BALLISTICS MISSILE DEFENSE AND
THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME*
by LI Bin
US-JAPAN COOPERATION ON THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
On August 16, United States and Japanese defense officials announced
the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to conduct joint research
on naval theater missile defense technology. The cooperation will
reportedly focus on the US Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense program.(1)
According to the MOU, the two countries will develop four major components
of the NTW guided missiles: the sensor, advanced kinetic warhead, second
stage propulsion and lightweight nose cone. The research and design
work will last at least three years. The US-Japan project of joint
research on the Navy Theater Wide missiles poses a serious problem in the
compliance of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It also
adds more to China's concerns over missile defense and military buildup
in Japan.
China has objected to missile defense in Japan since the issue appeared
because China believes that missile defense in Japan will disturb regional
stability.(2) The Chinese also worry that Japan would develop its
weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. The accumulation
of plutonium and the development of solid-fuel rockets have given Japan
the potential to develop nuclear weapons and missiles with which to carry
them.(3) Japan's refusal to apologize to its neighboring countries
for its invasion during and before World War II has increased the threat
perceptions in those countries. The development of anti-missile by
Japan will:
1. politically encourage Japan to go further in the direction of a military
buildup; 2. increase Japan's defensive forces while it holds a huge potential
to develop offensive forces and; 3. provide Japan with an excuse and an
opportunity it did not have before to exercise and improve its missile
technology publicly.
The US-Japan joint NTW missile research will certainly be regarded by
China as a serious challenge to China's national security. The issue
is now coupled with the issue of MTCR compliance. If the US wants
China to fully accept the MTCR - including its annexes as China's export
control law - the US needs to convince China that the joint research is
in compliance with the MTCR.
THE NTW CAPABILITIES AND THE MTCR LIMITATIONS
According to the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO),(4)
the Navy Theater-Wide (NTW) ballistic missile defense program will provide
an exo-atmospheric sea-based capability to counter medium to long range
theater ballistic missile threats. An NTW interceptor will probably
consist of an improved Standard Missile (the SM-3, or SM-2 Block-4), a
modified MK-41 Vertical Launching System, and a LEAP (Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric
Projectile) anti-missile. The NTW system includes NTW interceptors,
a SPY-B radar, an AEGIS fleet with which to carry the interceptors and
the radar, and some other Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence
(C3I) supporting the system.
An NTW interceptor is reportedly to have a speed of 4.5 kilometers per
second at burnout. If it is launched by the way of surface-to-surface
missiles, the NTW interceptor will have a range of about 2500 kilometers.
The Standard Missiles are designed as dual-use missiles: surface-to-air
or surface-to-surface.(5) So, an NTW interceptor that uses a Standard
Missile as its major component should not be difficult to be launched as
a surface-to-surface missile. The parameters of the Standard Missiles
are given below:(6)
Type of Missiles: SM -1 MR; Range in meters: 4.41; Diameters (cm):
34.3; Launch Weight (Kg): 495
Type of Missiles: SM-2 MR; Range in meters: 4.41; Diameters (cm):
34.3; Launch Weight (Kg): 621
Type of Missiles: SM Extended; Range in meters: 7.9; Diameters
(cm): 34.3; Launch Weight (Kg): 1341
The MTCR strongly forbids the transfer of technology of missiles
that can fly over 300 kilometers/second with a 500 kilogram payload.
To check the compliance of an NTW system transfer with the MTCR, we need
to calculate the range of the NTW interceptor if it carries a 500-kilogram
payload instead of a LEAP Kinetic Killing Vehicle (KKV). Since some
parameters of the NTW interceptor are not yet publicly available, some
educational guesses will therefore have to be made to describe the capabilities
of the NTW interceptor. By using an NTW model provided by Dr. David
Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists,(7) the calculation gives
the following result if the NTW interceptor carries a 500-kilograms payload
instead of a LEAP KKV:
Burnout speed: 1.42 kilometers/seconds; Burnout altitude: 54 kilometers;
And range: 261 kilometers. This calculation shows that the
range of an NTW interceptor is close to 300 kilometers/second when it carries
a 500-kilogram payload. If we consider the model uncertainties and
some simple upgrade of the propulsion system, it is possible that the NTW
interceptor and its subsystems should be identified as Category I items
of the MTCR. Therefore, the transfer of the NTW interceptor or its
technology raises a serious problem for compliance with the MTCR.
