean economy
continues to gradually shift toward markets. In this way, Pyongyang
is likely to follow a course first charted out by its two most influential
neighbors, South Korea and China.
Much more likely than collapse or a coup dreamed about by hawks
in Washington is the possibility that, within a decade, big party
bosses and players in North Korea will be operating vertically and
horizontally in integrated trading empires that look, feel, and
sound like South Korean chaebols, such as Hyundai and Daewoo, with
global operations but concentrated on a zone of urban-industrial
commerce and manufacturing along the northern side of the DMZ. There
will be at least a dozen or so North Korean billionaires selling
real estate at Panmunjon. The big question is: Will they be armed
with nuclear weapons? How this question is answered will depend
on whether the United States is willing to play a constructive role
in this nascent economic reform process or stand aside while it
happens.
Chinas Role
So far, the Bush administration has been unwilling to do so. Hard-liners
assume that time is on their side, with economic pressure squeezing
the North Korean economy while Pyongyangs obduracy costs it
the support of key regional players, most importantly China. But
the hard-liners are not only wrong about the North Korean economy,
they are also wrong about China. Far from consolidating Chinas
determination to hold North Korea accountable for its violations
of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the recent talks have actually
widened the distance between Beijing and Washington. China has played
a key role as host of the Beijing talks, first with just the United
States and North Korea and then with six parties including Russia,
Japan, and South Korea. It also serves as North Koreas economic
lifeline, providing most of its food and fuel. The hope among Washingtons
hard-line critics is that Pyongyang would behave so dangerously
as to drive Beijing to its knees.
This analysis rests on false assumptions about China and overlooks
key elements shaping its strategy toward Pyongyang most critically
how it views events on the peninsula through the prism of its own
foreign policy goals, especially reunification with Taiwan. These
Chinese goals actually give North Korea more leverage over China
than many hard-liners appreciate.
Given its vital interests, China places first priority on stability
of the Korean Peninsula. Beijing wants to avoid a flood of North
Korean refugees and needs South Korean investment, trade, and finance.
The Chinese are also aware that there are limits to their ability
to coerce North Korea, as Pyongyang can just as easily deploy its
nuclear weapons to target Beijing as Seoul, Tokyo, or Washington.
That comes on top of their continued need to reassure North Korea
that China will oppose regime change and, if necessesary, even support
the North Korean military against unilateral U.S. attacks. Most
critically, they want to prevent Washington from successfully using
coercion to get its way in Northeast Asia, fearing this would set
a precedent for the United States to militarily intervene in a reunification
war should Taiwan declare independence.
The Chinese have made it absolutely clear that they will militarily
back the North Koreans if they judge the United States, not North
Korea, to have escalated tension in Korea to the point of war. As
noted above, the Chinese see everything in North Korea through a
prism related to Taiwan. Americans should be under no illusion that
China has abandoned its interest in North Korea, provided
Pyongyang keeps its nuclear capacities suffiently quiet and underground
so that they are not perceived as an immediate threat by North Koreas
neighbors.
Indeed, if the Chinese needed any reminding of the stakes involved,
the North Koreans provided it. Those conversant with North Koreas
long-standing distrust of China, especially since Beijing recognized
Seoul without insisting on U.S. cross-recognition of Pyongyang in
the early 1990s, were not surprised by North Koreas threat
to test at the end of the talks. This was a deliberate poke in Chinas
eyes designed to bring home Pyongyangs frustration that Beijing
had not reined in U.S. unilateralism. It underscored North Korean
views that further talks were pointless.
It was no accident that China quickly moved to hold the United States
accountable for the lack of progress in the talks. Beijing blamed
the United States for dragging its feet and insisting on an unrealistic
North Korea acts first, we negotiate later stance.
To be sure, the Chinese have also read the riot act in Pyongyang,
telling North Korea that Beijing will view any North Korean nuclear
activities (such as a test) as dangerous and provocative. This advice
may have led the North Koreans not to display their latest missile
on North Korea national day in September.
Still, the Chinese now are letting policymakers in Washington know
that the United States has to shape up in the next round of talks
or there may not be one, at least not with China as host. Thus,
Chinas support for the U.S. position has become more contingent
on a major shift in U.S. policy toward pragmatism. At a minimum,
the United States will have to put enough tangible, new proposals
on the table to keep the talks alive.
