TMD, US-JAPAN RELATIONS, AND EAST ASIAN SECURITY(1)
by DUAN Hong
There has been a certain kind of cooperation between Japan and the United
States on ballistic missile defense since the late 1980s, but that cooperation
has been greatly strengthened and accelerated during the last three years.
In December 1998 the Japanese government formally declared that Japan would
commence joint research on a TMD system with the US in fiscal year 1999.
According to an agreement signed in August 1999, The joint R&D effort
will focus on the sea-based Navy Theatre Wide Missile defense system, which
will be deployed in 2007 in East Asia. With TMD suddenly becoming something
real and impending, it also turns out to be one of the most contentious
issues in East Asian security. The fault line is quite clear- cut: US and
Japan on one side arguing that TMD is defensive in nature and that the
introduction of TMD in Asia actually is irreversible, while China, Russia,
and the DPRK are on the other side expressing deep concern and strong objection
to the idea of TMD. Though still in the R&D stage, TMD has already
begun to show its teeth by dividing countries into different groups and
deepening the suspicions between major powers in this region. It is highly
likely that the US-Japan co- development, especially the possible deployment,
of TMD will lead to more uncertainties in East Asia than otherwise. The
joint TMD program will strengthen the US-Japan alliance further, but may
do so at the expense of regional stability and security, ironically that
which TMD is supposed to achieve.
TMD will increase the military cooperation between the US and Japan
and the potential of the US-Japan alliance to take military actions around
Asia. Mainly due to Japan's reluctance to join the US on TMD, TMD
had been conceived for years as a problem for the US-Japan alliance by
defense policy-makers in both Washington, D.C. and Tokyo. However, that
trouble has disappeared now. Possible divergence over the scope, size,
form, deployment and control of a TMD system might cause new problems in
the future. On the whole, however, the joint TMD program may be beneficial
to the US-Japan alliance. Obviously, the joint R&D of TMD will increase
the military cooperation between the US and Japan, enhance the military
and dual-use technology transfers between the two countries, and as such,
make their alliance even closer and stronger. There is also an argument
by both the US and Japan that TMD is able to improve military interoperability
and intelligence information sharing of the US-Japan alliance by helping
integrate Japan into the US command system(2).
An effective TMD system will greatly increase the overall capability
of the US-Japan alliance and thus, its potential to intervene in regional
conflicts. The revision of the US-Japan defense guidelines in the
late 1990s has changed the nature of the alliance in a profound way: it
has become a mechanism for dealing with a wide range of regional security
issues. Under the new guidelines, Japan has the obligation to provide logistics
assistance to the US troops that become involved in "contingency in the
areas surrounding Japan," although neither country has made clear the very
content of such a "contingency" and the scope of "areas surrounding Japan."
In brief, the new guidelines provide the framework for the alliance to
conduct military action for all possible occasions. But there is a fear
that, when a conflict emerges in the areas surrounding Japan - for example,
a conflict on the Korean Peninsula - Japan might be reluctant to join in
the US military intervention partly because of its vulnerabilities to possible
WMD retaliations. An effective TMD will undoubtedly help a lot in this
regard. In fact, some advocates of TMD argue that an important rationale
and potential benefit of TMD is that it will reduce the risks associated
with regional military interventions and as such contribute to the efficiency
of the US-Japan military alliance(3). Hence, it is plausible to assume
that with the protection of a sophisticated TMD umbrella, the US, and to
a lesser extent Japan, may be more ready to use force when dealing with
regional security issues. Given what happened in Kosovo in 1999,
many countries in East Asia do not see that scenario as a rosy one. Such
a super military alliance without any constraint certainly will raise more
suspicions and uncertainties among countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
Some of them may have to choose to invest more in advanced weapons and
military technologies, trying to prepare for the worse. As a consequence,
certain kind of arms race in this region may be inevitable in the long
run.
TMD will elevate Japan's role in regional security affairs, helping
Japan go even further in the direction of becoming a major military power.
Except for a lack of strategic capabilities, Japan is already a major military
power in many respects. As the biggest economic power in East Asia, Japan
has been keeping the second largest defense expenditure in the world for
years. In addition to having the strongest marine force in East Asia, Japan
also possesses some of the most advanced military equipment and technologies,
including highly sophisticated technologies of launching rockets and satellites.
