US-CHINA RELATIONS FACE BOTH CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
by Bonnie Glaser *
ABSTRACT
American presidential transitions inevitably bring a degree of uncertainty
to Sino-US. relations. George W. Bush’s accession to the presidency
is no exception. Among the many challenges facing the U.S. and China,
U.S. determination to deploy missile defense systems and handling the Taiwan
issue are two of the potentially most divisive and dangerous. Both
will demand high-level attention by Chinese and American leaders.
It is important that the two sides approach these challenges with an open
mind and a willingness to consider each other’s sensitivities and concerns.
An agenda for progress in Sino-American relations this year should not
be overly ambitious. Washington and Beijing should identify areas
where real achievements can be made and seek to bring those to fruition.
Both sides should focus on issues where bilateral interests overlap and
cooperation is possible. Expectations should not be set too high
on either side to avoid perceived failures and subsequent disappointment.
The broad objective in bilateral relations this year should be to accomplish
small, but concrete progress that contributes to building trust and confidence
between the two sides. Important goals that Beijing and Washington
should strive to achieve this year include: engage in substantive strategic
dialogue; open a dialogue on managing the strategic transition, including
missile defenses; make further progress in non-proliferation cooperation;
complete Chinese membership in WTO; engage in constructive interaction
on human rights; work jointly to ensure a successful APEC Summit and Bush-Jiang
summit; and continue close coordination and consultation on the Korean
peninsula.
INTRODUCTION
American presidential transitions inevitably bring a degree of uncertainty
to Sino-US. relations. George W. Bush’s accession to the presidency
is no exception. Bush’s references to China during the campaign as
a strategic competitor of the United States unnerved Beijing and left the
Chinese uneasy about U.S. intentions and unsure about the future of the
bilateral relationship. Now that Bush has taken office, the administration
is groping to determine what its campaign rhetoric means in practice and
how it will manage the broad range of issues in Sino-American relations.
Early signs indicate that continuity will predominate in Bush’s approach
to China, yet there may also be some changes in both tone and substance.
The Sino-U.S relationship is both complex and multi-faceted. An
extensive network of cultural, commercial, scientific and academic ties
inextricably binds the United States and China together. Indeed,
governmental interaction pales by comparison to the millions of contacts
that take place between Chinese and American citizens on a daily basis.
This significant web of ties provides strong incentives to keep the relationship
stable and on an even keel. Nevertheless, it is the official government
component of the relationship that largely determines the state of overall
bilateral ties. After several decades of official diplomatic dealings,
the U.S. and China have drawn some important lessons about Sino-American
relations. Among those lessons, the following merit special attention:
1) American and Chinese interests sometimes overlap or coincide, yet they
also often diverge across a range of bilateral, regional and global issues;
2) managing the differences on security issues deemed critical to either
country is imperative to avert a rupture of the bilateral relationship;
and; 3) development of an adversarial relationship between the U.S. and
China and, even worse, the outbreak of military conflict would be devastating
to both countries’ national interests and should be avoided at all costs.
The U.S. and China are simultaneously both partners and competitors.
The dichotomy between strategic cooperation and competition is thus a false
one—the U.S.-China relationship is a mixture of both.(1)
The Clinton administration’s consent to jointly adopt with Beijing the
objective of “building toward a constructive strategic partnership” was
unfortunate because it was roundly criticized domestically as an erroneous
description of the prevailing relationship that undervalued genuine U.S.
strategic partnerships with such nations as Japan and Australia.
The goal of establishing a strategic partnership with China was equated
to a policy that critics charged placed too much emphasis on the positive
elements Sino-U.S. ties and ignored the sometimes critically important
differences. In China, there are also voices that disapprove of the
agreed-upon objective of a strategic partnership, although many, including
the senior leadership, favor retaining the phrase because it provides a
positive framework for the conduct of Sino-U.S. relations and aids in deflecting
domestic criticism of Jiang’s policy of handling the bilateral relationship
according to his 16 character guideline—“increase mutual trust, reduce
friction, develop cooperation, and refrain from confrontation.”
