TMD AND NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY
by Shinichi OGAWA
Abstract
The rationale for Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in East Asia is to ensure
military cooperation among U.S. allies by reducing the risks of intimidation
from ballistic missiles and to secure America's ability to intervene in
regional conflicts where the potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) exists. An effective TMD can dissuade countries from expanding their
ballistic missile arsenals and thus contribute to non-proliferation and
reduction of the number of missiles equipped with WMD.
China and North Korea criticize East Asian TMD as accelerating the arms
race and destabilizing the strategic environment in East Asia. However,
China and North Korea should realize that it is their missile expansion
programs that are the prime movers of the arms race in the region, and
TMD is simply a response to such a buildup. Having said that, and
since TMD is politically divisive, deployment of TMD in East Asia should
proceed in a highly cautious manner, possibly after comprehensive dialogues
and discussions among regional states concerning the significance of missile
defense.
Text
1. Ballistic Missile Threat in East Asia
The international community today is witnessing an increasing spread
in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles. In East
Asia, Russia, China, and North Korea have deployed ballistic missiles with
ranges exceeding 300 kilometers. Apart from Russia, China and North
Korea have been increasing the number of their ballistic missiles.
China has deployed land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles, about
70 of which have ranges covering Japan and other Asian countries.(1)
China is replacing its CSS-2 ballistic missiles, which are the main body
of China's theater missile forces, with more modern and more accurate CSS-5
missiles.(2) North Korea has been making efforts to strengthen not
only its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, which can strike Japan,
but also longer-range ones, which may be capable of reaching the continental
United States. (3)
Most of the Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles are equipped
with nuclear weapons. Although China, since its first nuclear explosion
in October 1964, has declared unconditional negative security as- surances
to non-nuclear weapon states,(4) including Japan, the declaration has become
increasingly less credible because of China's heavy criticisms against
Japanese research on TMD technologies. As for North Korea, its ballistic
missile threat today is not formidable in military terms, because its ballistic
missiles are not likely to be armed with nuclear weapons,(5) and ballistic
missiles themselves are generally an ineffective delivery vehicle for releasing
biological and chemical (BC) agents over a wide area.(6) Nonetheless,
taking advantage of the secretiveness in its technology, North Korea may
threaten to employ its ballistic missiles under the pretense of being armed
with BC weapons to intimidate Japan.
In short, both China and North Korea can utilize their ballistic missiles
as weapons of terror or as a means of intimidation on U.S. allies in East
Asia to stay away from assisting U.S. military operations in the Taiwan
Straits or on the Korean Peninsula. And in the case of Japan this
scenario is more likely, since the Chinese and North Korean leadership
fully understand that the Japanese public are psycho- logically more vulnerable
to WMD than other nations because of their experiences of nuclear bombings
at the end of World War II and the sarin-gas attack in a Tokyo subway by
a cult group in 1995.
2. Countermeasures to Ballistic Missile Threat
Aside from a missile defense shield, there are several countermeasures
to theater ballistic missiles armed with WMD.(7) First is to attain
an Asian version of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
and/or to strengthen the existing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
To conclude an INF Treaty-type agreement, however, Asian ballistic missile
countries with land-based missiles must grow to understand that military
advantages brought about by the deployment of ballistic missiles are temporary
and those missiles will eventually turn out to be destabilizing war machines
if faced with an adversary's ballistic missiles armed with WMD. Neither
China, nor India, nor North Korea seems to understand this intrinsic defect
of land-based ballistic missiles.
It is true that the MTCR has delayed missile development programs in
various countries because of the cumulative weight of multilateral and
national export controls. Yet, despite such export control, determined
states can build and accumulate indigenous missile technologies over the
long run. The burgeoning scientific and technological complex will
become immune to MTCR controls. The MTCR can only buy time and is
essentially a supply-side approach and thus suffers from an inherent defect:
it does not deal with the motivations underlying proliferation. More
importantly, the MTCR can do little to roll back existing ballistic missiles.
The second option is diplomacy. In view of the small prospect
that arms control measures can eliminate the ballistic missile threat,
however, it is very difficult to visualize a diplomatic option removing
ballistic missiles. As illustrated by recent overtures to dissuade
North Korea from test-firing its ballistic missiles, diplomacy can at most
delay and constrain the development and deployment of ballistic missiles.
Preemptive strikes against missile sites in a severe crisis may be a
third option. This measure, however, runs the risks violating international
law. We have to recall the criticisms thrown against Israel when
it launched an air attack against Iraq's nuclear facility in 1981.
