THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN ASIA
Dr. David M. Finkelstein *
The overarching argument in the paper is that the controversy over the
future introduction of US TMD systems in the Asia-Pacific region is much
more a function of the political baggage associated with these systems
than their actual operational implications; specifically the issue of whether
and to whom these systems might be transferred. Clearly this is the case
in the context of the potential transfer of TMD to Taiwan and, to a lesser
extent, to Japan. As the chief opponent of US TMD Beijing worries less
about the ability of the systems to neutralize their missile forces than
over their assessment that TMD transfer to Taiwan will inexorably lead
to what they fear will result in “military relations creep” between Washington
A second major argument is that the original impetus for the US to develop
TMD systems was not a function of developments in Asia. To
the contrary, it began with a real and demonstrated threat to US forces
by the proliferation and actual use of theater ballistic
missiles against US forces in other parts of the world. Iraq’s use of SCUD
missiles during the Gulf War, and the fact that the single greatest loss
of American life during that war was the result of an Iraqi SCUD was a
watershed event for the US TMD program. Nevertheless, TMD became “an Asian
issue” because Chinese and North Korean missile programs and launches justified
the original decisions to move forward with the program after the fact.
Finally, it is argued that there will be no debate in the US over whether
US forces should receive TMD when developed. No one in the US is going
to argue that US forces everywhere should not have the protection
against TBMs these systems promise. When fully developed TMD will likely
be deployed with US forces around the world as a standard organic capability.
Future TMD deployment to the Pacific Command, will not be
used as a signal of US “strategic intent “ to any country in Asia---specifically
China or the DPRK. They no more signal intent at the strategic level than
a sophisticated air defense (anti-aircraft) system. At the same time, the
decisions surrounding the future sale or transfer of these systems to second
parties will have strategic-level political-military implications.
Discussions about the U.S.’s Theater Ballistic Missile Defense programs,
commonly referred to as TMD, are always difficult. They are difficult
discussions because they revolve about highly complex technical systems
the names and terminology of which frequently changes, and they are difficult
discussions because more often than not they are also discussions about
complex regional issues or strategic relationships. Often those who
understand the technical complexities of TMD do not focus on the political
implications of these systems and those whose concerns revolve about the
political aspects of the systems do not fully understand the technical
issues associated with TMD.
One thing is certain, however. It is hard to think of another
example in recent memory of a conventional (non-nuclear related) defensive
system that has accrued so much political baggage as has TMD.
What I will do today is to address some basics about TMD as a subject
of discourse, some basics about TMD as a system, and some basics about
its place in an Asian regional context. Also, some thoughts about
China’s concerns will be offered. Again, these are my views alone.
TMD AS A PUBLIC ISSUE IS A RECENT PHENOMENON
U.S. plans to develop and deploy a surface-to-air missile capable of
shooting down a ballistic missile have been in motion for over a decade
by now. The U.S. has had some systems such as Patriot in the field
for quite some time. Other more advanced systems, or variants to existing
systems, are still in the research, development, or testing stages. So
as a military requirement that has generated hardware procurement decisions
TMD is not a new issue.
For most of the past decade TMD as a military system with policy implications
has remained an “inside the beltway” issue. It has been much discussed
among the think tank crowd, it has been the focus of some international
“Track 2” seminars, and it has certainly been discussed within U.S. Government
and contractor circles. But until recently TMD had not really been
an issue in the public eye here in the U.S. nor has it been the subject
of wider public attention or debate such as National Missile Defense has
become by now. This, I would assert, is explained by at least three
First, if the American public were polled on whether their armed forces
deserve protection from theater ballistic missiles the likely response
would be “yes.” This is not a question that I suspect engenders
a lot of controversy either in Washington or the American heartland.
Second, discussing TMD usually means a technical discussion about a
highly complex family of weapons systems and their components, or debates
among arms control specialists about whether upper-tier TMD systems will
or will not be ABM Treaty compliant. Let’s face it, few people among
the general public want to enjoy their morning newspaper reading arcane
discussions about the pros and cons of exo- versus endo-atmospheric interception,
kinetic kill probabilities, or treaty compliant interceptor velocities.
