by Joeseph
Cirincione
Director, Non-Proliferation
Prject
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace
SUMMARY
The drive to deploy a National
Missile Defense System in the United
States is not driven primarily
by threats or technology, but by
politics. The ballistic
missile threat to the homeland of the United
States has substantially
decreased over the past 15 years. Despite
years of effort and over
$60 billion spent on research, there remain
major technological obstacles
to effective ballistic missile defense.
The push for a national
missile defense is motivated primarily by
deeply-held conservative
political and strategic views on the nature
of international conflict.
Conservative analysts see
a dangerous world with mounting threats.
They believe that American
security cannot be safeguarded by
international agreements
but primarily by military might. If the
United States is to continue
to project its military power, it must
have defenses to thwart
any nation's potential nuclear-armed missiles.
Some conservatives also
see war with a rising China as possible, even
inevitable, requiring robust
missile defenses. The Clinton
Administration has tried
to "triangulate" the issue, hoping to deploy
a limited system that would
not overturn existing arms control
arrangements or antagonize
Russia or China. The Clinton strategy
failed diplomatically and
technologically, but succeeding politically
in neutralizing missile
defense as a issue in the 2000 presidential
campaign (though it does
not seem that defense would have been a
significant issue, in any
event.). The international consequences of
this strategy, however,
are still severe, and an presidential decision
in the future to abrogate
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would
destabilizing the entire
non-proliferation regime.
This paper outlines the decreasing
missile threats to the United
States, the technical weaknesses
of proposed missile defense systems
and details the political
divide at the root of the missile defense
debate
SECTION ONE:
THE DECREASING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
Official Estimates
The unclassified version
of the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE), "Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States Through
2015," released on September 9, 1999
represents the official
U.S. government view of the ballistic missile
threat.
It presents a limited view
of some of the ballistic missile threats to
the United States.
The estimate lowers the established intelligence
agency standards for judging
threats and thus presents known missile
programs as more immediate
threats than previous assessments. While
some officials within the
Administration may disagree with the
assessment, they have not
publicly expressed their views.
The NIE projects forward
some current technological and development
trends, but, by assessing
"projected possible and likely missile
developments by 2015 independent
of significant political and economic
changes," (emphasis added)
it overestimates potential ballistic
missile threats from still
developing countries such as Iraq, Iran and
North Korea, and poorly
prepared policy-makers for the sharply
deteriorated international
security environment that would emerge
should the non-proliferation
regime weaken or collapse. The NIE
cautions that it tried to
balance what could happen, with what is most
likely to happen.
Every since the 1998 Rumsfeld
Commission report asserted, somewhat
hysterically, that a new
nation could plausibly field an ICBM "with
little or no warning,"(1)
government analysts have struggled to cover
all possibilities, while
still preserving their value for policy-
makers by reporting what
is most likely to happen. This conflict is
evident in the introduction
to the NIE, which notes a dissenting
opinion from one of the
intelligence agencies involved in producing
the consensus report:
"Some analysts believe that
the prominence given to missiles countries
'could' develop gives more
credence than is warranted to developments
that may prove implausible."
This "could" issue is perhaps
the most striking difference
between the 1999 NIE and
those published in 1993 and 1995. "Could" is
a highly ambiguous word.
For some it means "remotely possible," for
others it means "will."
The shift to the "could" standard represents
one of the three major changes
made to the assessment methodology from
previous assessments.
The other two shifts are:
(1) substantially reducing
the range of missiles considered serious
threats by shifting from
threats to the 48 continental states to
threats to any part of the
land mass of the 50 states; and,
(2) changing the timeline
from when a country would first deploy a
long-range missile to when
a country could first test a long-range
missile.
The shift on potential US
targets represents a range change of some
5,000 kilometers (the distance
from Seattle to the western-most tip of
the Aleutian island chain).
It essentially means that an
intermediate-range ballistic
missile, such as the Taepo-dong II, could
be considered in the same
class as an intercontinental-range missile.
The timeline shift represents
a difference of five years (what
previous estimates said
was the difference between first test and
likely deployment).
The Indian experience with the Agni II missile
provides some indication
the original standard may be the more
accurate. An Agni
II was first tested in April 1999 with a potential
range of 2,500 kilometers,
but despite Indian declarations of intent
to deploy, the missile has
yet to enter production. The Agni program
began in the mid-1980s.
These three changes account
for almost all of the differences between
the 1999 NIE and earlier
estimates. Thus, the new estimate, rather
than presenting a new, dramatic
development in the ballistic missile
threat, represents a lowering
of the standards for judging when a
system would be considered
a threat. This NIE may lead some observers
to conclude that there has
been a significant technological leap
forward in Third World missile
programs, when, in fact there has been
only incremental development
in programs well-known to analysts for
years.
For example, the 1993 NIE
said:
"Only China and the CIS strategic
forces in several states of the
former Soviet Union currently
have the capability to strike the
continental United States
(CONUS) with land-based ballistic missiles.
Analysis of available information
shows the probability is low that
any other country will acquire
this capability during the next 15
years."
The 1995 NIE, as summarized
by publicly by Richard Cooper, Chairman of
the National Intelligence
Council, found:
"Nearly a dozen countries
other than Russia and China have ballistic
missile development programs.
In the view of the Intelligence
Community, these programs
are to serve regional goals. Making the
change from a short or medium
range missile—that may pose a threat to
US troops located abroad—to
a long range ICBM capable of threatening
our citizens at home, is
a major technological leap .The Intelligence
Community judges that in
the next 15 years no country other than the
major declared nuclear powers
will develop a ballistic missile that
could threaten the continuous
48 states or Canada."
Several leading members of
congress harshly attacked the 1995 and 1993
estimates. In December
1996, a congressionally-mandated panel headed
by former Bush administration
CIA director Robert Gates reviewed the
1995 NIE and agreed that
the the continental United States was
unlikely to face an ICBM
threat from a third world country before 2010
"even taking into account
the acquisition of foreign hardware and
technical assistance, and
that case is even stronger than was
presented in the estimate."
With the three altered measurement
standards and in the wake of the
Rumsfeld Commision report,
the new 1999 NIE finds that over the next
15 years the US:
"Post likely will face ICBM
threats from Russia, China and North Korea
probably from Iran, and
possibly from Iraq, although the threats will
consist of dramatically
fewer weapons than today because of
significant reductions we
expect in Russian strategic forces."
By making the analysis so
specific, the NIE does a real service. It
highlights the very narrow
nature of the missile proliferation threat,
one confined to a few countries
whose political evolution will be a
determining factor in whether
they remain threats to the United
States. However, by projecting
"possible and likely missile
developments by 2015 independent
of significant political and economic
changes," the NIE limits
its value as a risk assessment tool. The
adoption of the "could standard"
and the selective and partial
inclusion of political factors
in analyzing the threat are the two
greatest weaknesses of this
NIE.