More importantly, if a preemptive strike fails to entirely eradicate an
adversary's missiles, such an action is likely to invite the very response
it sought to prevent and, in the worst case, result in an escalation of
hostilities.
The fourth option is to rely on U.S. extended deterrence.(8) In
the Cold War days, the U.S. provided its allies with powerful deterrence
since regional conflicts ran a risk of escalating into a broader U.S.-Soviet
armed conflict. However, post-Cold War regional conflicts, even those
involving U.S. allies, are now literally regional conflicts for the United
States, and American stakes in such regional conflicts are not always crucial
to U.S. interests. Additionally, U.S. self-restraint in showing off
nuclear weapons as an instrument for deterring regional conflicts, as pronounced
in the 1994 "Nuclear Posture Review,"(9) may have generated the impression
that American retaliatory options are now limited only to conventional
weapons. Nevertheless, there remains doubt that a threat of conventional
retaliation alone, even that of high-tech conventional weapons, is frightening
enough to deter a risk-prone adversary. The costs associated with
conventional weapons tend to be perceived as manageable. In addition,
emphasizing high-tech conventional weapons capabilities may risk promoting
development and production of WMD and their delivery means, including ballistic
and cruise missiles. North Korea and China, which obviously lack
the financial and technological capacity to counter U.S. high-tech weapons,
may well find it advantageous to strengthen their WMD to offset U.S. conventional
weapons superiority.
3. The Purpose and Security Significance of TMD
As noted previously, if arms control, diplomacy, preemptive strikes,
and deterrence are insufficient to deal with the ballistic missile threat,
Japan and other non-ballistic missile countries in East Asia have to consider
other means of intercepting incoming missiles and warheads. In East
Asia, Japan and Taiwan, in their own ways, have been committed to a missile
defense program. In May 1993 the U.S. proposed to launch a joint
development of TMD with Japan. After about five-years of preliminary
studies, in December 1998 the Japanese government decided to enter into
a U.S.-Japan joint technology research study to explore the technical feasibility
of developing sea-based TMD,(10) the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) defense system.
In August 1999, Taiwan's Defense Minister stressed the necessity of introducing
a TMD system based on a lower-tier system. Later, the Executive Yuan,
or Taiwan's executive branch, decided to develop a system on its own in
parallel with purchases from the United States.(11)
A TMD system defending U.S. allies in East Asia (like Japan) and U.S.
forces stationed in East Asian countries would have the following security
benefits. First, a TMD system can negate hostile states' attempt
to discourage U.S. friends and allies from cooperating with U.S. forces
through intimidation by ballistic missiles armed with WMD. Second,
although adversaries possessing theater ballistic missiles equipped with
WMD may threaten or use these weapons to deter or constrain U.S. military
operations, a missile shield covering forward-deployed U.S. forces can
lower such risks. Third, aside from a marginally effective TMD, a
very effective TMD might dissuade ballistic missile countries from expanding
their missile forces and thus contribute to the non-proliferation and reduction
of ballistic missiles. Fourth, TMD can counter the potential danger
of accidental or unauthorized missile launches, which becomes higher with
the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Fifth, a TMD system covering
Japan and other U.S. friends in East Asia could supplement the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. Sixth, as a side-benefit, a TMD system protecting U.S.
allies could contribute to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles. This is because missile defense, coupled with U.S. extended
deterrence, could contribute to reducing a state's desire to acquire nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. TMD could also enable the U.S. to
reduce its reliance on nuclear deterrence in a regional contingency, thereby
marginalizing the significance of nuclear weapons. Finally, a TMD
system covering Japan can protect U.S. forces in Japan, thereby contributing
to efficient operations of the U.S.-Japan alliance that has evolved into
a security-related "public good" in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore,
U.S.-Japan joint technology research on TMD will deepen military technology
cooperation between the two countries and thus strengthen the foundation
of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
4. Criticisms of the TMD program and Counter-arguments
China and North Korea have been denouncing America's plan to deploy
TMD in East Asia and the U.S.-Japan joint research on an NTW defense system.
Russia, despite its signing of the 1997 TMD Demarcation Agreements that
have paved the way for development and deployment of TMD systems, has joined
China and North Korea in their criticism of the NTW defense system.
