NMD, TMD, Arms Control
by GU Guoliang
After the end of the Cold War, the United States became the only superpower
in the world. While the international situation as a whole is relaxing,
the United States, which possesses the world's most powerful nuclear and
conventional forces, is claiming that it is now facing more serious and
challenging threats from multiple, unpredicted sources. Using the
grossly exaggerated threat posed by the so-called rogue states (or the
states of concern) described by the Rumsfeld Commission report and others,
the United States made a decision in 1999 to accelerate its development
of both National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD)
systems to defend the entire United States territory, its forward deployed
troops, and its allies against missile attacks. This reflects the
changing US arms control and nonproliferation policies and the US tendency
towards unilaterialism. US development of NMD and TMD has a major
negative impact on nuclear disarmament and international nonproliferation
efforts. It has affected the relations of the major powers, US-China
relations, and US-Japan relations in particular. US NMD and TMD development
has also undermined their cooperation in the field of arms control and
nonproliferation.
1. US NMD and TMD programs run counter to the objectives of arms
control, challenge traditional arms control theories, and cast doubt on
the future of international arms control regimes.
The objectives and functions of arms control are to slow global and
regional arms races, minimize the disparities between heavily and lightly
armed states (thus removing an important source of instability), and promote
trust and better understanding among nations.(1) However, the strategic
goal of the United States in developing and deploying NMD and TMD is to
achieve an absolute US military superiority in both offensive and defensive
capabilities, further enlarging the huge existing disparity between the
United States and other countries. This will certainly lead to an
arms race and undermine the trust among the major powers. Russia,
China, and even the United States' European allies have expressed their
opposition against and concern about US development of NMD. China
and other Asian countries have also shown their concern about the effects
of US TMD development on the Asia-Pacific region.
In the United States, the issues of NMD and TMD have brought about heated
debates on whether the idea of arms control is out- dated and whether arms
control will have a future. The proponents of NMD and TMD advocate
that traditional arms control theories, which embrace a mutually assured
destruction approach to deterrence and strategic stability, no longer fit
the post- Cold War security situation. They argue that deterrence
is no longer a viable threat-reduction strategy, and that deterrence may
fail in the face of multiple and unpredicted threats from so- called "states
of concern."(2) Therefore, the proponents want to replace offensive
deterrence with defensive deterrence and believe that NMD and TMD are the
right answers.
US development of NMD and TMD also reflects a growing tendency in the
United States toward unilaterialism. The Republican dominated congress
and some right-wing forces place more emphasis on US military build-up
and unilateral military intervention than international arms control treaties
and international nonproliferation cooperation. The failure of the
US Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) last October,
and the US attempt to modify and even threaten to abandon the Anti- Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty to pave the way for its NMD and TMD programs, reflect
this tendency toward unilaterialism. US advocates believe that the
United States can now have both the financial and technological capabilities
to develop and deploy NMD and TMD without having to care about the reactions
from Russia or other countries because they cannot afford to have an arms
race with the United States. They argue that international arms control
treaties cannot be effectively verified and can only pose a threat to US
maintenance of its military superiority. Because the US arms control
and nonproliferation policy is in disarray, many scholars both inside and
outside of the United States have real concerns about the future of international
arms control.
2. US development of NMD and TMD programs has resulted in a seriously
negative impact on nuclear disarmament and international nonproliferation
efforts.
In the past ten years or so, through common efforts of the international
community, a series of important progressive steps has been made in promoting
the nonproliferation process. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
was concluded in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. The Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely in 1995 and the CTBT was concluded
in 1996. After 1996, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva began
to prepare for the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
Based on the aforementioned achievements, the international community should
have further promoted the nonproliferation process and decreased the threat
from weapons of mass destruction, but the US NMD and TMD programs have
weakened and may even negate these past achievements.
US development of NMD and TMD will upset the existing global and regional
strategic balance and impede or even reverse the nuclear disarmament process.