If a country wants to use the NTW interceptor to carry weapons of mass
destruction weighing 500 kilograms, there are two factors that are unfavorable
to this effort. The first is aerodynamic instability caused by the shift
of weight center. It could cause aerodynamic instability if the light
payload of LEAP KKV is replaced with a heavy payload of 500 kilograms.
However, the factor of aerodynamic instability is not a crucial one and
it cannot stop the effort of using the NTW interceptor as a surface-to-surface
missile. Aerospace instability may reduce the accuracy of the missile
or make the missile tumble after the boost phase of the flight. However,
the warhead can continue flying and reach the designed range without serious
problems. For example, the Iraqis changed the design of the Scud
missile to an A-1 Hussein missile to extend its range and this caused aerodynamic
instability. However, there was no evidence that shows the A-1 Hussein
missiles to have had any difficulty in reaching their designed ranges due
to aerodynamic instability.
The second unfavorable factor is size-mismatching. The NTW interceptor
(or Standard Missile) has a relatively small diameter compared to most
surface-to-surface missiles with a 300 kilometer range. For chemical
and biological warheads, there are no size-mismatching problems because
their shapes could be made to match thin missiles without big difficulty.
A gun-type nuclear warhead, however, can have a size-mismatching problem.
For example, the gun-type US W33 warhead has a diameter of 0.40 meter,
comparable to that of the Standard Missile,(8) while an implosive nuclear
warhead weighing 500 kilograms is estimated to have a diameter of 0.58-0.76
meters.(9) So, the NTW interceptor has a problem of size-mismatching
if it carries implosive nuclear warhead weighing 500 kilograms. However,
size-mismatching is not a deadly problem for the NTW interceptor carrying
a big payload. The main consequence of size-mismatching is also aerodynamic
instability. As discussed above, aerodynamic instability cannot stop
the effort in delivering the big payload to the designed range.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MTCR COMPLIANCE
The Missile Technology Control Regime is an export control document
adopted by certain countries, including the United States and Japan as
their domestic law. The purpose of the MTCR is to prevent the spread
of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction within a certain
range. Missiles that can deliver at least a 500 kilogram payload
for at least 300 kilometers/second, along with their important subsystems
and technology are identified as Category I items of the MTCR. Missiles
that have ranges greater than 300 kilometers with any payload and some
other less sensitive equipment and technologies are identified as Category
II items of the MTCR. Category I items are strongly denied for export
and category II items are examined case by case and denied export if their
end-uses are not guaranteed. If the range of the NTW interceptor
is about 300 kilometers or greater when it carries a 500-kilogram payload,
it should be identified as a Category I item and the joint NTW research
is, therefore, a violation of the MTCR. The calculation in the last
section shows that the range is very close to 300 kilometers. If
more information about the NTW interceptor is available, the conclusion
will be more accurate. If the range of the NTW interceptor is much
less than 300 kilometers when it carries a 500-kilogram payload, it can
be identified as a Category II item because the NTW interceptor has a range
of about 2500 kilograms when it brings a payload as heavy as the LEAP KKV.
In this case, the joint NTW research should still be denied because the
end-use of the NTW technology is difficult to verify.
There are some arguments that claim that the joint NTW research does
not violate the MTCR. The first argument is that the MTCR allows
its "members" to share missile technology with each other. However,
this is a widely believed argument, but it is a misunderstanding of the
MTCR. The fact is that the MTCR does not distinguish "members" and
"non-members" at all in its content. If the MTCR allowed its "members"
to share missile technology, any enlargement of the MTCR community would
mean encouraging the proliferation of missile technology. The origin
of this misunderstanding came from some US about the implementation the
MTCR. These laws allow waving the sanctions of the transfer of missile
technology if the recipients of the technology are also MTCR partner countries.(10)
This is a reservation of the US to the MTCR that leaves a loophole to the
implementation of the MTCR in the US and sets a bad norm for missile technology
transfers among MTCR partner countries. The US-Japanese joint research
on NTW may not violate the US law, but it probably violates the MTCR.