Some might argue, for example,
that the diplomatic developments in
North Korea made the NIE
obsolete two weeks after it was publicly
released. If North
Korea does not flight test the Taepo-dong II and
if that nation can be further
convinced not to export missiles or
related technology, we would
eliminate the greatest source of an
additional ICBM threat to
the United States. If North Korea were taken
out of the equation, there
would be very little left to this estimate.
Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Command Admiral Dennis Blair said
"The North Korean development
and the Taepo-Dong launch is clearly one
of the key, if not the key
factor, in determining the parameters and
the deployment schedule
and the capabilities of [the national missile
defense system]."(2)
So if the Korean problem were resolved, "it
would have a very big effect"
on the program schedule and direction.
No mention was made in the
report of these diplomatic efforts or their
potential significance.
Similarly, under some other
plausible scenarios, North Korea may
collapse; democratizing
trends in Iran could alter the direction of
that nation's program; while
a post-Saddam Iraq could restore friendly
relations with the West.
These, of course, are political risk
assessments, not the kind
of technology estimates the 1999 NIE
details, although they were
included in previous NIEs. The
international political,
diplomatic and legal environment is highly
relevant to the prospects
for global development of ballistic
missiles.
Declining Global Arsenals
It has now become common
wisdom and certainly common political usage
to refer to the growing
threat of ballistic missiles. But is this
true? The threat is
certainly changing, and is increasing by some
measures. But by several
other important criteria, the ballistic
missile threat to the United
States is significantly smaller than it
was in the mid-1980s.
1. Decreasing ICBM Arsenals.
The number of intercontinental
ballistic missiles has decreased
dramatically since the height
of the Cold War. During the 1980s, the
Soviet Union deployed over
9,540 nuclear warheads on 2,318 long-range
missiles aimed at the United
States. Currently, Russia has fewer than
5,200 missile warheads deployed
on approximately 1,100 missiles (a 52-
percent decline).
2. Eliminated IRBM Arsenals.
There has been a near-100
percent decrease in the threat from
intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (with ranges of 3,000 to 5,500
kilometers) since the mid-1980s.
President Ronald Reagan negotiated
and implemented the Intermediate-Nuclear
Forces Treaty. The Soviet
Union destroyed 1,846 missiles
in this range, eliminating this entire
class of missiles from U.S.
and Soviet arsenals. China has some 20
missiles in this range,
and no other nation has developed
intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (though the launch of North
Korea's developmental Taepodong-2
would add a few missiles to this
category).
3. More MRBM Programs.
Apart from China and Russia,
a few countries have conducted tests of
medium- range ballistic
missiles (with ranges of 1,000 to 3,000 km)
which do not threaten the
territory of the United States. India
intends to begin production
of the Agni II, with a range of about
2,000 km and may be working
on a longer- range "Surya" missile. The
only other significant medium-range
threats come from missiles derived
from the North Korean No
Dong: Pakistan's Ghauri (1,300-km range) and
Ghauri II (2,000-km range)
missiles and Iran's Shahab-3 (also 1,300-km
range), all of which have
been flight tested.
4. Aging Scud Inventories.
Almost all the other nations
that possess ballistic missiles have only
short-range missiles.
For most, their best missiles are aging Scuds
bought or inherited from
the former Soviet Union and now declining in
military utility over time.
5. Fewer, Poorer Programs.
The number of countries trying
or threatening to develop long-range
ballistic missiles has not
changed greatly in 15 years, and is
actually smaller than in
the past. The nations now attempting to
perfect long-range missiles
are also smaller, poorer and less
technologically advanced
than were the nations with missile programs
15 years ago.
Only China and Russia have
the capability to hit the United States
with nuclear warheads on
intercontinental ballistic missiles. This
has not changed since Russia
and China deployed their first ICBMs in
1959 and 1981 respectively.
Confusion arises when policy-makers speak
of threats from missiles
to the United States or U.S. interests, such
as forward-deployed troops
or allied nations. This merges threats
from very short-range missiles,
of which there are many, with long-
range missiles, of which
there are few.
In short, the ballistic missile
threat is confined, limited and
changing relatively slowly.
Declining Ballistic Missile
Arsenals
Threat
Status (1985 vs. 2000)
Trend
ICBM (>5500 km)
52 % decrease.
IRBM (3000-5500 km)
99 % decrease.
MRBM (1000-3000 km)
3 new national programs.
SRBM (<1000 km)
Static but declining as
Scud inventories age.
Number of nations with
ballistic missile
programs of concern
Fewer, less advanced
(8 in mid-1980s, 7
today).
Potentially hostile
nations with ballistic
missile programs
More (3 in mid-1980s, 5
today).
Potential damage to the
United States from a
missile attack
Vastly decreased.
By focusing on developments
in a small number of missile programs in
developing nations, current
intelligence estimates neglect dramatic
declines in global ballistic
missile arsenals. As a result, official
statements of the ballistic
missile threat to the United States have
been distorted by an exaggerated
sense of the military dangers the
nation faces from long-range
missiles.
The missile threat is certainly
changing, and is increasing by several
important criteria. Globally,
however, compared to the threats the
United States confronted
in the 1980s, there are far fewer
intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles, almost no intermediate-
range ballistic missiles,
fewer nations with missile programs (and
those that exist are less
technologically-advanced), and, compared to
the threat of a global thermonuclear
war that would have ended life on
the planet, the potential
damage from a missile attack is vastly
decreased.
The United States is now
legitimately concerned primarily about five
nations, in addition to
Russia and China: North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
India and Pakistan.
Fifteen years ago, North Korea was not a concern,
but India, Brazil, Argentina,
Egypt, South Africa and perhaps Libya
were all involved in programs
to develop long-range missiles. All but
India have since terminated
such efforts. Israel retains the
capability to develop long-range
missiles, but is not considered a
threat to the United States
nor a likely exporter of missile
technology.
The Carnegie Non-Proliferation
Project maintains a comprehensive list
of all nations with ballistic
missiles of all ranges. The list is
available at the Project
web site at: www.ceip.org/npp.
SECTION TWO:
TECHNICAL OBSTACLES TO
EFFECTIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
None of the dozens of national
missile defense systems proposed over
the past 20 years has ever
proven to be technical feasible. This
includes the wide-range
of systems researched and developed under the
Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) program and the current candidates
proposed by the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and
missile defense advocates.
It is highly unlikely that
any candidate system can be shown to be
militarily effective during
the next eight years. That is, during the
next two presidential terms
neither the technology nor our testing
methods will provide an
assured capability to defeat long-range
ballistic missiles.
It is possible that the next president may decide
to proceed with deployment
of a national missile defense system during
that time, but that decision
will be based on political considerations
or the perception that the
threat justifies early deployment, not on
demonstrated ability to
defeat the likely threats.
