TMD AND US-CHINA-JAPAN COOPERATION
by WANG Qun
The TMD joint development by the United States and Japan now stands
out as a most prominent sticking point in East Asian security in the wake
of Japan's September 1999 agreement with the United States on TMD joint
development. Some argue that it is a stabilizer, whereas many more argue
that it destabilizes, not only constraining the relationship among the
major powers in Asia, but also affecting the region, especially the East
Asian security. I am grateful to the Nautilus Institute and the United
Nations University in Tokyo for sponsoring this workshop and giving me
the opportunity to share my personal views with our colleagues from the
US and Japan on this issue. I hope that such exchanges will help all interested
parties towards a better understanding on each other's concerns. I will,
on a personal basis, first zero in on the strategic goals of the
US and Japan in their TMD joint development endeavor before looking into
its implications on various fronts. In conclusion, I will try to come up
with some prescriptions on this issue.
I. The Strategic Goals of the US and Japan in their TMD Joint
Development
"Should there be no launching by DPRK in August 1998, would the United
States and Japan be still so persistent in the pursuit of their TMD joint
development program?" This is, actually, a question frequently addressed
to me as the United States and Japan are pressing rapidly ahead in their
TMD joint development endeavor. My answer is positive. The rationale behind
can be pretty simple. The people even with basic common sense will come
to see that the DPRK, in terms of both its intention and capability, is
simply not in a position, at least in the foreseeable future, to constitute
a threat to the territory of either United States or Japan. The excuse
employed by the US and Japan is untenable. The persistent pursuit of a
TMD joint development program in the wake of the DPRK's recent agreement
on a moratorium on testing long- range missiles is a strong case, attesting
to this very point.
There are, in fact, complicated and profound political, diplomatic and
military considerations behind the US and Japan in their TMD joint development
endeavor. The main strategic goal of the United States, as I see it, is
to establish its unchangeable strategic deterrence and superiority in Asia
with TMD as an effective military means, and subsequently reinforce its
diplomatic policies so as to guard against any potential developments on
the front of security in the region that might be at odds with the will
and interests of the US. Japan, for its part, has in effect approached
its joint development program with the strategic goal of substantially
enhancing its overall military strength and, on this basis, aggrandizes
its political position at the international stage.(1)
So, in pursuing the above strategic goals, both the United States and
Japan are virtually basing themselves on a wrong perception of security,
a perception characterized by cold war mentality.
II. Implications of the US-Japan TMD Joint Program
The TMD joint development by the United States and Japan is, in fact,
not a stabilizing factor in promotion of East Asian security, but rather
a destabilizing factor, affecting regional and even global security with
multi- fold implications.
Firstly, the sophisticated TMD systems, especially NTW currently under
the joint development by the United States and Japan, given its inherent
strategic capability, once deployed in East Asia, will undoubtedly serve
as an indispensable link within US NMD. Under such circumstances, the above
TMD systems will have the same severe negative impacts as those of NMD
on both global and regional security.
Secondly, the sophisticated TMD systems under joint development by the
US and Japan, if deployed, will contribute to wrecking the existing security
landscape in East Asia. This will undoubtedly tip the current tenuous strategic
balance in East Asia. Moreover, given the "revolutionary" nature of such
sophisticated military systems, other countries will have to come up with
corresponding adjustments to their own military strategies. As a result,
a spiral arms race in the region may be triggered.
Thirdly, the sophisticated TMD systems currently under joint development
by the US and Japan, if deployed in East Asia, will drastically enhance
the overall offensive-defensive capability of the US-Japan military alliance,
far exceeding the level they maintained during the cold war era, as such
sophisticated systems, given their strategic capability, can help push
the US NMD to the very forefront in East Asia, and enable the United States
to greatly enhance its capability of military involvement in regional security
issues as a result of its rapid military penetration and projection, thus
constituting a direct threat to surrounding countries in the region.
Fourthly, TMD joint development by the United States and Japan will
help Japan pick up its pace in its endeavor to embark on the course of
re- militarization. Japan's defense budget currently ranks only the second
in the world,(2) with overwhelming ground, naval and air forces.
In September 1997, Japan and the United States signed their amended Defense
Cooperation Guidelines.(3) In May 1999, the Japanese Diet reviewed
and subsequently endorsed the bill concerning "situation in the areas surrounding
Japan", which expand its defense area to "areas surrounding Japan". Moreover,
some politicians in Japan have, from time to time, called for changes in
Japan's military strategy, i.e. from a strategy of "defense confined to
its own territory and coastal waters" to a "preemptive" one.(4) And
some even went so far as to call for amendments to Japan's Peace Constitution.(5)
So, US-Japan cooperation on TMD can only contribute the resurgence of Japan's
militarism.
Fifthly, TMD joint development by the United States and Japan will give
rise to mounting misgivings and mistrust among the major powers in the
region, especially China and Russia, and subsequently erode the basis of
their cooperation in the regional context, thus making it difficult to
foster a sound and enabling security environment in the region.
Sixthly, the US-Japan cooperation on TMD will not be conducive to relaxing
the tensions on the Korean Peninsular, in particular the resolution of
the Korean nuclear and missile crises. The emerging positive developments,
from another perspective, point to the very fact that the excuses employed
by the US and Japan to develop TMD in East Asia is untenable. If they are
bent on their own way and continue to pursue TMD, it will affect the momentum
being gained in the wake of the recent rapprochement between DPRK and ROK.
As a result, any resolution to the above crisis will remain elusive.