Their criticism can be summarized into the following points.(12)
First, an NTW covering Japan will spark an arms race in East Asia, deteriorating
the regional strategic environment, and portends Japan's rise into a military
power. Second, an NTW system has the potential to shoot down strategic
ballistic missiles and therefore destabilizes the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese
strategic relationships. Since the NTW system has strategic implications,
U.S. transfer of missile defense technology to Japan in the context of
NTW development would violate U.S. obligations under the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. Third, Japanese deployment of an NTW defense
system could be used to defend Taiwan. Fourth, supplying a TMD system
to Taiwan interferes in China's internal affairs and seriously infringes
on China's sovereignty. Fifth, a TMD covering Taiwan would increase
Taiwan's false self-confidence and would lead towards Taiwanese calls for
independence. Sixth, a TMD sale to Taiwan would be an important step
toward the creation of a de facto U.S.-Taiwan military alliance.
Seventh, U.S. transfer of missile defense technologies to Japan and Taiwan
could violate the MTCR. Finally, TMD is politically divisive, creating
a new security demarcation between the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan, on the
one hand, and China, North Korea, and possibly Russia, on the other.
However, some of these criticisms are not sufficiently persuasive.
In contrast to a ballistic missile defense (BMD) covering a country armed
with ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear weapons, TMD covering a country
like Japan, which deploys neither ballistic missiles nor WMD, is not likely
to destabilize seriously strategic relations with neighboring countries.
Contrary to the aforementioned criticism, the absence of TMD might lead
to an arms race. For instance, South Korea, while turning down the
U.S. offer of a TMD program, is planning to develop longer-range ballistic
missiles to neutralize North Korea's missile threat.(13) In addition,
China's missile exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan generated two types
of responses in the island: one called for introducing a missile defense,
the other advocated the development of offensive missiles capable of hitting
China's major cities.(14) China and North Korea should realize that
it is their missile expansion programs that are the prime movers of the
arms race in this region, and TMD is simply a response to such a buildup.
Moreover, regardless of Japan's decision on TMD, China seems to continue
to modernize its missile and nuclear forces, and China's missile buildup
program will be determined not so much by Japan's deployment of TMD as
by other factors, including missile programs in India, Russia, and the
United States.
As to the criticism that an NTW system can intercept strategic missiles,
we have to recall the 1997 U.S.-Russian TMD Demarcation Agreements.
The Second Agreed Statement, defining high-velocity TMD systems includeing
an NTW system, declares five principles that regulate the deployment of
the high-velocity TMD system. One of them states that high-velocity
TMD systems that pose a realistic threat to strategic missiles of another
party to the ABM Treaty cannot be deployed.(15) Furthermore, since
the U.S.-Japan joint NTW program is simply at the stage of a technology
feasibility study, it is difficult at present to judge if the interceptor
missiles have the potential to shoot down strategic ballistic missiles.
The same can apply to the allegation of an MTCR violation.
One might add that China and North Korea have not only been strengthening
their ballistic missiles but have also been suspected of being exporters
of missile-related materials (China) and whole missile systems (North Korea).
The very fact that such countries criticize Japan, which does not maintain
any ballistic missiles, for conducting research into a missile shield is
misguided and unacceptable.
5. Concluding Remarks
A TMD system is the only means present to cope with ballistic missiles
actually fired. Passive defenses, such as civil defense, are, in
terms of damage-limitation, not effective against attacks by WMD-armed
ballistic missiles. They are also politically unpopular as well.
As long as there remains a risk in East Asia of deterrence failure and
an accidental or unauthorized launch of a ballistic missile armed with
WMD, we have to build a TMD system.
However, a TMD system in East Asia, and probably elsewhere as well,
is in essence a double-edged sword. Depending on its capability and
the country that deploys it, TMD could either reduce a ballistic missile
threat and prevent missile proliferation, or further increase missile proliferation.
The deployment of TMD in East Asia should proceed in a highly cautious
manner, possibly after comprehensive dialogues and discussions concerning
the significance of ballistic missiles and missile defense among ballistic
missile and non-ballistic missile countries in the region.
Before such comprehensive dialogues and discussions, a couple of words
should be brought forward to Asian ballistic missile countries such as
China and North Korea. First, the prime movers of the arms race in
East Asia are their missile buildups. The TMD program is simply a
response to such buildups. If missile-threatened countries, responding
to China's and North Korea's ballistic missile buildups, opt for missile
development and deployment instead of TMD program, such a move would be
even more destabilizing and threatening to China and North Korea.
Second, ballistic missile countries in East Asia must understand that the
advantages derived from the deployment of ballistic missiles are transitory.
It is true that ballistic missiles have certain generic, military advantages:
long-range missiles can diminish the protective effects of distance and
thus enable the possessor to visualize a variety of war plans; and ballistic
missiles carrying WMD can be expected to give rise to a deterrent effect.
These military advantages, however, are likely to be neutralized sooner
or later by the deployment of ballistic missiles by adversaries.