Given the overwhelming advantage
enjoyed by offensive nuclear forces,
and the enormous technical
difficulties inherent in any missile
defense, this should not
be surprising. It may be possible to someday
construct a system that
could provide at least some defense against
intercontinental ballistic
missiles. However, the United States is
years away from conducting
the kinds of realistic tests that could
provide military and political
leaders with the minimum confidence
they must have before risking
the lives of millions of citizens.
Understanding Ballistic
Missile Defense Interceptor Tests
The past two decades of efforts
to invent a viable national missile
defense have been characterized
by exaggerated claims of success and
promises of performance
that later proved false. It is difficult to
recall a missile defense
proponent who understated the actual
performance of a system.
The problems began with the false claims of
proponents of the X-ray
laser that helped launch the SDI program(3)
and continue through claims
today that Aegis destroyers and cruisers
can quickly and inexpensively
provide a highly-effective defense
against both intermediate-
and intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles.
For example, many experts
and officials believe that countermeasures
will not be significant
obstacles to effective ballistic missile
defense because we have
already solved the discrimination problem.
This is not true, despite
some misleading claims of success. The
national missile defense
interceptor on 2 October 1999 contained a
test element where the interceptor
was to distinguish between the
target and a decoy object.
Ballistic Missile Defense officials
provided important qualifying
details of the test in briefings before
the test that did not make
it into their briefings after the test.
The official news release
for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs on 2 October
stated:
"The test successfully demonstrated
'hit to kill technology' to
intercept and destroy the
ballistic missile target. An exoatmospheric
kill vehicle (EKV) weighing
about 120 pounds, equipped with two
infrared sensors, a visible
sensor, and a small propulsion system,
located and tracked the
target, guiding the kill vehicle to a body-to-
body impact with the target
and resulting in the target destruction
using only the kinetic energy
of the collision. This "hit to kill'
intercept demonstrates that
a warhead carrying a weapon of mass
destruction-nuclear, chemical
or biological - will be totally
destroyed and neutralized."
Hitting a small target at
these distances and speeds is a remarkable
technological achievement,
but not an unprecedented one. Previous
tests of similar interceptors
have hit targets twice, in 1984 and in
1991. In both previous
cases, as in this demonstration, the targets
were significantly enhanced
to ensure the likelihood of success. The
October news release
cited above neglected to mention four critical
test enhancements:
1) The target followed
a pre-programmed flight path to a designated
position.
2) The interceptor
missile also flew to a pre-programmed position.
3) A Global Positioning
Satellite (GPS) receiver was placed on the
target to send its position
to ground control and the necessary target
location information was
downloaded to a computer in the kill vehicle.
4) The decoy released
had a significantly different thermal signature
than the target, making
it easier for the sensors on the kill vehicle
to distinguish between the
objects.
5) Later analysis,
disclosed by The New York Times, not by test
officials, that the test
had very nearly failed due to three other key
problems:
6) Incorrect star maps
loaded into the kill-vehicle's computer
prevented the vehicle from
ascertaining its position once it had
separated from the booster
7) Back-up inertial
guidance systems led to inaccuracies in pointing
the sensors used to locate
the target.
8) The sensors finally
saw the large, bright balloon decoy, re-
oriented, continued searching
and located the cooler warhead that it
had been programmed to recognize
as the correct target.
For test purposes, there
is nothing wrong with minimizing the number
of variables in order to
test key elements of the weapon system. The
GPS receiver, for example,
was substituting for information that might
be provided by future missile
defense radars. It is vital, however,
that test officials provide
full disclosure of test limitations to
policy-makers at every stage
of the process, lest test results be
interpreted to have greater
significance than, in fact, they do. The
October test was much more
a demonstration of two missiles
intercepting each other
than it was a test of intercepting an enemy
missile under combat conditions.
It proved only that a kill vehicle
can intercept a target if
it can see it.
Some officials, such as Department
of Defense Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation Philip
Coyle, have tried to caution lawmakers on
the tests. Director
Coyle warns that the test are "carefully
scripted." In his
latest annual report to Congress he notes that the
test program for a national
missile defense system:
"is building a target suite
that, while an adequate representation of
one or two re-entry vehicles,
may not be representative of threat-
penetration aids, booster
or post-boost vehicles. Test targets of the
current program do not represent
the complete 'design-to' threat space
and are not representative
of the full sensor requirements spectrum
(eg., discrimination requirements)."
Misinterpretation of test
results is not an abstract concern. The
last time the United States
conducted a successful high-altitude, hit-
to-kill intercept in the
presence of decoys in 1991, the then-director
of the Strategic Defense
Initiative Office told Congress that the ERIS
interceptor had determined
on its own "which of the targets to go
after, whether the decoy
or the target." His annual report to
Congress that year claimed
that the ERIS test "validates the concept
of performing mid-course
intercepts using basic discrimination
techniques" and had discriminated
between decoy balloons and the
target warhead.
These clams were false.
The General Accounting Office in their
report, "Strategic Defense
Initiative: Some Claims Overstated for
Early Flight Tests of Interceptors,"
(NSIAD-92-282) found that SDIO
officials consistently overstated
the success of interceptor flight
tests. In particular,
in the ERIS intercept of 1991:
"The interceptor was not
capable of discriminating targets from
decoys. A program
official said that the interceptor was pre-
programmed to hit the middle
object in the target complex his if the
target complex had not deployed
as planned and one of the balloons had
been positioned as the middle
object instead of the re-entry vehicle,
ERIS would have attempted
to intercept the balloon, since it cannot
discriminate a re-entry
vehicle from a decoy on its own."
The 1991 test also placed
a transponder of the target vehicle to guide
the interceptor to the RV.
None of this information was disclosed to
Congress until an investigation
by the Government Operations Committee
revealed the limitations
of the test and the misrepresentations of
success. Similarly
the only hit from four attempts during the Homing
Overlay Experiment (HOE)
in the early 1980s was made possible only
after the target was heated
to 100 degrees Fahrenheit to increase its
visibility to the interceptor's
infrared sensors. Still the HOE, ERIS
and now EKV tests go down
in the books as successes, usually
unqualified.
The GAO report cited above
found a pattern of misleading claims,
forcing them to conclude
that SDI officials had inaccurately portrayed
four of five tests as successes,
when they were not.
Equally relevant to the
current debate, these inaccurate reports
included claims that a space-based
"Brilliant Pebbles" test was "a
"90-percent success," and
was ready to proceed to more advanced
testing. GAO found
that the "90-percent success" claim was based on a
substantially downward revision
of the original goals for the test to
correspond with what the
interceptor was able to achieve, not what was
originally planned.
Of the original four goals, none was fully met,
including its complete inability
to detect, acquire and track a
target. Since the
program's "accomplishments were significantly less
than planned," GAO concluded,
the first phase of the program's testing
"was completed only in the
sense that SDIO had decided to proceed into
Phase II."(4)
This history is part of
the reason why it is common to hear advocates
of missile defense claim
that their proposed system is ready to go,
inexpensive to build and
highly effective. But as former BMDO
Director Air Force General
Lester Lyles said, in directly rebutting
before the Senate last year
the claims of the Heritage Foundation that
effective sea-based missile
defenses could be rapidly deployed, "When
it comes to missile defense,
there is nothing quick, cheap and easy."