From the U.S. perspective, within certain bounds, competition can be
a healthy component of any relationship. Bush administration officials
have urged Beijing to not be alarmed by American references to the bilateral
relationship as a competitive one. The new team in charge in Washington
is likely to appraise China and formulate its policies based on the hard
realities that prevail today as well as possible uncertainties in the future.
In Secretary of State Colin Powell’s confirmation hearings, he stated that:
“A strategic partner China is not, but neither is China our inevitable
and implacable foe. China is a competitor, a potential regional rival,
but also a trading partner willing to cooperate in areas where our strategic
interests overlap. China is all of these things, but China is not
an enemy, and our challenge is to keep it that way by enmeshing them in
the rule of law, by exposing them to the powerful forces of a free enterprise
system and democracy, so they can see that this is the proper direction
in which to move.”(2)
China must now adjust to this new rhetoric of the Bush administration
and work with Washington as before to maximize cooperation, manage friction
and promote peace and stability globally as well as in the Asia-Pacific
region. Both the U.S. and China will continue to share a strong interest
in preserving an amicable, stable and cooperative relationship.
TWO CHALLENGES FACING CHINA AND THE U.S.:
MISSILE DEFENSE AND TAIWAN
Among the many challenges facing the U.S. and China, U.S. determination
to deploy missile defense systems and handling the Taiwan issue are two
of the potentially most divisive and dangerous. Both will demand
high-level attention by Chinese and American leaders. It is
important that the two sides approach these challenges with an open mind
and a willingness to consider each other’s sensitivities and concerns.
MISSILE DEFENSE
The Bush administration has declared its intentions to build and deploy
both national and theater missile defense systems. The president
and his national security team are firmly committed to moving American
defense planning beyond the Cold War. They deny that it is necessary
to continue to rely on mutual assured destruction and massive retaliation.
(3) They are eager to embrace a very different defense structure
to deal with what they view as a very different era. Efforts are
underway to persuade U.S. allies that their interests will be protected
under U.S. missile defense plans. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
proposal to Europe and the NATO alliance to jointly work to develop a common
defense against missile attacks suggests that Moscow may have accepted
the inevitability of the deployment of some form of missile defense system.
Although resolution of U.S. and Russian differences will not take place
overnight, negotiations may soon begin in earnest and an eventual understanding
may well be possible.
China remains concerned that the deployment of missile defenses will
disrupt global strategic stability, undermine efforts to curb the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, neutralize China’s strategic deterrent, and hamper
Chinese attempts to promote the reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland.
Beijing also is convinced that U.S. missile defense plans are at least
in part driven by American concerns about a rising threat from China.
Thus, a decision to proceed with deployment of theater and national missile
defense systems will be perceived in Beijing as evidence of U.S. hostile
intent.
A heated debate about the wisdom of missile defense continues in the
United States. The China portion of this debate is increasingly focused
on whether the U.S. should accept or deny China’s desire to have a credible
strategic deterrent against the United States. Some argue that it
is immoral to permit Americans to be vulnerable to nuclear attack by any
country if the technology exists to defend U.S. territory against such
attacks. Others explicitly seek to capture China’s deterrent either
because they foresee an adversarial relationship with China or because
they want to deny Beijing the opportunity to deter U.S. involvement in
a Taiwan Strait conflict by making nuclear threats against U.S. territory.
Yet others maintain that any attempt to deny China a reliable strategic
deterrent capability will almost certainly have destabilizing consequences.
The U.S. has never explicitly made a policy determination on the legitimacy
of China’s deterrent. This will be an important decision that the
Bush administration will have to address as it proceeds to finalize its
missile defense plans.
In the next decade, the U.S. and China are likely to embark on a transition
to a new strategic nuclear relationship. The U.S. will almost certainly
move toward a re-definition of deterrence that encompasses both offense
and defense. China will be modernizing its nuclear forces to enhance
the survivability, safety and reliability of its deterrent. This
transition period could be one of tremendous uncertainty and suspicion.
It could further promote the perception of an adversarial bilateral relationship
in both countries and result in unchecked competition of offense and defense.
Such an outcome can be averted, however. It is incumbent upon officials
and strategic thinkers in both the U.S. and China to seriously consider
measures the two sides can take to manage the strategic nuclear transition
in a way that alleviates tension and builds trust.