The third reason TMD has not engendered wide public debate is that unlike
National Missile Defense, TMD, in any of its variants, does not automatically
raise questions about the future of international nuclear arms control
regimes. TMD is a theater level system that aims to defend against conventional
ballistic missiles, not nuclear weapons.
Over the past couple of years the low profile of TMD has changed somewhat,
and TMD is in the news more often than before. As a news item it is no
longer to be found only in the defense and trade weeklies or the arms control
journals. Why the change? Because TMD is now being viewed through the lens
of some very significant Asian security issues.
Clearly, TMD has become enmeshed in larger strategic discussions about
how to deal with North Korea, what TMD may or may not mean as a factor
in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, its impact on the cross-Strait military
balance, what TMD means for U.S. allies beyond Asia, and---most recently---whether
(and to whom) these systems should (or should not) be sold. And certainly,
China, which is the most vocal critic of TMD, has enjoyed some success
in making TMD an issue through its vocal opposition to it.
Yet, I do not wish to overstate the case. It is true that the general
public in the U.S. has read and will read more about TMD; but only in the
context of other regional issues. TMD, I predict, will not become a major
issue of public debate for the American public for two reasons.
First, the degree to which the general public in the U.S. intensely and
regularly follows regional security to the point that the ins and outs
of TMD is a matter of general knowledge and discourse is likely negligible.
And second, as I stated before, no one in the U.S. is going to argue that
American forces should not have protection against conventional ballistic
missiles if such a defense is feasible.
At the end of the day, the fact is that TMD for U.S. forces was not
a political issue for the Clinton administration and it will not be a political
issue for the new Bush administration.
U.S. TMD DID NOT START OUT AS AN ASIA ISSUE
One basic point that is often lost in the discussions about TMD in an
Asian context is that developments in Asia were not the driving force behind
the initial U.S. decisions to move forward with TMD.
The genesis of the U.S. TMD program is, in my view, explained by the
confluence of two trends that go back more than a decade: one bureaucratic
and one operational.
The bureaucratic trend was the slowdown in the late 1980s of the efforts
of the old Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) created during the
Reagan Administration. The operational trend was the concomitant rise in
the late 1980s and early 1990s of the development, deployment, and actual
employment of theater ballistic missiles around the world.
By now, many people have forgotten about the “War of the Cities” between
Teheran and Baghdad, the SCUDs fired by Libya in 1986, the Iranian missile
problem faced by the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s, or
the hundreds of Soviet SCUDs that were deployed in Afghanistan from 1988
to 1991. And clearly, if there was no real operational impetus for
developing TMD prior to 1991 there certainly was one as a result of the
Gulf War. According to BMDO data, during that conflict Iraq fired some
90 SCUDs against Saudi Arabia and a few against Israel as well.
And, very significant from a U.S. perspective, it must be reminded that
the single greatest loss of life incurred by U.S. forces during the Gulf
War was the result of an Iraqi SCUD attack.
It is worth pointing out that the very mixed performance of U.S. Army
Patriot batteries against Iraqi SCUDs was due to the simple fact that the
Patriot was not designed to be an anti-missile system. The Patriot deployed
in the Gulf War was an anti-aircraft system. And it was clear from the
Gulf war experience that the U.S. had best do something to deal with the
very real threat of ballistic missiles. So, to a certain extent, Patriot
and other U.S. TMD systems are not the "Son of Star Wars" as some have
in the past derisively labeled it, but more properly, "Son of Sadaam."
Hence, the old SDIO organization transformed in the early 1990s into
the current Ballistic Missile Defense Organization with a mandate to consider
ways to deal with the emergent threat posed by theater ballistic missiles
in general and to get some handle on the various TMD programs that were
underway within the Services.
The point here is that the U.S. TMD program was driven by, and continues
to be driven by, the perception---correctly, I believe---that a generic
threat to U.S. forces exists in the form of theater ballistic missiles
and that these missiles have spread to areas of the world in which the
U.S. armed forces often operate or might operate.
The U.S. TMD program, in my opinion then, is not about any specific
country or any particular region of the world.
TODAY TMD IS ALSO ABOUT ASIA
While the impetus behind TMD was not originally driven by Asian security
scenarios TMD has today become almost synonymous with Asia within the circles
of savants. It may also be worthwhile, then, to review some basics
about why or how that happened.