President Clinton rediscovered
this truth when, despite large funding
increases by both Congress
and the Administration over the past four
years, the technical problems
with the proposed National Missile
Defense System proved overwhelming.
He said on September 1, "I simply
cannot conclude with the
information I have today that we have enough
confidence in the technology,
and the operational effectiveness of the
entire NMD system, to move
forward to deployment."
MISPLACED FAITH
Some argue that when President
Clinton assumed office in 1993, he
sabotaged plans that, if
allowed to continue, would have by now
produced a working and affordable
missile defense. The Global
Protection Against Limited
Strikes (GPALS) plan introduced by
President George Bush and
Defense Secretary Richard Cheney in January
1991 scaled-back the original
SDI program. It proposed instead a
space-, sea- and land-based
system to destroy from 10 to 200 warheads
"delivered by ballistic
missiles launched from anywhere in the world
to attack areas anywhere
else in the world." The system relied
heavily on the so-called
"Brilliant Pebbles" space-based kinetic kill
weapons.
Some advocate a return to
such a system today. But their confidence
in the concept is based
on faith, not fact.
The Congressional Budge
Office at the time estimated that the 12-year
cost of the GPALS plan would
be at least $85 billion (in 1992
dollars).(5) Annual expenditures
would have averaged $8 billion.
Since the system consisted
largely of view graphs and concept studies,
CBO pointed out that "the
complexity of the Grand Forks and GPALS
defenses suggests that total
costs could exceed planned levels."(6)
The General Accounting Office,
in a report to the Chairman of the
Legislation and National
Security Subcommittee in 1992, warned that
the plan would have to "overcome
tremendous technical challenges."(7)
This report was the last
independent evaluation conducted of the GPALS
program. It was not
optimistic about the technical feasibility of the
weapons proposed.
"Such a system will push the cutting edge of
technology," GAO warned,
"SDIO must rely on some technologies that
are as yet unproven and
learn how to integrate them into a reliable
system" For the system to
work, the GAO advised, "significant advances
must be made over the next
several years in critical areas . . . if
these advances are not achieved,
schedule delays, escalating costs,
and performance problems
could occur."
Even if the technologies
became available, the analysts said, there
was still "the enormous
challenge of integrating them into a cohesive
system."
In short, space- and sea-based
systems proposed in the waning days of
the previous administration
were hardly the ready-to-go weapons that
advocates now fondly remember.
Outside of those with a direct
financial or career interest
in the programs, few experts or military
officers thought any of
these programs could deliver real, near-term
military benefit.
THE HISTORIC RECORD
Based on current schedules
and all available evidence it is reasonable
to assume that if proposed
high-altitude, ballistic missile defense
systems are used in combat
they will fall far short of predicted
effectiveness. It
is unlikely that the systems will completely fail,
but the evidence indicates
that they will perform significantly below
either tested or predicted
kill rates. Military commanders,
therefore, would be wise
not to base troop deployments or engagement
strategies on unrealistic
expectations of the protection these
defenses will offer.
The evidence available includes:
* the performance
of the Patriot missile system in the Gulf War
* the performance
of high-altitude missile defense systems in tests
to-date
* current test plans
for proposed systems prior to production and
deployment
THE PATRIOT EXPERIENCE
In the United States,
confusion over the Patriot's performance in the
Gulf War still fuels overly
optimistic estimates of the effectiveness
of new, proposed defensive
systems. During the war, many believed
that the Patriot had achieved
a near-perfect intercept rate, as was
reported initially from
the battlefield and Washington. Claims were
revised downwards from 96
percent in testimony to Congress after the
war, to 80 percent, 70 percent,
and—after a investigation by the
Government Operations Committee
in 1992—to 52 percent, though the
Army report notes that destruction
of only 25 percent of the Scud
warheads is supported by
evidence with high confidence levels.(8)
Independent evaluations
are more pessimistic, concluding that the
Patriot hit few if any Scuds
during the war. These include
assessments conducted by
the Israeli Defense Force, the Congressional
Research Service, the General
Accounting Office, and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
and staff of the Government Operations
Committee.
The General Accounting
Office review of the evidence in support of the
Army claims revealed that,
using the Army's own methodology and
evidence, a strong case
can be made that Patriots hit only 9 percent
of the Scud warheads engaged,
and there are serious questions about
these few hits. The
speed of the Scuds, the limitations of the
Patriot missile system,
and the confusion and targeting difficulties
caused by the break-up of
the Scud missile as it re-entered the
atmosphere seem to have
contributed to the high failure rate.
The Patriot missile,
equipped with a new multi-mode seeker, failed in
two out of three intercept
tests conducted after the war. The Army
declared it "operationally
unacceptable." The new replacement
interceptor missile for
the PAC-3 configuration, the ERINT, will not
initially deployed until
2001. Until then, US forces cannot reliably
intercept even the short-range
Scuds encountered in the Gulf War.
Whatever the kill
ratio attributed to Patriot, the few unclassified
hard figures released by
the Army should serve as a sobering reminder
of how combat conditions
can wreck havoc even on systems that perform
well on the test ranges,
as the Patriot did.
A total of 158 Patriot
missiles were fired at fewer than 47 Scuds
during the war:
* 86 Patriots were
launched at real Scud targets, but
* 30 per cent of the
Patriots were launched as Scud debris mistaken
for targets
* 15 per cent of the
Patriots were launched against false targets
caused by radar backlobe
and sidelobe interference (including one
launched by accident in
Turkey.)
The fragmentation and EMC
problems were known at the time (the Scud
fragmentation had been observed
during the Iran-Iraq war) but were not
included in deployment and
operational planning for the Patriot nor
were they included in any
tests of the system.
It is my personal evaluation,
as the chief investigator for the
Government Operation Committee's
1992 review and based on all
available evidence, that
the Patriot hit few, if any, Scud warheads.
The Patriot was simple overmatched.
It was never designed to hit a
target as complex as that
presented by the Scud. As Raytheon
executive Robert Stein explained
after the war:
"Upon reentry, the resulting
forces caused the missile to break apart
into several pieces.
These extra pieces looked to the Patriot
software like targets that
were diving at high speed and were going to
impact in the areas that
the defense design was laid out to defend.
In effect, they became 'decoys'
that were indistinguishable from TBMs
to the Patriot radar, since
no discrimination features had been
implemented in anticipation
of these types of targets.
"The anomalous behavior
that the operators were seeing was created by
the aerodynamic instability
of the warhead section after the missile
started to break up.
It was spiraling, rather than travelling on an
expected ballistic trajectory,
because of changes in its center of
gravity and center of aerodynamic
pressure after breakup. In
addition, its radar reflectivity
had dropped significantly because of
its smaller size.