TAIWAN
Taiwan remains the most sensitive and potentially the most explosive
issue in Sino-American relations. For Beijing, the U.S. attitude
and policy toward the Taiwan issue embodies the essence of U.S. intentions
toward China and determines the overall state of Sino-U.S. relations. The
intensification of Chinese worries over the past several years that Taiwan
is drifting toward independence has combined with heightened Chinese suspicions
that the U.S. seeks to indefinitely prolong separation of the two sides
of the Strait. The establishment of a democratic political system
on the island and the election of a president from the Democratic Progressive
Party, which calls for independence in its party platform, have further
increased the complexity of the issue. Chen Shui-bian’s refusal to
acknowledge the existence of one China has irritated Beijing. U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan have become increasingly objectionable to China, especially
the transfer of weapons and capabilities that reduce Taipei’s vulnerabilities
to military coercion by China.
From the perspective of the United States, any outcome of the dispute
between Beijing and Taipei will be welcome as long as their differences
are resolved peacefully. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated in
his confirmation hearings on January 17: “Let all who doubt, from whatever
perspective, be assured of one solid truth: We expect and demand
a peaceful settlement, one acceptable to people on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait.” A priority objective of U.S. policy in the past two years
has been to encourage both sides of the Strait to re-open talks, settle
outstanding problems and discuss confidence-building measures.
The uncertain and unstable relationship between Taiwan and the PRC represents
a dangerous security risk for the United States. If strained relations
between the China and Taiwan were to erupt into military conflict, the
U.S. would inevitably be drawn in because of its legal and moral commitments
to Taiwan's defense. If a military conflict occurs it will upset
regional stability and result in long-term enmity between the U.S. and
China. The outbreak of a cross-Strait war would represent a colossal
failure of Chinese and American policy.
The unrelenting military buildup in southern China opposite the Taiwan
Strait, especially the deployment of hundreds of short-range ballistic
missiles, has raised U.S. doubts about Chinese commitment to rely on peaceful
means to manage cross-Strait relations. U.S. calls for China to exercise
military restraint, for example by freezing the numbers of SRBMs deployed
opposite Taiwan and pulling back those already deployed out of range of
the island, have gone unheeded. Chen Shui-bian’s concerted efforts
to avoid provoking China since his inauguration last May, unlike his predecessor
Lee Teng-hui, have led to the widespread perception in Washington that
the major source of cross-Strait instability has shifted from Taiwan to
the Mainland.
On the positive side, trade and investment across the Strait are expanding,
even as political relations have stalemated. The accession of both
China and Taiwan to the WTO, expected later this year, should further boost
trade and economic ties between their two highly complementary economies.
Although it is uncertain whether economic integration between the two sides
of the Strait will promote a political reconciliation, it is likely to
contribute to a general easing of tensions and will also increase the costs
to both Beijing and Taipei of seeking to force a change in the status quo.
The annual decisions regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will be made
later this spring. Secretary of State Powell has stated that the
U.S. “has an obligation to Taiwan to make sure that their level of defense
capability remains constant over time, and they are in a position to defense
themselves against any threats that might come their way.”(4) China
has warned the Bush administration against the sale of major new weapons
systems to Taiwan, specifically the Aegis battle management system, Advanced
Patriot missile defense systems known as PAC-3, and submarines. Congress
has put the new administration on notice that if it does not prepare a
robust arms package for Taiwan this year, the Senate will press forward
with the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act which would legislate an expansion
and upgrading of military ties between the U.S. and Taiwan.(5)
Both the U.S. and China should carefully handle their differences over
Taiwan.
It is contrary to China’s interests to make U.S. policy toward Taiwan,
and arms sales in particular, a litmus test of broader U.S. intentions
toward China. Taiwan is but one of numerous issues on which the U.S.
and China will continue to disagree. Moreover, while reunification
of the island with the Mainland is understandably a pressing matter for
China, it is only one of Beijing’s priorities. Other priorities include
raising farmers’ incomes, developing China’s western lands, addressing
the needs of unemployed workers, solving China’s water and energy needs,
sustaining overall economic development and preserving a peaceful international
environment. Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s visit to Washington later
this month poses an opportunity for both sides to develop a positive agenda
for promoting Sino-American relations and advancing bilateral cooperation.