Reactionary deployment not only would negate the aforementioned advantages,
but would also bring about hair-trigger strategic instabilities, if survivability
of deployed ballistic missiles were not ensured. The key to success
for controlling ballistic missiles in East Asia depends on the recognition
by regional states that strategic stability ensured by the non-deployment
of ballistic missiles is more important and desirable than the short-lived
military advantages brought about by ballistic missiles.
Finally, we must remember that the development and possession of missiles,
particularly those capable of delivering large payloads, are closely related
to the development and possession of WMD. Put another way, the strengthening
of efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD leads to the arrest of the
proliferation and use of missiles. This is why the international
community must redouble its collective efforts to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear and BC weapons.
(The opinions expressed in this essay are the personal views of the
author.)
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(1) Boueichou [Japan's Defense Agency], Bouei-Hakusho Heisei 12 [White
Paper on Defense 2000] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Office, 2000),
p. 53.
(2) Ibid.
(3) In testimony given before a U.S. Senate committee in September 1999,
Robert D. Walpole, U.S. national intelligence officer for strategic and
nuclear programs, stated that the Taepo Dong-2 is believed to have potentially
the same capability as an ICBM. See "Statement for the Record to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," September
16, 1999.
(4) Li Daoyu, "Foreign Policy and Arms Control: The View from China,"
Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, No. 10 (December 1993), pp. 9-10.
(5) We cannot rule out the possibility that North Korea has produced
a couple of primitive nuclear explosive devices. However, to assemble
a nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a missile, nuclear testing will
be required to make a smaller and lighter warhead, and North Korea has
not carried out any nuclear weapon tests so far.
(6) A comment by Dr. David C. Wright at the International Symposium
on "East Asian Regional Security Futures: Theater Missile Defense Implications,"
held at the United Nations University in Tokyo, June 24-25, 2000. Also
see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey
1996/97 (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 17.
(7) For a similar but more detailed discussion on these measures, see
Jeffrey A. Isaacson, "North Korean Missile Proliferation Threat on Northeast
Asian Security: American Perception and Strategies," KNDU Review, vol.
4 (1999), pp. 11-13.
(8) As a basic defense policy Japan has decided not to possess long-range
missiles or bombers that can be employed exclusively for the purpose of
devastating other countries. This policy deprives Japan of delivery
means of its own that could create retaliatory deterrence.
(9) See the last page of the "Results of DoD Nuclear Posture Review,"
announced on September 22, 1994.
(10) According to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the U.S.
Department of Defense and the Japanese Defense Agency in August 1999, the
NTW joint technology research covers the design of four components of interceptor
missiles - infrared homing device, kinetic warhead, second-stage propulsion,
and nose cone - and trial production of infrared homing device. Japan,
the National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review
2000 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2000), pp. 90-91.
(11) Ibid., pp. 82-83.
(12) See, among others, a special report on TMD and National Missile
Defense (NMD) came out in the Liberation Army Daily of March 22, 1999;
a special article on U.S.-Japan TMD published in the People's Daily of
April 2, 1999; The Monterey Institute of International Affairs, Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, "EANP Factsheets: China's Opposition to US
Missile Defense Programs," (http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/fact/chinamd.htm),
(September 5, 2000); and Howard Diamond, "China Warns U.S. on East Asian
Missile Defense Cooperation," Arms Control Today, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January/February
1999), p. 27. As for criticisms by North Korea, see The Monterey Institute
of International Affairs, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in North East Asia:
An Annotated Chronology, 1990-Present (Monterey: Monterey Institute of
International Affairs, June 2000), pp. 25, 60. For Russian blame,
see, for instance, Alexei Arbatov, "The ABM Treaty and Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI
Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 691 and Arms Control Association, "News
Brief," Arms Control Today, Vol. 29, No. 5 (July/August 1999), p. 31.
(13) The International Herald Tribune, July 13, 2000.
(14) Arthur S. Ding, "China's Concerns About Theater Missile Defense:
A Critique," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp.
96-97.
(15) The Second Agreed Statement is based on the following principles:
(1) The parties are committed to the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic
stability; (2) Development and deployment of TMD systems are possible,
but it should not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty;
(3) TMD systems that do not pose a realistic threat to strategic nuclear
force of another party to the ABM Treaty may be deployed; (4) TMD systems
will not be deployed by the parties for use against each other; and (5)
The scale of deployment of TMD systems in quantity and geographic scope
will be consistent with non-strategic missile programs confronting the
party. For the original wordings, see Arms Control Association, "New
START II and ABM Treaty Documents," Arms Control Today, Vol. 27, No. 6
(September 1997), pp. 21-22.
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