Though Japan has chosen not to produce and possess nuclear weapons, it
does have the capacity to make nuclear bombs within very short time.
In a word, Japan has every POTENTIAL to quickly become a major military
power. The US has been encouraging Japan to engage in overseas military
actions more actively through the redefinition of the bilateral alliance.
Now with the joint TMD program with the US, Japan is not only going to
spend more on its military(4), its capabilities in early warning, intelligence
collection and rapid response of military action will also be greatly enhanced(5).
Furthermore, as the revision of the US-Japan alliance, the introduction
of TMD will have a profound impact on Japan's security approach. To stretch
military muscle overseas more actively, to conduct TMD cooperation, and
especially the technology transfers with the US, and to deploy a TMD system
on Japanese soil, Japan must first address various constitutional and other
legal restraints. For example, it will pose a serious constitutional
and political problem for Japan if the US and Japan opt for a TMD system
with boost-phase interceptors. Actually we have already witnessed
some repercussions of TMD on the debate inside Japan over its military
strategy recently. Since 1999, some influential Japanese officials began
to argue bluntly that it is within Japan's self-defense right to launch
preemptive attack against overseas bases from which a missile attack against
Japan might be attempted. Soon, Japan's defense white paper of 1999 recognized
that right by reinterpreting the constitution.
What makes things even more complicated is the fact that Japan is undergoing
critical changes(6). There is greater sentiment for Japan to become a "normal"
country. Attitudes about security is in flux, and correspondingly,
the idea that Japan should take a more independent security approach and
play a larger role in regional security arena is gaining ground. Changing
the pacifist constitution used to be taboo, but the topic is now being
overtly and hotly debated. There are uncertainties regarding the future
orientation of Japan: Will Japan be satisfied with acquiring only missile
defense capabilities? How will a Japan with much stronger muscle and more
aggressive approach pursue security relations with other countries in this
region? The ongoing TMD program may, to a large extent, influence
answers to those questions. Some people in Japan do want to remilitarize
Japan and TMD can easily be used to facilitate their objectives.
Therefore there is deep concern that TMD will be taken as an excuse by
those Japanese favoring a strong military and more aggressive security
approach. Unfortunately, the lack of transparency over the details of the
US-Japan joint TMD program and over the strategic intentions of Japan itself
only increases those concerns and suspicions.
TMD has the potential to upset the strategic stability in East Asia
and thus shake the very foundation of regional security. There is an increasing
consensus in East Asia that relations between major powers in this region,
especially trilateral relations between the US, Japan and China, have a
decisive impact on the stability of the region as a whole. How that trilateral
relationship evolves will influence the landscape of the regional security
in a profound way. Unfortunately, relations between major powers in this
region are very unbalanced in two ways.
Firstly, there is a large gap between the capabilities of the different
countries, both economically and militarily. The US is the only superpower
in the world. Japan has perhaps one of the strongest conventional forces
in the world, and is increasingly becoming a major military power; it does
not possess its own strategic capabilities, but enjoys the protection of
the US nuclear umbrella. China is lagging far behind the US and Japan in
terms of military power and technological capabilities.
Secondly, the US and Japan are close allies, whose security alliance
has just been updated. On the contrary, China's relations with both the
US and Japan are far from satisfying; there are a lot of problems in those
relationships; a basic trust is missing.
However, a subtle strategic balance does exist between the three - that
is, China has a very limited strategic deterrent capabilities. With that
very limited strategic capabilities, China feels secure while it does not
pose any threat to the security of the US and Japan. On the basis of such
a strategic balance or stability, major powers can pursue dialogues and
cooperation in spite of mistrust and divergences.
An effective TMD system, if deployed in East Asia, has the potential
to break down that fragile strategic stability by neutralizing China's
deterrent capabilities. An effective TMD will definitely degrade China's
medium-range missile capability(7). Furthermore, according to experts'
assessment, upper-tier TMD, like the NTW system that is currently under
the co-development of the US and Japan, actually will have a capability
to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles with ranges up to 10,000
kilometers(8).