In effect, what Iraqi engineers had created, purely
unintentionally and by poor
workmanship and design, was a high-speed,
low radar-cross-section,
maneuvering reentry vehicle (RV0 accompanied
by decoys…"(9)
This is the type of target
that TMD and NMD systems should expect in
combat and should be used
extensively in all test programs now.
CURRENT PLANS
All the proposed new missile
defense systems except for the Navy Area-
Wide system, employ hit-to-kill
interceptors. That is, unlike the
Patriot interceptors, which
used a proximity fuse and an explosive
warhead to scatter pellet-size
fragment in the path of the intended
target, the new interceptors
will attempt to hit the target head-on
using the kinetic energy
of the encounter to destroy the target.
The track record for test
of exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptors
should indicate caution
in projections of future capabilities. There
have only been 15 intercept
attempts outside the atmosphere conducted
by the Department of Defense
since 1982. Of these, only 4, or 26 per
cent, actually hit their
targets.(10) The low number of past tests
and the weak success rate
warrant deep skepticism for much success in
the near future with the
proposed systems.
LOWER-TIER SYSTEMS
The most promising new system,
the improved Patriot system, or PAC-3,
is designed to intercept
Scud-type missiles of the type now deployed
by potential Third World
adversaries. These 300- to 1000-kilometer-
range missiles will represent
a challenge, but one which the PAC-3
should be capable of intercepting.
The new ERINT missile for the
system successfully intercepted
two targets (although at relatively
short ranges) in a shoot-off
with the Patriot multi-mode missile in
1993, but its has since
undergone some design changes. It has enjoyed
five successful intercepts
over the past two years; three against
short-range Hera targets
and two against cruise missile targets The
Navy Area-Wide (Lower Tier)
system (an upgrade to the AEGIS radar
system and Standard missile)
and the multi-national MEADS program are
also aimed at these lower-range
threats, but have yet to have any
intercept tests.
Some experts still voice
concern, however. David Eshel, a retired
career officer in the Israeli
Defense Force, writes in the September
Janes' Intelligence Review,
"Although this system [the PAC-3] has an
increased range and an onboard
terminal radar guidance system it is
doubtful that this could
overcome the unique corkscrewing effect of
the Iraqi Al-Hussayin Scud
missile."
Without realistic tests
it is impossible to predict performance, but
these lower-tier systems
appear to hold out the best possibility of
successfully intercepting
the existing Third World missile threats
armed with single warheads.
(Missiles armed with submunitions
released after the boost
phase would defeat any known kinetic energy
missile defense system.)
They rely on previously developed radar and
hardware systems and, because
they intercept their targets within the
atmosphere after any decoys
deployed would have been stripped away,
they do not encounter the
difficult discrimination problems facing
higher, outside the atmosphere
interceptors. Countermeasures remain
one of the major unsolved
technical barriers to effective missile
defense despite decades
of effort.
HIGHER-TIER SYSTEMS
Potentially more threatening
than Scuds are medium-range missiles that
travel from 1000 to 3,500
kilometers. No nation hostile to the United
States currently fields
such missiles, except for several Nodong
missiles deployed by North
Korea with a range of 1000 km. But this is
the threat represented by
systems reportedly under development in
North Korea and Iran.
Both the Administration and Congress favor
developing systems to intercept
these missiles, with Congress urging a
faster development and deployment
schedule. To-date, tests of the
most promising candidates,
the Army's Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense system (THAAD) and
the Navy Theater-Wide (Upper Tier) system,
have been disappointing.
While both systems may be technically
feasible, THAAD has failed
in six of its eight test intercept
attempts, and the Navy has
gone zero for four in tests of the LEAP
kill vehicle (Lightweight
Exo-Atmospheric Projectile).
These were tests against
specially designed targets, with known
trajectories and characteristics,
well within the expected performance
range of the systems. The
THAAD tests were against Storm and Hera
targets, which have a maximum
range of about 750 and 1,100 kilometers,
respectively. A suitable
long-range target of 2,000 kilometers or
more, does not yet exist.
The Navy plans to use surplus Terrier
missiles as targets for
the Theater-Wide tests.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
SYSTEM
Noting that the NMD schedule
is shorter than most other major system
acquisition programs, the
General Accounting Office warned in 1997 of
the high risks inherent
in the program:
"Because of the compressed
development schedule, only a limited amount
of flight test data will
be available for the system deployment
decision in fiscal year
2000. By that time, BMDO will have conducted
only one system-level flight
test, and that test may not include all
system elements or involve
stressing conditions such as targets that
employ sophisticated countermeasure
or multiple warheads. As a
result, not all technical
issues, such as discrimination, will be
resolved by the time of
the deployment review. Also the current
schedule will permit only
a single test of the integrated ground-based
interceptor before production
of the interceptor's booster element
must begin. If subsequent
tests reveal problems, costly redesign or
modification of already
produced hardware may be required."(11)
By comparison, the only
other U.S.-based ballistic missile defense
system, the Safeguard, had
an acquisition schedule twice as long as
planned for the NMD program.
Safeguard also had 111 flight tests,
compared to only three intercept
tests and one system-level flight
test before a fiscal year
2000 deployment decision. The GAO noted
that even this system-level
test will not be comprehensive because it
will not include all system
elements, and:
"The single integrated system
test will not assess the NMD system's
capabilities against stressing
threats such as those that use
sophisticated countermeasures
or multiple warheads. The test is to be
conducted against a single
target with only simple countermeasures
such as decoys. No
test against multiple warheads is planned."
In June 1998, the GAO reaffirmed
its findings, concluding that even
with increased funding technical
and schedule risks are high.
THE BOTTOM LINE
There are no current plans
to test the THAAD, the Navy Theater-Wide or
the NMD system against realistic
threats such as multiple warhead
missiles that deploy warheads
with realistic decoys or jammers.
Department of Defense Director
of Operation Test and Evaluation Phil
Coyle concluded in a August
11 memorandum (reported by Bloomberg News
on August 23) that "test
results so far do not support a
recommendation at this time
to deploy in 20005." President Clinton
apparently agreed.
Director Coyle also warned:
"Deployment means the fielding
of an operational system with some
military utility which is
effective under realist combat conditions,
against realist threats
and countermeasures when operated by military
personnel at all times of
day or night and in all weather. Such a
capability is yet to be
shown to be practicable for NMD."
The same, of course, is
true of the higher altitude TMD systems. This
should give military commanders
and policy-makers low confidence in
the ability of these systems,
if deployed, to provide their troops,
the nation or US allies
any appreciable degree of protection against
longer-range ballistic missile
threats. Defense planner should
consider whether more realistic
schedules and elimination of
duplicative programs could
reduce the approximately $20 billion
planned for missile defense
efforts over the next five years and the
savings allocated to more
pressing defense needs.Section Three: The
Political Divide
The debate over the wisdom
of deploying a national missile defense
system has been determined
in large part, by the struggle between two
main schools of thought:
those that favor maintaining the current
global treaty regime and
those who seek to replace it with a new
conservative defense paradigm.