Two relatively recent events, I would assert, made Asia a lightening
rod for U.S. TMD programs: North Korea’s launching of a Taepodong
missile in August 1998 and the two instances of Chinese missile firings
in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996.
First, North Korea. Even if one argues after the fact that the DPRK
Taepodong launch in August 1998 was merely part of a satellite program,
and not part of an offensive missile program, the point remains that the
launch demonstrated a capability on the part of an often dangerously unpredictable
regime. But most unnerving was the fact that the trajectory of the
projectile was dangerously close to Japan.
The effect was nothing short of galvanizing within the Japanese government
and upon Japanese popular opinion. It may not be too much of an overstatement
to assert that Pyongyang’s launch was the single most important factor
in Japan’s decision, after many years of internal deliberations, to join
the U.S. in TMD research.
Second, it was China’s missile launches in 1995 and 1996, however, turned
the U.S. TMD program into a cause celebre within some circles in
both Washington and Taipei.
Chinese interlocutors will argue intensely that Beijing’s Taiwan Strait
exercises and their accompanying missile launches in 1995 and 1996 were
successful because both Taipei, Washington, and even Tokyo were finally
made to understand how serious Beijing is about reunification with Taiwan
and that China will brook no backsliding. In retrospect, measured
against that criterion, they are correct. All concerned parties re-learned
how serious China is about reunification. So Chinese arguments that their
use of missiles was successful in that they helped to achieve a political
objective is likely correct.
Also in retrospect, however, there is an argument to be made that China
paid a dear price for the use of those missiles:
· The use of missiles by China, especially in 1995, likely enhanced
popular support in Taiwan for Lee Teng-hui.
· The use of missiles certainly unnerved other countries in the
region and fueled what the Chinese call the "so-called China threat."
· The use of missiles by Beijing were likely responsible in part
for the U.S.’s dispatch of naval forces to the region and the subsequent
deepening of the downturn in U.S.-China relations as a cycle of action
and reaction spun about.
· In the U.S., at least as a general perception among the public
due to extensive media coverage, the use of missiles made the letters "P-L-A"
synonymous with missiles, and made reporting about Chinese missiles, counting
Chinese missiles, and studying Chinese missiles a popular pastime among
the media and political-military analysts in the U.S. and beyond.
Moreover, and clearly worrisome to Beijing, because of the missile launches
TMD became an attractive system to many in Taipei. China posed a missile
threat and TMD seemed on the surface to some on Taiwan a good potential
solution. Equally worrisome from a Chinese perspective, their use of missiles
also made TMD attractive to some in Washington, in and out of government,
who are concerned about ensuring that U.S. obligations under the terms
of the Taiwan Relations Act were met. Finally, the use of missiles
by China, as well as the DPRK’s missile launch, clearly provided U.S. defense
contractors and U.S. Government TMD programmers with dramatic justifications
for expensive systems long under development.
As a further result, then, of the Chinese missiles tests:
· TMD became an issue in Taiwan domestic politics; between some
in the DPP and the former ruling KMT.
· TMD became a highly politicized issue in Washington resulting
in Congressional pressures on the Executive Branch to at least think about
how future TMD systems might be used to protect allies and others in Asia;
to include Taiwan! (Witness the requirement in the FY 99 National Defense
Authorization Act for DoD to produce a study on notional TMD architectures
· TMD became a contentious issue in U.S.-Taiwan relations with
respect to annual arms sales reviews.
· And, most important in my view, TMD, in conjunction with a
whole host of other fractious issues became---and remains---another major
point of contention in U.S.-China security relations.
Not surprisingly, then, the dynamics that today surround most discourse
about TMD in an Asian context is really discussion that revolves around
political issues much more than they revolve around operational issues.
And in so doing, any understanding of the systems under discussion often
seems, amazingly, to be less relevant than what these systems symbolize
in terms of psychological reassurance, strategic intentions, or political
THREE COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT TMD
Back then to some of the “basics.” Because discussions about TMD
in Asia are often political discussions in disguise, there is often a good
deal of misunderstanding about these systems and their capabilities.
My own understanding of these systems is rudimentary at best, but there
are probably three common misunderstandings that are worth pointing out.