It would be a mistake for China to assess the success or failure of Qian’s
visit based on subsequent decisions on U.S. arms transfers to Taipei.
SETTING A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
An agenda for progress in Sino-American relations this year should not
be overly ambitious. Washington and Beijing should identify areas
where real achievements can be made and seek to bring those to fruition.
Both sides should focus on issues where bilateral interests overlap and
cooperation is possible. Expectations should not be set too high
on either side to avoid perceived failures and subsequent disappointment.
The broad objective in bilateral relations this year should be to accomplish
small, but concrete progress that contributes to building trust and confidence
between the two sides.
1. Engage in Substantive Strategic Dialogue
At both mid and high levels, the U.S. and China should conduct regular
discussions on a broad range of security issues. This should cover
issues such as each side’s respective global strategies, foreign policy
priorities and security concerns. It should also include conversations
on major power relations, the evolving role of the United Nations, use
of force and diplomacy in international relations and regional security
issues (Northeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East/Persian Gulf, Central Asia).
East Asian matters should be explored in depth, including exploration of
a new regional security architecture that retains strong U.S. security
alliances and forward deployed American military forces and, at the same
time, involves China as an active participant in maintaining regional security.
One important goal of such a dialogue would be to identify new areas
of common interest and potential cooperation, such as keeping the sea lanes
open for shipment of oil. A second objective would be to clarify
areas of possible conflict of interest and discuss ways to manage differences.
A third objective would be to establish channels of communication that
would be available in the event of a crisis or a perceived need to exchange
views on important issues.
2. Open a Dialogue on Managing the Strategic Transition
Chinese and U.S. leaders should agree to open a bilateral dialogue in
which both sides discuss how to preserve each other’s strategic interests
as both proceed with plans to alter their strategic nuclear force structure.
Such a dialogue could include: 1) discussion of the past, present and future
role of nuclear weapons; 2) the meaning of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold
war era; and 3) acceptable offense/defense balances.
The U.S. can also consider unilateral steps to clarify its strategic
intentions toward China and the capabilities of its NMD and TMD programs
once these defense architectures are decided. In turn, Beijing should
be more transparent with the U.S. about its strategic nuclear modernization
program and offer reassurances that it will not proliferate BMD countermeasures
technology to other states.
3. Make Further Progress in Non-proliferation Cooperation
China should reiterate and adhere to its commitment made in November
last year to not export nuclear-capable missiles or their technologies
and strengthen export controls on missile-related items. In addition,
a target date should be set for publication of the promised export control
list for missile-related and dual-use technology items. If China
is perceived to be backsliding on these obligations, this will provoke
a major backlash in Congress and inhibit the Bush administration’s efforts
to build a new consensus on China policy. Conversely, evidence that
Beijing is abiding by its latest non-proliferation commitment will help
to deflect criticism of China and boost confidence in the value of U.S.-Chinese
cooperation in curbing proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems.
In addition, the U.S. and China should consider next steps to advance
their bilateral cooperation in the non-proliferation sphere. Chinese
membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime remains in U.S. interests
and Washington should not abandon this goal. At the 1998 summit,
Jiang Zemin told President Clinton that Beijing would “actively consider”
joining the MTCR and China has not subsequently publicly denied continued
interest in membership, although serious consideration of this issue was
suspended following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
in May 1999. Consultations between Chinese and American officials
to discuss formal Chinese participation in MTCR should resume as soon as
possible. In the meantime, China should implement the steps that
would make it eligible for membership in the future.
China’s past linkage of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to Chinese cooperation
on non-proliferation should be reassessed. Curbing proliferation
is in Chinese interests and should thus be pursued as an end in itself,
not linked to other matters. Moreover, there is no leverage to be
gained over the United States through such linkage, especially with the
new team in charge in Washington. Any deliberate horizontal proliferation
activities by China to signal displeasure with U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan
will be extremely counterproductive and damaging to Sino-American relations.