President Clinton has tried
to bridge the gap by advocating deployment
of a missile defense system
that is compliant with an amended Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.
However, when the U.S. administration
failed to overcome the deep
misgiving of the NATO members, they lost
any chance of winning Russian
support for sweeping treaty amendments.
Test failures undercut domestic
support for rushing to an early
deployment decision and
reinforced European, Russian and Chinese
opposition. President
Clinton abandoned the effort on September 1.
The debate over missile defense,
however, is certain to continue. It
can best be understood in
terms of this larger clash of world views.
DEFENDERS OF THE REGIME
The establishment view seeks
to preserve the existing framework of
interlocking treaties and
agreements that has, with some noticeable
failures, prevented the
spread of weapons of mass destruction from a
few to many nations and
has helped prevent wars involving these
weapons among the nations
that still possess them. The treaty regime
has been painstakingly assembled
oven the past fifty years through the
efforts of many nations,
but most often with the leadership of the
United States under both
Republican and Democratic presidents.
This view is similar if not
identical to the views of European leaders
and publics. Most
leaders of the NATO nations have summarized the
current situation in words
similar to those of President Jacques
Chirac:
"Worrying events have occurred
in the last two years with renewed
tests of nuclear and ballistic
weapons, the fact that three nuclear-
weapon States failed to
ratify the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty], and that the fundamental
provisions of the ABM [Anti-
Ballistic Missile] Treaty
were challenged yet again. The 21st century
should not only seek to
safeguard the valuable achievements generated
over the pas fifty years
by multilateral treaties, but also enable the
international community
to regain the momentum it appears to have lost
today." (12)
The basic strategy for preventing
further proliferation and for
thwarting missile attacks
on the United States was summed up by then-
Secretary of Defense William
Perry in 1996. The United States, he
said, has three lines of
defense against proliferation. The first and
strongest is to prevent
and reduce the threat through the non-
proliferation regime.
But some nations will cheat on the treaties or
remain outside the regime.
Therefore the second line of defense is a
strong military to deter
any attack and to seek out and destroy mass
destruction weapons before
they can be used. If this line fails, a
third line of defense is
provided by active defenses, including
ballistic missile defense
systems.
President Clinton referenced
these three lines of defense in his
speech announcing a delay
in the national missile defense program on
September 1.
"We have carried out a comprehensive
strategy to reduce and secure
nuclear arsenals, to strengthen
the international regime against
biological weapons and nuclear
testing and to stop the flow of
dangerous technology to
nations that might wish us harm. At the same
time, we have pursued new
technologies that could strengthen our
defenses against a possible
attack, including a terrorist attack here
at home. None of these elements
of our national security strategy can
be pursued in isolation.
Each is important, and we have made progress
in each area."
Within this camp, there are
differences over how serious are the
threats from new ballistic
missile programs and how effective and
reliable missile defenses
can be. In general, however, if forced to
choose between deploying
a limited national missile defense system and
preserving the treaty regime,
they would choose the regime.
THE ASSAULT ON THE REGIME
For proponents of the new
defense paradigm, this is precisely the
problem. Hundreds
of articles and speeches by conservatives have used
the South Asian tests and
the Korean and Iranian missile launches as
proof that future threats
are inherently unpredictable, our
intelligence estimates are
consistently unreliable, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction
fundamentally unstoppable and, thus,
the only truly effective
response is reliance on American defense
technology. This requires
substantial defense budget increases and
the deployment of new weapons
systems, including new types of nuclear
weapons and, most prominently,
missile defense systems. Conservatives
have skillfully deployed
expert commissions and congressional
investigations to endorse
this view.
The reports of the Commission
on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States in 1998 (the
Rumsfeld Commission) and the Committee on
U.S. National Security and
the People's Republic of China in 1999 (the
Cox Committee) were particularly
influential in shaping media and
political elite opinion.
The Administration's response was been to
cede ground, embracing missile
defense and budget increases while
husbanding the political
and personal capital usually devoted to the
first line of defense.
With the most conservative elements of the
Republican Party in control
of congressional committees, treaty
ratifications and diplomatic
appointments were been delayed for years.
The impact has been global.
A regime in need of repair and
revitalization remains in
a state of suspended anticipation.
It is difficult for many
in Europe and Asia to fathom this rather
cavalier disregard for existing
treaties and threat reduction
arrangements. But
the now dominant side in this debate forcefully
rejects the very idea of
negotiated arms reductions as a Cold War
relic, unsuited for the
current period.
Many conservatives see a
world, in Governor George W. Bush's phrase,
"of terror and missiles
and madmen." Paul Wolfowitz, one of Bush's
key advisers and a former
deputy secretary of defense, compares the
1990s to the 1890s.
Then, too, he says, Americans thought the great
wars were behind them and
the coming century would be characterized by
an internationalizing economy,
the spread of wonderful new
technologies, and the resolution
of national disputes through
arbitration. Instead,
he says, the twentieth century brought us the
two most horrific wars in
human history. These wars were started by
two nations no one in the
1890s thought of as great powers: Germany,
just united as a nation;
and Japan, only then emerging from centuries
of feudalism. Today,
says Wolfowitz, China presents "the obvious and
disturbing analogy."(13)
Other defense hawks go further,
arguing that a U.S.-China clash is
almost inevitable.
"China is building up its military with high-tech
weapons that can threaten
neighbors and the United States," warns
Arthur Waldron, director
of Asian studies at the American Enterprise
Institute.(14) "China's
territorial claims would likely lead to
regional war if they were
consistently enforced." Such a war, he
fears, could start as much
by miscalculation as by design.
Several years ago, Samuel
P. Huntington offered a broader vision in
his article and book, The
Clash of Civilizations. "The fault lines
between civilizations will
be the battle lines of the future," he
says, noting in particular
what he calls the "Confucian-Islamic
alliance" he sees forming
against the West.(15)
Former Secretary of the Navy
James Webb is one of several who still
echo this view. Webb warned
nearly two years ago that "China has been
developing a strategic axis
with the Muslim world . . . evidenced most
clearly by its continuing
military assistance to Iran and . . .
Pakistan."(16)
Modern day arms control treaties,
in this view, are worse than no
treaties at all. They promote
complacency, lulling America into a
false sense of security.
Meanwhile, several non-Western nations
(columnist Charles Krauthammer
calls them "weapon states") are busily
acquiring and deploying
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
ballistic missiles.
The West naively "promotes
nonproliferation as a universal norm and
nonproliferation treaties
and inspections as means of realizing that
norm," says Huntington.
The non-Western nations, on the other hand,
"assert their right to acquire
and to deploy whatever weapons they
think necessary for their
security," seeing weapons of mass
destruction "as the potential
equalizer of superior Western
conventional power."