Thus, the burning question for all parties (which could number seven
as the European Union may join) at the next round of talks is whether
the United States will unfold its own road map that all parties
can sign onto in different ways.
A Ukrainian Solution?
The failure to offer a U.S. initiative would risk the collapse of
the talks and any hope of constraining the North Korean nuclear
program. Fortunately, the empirical evidence of irreversible change
in North Korea combined with authoritative policy statements and
rational self-interest indicates that North Korea may accept an
affordable trade-in price paid by the U.S. and others for North
Koreas nuclear capacities. There is an important precedent
for such an outcome. In the mid-1990s, Ukrainewhich had possession
of some 1,900 former Soviet nuclear warheadsagreed to get
rid of them all in exchange for security assurances, economic support,
and energy assistance. Such a result did not come easily or cheaply
and required the dedicated attention of President Bill Clinton and
international partners. There were numerous members of the Ukrainian
leadership who feared giving up their nuclear deterrent force, who
saw the missiles as symbols of Ukrainian status and power. But in
the end, Ukraine agreed to relinquish the weapons and embrace Europe
and the world.
It is possible that this model could work for North Korea as well.
As with Ukraine, energy assistance, economic aid, and security guarantees
are at the heart of North Koreas diplomatic goals. China,
Russia, South Korea, and the United States are all, for the first
time, on relatively good terms; together, they could engage North
Korea in a way that assured its goals would be met, but only in
exchange for an accelerated and verified dismantlement of Pyongyangs
nuclear capability.
Underlying this view is the observation that North Koreas
leadership faces multiple, conflicting trade-offs and dilemmas and
that nuclear weapons are a means, not an end. An appreciation of
the real pressures on Pyongyang, plus a differing estimate of the
willingness of the Kim Jong-Il clique to make the shift from a corrupt,
criminal economic base to a normal commercial national economy,
are at root the difference between doctrinaire hard-liners and tough-minded
pragmatists. Following the formers policy prescriptions risks
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Of course, there is no way to provide proof positive
that North Koreas leadership can survive the roller-coaster
ride if such a transition is underway, or to refute the view that
Kim Jong Ils clique is unable to make the shift from a corrupt,
criminal economy toward a normal one nested in world markets. But
as bad as an actually existing North Korea may be, the
replacement could be worse, including possibly more motivated nuclear
export racketeers or civil war and loss of central control over
fissile material or actual nuclear weapons. The stakes are so high
that it is imperative that the United States fully test the proposition
that North Koreas nuclear weapons program can be bought out
while precision-guided markets and nongovernmental programs transform
North Korea from the inside out.
The North Koreans continue to probe U.S. intentions and the mood
in Washington to see what the traffic might bear. It is still not
too late to test North Korean intentions in return. The United States
holds the key to this door. So long as it lists North Korea as a
terrorist state, international institutions such as the World Bank
will not allow it to join. Without such intermediaries, countries
such as Japan and major corporations will not kickstart and invest
in North Koreas economy.
Bipolar Disorder in Washington
Provided the United States is willing to put something new on the
table, it is likely there will be a third round of talks. North
Korea has shifted slightly from insisting on a written nonaggression
pact, and U.S. officials are working on nontreaty ways of offering
a security guarantee to North Korea that would save face but mean
little given the realities at the DMZ.
But fundamentally, until and unless the United States is willing
to drive a set of stakes in the ground that indicate what it is
willing to do for Pyongyang and when, and what North Korea must
do in reciprocal, interdependent fashion, the talks will not achieve
President Bushs goal of peacefully resolving the nuclear issue
in Korea. There is no shortage of pragmatic visions for dealing
with Pyongyang, including grand schemes for comprehensive settlements,3
lesser steps forward one foot at a time,4 and detailed technical
schemes for the hardest question of all monitoring and verifying
the lack of clandestine enrichment activity.5 What is missing is
political will from the White House.
Meanwhile, North Korea may be pursuing feverishly its nuclear weapons
and thereby increasing their political-military value and their
potential trade-in price. By now, Pyongyang may have successfully
reprocessed the spent fuel stored at Yongbyon since 1994, in which
case it
already has the fissile material to manufacture up to eight plutonium-based
nuclear weapons.