4. Complete Chinese Membership in WTO
Hard bargaining in Geneva continues on China’s WTO accession, but both
the U.S. and China have a strong interest in early completion of a multilateral
agreement. If there is no agreement reached by June 3, then President
Bush will be required to send new waiver authority to Congress and an acrimonious
debate on China policy will ensue. Although the result would unquestionably
be renewal of China’s normal trade status, the debate would nevertheless
focus attention on negative Chinese behaviors and sour the atmosphere in
Sino-U.S. relations. Beijing and Washington should therefore attach
high priority to an early completion of China’s entry into WTO. In
addition, the smooth accession of Taiwan to the WTO following China’s entry
will promote the development of cross-Strait trade and economic cooperation,
thus serving Chinese and U.S. interests in easing tensions between Taipei
and Beijing and promoting reconciliation between the two sides of the Strait.
5. Engage in Constructive Interaction on Human Rights
The decision by the Bush administration to sponsor a resolution at the
UN Human Rights Commission condemning China’s record indicates that the
United States will not shy away from criticizing Chinese human rights violations.
Beijing should resist its inclination to define the U.S. action as “confrontational”
and refuse to engage with the United States on human rights matters.
Both the U.S. and China need to find ways to engage in constructive interaction
on human rights.
The U.S. should credit China with making advances in the areas of social
and economic rights while continuing to urge greater progress in the provision
of political rights. Congressional approval for spending U.S. government
funds to support rule-of-law programs in China has opened up new opportunities
to provide technical assistance for the development of China’s legal system.
USAID to China and inclusion of China in the U.S. Asian Environment Program
should also be considered. China should attach priority to ratifying
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which
it signed in 1997. In addition, Beijing should follow through on
its suggestion last Fall that the bilateral human rights dialogue be resumed.
An agenda should be worked out to ensure that such a dialogue produces
positive results.
6. Work Jointly to Ensure a Successful APEC Summit and Bush-Jiang
Summit
Beijing’s chairmanship of APEC this year provides an opportunity for
China to assume a regional leadership role and build on past achievements
by APEC members. China should seek to revive the core APEC objectives
of economic liberalization and trade expansion. Steps could also
be taken to press for the reduction of barriers to information access.
Preparation for a Bush-Jiang summit, which may be part of an extended
tour of China made by the new U.S. president, should begin early.
Beijing should not wait for the U.S. to begin identifying areas where progress
can be made and new agreements can be reached. Instead, China should
seize the initiative and table constructive proposals. The U.S. should
use the summit opportunity to signal the importance of Sino-American relations
to regional security and reassure Chinese leaders of U.S. support for China’s
emergence as a strong, prosperous power.
7. Continue Close Coordination and Consultation on the Korean
Peninsula
Beijing and Washington have worked in parallel to achieve the shared
objectives of: 1) easing tensions between North and South Korea; 2) encouraging
North Korea to invest in economic development rather than in destabilizing
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; and 3) coaxing
North Korea to emerge from its isolation and become a participating member
of regional and international society. The recent thaw on the Korean
peninsula provides hope for an eventual peaceful solution, but the potential
for failure still exists. The U.S. and China need to closely coordinate
to promote developments in a positive direction.
If the outcome of the current Bush administration policy review produces
a change in the U.S. approach toward North Korea, the U.S. should consult
with Beijing and attempt to win Chinese support for its revised policy.
The Bush administration will no doubt continue to accord top priority to
restricting North Korea’s development and proliferation of WMD and conventional
weapons technologies. Beijing should employ whatever influence it
has with the North to ensure that Pyongyang does not abandon the moratorium
on its nuclear program and long-range missile tests. Continued effective
cooperation on the Korean peninsula will serve as a reminder of the value
of Sino-U.S. relations to skeptics in both China and the United States.
----------------------
* Prepared for the conference entitled "Partnership for Peace: Building
Long-term Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," co-sponsored by the
Nautilus Institute and Fudan University, March 3-4, 2001.
1. David Shambaugh, “Facing Reality in China Policy,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2001, pp. 50-64.
2. Secretary of State designee Colin Powell's statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 17, 2001. http://usinfo.state.gov/products/washfile.htm.
3. See, for example, the comments by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
on “ABC News Sunday,” February 11, 2001.
4. Colin Powell, “This Week on ABC,” February 4, 2001.
5. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Prospects for the TSEA Under Bush,” Taipei
Times, February 7, 2001.