Over the past years, the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia), through
arduous negotiations, concluded the ABM Treaty, the Treaty on the Elimination
of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) I, and START II. These treaties constitute
the cornerstone of the strategic balance between the United States and
the Soviet Union (Russia). They also lay the basis for further nuclear
disarmament. The US development of NMD and the upper-tier TMD systems
violate the goals and the basic provisions of the ABM treaty, which prohibits
the establishment of a territorial anti-missile system and the development,
testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or land-based
mobile anti-missile systems and their components. Russian leaders
have stated several times that Russia opposes any modification to the ABM
treaty and have warned that if the United States abandons the ABM treaty,
Russia will withdraw from all nuclear arms control treaties negotiated
with the United States. Russian military leaders have claimed that
Russia will develop new offensive strategic weapons if the United States
deploys NMD. This will trigger a new round of arms race between the
United States and Russia.
US development of NMD will also weaken and neutralize the credibility
of the limited nuclear arsenals possessed by the United Kingdom, France,
and China. It will also undermine their strategic interests.
The maintenance of a strategic balance among the major powers is the precondition
for nuclear disarmament. If the balance is undermined, the nuclear
disarmament process will be obstructed, delayed, and maybe even reversed.
The United States' European allies have expressed their opposition against
and concern about US development of NMD. President Chirac of France
warned that the US NMD program would endanger the efforts made by the international
community in preventing nuclear proliferation. German Chancellor
Schroeder noted that the NMD program would lead to a new round of global
arms racing and have a negative impact on the unity of NATO. The
European countries fear that this program will suspend the implementation
of the existing arms control agreements between the United States and Russia
and decouple US security with Europe.
The US development and deployment of a TMD system in Asia will upset
the regional military balance and undermine stability in the Asia-Pacific
region. The TMD system is not only a part of the NMD system, it is
also a forward deployed US NMD system. Joint TMD development between
the United States and Japan also constitutes proliferation of missile technologies
in the region. The deployment of TMD could only worsen the security
situation in Northeast Asia. That is why South Korea has refused
the offer of joint TMD development with the United States, but has instead
pursued a "sunshine policy" towards North Korea, which successfully resulted
in a historic summit between the two leaders. The joint development
of TMD between the United States and Japan has caused suspicion and concern
about the intention of Japan, not only from China, but also from other
Asian countries. An arms race in the Asia-Pacific region has already
begun.
The non-nuclear states always link the progress in nuclear disarmament
with nonproliferation. The understanding reached at the 1995 NPT
Review and Extension Conference is that the nuclear states should negotiate
in earnest on effective nuclear disarmament measures in accordance with
the provisions of Article VI of the NPT. If the nuclear disarmament
process is at a standstill as a result of US development of NMD and TMD,
it may push the nuclear nonproliferation regime to the brink of collapse.
Since the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the international
community has shown an increasing concern about the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. The US rejection of CTBT ratification and its
attempt to modify the ABM treaty have weakened the credibility of the United
States as a leader in the field of arms control and nonproliferation.
Since the existing arms control and nonproliferation agreements are being
questioned, it is improbable that any new arms control and nonproliferation
agreements will be reached. That is why the negotiations at the Conference
on Disarmament are now at a stalemate. Furthermore, this stagnant
situation may encourage some "threshold" countries to follow the footsteps
of India and Pakistan. If that happens, all the efforts and achievements
made by the international community over the years will be negated and
the world will be even more insecure. 3. US development of NMD and
TMD has soured the relations among the major powers. It has soured US-China
relations and China- Japan relations in particular. It has also undermined
the cooperation among these countries in the field of arms control and
nonproliferation.
In recent years, China and the United States have cooperated well in
the field of arms control and nonproliferation. China and the United
States, both signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), are dedicated to ensuring the effective
implementation of the conventions. In the joint China-US statement
made during President Jiang's visit to the United States in 1997, both
countries agreed to cooperate on the execution of the CWC and enhance government
supervision over the exports of chemicals. During President Clinton's
visit to China in 1998, a joint statement reiterated that both countries
would seriously and comprehensively fulfill their respective responsibilities
in accordance with the BWC. China and the United States, both being
signatories of NPT and CTBT, are also cooperating in nuclear disarmament
and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear
capable ballistic missiles. China and the United States also cooperate
effectively in the issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and dealing
with the security in South Asia. In response to India's and Pakistan's
nuclear tests, leaders from both countries conducted talks through a hotline
and made a joint statement urging India and Pakistan to stop nuclear tests
and sign the CTBT. Both countries also expressed their support for
the negotiation of the FMCT. China and the United States have tried
to establish confidence-building mechanisms, and enhance military-to-military
exchanges and arms control dialogues at different levels. The
cooperation between the two countries in all the areas of arms control
and nonproliferation has contributed to the improvement of China-US relations
as well as to world peace and stability.