Given the slow pace of past and future multilateral talks relative
to possible North Korean proliferation activity, the Bush administration
is stunningly serene about the prospect that North Korea will simply
play its nuclear hand once and for all. Some officials say that,
if it were to do so, then the international response would be overhelming.
When asked for a game plan or precedent to this effect, they are
silent. Similarly, the administration has no specific format in
mind for a multilateral pact with North Korea.
In fact, the White House appears to be relying on Kim Jong Il to
slice his nuclear salami paper-thin, rather than cut off big chunks
by testing and deploying. This is risky as it places the initiative
in Pyongyang rather than Washington.
Wild Cards
Unfortunately, American history in Korea is full of rude surprises
and strategic miscalculations. Pushed hard enough, the North Koreans
may conduct an underground, low-yield subcritical test that would
keep everyone guessing and increase the ambiguity created by their
nuclear weapons. In this Green Flash scenario, North
Korea would walk free with nuclear weapons while the U.S.-led Proliferation
Security Initiative chases their exports.6 Just to complicate the
situation, Pyongyang might invite inspectors back into North Korea
at this juncture or if the situation on the peninsula veered back
toward war, as it has in the past with little notice,7 they could
export a nuclear weapon, perhaps the most dangerous outcome of all.8
Or North Korea could conduct a transparent, above-ground nuclear
test and hang tough, the so-called Boom Boom scenario. This outcome
might suit the hard-liners in that it would justify their previously-held
views. Yet, it might prompt unilateral U.S. military strikes that
would risk all-out war on the Peninsula and even with China. More
likely, it would portend the United States drifting away from the
Korean Peninsula while other powers cut their own deals with Pyongyang
and respond to a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in other
Asian states. Should President Bush be reelected, and should Iraq
be stabilized, it is conceivable that he would then decide to take
action seeking to reverse the North Korean rush across the nuclear
redline. But by then, U.S. power to affect the situation will have
dwindled while our uncertainty as to what North Korea actually has
will have increased greatly.
If these outcomes are unacceptable to the White House, then some
other factor must trigger President Bushs attention between
now and the elections, preferably earlier rather than later. Perhaps
the Democratic presidential candidates will start to beat the administration
publicly for a failed North Korea policy rather than ducking for
cover on the issue. Perhaps Pyongyang will simply collapse and go
away. However, wishful thinking is a poor basis for breaking the
link between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism in the case
of North Korea.
NOTES
1. The term compellence was devised by the scholar Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence (Greenwood Press, Wesport, Ct. 1976). It describes
a more complex strategy than simple deterrence. A compelling
threat is an active or offensive strategy taken on the initiative
of the threatener while a deterrent threat is described as a promised
reaction to an adversary whose potential action evokes a specified
response.
2. Announced May 31 by President George W. Bush in Poland, the Proliferation
Security Initiative seeks to bolster the resolve and capabilities
of participating countries to intercept shipments of WMD, missiles,
and related technologies to terrorists and countries of proliferation
concern. The United States has made no secret that North Korea is
a primary target of the initiative even though it is ostensibly
not aimed at any specific countries. Washington has enlisted 10
other countriesAustralia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdomin
the initiative and says that it will seek to broaden the effort
as much as possible.
3. M. OHanlon, A Master Plan to Deal with North
Korea , January 2003, Brookings Institution, available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/uspolicy/Michael.html.
4. M. Armacost, D. Okimoto, G.W. Shin, Addressing the North Korea
Nuclear Challenge, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University,
April 15, 2003, available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/uspolicy/APARC.html.
5. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Nautilus Institute,
Verifying DPRK Nuclear Disarmament, A Technical Analysis, 2003,
available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/monitoringVerification/CEIP=WP_38_Nautilus=final.pdf.
6. See Nautilus Institute, A Korean Krakatoa? Scenarios for the
Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, August 2003,
available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/scenarios/DPRKscenarios2003.pdf.
7. See Robert G. Rich, U.S. Ground Force Withdrawal From Korea:
A Case Study in National Security Decision Making, Executive
Seminar in National and International Affairs, 1981-82, released
to Nautilus Institute under US Freedom of Information Act, available
at www.nautilus.org/foia/richwithdrawl.html.
8. See P. Hayes, Plutonium Pineapples: Avoiding Awful Choices
OVer North Korean Nuclear Exports, PFO 03-40, August 20, 2003,
available at www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0340_Hayes.html.
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