Worse still are multilateral
arrangements. These weaken America, like
"Gulliver in the land of
Lilliputians, stretched out, unable to move,
because he has been tied
down by a whole host of threads," as Senator
Jeff Sessions (R.-Al.) warned
his colleagues during the debate over
the Comprehensive Test Ban.(17)
The Senate defeat of the test ban
crystallized the new attitude
popular among conservatives: mistrust
treaties, increase defenses,
assert American authority.
Many conservative experts
believe that they can pick and chose among
the treaties. In reference
to President Chirac's statement cited
above, they would see only
the first item as one of concern and rate
the others as progress (some,
in fact, view India's nuclear status as
a welcome counter-weight
to China). START treaties are no longer
necessary, in this view.
The United States, they say, does not
negotiate with the British
and the French on force levels, why should
we with the Russians?
The nuclear test ban and ABM treaty should be
jettisoned because they
restrain US force options. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty, on
the other hand, can restrain others and
should be kept as long as
no one takes the Article IV commitment to
eventual nuclear disarmament
seriously. Better still are export
restraint agreements such
as the Missile Technology Control Regime and
the Australia Group, which
are agreements among the weapon-states to
keep technology out of the
hands of states of concern.
THE CHINA SYNDROME
Conservative concerns about
China are central to the drive to deploy
missile defense systems.
These concerns reached a fevered pitch in
mid-1999. That spring
hundreds of news stories, led by an aggressive
series of The New York Times
investigative reports, trumpeted the
alleged transfer of U.S.
nuclear secrets to China by a traitorous
scientist at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. In May, a Congressional
report concluded that China
was using stolen U.S. data to modernize
its nuclear arsenal.
In the weeks after the publication
of the Times stories, the press
depicted Los Alamos scientist
Dr. Wen Ho Lee as a Chinese superspy,
responsible for the "transfer
of huge amounts of secret data from a
computer system at a Government
laboratory, compromising virtually
every nuclear weapon in
the United States arsenal..."(18)
Conservatives claimed that
U.S. nuclear labs were riddled with spies.
Senator Richard C. Shelby
(R – Al.) stood at the gates of Los Alamos
in April and demanded that
something be done about the "hemorrhaging"
of U.S. nuclear secrets
to foreign countries.(19) Conservatives
proclaimed that stolen secrets
from Los Alamos represented, in the
words of Senator Don Nickles
(R – OK.) "the most serious case of
espionage"(20) in U.S. history
and "could advance Chinese nuclear
weapons programs by decades."(21)
Department of Energy official Notra
Trulock (the main source
for the Times stories) went on NBC's "Meet
the Press" in May and compared
the possible loss of nuclear secrets
at Los Alamos to "the Rosenbergs
-Fuchs compromise of the Manhattan
Project information" at
the end of World War II.(22) A Justice
Department spokesman said
"what Lee stole was the crown jewels."(23)
A report issued by Sen.
Arlen Specter said "it would be hard,
realistically impossible,
to pose more severe risks to U.S. national
security."(24) Specter's
report noted that at Lee's December 13 bail
hearing, Assistant Laboratory
Director for Nuclear Weapons Dr.
Stephen Younger said the
Lee data "combined with someone that knew
how to use them, could,
in my opinion, in the wrong hands, change the
global strategic balance."
Conservatives also used the
case to attack the Clinton
administration, charging
that it had long overlooked glaring evidence
of Chinese spy activities
at the nuclear labs to pursue a policy of
engagement with Beijing.
Columnist William Safire's charged: "During
President Clinton's watch,
America's most vital nuclear secrets –
guarded intensely for five
decades – have been allowed to spill out
all over the world."(25)
Republican presidential candidates Pat
Buchanan and Steve Forbes
called for the resignation of National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger.
The Cox Committee report
on "U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial concerns
with the People's Republic of China"
seemed to validate these
serious charges. Prepared in just over three
weeks and after the questioning
of only three witnesses (primarily
Notra Trulock), the report
(named for chairman Christopher Cox (R-
Ca.)) claimed to detaile
widespread Chinese theft and implementation
of U.S. nuclear weapons
designs. The report charged that Chinese spy
activities in the U.S. had
"helped the PRC to fabricate and
successfully test modern
strategic thermonuclear weapons." House
Majority Leader Dick Armey
said "It's very scary, and basically what
it says is the Chinese now
have the capability of threatening us with
our own nuclear technology."
Lost in the hyperbole, was
that, as Committee member Norm Dicks (D-
Wa.) admitted afterwards,
the report represented a "worst case
assessment." Indeed,
just a few weeks before the publication of the
Cox report (and with little
fanfare) the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence released its
own report on the topic. The Senate report
criticized the Clinton administration
but did not conclude that China
was close to altering strategic
nuclear balance. Furthermore, an
interagency "Damage Assessment"
team created at the behest of the Cox
Committee to report on the
implications of Chinese nuclear espionage
concluded that "significant
deficiencies remain in the Chinese weapons
program to date, the aggressive
Chinese collection effort has not
resulted in any apparent
modernization of their deployed strategic
force or any nuclear weapons
deployment." China's 20 ICBMs remain
dwarfed by the 12,000
weapons in the U.S. nuclear triad.
A year later, there is no
evidence that Wen Ho Lee actually passed
information to China.
In an opinion released August 31, 2000, New
Mexico District Court Judge
James Parker wrote that, while he
"remain(ed) seriously concerned
about evidence of several deceptions
as to which innocuous explanations
have not yet been provided"(26) the
prosecution "has never presented
direct evidence that Dr. Lee intended
to harm the United States
or secure an advantage for a foreign nation"
Furthermore, new evidence
presented by the defense indicated that the
alleged stolen data "is
in large part available in the 'open'
literature in the public
domain and that many of the individual files
Dr. Lee took are unclassified."
Although he faced 59 counts
regarding the mishandling
of classified information, Lee was never
charged with acts of espionage
and is now a free man.
But conservatives continue
to raise the specter of a Chinese military
gearing up to challenge
the conventional and strategic superiority of
the American armed forces.
Below is an extensive quote
from Representaive Dan Burton, a
Republican congressman from
California and chairman of the Government
Oversight and Reform Committee
in the U.S. House of Representatives.
At a September 8, 2000 hearing
on the technical prospects for national
missile defense, Rep. Burton
made clear that his interest in missile
defense was directly linked
to his view of China.
"One of the things that's
concerned me, as chairman of the committee
and as a member of Congress
-- and, I think, my colleagues as well --
has been the theft of nuclear
secrets at Los Alamos and Livermore.
And a lot of people have
said that the theft of those secrets could
be analogous to what happened
with the Rosenbergs back in the '50s.
I mean, it's a major, major
problem".