The most common misunderstanding about TMD is, in my view, also the
most important. Specifically, in many discussions about either the virtues
or the dangers of these systems, TMD is often portrayed as a “magic system”
that in a “stand alone” configuration or in some few multiples can solve
one's potential incoming ballistic missile problem.
Even if we assume that the TMD systems under development will be able
to perform as advertised---and we are not yet in a position to know if
they will or will not--- the general thinking one hears from technical
savants is that TMD will be most effective when it is part of a multi-layered
air defense system comprised of standard air defense systems as well as
various members of the TMD family of systems---envision if you will bubbles
within bubbles of air defense coverage.
The point to make here is that the acquisition of a few TMD systems
may provide some psychological succor to its owners but they may not necessarily
solve one’s ballistic missile problem by themselves.
A second point of common misunderstanding is that TMD systems must
be “netted” to satellite systems, sensors, and a host of extra-battery
systems to work. In other words, hypothetically, if a TMD system were sold
to a second party, that second party would be dependant upon U.S.-controlled
peripherals such as satellites for target acquisition and cueing.
This is untrue of lower-tier systems. These are designed as stand-alone
point-defense systems. It is true that such peripherals could enhance the
capabilities of upper-tier systems, but my understanding is that this is
not a necessary precondition for their employment. Both upper-tier TMD
systems, the Army’s THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Area Defense) and the
Navy’s Theater Wide TMD, are apparently capable of operating as self-contained
units. Hence, the hypothetical sale of an upper-tier system does not ipso
facto require active U.S. involvement for the owners. I do not bring
this up to argue for or against such sales per se, but merely to make the
A third common misunderstanding is a function of the terminology used
to describe TMD. Many mistakenly take the word “Theater” in Theater
Missile Defense to mean that TMD will protect (cover) the entire “theater”
of a unified command, such as PACOM or CENTCOM. Not so. The word
“Theater” really means that TMD is intended to be used for force protection
within a specified “theater of war” or “theater of operations,” both of
which are vastly smaller areas geographically than a unified Commander-in-Chief's
(CINC’s) entire Area of Responsibility (AOR).
So to talk about TMD in a political context is difficult without also
getting into a discussion that differentiates between different types of
systems with different components that possess different theoretical capabilities.
One has to walk one’s way through discourses about lower-tier systems and
upper-tier systems, ground-based systems, sea-based systems, air-borne
systems, associated radars and C4I systems and the like. Consequently,
discussions about TMD can very frustrating and degenerate quickly into
exercises in rhetoric as systems are blurred, capabilities are confused
or ignored, and arguments go in a straight line from lower-tier to upper-tier
to even NMD systems, and from stand-alone systems to fully-integrated regional
BASIC CHINESE CONCERN ABOUT TMD: OPERATIONAL OR POLITICAL?
I do not think it would be unfair to say that the two principal reasons
that the U.S. TMD program is now the subject of controversy in Asia are
because: (1) China has been so consistently against the program and (2)
because TMD became a matter of public debate in Taiwan beginning in 1999.
The combination of those two elements alone is enough to make TMD a volatile
chemical solution. When we add to the mixture calls from some sectors
in the U.S. to throw a TMD-net over Taiwan, then we also have the potential
for an exothermic reaction.
In the case of Taiwan, as mentioned earlier, China’s ballistic missile
threat would naturally make TMD an attractive system to consider. But in
1999 TMD became enmeshed in Taiwan domestic politics as the Legislative
Yuan (LY) took up and debated the pros and cons of whether to consider
“joining” the U.S. TMD program. The Taiwan debate was clearly a strictly
notional and domestic debate because, to my knowledge, Taiwan was never
invited by the U.S. to join in the first place! Pressure from
the LY led in turn to vague statements from the Ministry of National Defense
asserting that Taipei had “made no decisions” on the issue of pursuing
participation in the U.S. TMD program but would not rule out considering
it in the future. Clearly, this was a matter of domestic politics and domestic
posturing. But clearly such debates raised the profile of U.S. TMD.
Beijing’s opposition to TMD is long-standing, going back quite a few
years by now. But I suspect that China's core objections to the program
are, at this point, mainly political and mainly tied to Taiwan.
