RUSSIA’S NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND THE SITUATION IN EAST ASIA
by Vladimir Orlov (1)
A paper presented at the workshop East Asian Security Challenges
Nautilus Institute
Shanghai
(A revised version)
April 10, 2001
ABSTRACT
Russia's firm and unequivocal commitment to nuclear and WMD nonproliferation
is based on domestic factors. In the current geopolitical conditions (challenges
coming from Chechnya and other southern neighbors), Russia will not be
able to give an adequate response to new challenges on the part of new
possessors of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, if emerged. Russia
cannot afford to distract its resources to meet these potential threats
that may emerge new its borders.
Occasional accusations of Russia's promoting proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and delivery systems by official transfer of materials,
technology and expertise to Middle East nations (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya)
and Northeast Asia (North Korea) have no grounds. A real problem is an
insufficient level of sensitive export controls, above all in the area
of missile components and technologies, as well as biotechnologies. Missile
smuggling, brain drain, intangible proliferation-sensitive technology transfer
- all this took place in the early 1990s. In the late 1990s, the export
controls and smuggling prevention issues got in the focus of attention
of Russian authorities and the situation began to improve. At the same
time, our analysis make us call into question that all channels for illicit
trafficking in sensitive technologies have been eliminated.
North Korean nuclear crisis demonstrated Russia's limited role in Northeast
Asia in contrast to the role of the former Soviet Union played by Moscow
during and after the Korean war. Russia's inability to affect the Korean
nuclear program resulted in a situation when Russian leadership and governmental
experts put up with the loss of Russia's role in solving North Korean nuclear
problem, accepted their helplessness and blessed the USA for negotiations
with Pyongyang.
Moscow made an attempt to improve relations and clarify the situation
with North Korean missile intentions during President Putin's visit to
Pyongyang in July. The visit was supposed to have "external effect" - to
show the West that Russia was returning to its traditional spheres of influence
to get some economic and political dividends. After his return from Pyongyang,
President Putin admitted, "We hope that the results of my visit will serve
all parties concerned. We do not want to monopolize these results."
However, with the new, republican, administration in Washington in office,
the situation is likely to change. Top U.S. politicians have no plans to
go to Pyongyang. Instead, they talk more in “stick” terms rather than in
“carrot” ones. In this new context, Russia’s increasing contacts with Pyongyang
may play a positive and important role.
RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
As a declared nuclear-weapon state (NWS) Russia has a core interest
in preserving and strengthening the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. According to the National Security Concept approved in January
2000, the need for strengthening the nonproliferation of WMD and their
delivery systems is "the primary task in the area of maintaining national
security", while WMD proliferation is considered to be one of the major
threats to the national security and Russia's interests (2).
It is interesting that, according to the results of the all-Russian
public opinion poll conducted at the request of the PIR Center, 78% of
Russians (evidently, emotionally and not as experts) support the continued
nuclear nonproliferation endeavors.
Even throughout the most terrible economic difficulties, Russia has
never directly or indirectly violated Article I of the NPT and has not
transferred nuclear weapons or their components to other states. Russia
complied with Article IV concerning the assistance to the non-nuclear weapon
states in providing peaceful technologies and the construction of the nuclear
power plant in Bushehr (Iran) should be considered in this context.
Like the USA, Russia also had the proliferation temptations. But unlike
the US temptations - the desire to play the role of the only superpower
(sometimes without knowing when to stop and with breaching the international
norms) - the Russian temptations were weak and related to the loss of the
Great Power status. So far, one can say that Russia has managed to resist
this temptation. "Russia demonstrates its firm commitment to strengthen
export controls and WMD nonproliferation regime," stated President Putin.
– "Russia believes that the NPT is one of the pillars of international
security system. The NPT is the fundamental mechanism preventing nuclear
arms proliferation and promoting international cooperation in the area
of peaceful nuclear energy uses." (3).
Russia's firm and unequivocal commitment to nuclear and WMD nonproliferation
is based on domestic factors. In the current geopolitical conditions (challenges
coming from Chechnya and other southern neighbors), Russia will not be
able to give an adequate response to new challenges on the part of new
possessors of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, if emerged. Russia
cannot afford to distract its resources to meet these potential threats
that may emerge new its borders.
Even when the US-Russian relations cooled down (NATO expansion, NATO
aggression against Yugoslavia) and there were real chances to irritate
the USA, Russia has never dared to play the nonproliferation card, believing
it would be an extremely dangerous game.
Thus, occasional accusations of Russia's promoting proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems by official transfer of
materials, technology and expertise to Middle East nations (Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Libya) and Northeast Asia (North Korea) have no grounds.
A real problem is an insufficient level of sensitive export controls,
above all in the area of missile components and technologies, as well as
biotechnologies. Missile smuggling, brain drain, intangible proliferation-sensitive
technology transfer - all this took place in the early 1990s (4). In the
late 1990s, the export controls and smuggling prevention issues got in
the focus of attention of Russian authorities and the situation began to
improve (5). At the same time, our analysis make us call into question
that all channels for illicit trafficking in sensitive technologies have
been eliminated.
