NMD AND ARMS CONTROL DEBATES
AT THE 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
by Mitsuru KUROSAWA
Abstract
The issue of the NMD (National Missile Defense)/ABM (Anti-Ballistic
Missile) Treaty was one of the most controversial one at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. Not only Russia, China and France, but also many non-nuclear-weapon
states as well as Conference President Abdallah Baali and UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan strongly criticized the U.S. plan on the NMD. Because
of this sharp confrontation between the U.S. and others, the prospect of
the conference had been very pessimistic, and it was afraid that the issue
might destroy the conference.
However, the five nuclear-weapon states found out an iridescent phrase
on the issue, which permitted the conference to adopt a final document
by consensus. In fact, the five nuclear-weapon states shelved the
issue because they knew they could not resolve it at the conference and
continuing the debates on it would destroy the conference. Although
the issue was shelved at the first day of the second week, the issue has
appeared anywhere during the discussion until the end of the conference.
And the issue had a very negative impact on the proceedings and results
of the conference.
In this paper, I would like to examine the debates on the issue at the
conference, showing how strong the opposition to the U.S. program was and
how negative the issue was for the conference .
The Forecast of the Conference
Among experts of the non-proliferation, the forecast of the conference
was generally pessimistic, because international relations in general,
and relation between the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. and China in particular,
have been getting worse and worse in the past few years.(1) Confrontation
between the nuclear-weapon states and non-non-nuclear-weapon states has
been a typical pattern at the review conferences based on the very nature
of the treaty regime. In addition, at this conference, the confrontation
among the nuclear-weapon states was characteristic. The experts thought
it would be difficult to adopt a final document because of these double
confrontations. Among some reasons behind the confrontations, the
most serious one was the issue of the NMD/ABM Treaty.
The Opening Ceremony
Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria made a statement as the president
of the conference at its beginning. When he referred to the negative
and positive developments in the past five years, he mentioned "the challenge
to the ABM Treaty and the intention of the United States to deploy an anti-missile
defense system" as one of the negative developments.(2)
Address by Mr. Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
was more warning as follows:
Let me turn to the most recent challenge facing us in the area of nuclear
disarmament: the growing pressure to deploy national missile defenses.
This pressure is jeopardizing the ABM Treaty - which has been called the
"cornerstone of strategic stability" - and could well lead to a new arms
race, setbacks for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and create
new incentives for missile proliferation.(3)
Just from the beginning of the conference, the NMD/ABM Treaty has been
one of the most controversial issues.
The Nuclear-Weapon States
The United States, the only state which defended the NMD program at
the conference, tried to mitigate concerns and defend itself by emphasizing
their consultation with Russia and China, justified its program by stating:
"The world has changed dramatically in the almost three decades since the
ABM Treaty was signed. That Treaty has been amended before, and there
is no good reason it cannot be amended again to reflect new threats from
third countries outside the strategic deterrence regime." Secretary
of State Ms. Madeleine Albright also made it clear that it was not intended
to degrade Russia's deterrent and nor would it have that result.(4)
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Igor Ivanov,
criticized the U.S. program from two aspects. The first is that further
reduction in strategic offensive weapons can only be considered in the
context of the preservation of the ABM Treaty which is the cornerstone
of strategic stability and the compliance with the ABM Treaty in its present
form without any modification is a prerequisite for further negotiations
on nuclear disarmament. The second is that the collapse of the ABM
Treaty would undermine the entirety of disarmament agreements concluded
over the last 30 years.(5)
Ambassador Mr. Sha Zukang of China, citing the speech of President Jiang
Zemin that so-called missile defense program will inevitably exert an extensive
negative impact on international security and stability and trigger off
a new round of arms race in new area, thereby seriously obstructing or
neutralizing international efforts of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation,"
harshly criticized the intention of the U.S. as follows: "Relying on its
overwhelmingly superior strength in economy, science and technology, a
certain military power, notwithstanding its large nuclear arsenals with
overkill capability, is vigorously pursuing the development of national
missile defense (NMD) system in an attempt to seek absolute security for
itself."(6)
Mr. Hubert de La Fortelle, the representative of France, told: "France
attaches the utmost importance to maintaining strategic stability, of which
the ABM Treaty is an essential element. It is anxious to avoid any
challenges to the Treaty liable to bring about a breakdown of strategic
equilibrium and to restart the arms race."(7)
Mr. Peter Hain of the United Kingdom did not so strongly criticized
as others did, but he referred to the importance of the ABM Treaty, saying:
"We have made clear to both sides (the U.S. and Russia) that we continue
to value the ABM Treaty and wish to see it preserved." (8)
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
The statement by Portugal on behalf of the European Union also mentioned
the issue by saying: "We reaffirm the importance of the ABM Treaty, as
one of the pillars of strategic stability. The EU wishes to see that
Treaty preserved."(9)
The statement by Mexico on behalf of seven NAC (New Agenda Coalition)
states had no mention to the issue, but the working paper submitted by
them included the following phrase: "Stressing that the ABM Treaty remains
a cornerstone of strategic stability and underlining the responsibility
of its states parties to preserve its integrity." (10)
The statement by Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Movement
of Non-Aligned Countries said: "The movement is also concerned over the
negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic
missile defense system and the weaponization of outer space which have
contributed to the further erosion of the international climate conducive
to the promotion of disarmament and security. In this context, it
calls for compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty."(11)
From these statements, it is obvious that almost all states except the
U.S. strongly argued for the preservation of the ABM Treaty and pointed
out that the NMD would have negative influence on further nuclear reduction
and on the very existence of the arms control and disarmament agreements
agreed for the last thirty years.