It is probably true that future U.S. TMD programs have the potential
to cause PLA planners to worry about the viability of their conventional
missile forces; an operational concern. But it is no secret that it is
faster and cheaper to build more missiles than to build and buy more TMD
systems. In other words some Chinese argue that the simplest antidote
to TMD is to overwhelm it and some in China feel this would not be a problem
for them. So while there are likely some operational concerns about TMD,
they do not seem to be the core of China’s objections. The core objections
seem to be political.
So what are China's political concerns about TMD? As the Chinese articulate
them, there are four key concerns:
· First, TMD will be shared with other U.S. allies in the region
and serve as the technological glue for an anti-China coalition.
· Second, that sharing TMD with Japan will take Tokyo down the
road to a more active military role in the region.
· Third, transferring TMD to Taiwan will encourage Taipei to
continue to resist coming to terms with Beijing.
· Fourth, selling additional TMD systems to Taiwan will provide
the technological codicil under which U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation
will be resurrected.
Are there merits to these arguments or is this yet another case of "seeing
an acorn but imagining the oak tree?" Let's consider each concern
· Sharing TMD with other U.S. allies in the region will serve
as the technological glue for an anti-China coalition.
Other than Japan, it is unclear to me at this point that any of Washington's
allies in the region are seriously interested in acquiring systems that
have yet to be proven effective or even deployed. So far even Seoul has
shown little interest. But the point is really that TMD as a system
would hardly drive decisions that are really political in nature.
Moreover, coalitions are usually not driven by technology but by shared
· Second, that sharing TMD with Japan will take Tokyo down the
road to a more active military role in the region.
My thinking is that this is quite a lot to rest at the feet of TMD.
Japan already has some lower-tier TMD systems. Would possessing upper-tier
systems make a difference? Again, this is an open-ended question.
Tokyo's future role in the region will surely rest upon Japanese domestic
political decisions far greater than the hypothetical possession of new
· Third, transferring TMD to Taiwan will encourage Taipei to
continue to resist coming to terms with Beijing.
Without prejudice to the issue of whether or not the U.S. should
sell additional systems to Taiwan I would say that to the degree that
possessing additional TMD systems might provide Taiwan with a false
sense of military security, Beijing may have this one right. Yet, it
is, I think, clear that the key to whether or not Beijing and Taipei can
reach an accommodation transcends the questions of what offensive capabilities
China can bring to bear or what defensive systems Taiwan can obtain to
· Finally, selling TMD to Taiwan will provide the technological
codicil under which U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation will be resurrected.
Certainly, to the extent that there have been calls in the U.S. recently
to expand military relations with Taiwan, one can appreciate why Beijing
is voicing its concern. Yet, Beijing’s argument that TMD would be a driver
of what we might term “relationship creep” is a difficult proposition
to accept. Clearly, a decision to revivify the defense relationship
with Taiwan would engender serious policy questions about the basic U.S.
stance toward China. It would likely initiate a serious debate in the U.S.
and not be entered into cavalierly because one particular weapon system,
defensive though it may be, holds out the prospect, on technical grounds,
for a qualitatively different relationship.
To recapitulate then, the key Chinese concerns about TMD seem to be
political, not operational. The most important political concerns revolve
about Taiwan. And while some of these concerns speak to the realm of the
“technically possible” none necessarily represent the “politically probable.”
I would offer that that a good deal of the concern expressed by China
about TMD in the Asia-Pacific region is as much about distrust of and uncertainty
about U.S. strategic intentions as it is about the TMD systems themselves.
THE ISSUE OF FUTURE U.S. DEPLOYMENTS OF TMD SYSTEMS
The conference organizers indicate that at the last session in Tokyo,
which I did not attend, there was a great deal of discussion among participants
as to whether perceived U.S. threats in Asia justify "importing" TMD systems
into the region. Other issues that came up, I am told, included the relative
importance of DPRK versus Chinese missile threats as the impetus for TMD
deployments, and what future U.S.TMD deployments to Asia may "signal" about
U.S. regional intentions, especially toward China. I have been asked to
comment on some of these issues and am happy to provide some personal opinions.
Some of my views are implied in the discussion above. But allow me to address
these questions more directly.
· The question of threats in the region to which the U.S.
sees TMD as the necessary response.