Seventhly, the US-Japan cooperation on TMD will not help prevent the
proliferation of missiles; on the contrary, such cooperation can only multiply
the risk of the proliferation of missile technologies and render MTCR ineffective,
given that technologies for both offensive missiles and missile defenses
are mutually convertible, and many technologies for missile defenses can
be used and adapted to develop and improve the technologies for offensive
missiles. In fact, many TMD systems, even in the case of such a low-tier
TMD as PAC-III, are subject to the control of the MTCR as Category II items.
So, US- Japan cooperation on TMD is, in fact, very much at odds with the
non- proliferation purpose the United States has advocated.
Lastly, the deployment of sophisticated TMD systems in East Asia will
constitute a direct grave threat to China's national security interest.
According to the information made available by the US side, NTW, for instance,
is an upper-tier TMD system inherently capable of intercepting ICBMs even
in the ascent/boost phase.(6) The NTW system, given its velocity,
is capable of penetrating 800 to 1000 km inside China, thus directly threatening
the safety of China's coastal provinces. The Chinese have naturally registered
their grave concerns and strong opposition.
III. The Taiwan Question in Asia-Pacific
TMD Architectures
TMD relating to Taiwan represents a special concern to China, as it
involves not only China's sovereignty but its national security interests
as well.
Our concerns on this score are actually two-fold. One is the American
factor, i.e. the direct provision by the US to Taiwan of TMD systems, equipment,
technologies, services or other assistance. Another is mainly the Japanese
factor, i.e. the potential incorporation of Taiwan into the US-Japan TMD
protection umbrella.
Neither scenario is acceptable to China, because both scenarios constitute
not only an act of interference in China's internal affairs on the part
of the US and Japan, but also a major shift in the latter's policy towards
China. Given the nature of TMD systems, especially with the involvement
of early warning information, the provision of assistance to Taiwan, particularly
in a case of Taiwan contingency, is virtually tantamount to restoring "something"
in a nature of a quasi- military alliance between the US and Taiwan. This
will give rise to serious political and military consequences.
So, if the US and Japan are to provide Taiwan with TMD, no matter in
what form, or to incorporate Taiwan into their TMD protection umbrella,
it will not only shake the basis of China's relations with the US and Japan
with destructive impacts, but also inject new destabilizing factors into
the regional security environment.
China, for its part, is resolutely opposed to the above attempts. China
has no room whatsoever for any compromise on this issue. This is a red
hot line. Untouchable.
IV. Prescriptions
TMD based on unilateral military advantages is not a relevant answer
to addressing the threat flowing from missile development and missile proliferation.
The following measures merit our reflection:
Firstly, it is essential to do away with the cold war mentality and
come up with a correct perception of security in fostering a sound and
enabling regional security environment.(7)
Secondly, it is fundamental, in addressing security problems, to face
squarely and respect the legitimate security interests and concerns of
all relevant countries and to ensure the undiminished security for all.
This represents two important principles if the problems are to be put
behind us. It would be undesirable if one seeks its own unilateral security
at the expense of others. Security issues can only be addressed in the
context of cooperative and collective security through enhanced dialogue
and cooperation.
Thirdly, given that the relations among major powers always constitute
a main axis on regional security issues, it is therefore essential to enhance
their coordination on the basis of dialogue and cooperation among all relevant
countries. Such a "power concert" will help remove the mounting misgivings
and mistrust among major powers and subsequently propel the advancement
of cooperation in promotion of solutions to the relevant issues. In the
absence of a healthy relationship among major powers, a sound, stable and
enabling regional security environment will be impossible.
Fourthly, it is necessary to do away with any TMD cooperation based
on military alliance in which the enhancement of the alliance's overall
offensive-defensive capability is the objective.
Fifthly, there must be a ban on the development and deployment of all
TMD systems with inherent strategic capability. Lastly, it is essential
to ensure that Taiwan be excluded from any TMD mechanism. To this end,
the United States and Japan should undertake in explicit terms not to provide
to Taiwan, in whatever form, any TMD system, equipment, technology, service
or other assistance, or to incorporate Taiwan into their TMD protection
umbrella.
V. Conclusion
With the above in view, I am of the view that the excuse employed by
the United States and Japan in pursuing their TMD joint development program
is untenable. TMD is not a relevant answer to threats flowing from missile
development and missile proliferation; on the contrary, it can only constrain
the relations of major powers, increase their mistrust and thus impede
their cooperation with profound and far-reaching negative impacts on regional
peace, security and stability. A correct perception of security, coupled
with coordination among major powers and enhanced dialogue and cooperation
among all relevant countries in accordance with the principle of undiminished
security for all, is of utmost importance if the regional security issues
are to be put behind us.
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(1) "Can BMD Really Enhance Security?" Statement by Mr. Sha Zukang,
at 2nd China-US Conference on Arms Control and Non-proliferation, 28 April,
1999, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/read.asp?forefather=002&pkey=19991
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(2) Sipri Year Book 1999, Chapter 7 Military Expenditure, table 7A
3
(3) "Issue of Japanese-American Security Cooperation", http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/en.../read.asp?forefather=003&peky=1999123009492
(4) See news coverage of Central News Agency, Taiwan, 5 March, 1999
(5) "New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan And Its Search for an Arms
Control Strategy", Michael J. Creen and Katsuhisa Furukawa, Arms Control
Today, July/August 2000, pp17
(6) see BMDO report on theater missile defense
(7) "Promote Disarmament Process and Safeguard World Security", Address
at the Conference on Disarmament by Jiang Zemin, President of the People's
Republic of China, 26 March 1999, Geneva, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/read.asp?forefather=002&pkey=19991
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