Under this circumstance, during the first week of the conference, it
was highly afraid of that the conference would fail because of this sharp
confrontation on the issue of NMD/ABM Treaty between the U.S. and other
countries in general and between the U.S. and other four nuclear-weapon
states in particular.
Common Statement by Five Nuclear-Weapon States
On the first day of the second week, May 1, the five nuclear-weapon
states submitted a common statement, which was a compromise among the five.
It dealt with many issues from universality to nuclear disarmament, negative
security assurances, safeguards and others. The NMD/ABM Treaty was
dealt with in the context of START III, stating: "We look forward to the
conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening
the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for
further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its
provisions."(12) This phrase was adopted as it was in the final document.(13)
The phrase "preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty" is iridescent.
The U.S. could justify its position by emphasizing the word "strengthening",
because the U.S. could understand that amending the Treaty meant strengthening
the Treaty. The other four nuclear-weapon states naturally accentuate
the importance of the word "preserving" in order to justify their position.
On balance, the U.S. can be said to be able to preserve its position.
On this issue, the U.S. could extract a concession from the other four.
As the price for it, the U.S. had to made concessions in other issues.
For example, the commitment to the negotiations on a cut-off treaty was
severely watered down because the U.S. had to yield to the China's demand.
Demand for Strategic Stability
In spite that the phrase on NMD/ABM Treaty issue had been settled among
the five on the first day of the second week, the issue continued to be
very hot during the last three weeks.
One argument is that strategic stability, whose main element is the
ABM Treaty, should be maintained when discussing future measures for nuclear
disarmament. In the case of further efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals
unilaterally, the phrase "for the maintenance of strategic stability" was
added. In the case of further reduction of non-strategic nuclear
weapons, the phrase "in the context of strategic stability" was added.
In the case of measures to de-alert and de-activate nuclear weapons systems,
the phrase "for the maintenance and promotion of strategic stability" was
added. Finally, in the case of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons
in security policies, the phrase "to enhance strategic stability" was added.(14)
On the last Wednesday, two days before the final day of the conference,
these concrete nuclear disarmament measures were bound into one and the
same paragraph, which has a common chapeau for these measures.(15)
The chapeau contains the phrase "based on the principle of undiminished
security of all". The phrase "strategic stability" was replaced by
"undiminished security" at the last stage, but the meaning is almost the
same. That is, any future nuclear disarmament measure is conditioned
by undiminished security for all, and many nations, in particular, Russia
and China, interpret that modification and abandonment of the ABM Treaty
is tantamount to the diminished security.
The other argument is that the prevention of arms race in outer space
(PAROS) is more urgent and important than a cut-off treaty. This
is the argument by China. There has been a general consensus that
the first priority after the CTBT would be the negotiations on a cut-off
treaty. The Shannon mandate was once adopted at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it was
widely expected that a clear direction to the Conference on Disarmament
to negotiate a cut-off treaty would be agreed in a final document.
However, the U.S. sacrificed the clear commitment to a cut-off treaty for
its demand for the NMD. As a result, China's argument prevailed and
the early commencement of the negotiations on a cut-off treaty becomes
almost impossible.
Conclusion
The 2000 NPT Review Conference succeeded in adopting almost 30-page
final document by consensus. It means prima facie a great success
of the conference from the viewpoint of many observers whose forecast was
very pessimistic. However, we have to judge the success of the conference
by examining the contents of the final document. The U.S. attitude
to save by any means the NMD program made the U.S. very passive in the
discussion on nuclear disarmament, and the five nuclear-weapon states agreed
the lowest common denominator.
The outcome of the conference in concrete nuclear disarmament measures
is very low, mainly because the four nuclear-weapon states did have a disincentive
to proceed for substantive nuclear disarmament measures. The main
reason for their reluctance was the U.S. program of the NMD.
In essence, the conference could adopt the final document as they shelved
this controversial issue of NMD/ABM Treaty. However, the issue still
alive after the conference, and the issue made the future of nuclear disarmament
very equivocal.
(1) Mitsuru Kurosawa, "Toward the 2000 NPT Review Conference,"
Osaka University Law Review, No.47, February 2000, p.15.
(2) Statement by the President of the 2000 Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
H.E. Ambassador Abdallah Baali (Algeria), April 24, 2000, p.2.
(3) The Secretary-General Address to the NPT 2000 Review Conference,
24 April 2000, p.3.
(4) Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to the
Opening Session of the United Nations Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference 2000, April 24, 2000, p.4.
(5) Statement by H.E. Mr. Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 25, 2000,
p.7.
(6) Statement by H.E. Amb. Sha Zukang, Head of Delegation of
the Government of the People's Republic of China at the 2000 Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
24 April 2000, p.7.
(7) Intervention de S.E.M. Hubert de La Fortelle, Representant
de la France aupres de la Conference du Desarmement, Conference d'Eamen
du TNP, 25 avril 2000, p.6.
(8) Toward A Nuclear-Free World: the United Kingdom and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, Peter Hain MP, Minister of State, Foreign Office,
NPT Review Conference, 24 April 2000, p.4.
(9) Statement by the Head of Delegation of Portugal, Ambassador
Antonio Monteiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations,
on Behalf of the European Union, April 24 2000, p.4.
(10) NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3, 24 April 2000.
(11) Statement by H.E. Dr. Makarim Wibisono, Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT
to Introduce a Working Paper submitted by Members of the Movement of Non-Aligned
Countries, 24 April 2000, p.3.
(12) NPT/CONF.2000/21, 1 May 2000.
(13) NPT/CONF.2000/28, 22 May 2000.
(14) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/CRP.7, 9 May 2000, NPT/CONF.2000/CRP.2,
15 May 2000.
(15) Non-Paper, 17 May 2000.
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