It is true that a sophisticated TMD does not exist now and there're
still some uncertainties over its technological feasibility. However, the
potential is out there; and the mistrust and suspicions of China regarding
the long-term strategic intentions of the other two make that potential
even more troublesome. The stake is just too big for China to take the
chance. In the long run, China may feel it necessary to take some counter
actions, which in turn may push the US and Japan to invest even more in
missile defenses and other advanced military technologies. With the introduction
and development of TMD, there is a real danger that major players in East
Asia will be trapped into a downward spiral of security dilemma.
TMD has increased and will continue to increase the suspicions between
major powers in East Asia. It may be cliché to say that there exist
deep mistrust and suspicions between the US, Japan and China. But the point
is that those suspicions have been getting stronger during the last few
years. In the US, China is regarded as potential competitor that may have
the capability and willingness to challenge the American primacy in the
future. The popular description of Sino-American relations has been
changed to "strategic competitor" from the more optimistic "build towards
a constructive strategic partnership"(9). In Japan, the perception of a
rising China is markedly divided, while the perception of so-called "China
missile threat" has become more acute. In the mean time, with the strengthening
of the US- Japan military alliance, the introduction of TMD, and especially
the bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO last year, China is
even more suspicious of long-term intentions of the US and Japan. There
is a consensus among Chinese scholars that the revision of the US-Japan
defense guideline, if it was not completely targeted against China(10),
was to a large extent motivated by the perception of China's rising. The
joint TMD program between the US and Japan adds new salt to that suspicion.
Both the US and Japan claim the "North Korea missile threat" as the
rationale for their development and future deployment of TMD in East Asia.
Given the DPRK's unprecedented economic stringency and consequently the
deterioration of its security situation, it is extremely hard to think
the DPRK will pose any serious threat to Japan and the United States. A
military attack initiated by the DPRK will only result in its collapse,
and will be no different from suicide. In fact, despite their emphasis
on the missile threat from the DPRK, some insiders of Japanese defense
policy circle tend to take North Korea's failed launch of a satellite in
1998 as a blessing rather than disaster, for it helps them mobilize the
necessary public support for TMD and thereby put new momentum to the alliance
with the US. In brief, the North Korea missile threat is just not convincing
enough.
Some Chinese do worry that the real intention of TMD behind the scene
may be China. Latest development in Northeast Asia deepens that fear further.
The DPRK declared a moratorium on missile test in September 1999; then
it began to take an unprecedentedly open diplomatic approach, actively
pursuing dialogues and better relations with many western countries. Finally
the leaders of the two Koreas conducted a summit meeting in Pyongyang in
June 2000. Unfortunately, the US and Japan are determined to put forward
their joint program on TMD no matter what have been achieved on the Korean
Peninsula. But the problem is that, a big adventure like TMD does need
something to justify its huge costs and all the possible risks. With the
easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and consequently the inevitable
declining of "North Korea missile threat," some Chinese scholars fear,
China become the primary rationale for TMD.
TMD will increase uncertainties and tensions over Taiwan Strait Taiwan
stands as the most difficult and sensitive issue in both Sino-American
and Sino-Japanese relations. It is the only issue that can drag the United
State and Japan, perhaps to a lesser extent, into a military conflict with
China. China's grave concern over the redefined US-Japan security alliance
is also largely driven by the deliberately ambiguous attitudes of the US
and Japan over Taiwan. Though reluctant to define the geographic coverage
or scope of the new defense guideline in an explicit way, neither the US
nor Japan rule out the possibility that they will intervene in the case
of a conflict or "contingency" across the Taiwan Strait. The same ambiguity
strategy is being taken on TMD again. Both countries, especially the US,
refuse to exclude the possibility of providing Taiwan with certain form
of TMD protection-by selling TMD equipment and technology to Taiwan, by
integrating Taiwan into a US-Japan TMD system led by the US, or by deploying
a Japan-based ship equipped with missile defense capabilities(11). Such
an ambiguity has already enhanced China's suspicions about the US and Japan's
real intentions towards China and especially towards Taiwan, which puts
new strain upon Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. Since Taiwan
lies in the vital national security interests of China, it is certain that
TMD will continue to harass relations between major powers in East Asia
and may in a critical way.