"As I understand it, the
W-88 warhead technology is now in the
possession of the Chinese
Communist government, and they also have
other technology, through
their connections with Loral and Hughes and
other companies, regarding
their space satellite technology. They
now have the ability to
build an ICBM, and they also have the ability
to put multiple warheads
on one missile, and they also have the
technology to put that on
a mobile launch vehicle that could be
hidden in woods or someplace
else, which would be very difficult for
our spy satellites to pick
up.
"And the question I have
is that how long will it be before they have
a mobile-launched ICBM or
a permanently-fixed ICBM in silos with
multiple warheads such as
the W-88 warhead, where they could put
eight to 10 on one missile?
And what does that mean for the United
States security? And
do we have any way -- right now, or in the
foreseeable future--to intercept
and shoot down the multiple warhead
missile if it's launched
at the United States?
"Once it's perfected, if
they launch it at the United States, do we
have any defense for it?
And also, because of the MIRV-ing, because
they've got up to as many
as 10 warheads on it, once those split
apart in the outer atmosphere,
could we shoot down all 10 of those
smaller missiles with the
W-88 warhead, or would we just lose a bunch
of cities in the United
States?"
THE DANGERS AHEAD
The arms control a la carte
approach now favored by many conservatives
echoes the embryonic U.S.
strategy of the 1950s, where a few nations
thought they could stop
the spread of weapons of mass destruction by
forming supplier groups
to contain key technologies, while developing
nuclear, biological, chemical
and missile arsenals for themselves. It
was precisely the failure
of this piece-meal method that brought about
the current non-proliferation
regime.
The regime only works as
an integrated whole. Without the test ban
treaty and serous reduction
in U.S and Russian arsenals, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty will
lose credibility, suffering a death by
disinterest if not outright
defection. Proliferation of missile
defenses could weaken the
Missile Technology Control Regime, encourage
the proliferation of missiles
and defense counter-measures. For those
without nuclear production
capabilities, chemical and biological
weapons will hold new appeal.
As legal, diplomatic and political
deterrents weaken, it becomes
easier for a nation to shatter the
barriers, triggering a global
crisis.
This is not an abstract debate.
If the United States disassembles
diplomatic restraints, shatters
carefully crafted threat reduction
arrangements and moves from
builder to destroyer of the non-
proliferation regime, there
will be little to prevent new nations from
concluding that their national
security requires nuclear arms. Nor
will it be just a matter
of diplomatic emergency meetings. Nuclear
insecurities and regional
tensions could freeze foreign investments,
strangling economic growth
both regionally and globally.
The two years after the U.S.
presidential election will be critical to
determining which side in
this debate will dominate U.S. policy.
The fate of the regime is
at stake.
-----------------------
(1) The Report of the
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States,
July 15, 1998. The panel, known as the
Rumsfeld Commission after
its chairman, former secretary of defense
Donald Rumsfeld, was appointed
by the Congress to provide an
independent assessment of
the ballistic missile threat.
(2) Presentation of
Admiral Dennis Blair to the Carnegie
International Non-Proliferation
Conference, March 16, 2000. See
Proliferation Brief, "Pacific
Command Chief Assesses Asian Security
at Carnegie Conference,"
March 23, 200 at www.ceip.org/npp.
(3) In February 1981,
Aviation Week and Space Technology reported,
based on briefings by Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory
scientists Lowell Wood and
Edward Teller, "X-ray lasers based on the
successful Dauphin test
are so small that a single payload bay on the
space shuttle could carry
to orbit a number sufficient to stop a
Soviet nuclear weapons attack."
(cited by William Broad in Teller's
War, p. 92, (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1992).
(4) United States General
Accounting Office, "Strategic Defense
Initiative: Some Claims
Overstated for Early Flight Tests of
Interceptors," September
1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-282.
(5) Congressional Budget
Office, "Costs of Alternative Approaches to
SDI," May 1992, p. 20.
(6) Ibid.
(7) United States
General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman,
"Strategic Defense Initiative:
Changing Design and Technological
Uncertainties Create Significant
Risk," February 1992 (GAO/IMTEC-92-
18).
(8) See Hearings
before the Legislation and National Security
Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, House of
Representatives, 102nd Congress,
Second Session, "Performance of the
Patriot Missile in the Gulf
War." April 7, 1992, summarized in
Activities of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 102nd
Congress, First and Second
Sessions, 1991-1992, December 31, 1992, pp.
179-185.
(9) Robert M. Stein,
"Correspondence: Patriot Experience in the
Gulf War," International
Security, Summer 1992, at p. 199.
(10) The four hits
were by the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) in
1984, the Exoatmospheric
Reentry-Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS)
in 1991, the National Missile
Defense system interceptor in 1999 and
one of the two THAAD intercepts
which can be considered outside the
atmosphere in June 1999
(THAAD hit two out of eight targets flying at
various altitudes).
(11) United States
General Accounting Office, "National Missile
Defense: Schedule and Technical
Risks Represent Significant
Development Challenges,"
December 12, 1997 , GAO/NSIAD-98-28.
(12) ("L'Action de
La France: Ma rise des armements, disarmement et
non-proliferation,
La Documentation Francaise, Paris, 2000)
(13) Paul Wolfowitz,
"Bridging Centuries: Fin de Siecle All Over
Again," National Interest,
Spring 1997.
(14) Arthur Waldron,
"Why China Could Be Dangerous," American
Enterprise, July/August
1998, p.40.
(15) Samuel P. Huntington,
"The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign
Affairs, vol. 72 (Summer
1993), p. 22.
(16) James Webb, "Warily
Watching China," New York Times, February
23, 1999, p. A23.
(17) "Out Maneuvered,
Out Gunned, and Out of View," Stephen
Schwartz, The Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, January/February
2000, p. 31
(18) Risen, James and Jeff
Garth. "U.S. Says Suspect Put Code in
Bombs in Unsecure Files."
New York Times 28 April 1999: A1.
(19) Brooke, James.
"Senator Tells Nuclear Bomb Labs to End Foreign
Scientist's Visits." New
York Times 13 April 1999: A14.
(20) Mesler, Bill.
"The Spy Who Wasn't." The Nation 9 August 1999.
(21) Pincus, Walter
and Vernon Loeb "U.S. Bungled Spy Probes,
Senators Say." Washington
Post 6 May 1999: A2.
(22) Pincus, Walter
and Vernon Loeb "Espionage Whistleblower
Resigns." Washington Post
24 August 1999: A1.
(23) Broad, William
J. "Files in Question in Los Alamos Were
Reclassified." 15
April 2000: A1.
(24) Specter, Arlen.
"Report on the Investigation of Espionage
Allegations Against Dr.
Wen Ho Lee" Available at:
http://www.senate.gov/~specter/reportp.htm
(25) Safire, William.
"The Deadliest Download." New York Times 29
April 1999: A29.
(26) Parker, Hon.
James "Memorandum Opinion." 31 August 2000.
Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/09/04/scientistsecrets.ap/index.html
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