The second argument is that the end-use of the jointly developed NTW
technology will be verified, so the transfer of these items is not a violation
of the MTCR. However, the MTCR calls for strong presumption to deny
the transfer of Category I items regardless of their purpose. If
the NTW interceptor can deliver a 500-kilogram payload for approximately
300 kilograms/second or greater, it will be identified as a Category I
item and the transfer of its technology will be regarded as an MTCR violation
no matter what mission the NTW system is designed to have. If the
range of the NTW interceptor is much less than 300 kilometers/second when
it carries a 500-kilogram payload, the possibility of MTCR violation cannot
be simply excluded by end-use assurances either. The reason is that
the end-use of transferred technology can never be verified well.
The verification of the end-use of some transferred hardware may be possible
while the verification of the end-use of data or knowledge is very difficult.
People may not even be able to receive any early warnings if either the
US or Japan converts the knowledge learned from joint NTW research into
designing surface-to-surface missiles. So, we cannot expect a reliable
or effective end-use verification arrangement in the joint NTW research.
Obviously, the joint US-Japan NTW study has posed a big challenge to
the compliance of the MTCR, even though US laws do not forbid the activity.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
Although the United States has its own reservation about the MTCR, it
urgently pushes more countries - including China - to fully accept the
MTCR as their export control law.(11) There is no doubt that
China is watching the MTCR implementation process closely. So, it
is a very bad time for the US to sign an MOU with Japan to jointly develop
anti-missile technology that probably violates the MTCR. This is
certainly a big concern for China. Before the signing of the MOU,
a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said China believed the MOU
to be harmful to regional security.(12) If the US and Japan cannot
convince China that the joint research complies with the MTCR, it will
have a negative impact on China's attitude towards the MTCR. China
will have to draw the conclusion from this event that the MTCR and its
current implementation system will constrain China rather than protect
China's security. If the MTCR cannot bring security benefits to China,
it is unimaginable that China will be happy to adopt the entire MTCR as
China's domestic law.
In this analysis, there are some uncertainties about the range of the
NTW interceptor because there insufficient public information. A
more accurate judgment about the MTCR compliance of the joint NTW research
can be made if more information is provided. A US defense official
said that ". . . these (NTW systems) are defensive systems and we are being
very transparent with countries in the region about our work here."(13)
To respond to China's concern over the US-Japanese joint NTW project, the
US and Japan should provide the transparency of the project in East Asia
as they had promised so that China can review the joint NTW project according
to the MTCR criteria. If the final conclusion is that the project
violates the MTCR, the US and Japan should consider terminating the project
immediately if they want to sustain or enhance the MTCR.
--------------
(1) "US, Japan ink plan to cooperate on Navy TMD," Aerospace Daily,
August 17, 1999. Vol. 191, No. 33; p. 251.
(2) see, for example, the Speech of PRC Delegation to the ASEAN
Forum on TMD, March 5, 1999. Bangkok. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/c/c/ccbe.htm
(3) see, for example, Liu Cheng'an, "The Enlargement of Japan's
Potential Nuclear Capabilities and Its Impact on The Security in the Asian-Pacific
Area", in the Collection of Arms Control Papers of PSNSS, 1996 Janurary.
(4) Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "FY 1998 President's
Budget Press Release" http://www.smdc.army.mil/presbudget.html
(5) "Navy Fact File: Standard Missile," http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-stnd.html
(6) see endnote 5
(7) David Wright, Private Communication.
(8) Cochran, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. I, US Nuclear Forces
and Capabilities, p. 47.
(9) Li Bin, "Nuclear Missile Delivery Capabilities in Emerging
Nuclear States", Science & Global Security, 1997, Vol. 6, pp. 311-331.
(10) For example, The 1991 FY US National Defense Authorization
Act (Public Law 101-510).
(11) Howard Diamond, "US Renews Effort to Bring China into Missile
Control Regime", Arms Control Today, March 1998.
(12) Zhang Qiyue, Spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
Press Conference, June 29,
1999. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/c/b/cb1999/cb199900629.htm
(13) "United States, Japan Finalize Deal On Navy Theater Wide
Cooperation," Inside Missile Defense, August 25, 1999. Vol. 5, No.
17.
End notes:
* The work is supported by a fellowship granted by the Ploughshares
Fund. |