The first point to make is that the U.S. has had TMD deployed in the
Asia-Pacific for some time now. My understanding is that there have been
batteries of Patriot missiles organic to U.S. Forces Korea for quite a
couple of years; certainly since 1994 at the height of U.S.-DPRK tensions
over North Korea's nuclear program. But I would argue that the dispatch
of TMD to Korea under those circumstances was an act to demonstrate political
resolve on the part of the U.S. vis-à-vis DPRK intransigence; not
one of real military significance. As we all know, the major threat to
Seoul is not missiles but conventional artillery. So the deployment of
TMD batteries to South Korea was really a political act much as Patriot
deployments to Israel during the Gulf War had more political and psychological
impact than any real military relevance.
The second point I would make is that the purpose of TMD is not intended
to be used as some convenient chess piece to be moved by diplomats or strategists
to send political signals. Although the case of South Korea bespeaks otherwise,
I would say that was an exceptional circumstance.
In previous sections of this paper I have argued that the impetus for
the development of TMD was not any particular country's missile capabilities.
The impetus was the fact that the proliferation of conventional missiles
had gotten to the point that there was a real generic threat that had to
be dealt with for U.S. force protection. Events in Asia were neither the
original impetus for TMD R & D nor will Asia be the exclusive reason
for TMD deployments.
If at some point in the future the various TMD systems reach a mature
state and are ready for incorporation into the U.S. armed forces then I
suspect that they will be deployed to all U.S. forces.
It is important to remember that U.S. military forces around the world
are assigned to various unified commands. Those unified commands are regionally
oriented and based. However, it is absolutely critical to
understand that those forces are geographically fungible. What I mean,
for example, is that U.S. Navy assets assigned to the Pacific Command are
as likely to be sent to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or the waters
of South Asia in times of crisis as they are to be deployed into East or
So I think that it would be a mistake to draw any conclusions about
U.S. intentions towards, or threat perceptions o, any particular country
based on which unified commands or which units have which TMD systems at
any future point in time. TMD assets deployed in the U.S. forces anywhere
have the potential to be deployed everywhere in time of crisis or worse.
So to talk about "importing" TMD into the region based on this threat or
that is not necessarily how U.S. force planners view it.
· The question of how future U.S. TMD deployments might
reflect U.S. strategic intentions toward China.
You may be disappointed to hear the argument that, in my view, it is
highly unlikely that any future U.S. deployment of TMD assets in the Pacific
Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR) would be a venue that the U.S. Government
would choose to use to "signal" or "reflect" strategic intentions towards
First, as I have suggested above, those PACOM assets can be deployed
almost anywhere. Placing these assets in the PACOM AOR is not necessarily
a very clear way, then, to make a very specific point.
Second, what kinds of TMD systems are we talking about? If land-based
systems, then where would they be placed to send a signal that reflected
U.S. strategic intentions toward China? In Korea? In Japan? In Australia?
How about sea-based systems? If sea-based TMD systems are in the region,
they are likely either in ports such as in Honolulu or in Japan or on the
high seas. How can that signal strategic intentions? I do not see how.
Third, TMD is a conventional weapon system; an air defense system meant
to defend against conventional missiles. It is for U.S. force protection
and is not inherently offensive. Let's consider U.S. Navy TMD systems (yet
to be developed and deployed, by the way). How would a ship-based missile
meant to intercept incoming missiles send any different a signal or reflect
strategic intentions in some greater way than the current sea-based missiles
used to defense against aircraft?
Overall, then, I have a great deal of trouble accepting as a proposition
that the future integration of TMD systems into U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific
region (or beyond) will somehow reflect U.S. strategic intentions towards
Now, all of the discussion above has been focused on U.S. forces having
TMD; not second parties. I have already mentioned that one of China’s key
concerns about TMD is in relation to Taiwan. So the question is, what would
the hypothetical U.S. sale of mature TMD systems to Taiwan say about U.S.
intentions toward China?
My answer to this question may also seem flippant but is not meant
to be. And my response to this question is this: the hypothetical sale
of U.S. TMD systems to Taiwan would not signal U.S. strategic
intent toward China. However, such sales would be a significant indication
of what Washington perceives China’s intentions towards Taiwan to be.
* This paper represents the personal analysis and opinion of the
author only and should not be construed as the views of The CNA Corporation.
This is an update to an earlier paper prepared for the Woodrow Wilson Center
in October 2000.