Nevertheless, the US development of NMD and TMD has caused serious concern
for China. From time to time, US officials explain to China that
the US NMD system is not directed against China. But according to
Walter B. Slocombe, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "National
missile defense is designed to counter a few tens of reentry vehicles"(3)
instead of several missiles from the so-called "states of concern."
Therefore, China's very limited number of strategic missiles will be captured
by the US NMD system. Furthermore, if George Bush Jr. is elected
the next US president and if the United States is going to pursue a more
ambitious, "thick" NMD program, China's strategic interest will certainly
be undermined. Whether or not US NMD is directed against China's
limited deterrent capability will show whether the United States is treating
China as a partner or an adversary. This will be a test for US policy
towards China. As Ambassador Sha Zhukang, Director-General of the
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
has stated several times, China will not sit idly and let its fundamental
national interest be harmed.
Joint US -Japan development of TMD has increased the distrust between
China and Japan. The intentions of both the United States and Japan
has also become a serious concern for China. China suspects that
the joint development of TMD may further strengthen the US-Japanese military
alliance, which is directed against China. The cooperation also changed
the passive role of Japan and turned Japan into a more active participant
in its alliance with the United States. The joint TMD development
may encourage the rightwing forces in Japan to embark on a militarist road.
After North Korea's satellite test in August 1998, some politicians in
Japan called for a change to Japan's military strategy from an "exclusive
defense" to a "preemptive strategy" to contain aggression in the region.
This reminded the people in Asia of what happened several decades ago.
Furthermore, the joint TMD development may also involve Japan in any military
conflict across the Taiwan Strait, since Japan still maintains an ambiguous
explanation for the so-called "surrounding areas." Under such circumstance
and owing to the mutual suspicion and distrust, China and Japan will have
difficulty in expanding dialogue and cooperation in the field of arms control
and nonproliferation.
The possible inclusion of Taiwan in a US TMD system is a most serious
issue. Both the American Omnibus Appropriation Act and the 1999 Fiscal
Year Department of Defense Authorization Act support the inclusion of Taiwan
into the TMD system. If the United States transfers TMD systems to
Taiwan, it will encourage the separatists in Taiwan to move closer towards
independence and make it more difficult for the mainland to strive for
peaceful unification. It will enable Taiwan to directly threaten
the air- space security over the Taiwan Strait and China's mainland.
It will also upgrade the US-Taiwan relationship to one of paramilitary
alliance and undermine the very foundation of the three China-US joint
communiques. If the United States includes Taiwan in its TMD system,
the security of Taiwan will not be enhanced. Instead, the situation
in the Taiwan Strait will become more unstable. China will not tolerate
the infringement on its territorial integrity and let Taiwan gain independence.
In sum, if the United States insists on developing and deploying NMD and
TMD without properly addressing China's security concern, China-US relations
will be seriously hurt and it will not be possible for the two countries
to continue cooperation in the field of arms control of nonproliferation.
Conclusion
US NMD and TMD programs will not bring real security to the United States
and its allies but only impede international arms control and nonproliferation
efforts and result in instability and insecurity in the world. As the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction becomes an increasingly important security
concern for the international community (and the United States in particular),
one country, no matter how powerful it is, just cannot achieve absolute
security without considering the security of other countries and cooperating
with them. The right approach to maintaining international peace
and security is for the international community to maintain and strengthen
international arms control and nonproliferation regimes and make joint
efforts and cooperate with each other to deal with the threat of proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
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Notes
(1) Jozef Goldblat: Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and
Agreements, p5.
(2) Kerry Kartchner: The Objectives of Arms Control, American
Defense Policy, p423-429.
(3) Walter B. Slocombe, The Administration's Approach, The Washington
Quarterly, Summer 2000.
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