To make things worse, the US and Japan's current approach to TMD and
Taiwan may aggravate tensions over the Taiwan Strait by giving Taiwan a
false perception with regard to the US protection. Now TMD is still in
R &D stage. However, given the sensitive nature of TMD and Taiwan issue,
for many the symbolic and political implications of TMD go far beyond its
real capability. Just as an American scholar observes (quite correctly,
if I might say), both those Americans arguing for providing TMD to Taiwan
and those Taiwanese seek TMD aggressively from the US are driven more by
political calculations(12). They seem to believe TMD will create a tighter
military link between the US and Taiwan and thus render American abandonment
of Taiwan in a crisis less likely, which remarkably corresponds to Chinese
view and worries about this issue. The fact that the US keeps the options
to provide TMD to Taiwan open per se may be perceived by the secessionists
in Taiwan as sort of guarantee of the US protection, and then they may
feel even less motivated to engage in serious political talks with mainland
China. As a consequence, the sentiment in Taiwan for formal independence
may be encouraged, and as such the likelihood of military conflict will
become greater.
Lastly, but not the least important, with an effective TMD system, the
scenario that the US-Japan alliance involves in a conflict over Taiwan
is getting even more real. Then the possibility of a conflict between China
and the US-Japan alliance is also increasing.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis of TMD implications might be too gloomy for many
advocates of TMD. Unfortunately, the danger is real. In the past two years,
we have already witnessed a lot how TMD issue could damage relations between
countries and impede their cooperation on other important security issues.
The result can be even worse if the US and Japan continue to head for a
TMD system without addressing basic concerns over that issue. As major
players in East Asia, the US, Japan and China all have vital interests
in maintaining the regional stability and security. There is no reason
why we should let TMD damage our relations and ultimately ruin the stability
of the whole region. Therefore, to increase confidence and trust between
countries, to maintain the stability of East Asia region as a whole, The
US and Japan may have second thoughts over their joint TMD program and
take into account basic concerns of other countries in a serious manner.
At least they could promise not to provide any TMD, whether TMD equipment
or technology, to Taiwan. Meanwhile, to reduce the uncertainties that might
be caused by TMD, they may show more transparency over their TMD program
and their strategic intention towards China. More dialogues on TMD and
security issues will certainly be helpful in that regard. We may have a
lot of differences, but at least we should and could speak it out.
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(1) This paper is based on author's presentation at the Workshop
on "East Asian Regional Security Futures: Theater Missile Defense Implications",
which is jointly sponsored by the Nautilus Institute and the UN University,
(Tokyo, June 24- 25, 2000). The paper reflects only author's personal views.
(2) See Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo's Temperance", The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 3 (Summer 2000).
(3) At the workshop on TMD's Implications on East Asian Security
held in Tokyo in June 24-25, Japanese participants mentioned this point
explicitly. It is a coincidence that, advocates of NMD in the US also believe
that one rationale of NMD is for the US to have the freedom to act globally.
To know more about this argument, see Keith B. Payne, "The Case for National
Missile Defense", Orbis, Spring 2000.
(4) Under the joint TMD program with the US, Japan's R&D costs
are expected to be around $250m over five years. See IISS, The Military
Balance 1999-2000.
(5) See Zhu Feng, "On TMD and East Asia Security", International
Studies, no.4, 1999.
(6) See, for example, Kurt M. Campbell, "Energizing the
U.S.-Japan Security Partnership", The Washington Quarterly, vol. 23, no.
4 (Autumn 2000); Michael Green, "Why Tokyo Will be a larger Player in Asia",
available at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/.
(7) See IISS, The Military Balance 1999-2000.
(8) See, for example, Frank Barnaby, "Ballistic Missile Defense
Re-visited II", Peace, June 2000.
(9) See, for example, David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic
Relations: From Partners To Competitors", Survival, vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring
2000).
(10) See China-US-Japan Relations In Transition, edited by Zhang
Yunlin, Chinese Social Science Publishing house (Beijing: 1997).
(11) As to the US options for providing TMD capabilities or protection
to Taiwan, see "Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Options for
the Asia-Pacific Region", the US Department of Defense.
(12) See, Thomas J. Christensen, "Theater Missile Defense and
Taiwan's Security", Orbis, Spring 2000. |