We may conclude that in the next few years there is a high possibility
of missile technology and conventional arms smuggling to a number of states,
above all in the East Asia and the Middle East.
At the same time, this is not the matter of state indulgence to illegal
supplies, but the problem of insufficient capabilities of the state to
prevent such attempts at the customs level, especially within the Customs
Union of the CIS.
Russian and US interests in tightening control over WMD proliferation-sensitive
export objectively coincide (6). Although in the recent years Washington
has been exerting pressure on Russia in this area (for a number of domestic
policy reasons) and this pressure negatively affected US-Russian nonproliferation
dialogue, one can expect that Russia will be interested in maintaining
productive and continuous dialogue with the USA on key nonproliferation
issues, which would replace the petty quarrels (7).
Russia and East Asian Proliferation Threats: North Korea
One of the elements of Russia’s nonproliferation policy is reducing
current and avoiding potential challenges in East Asia related to weapons
of mass destruction.
The situation in East Asia is determined by a complicated combination
of military and political factors.
Firstly, there is a recognized NWS in the region - China, which possesses
nuclear weapons and intermediate- and long-range delivery systems.
Secondly, there is, at least, one state that has an officially declared
non-nuclear status but has all military-technical and industrial capabilities
to develop a nuclear weapon program; this is Japan. The latter carries
out a program of stockpiling plutonium officially designated for peaceful
nuclear energy uses. This program causes some apprehensions of international
community (8).
Thirdly, there are, at least, two hotbeds of military-political confrontation
- on the Korean peninsula, where complicated negotiations between North
and South Korea are under way (commenced in June 2000 after the Pyongyang
meeting of the leaders of two Koreas), and between China and Taiwan (9).
The most WMD-proliferation-sensitive issue has become development of
the North Korean nuclear and missile programs.
North Korean nuclear crisis demonstrated Russia's limited role in Northeast
Asia in contrast to the role of the former Soviet Union played by Moscow
during and after the Korean war. In Soviet times, the USSR assisted Pyongyang
in developing its peaceful nuclear energy capabilities. The Soviet Union
supplied North Korea with a small enriched-uranium research reactor, which
became operational in 1966 and was under IAEA safeguards. However, the
USSR never facilitated North Korea in developing any components of its
nuclear weapons program and for some time (in the late 1970s-early 1980s)
was even unaware of such Pyongyang's plans.
The USSR facilitated North Korean accession to the NPT (1985), taking
advantage of Pyongyang's interest in building nuclear power plant with
the help of the Soviet Union.
In December 1985, the parties signed a Pyongyang-sponsored agreement
on constructing a nuclear power plant with 4 VVER-440 reactors. In 1992,
Russia cleared up that it would supply 3 MP-640-type reactors, which seemed
to be safer. Construction started near Sinp'o, Russia finished technical
study and Russian specialists began their field activities. Besides, in
1991, the USSR and the DPRK signed a $185-million contract concerning fuel
assembly supplies (10).
In the late 1980s-early 1990s, peaceful nuclear cooperation of the two
states faced some problems, which, in fact, had nothing to do with nonproliferation.
The DPRK refused to make payments to Russia, since Pyongyang did not recognize
it as the Soviet successor (11).
First evidence of North Korean nuclear ambitions was obtained by US
intelligence satellites in 1984. In 1986, the satellites made threatening
pictures of Yongbyon reactor. And in December 1988, Washington initiated
its first cautious dialogue with Pyongyang concerning this topic (12).
In 1986, North Korea started to operate its indigenous 5-MW gas-cooled
graphite-moderated reactor with capabilities for plutonium production.
It also commenced the construction of two more powerful industrial reactors
to develop capabilities for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel
and the separation of weapons-usable plutonium.mIn 1989, North Korea was
suspected of recharging nuclear reactor, reprocessing discharged nuclear
fuel and obtaining about 12 kg of weapons-usable plutonium. This amount
was enough to manufacture a couple of nuclear warheads (13).
In 1988-1994, the USSR and later Russia regarded the North Korean nuclear
program as one of the most serious regional nonproliferation challenges
contradicting Soviet/Russian interests in the region. At the time, the
USSR and then Russia were not able to control development of Pyongyang's
military nuclear program and did not have any significant impact on North
Korea's activities. Moscow tended to believe that North Korea did not possess
any nuclear explosive devices (14) and that the program was frozen (allegedly
since 1992). Nonetheless, there was no accurate data and this lack of information
sometimes increased Russia's suspicions (15). In the secret report, KGB
experts had provided the following assessment: "From a reliable source,
the KGB has received information that scientific and experimental design
work on the development of atomic weapons is actively continuing in the
DPRK. According to this data, the development of the first atomic explosive
device has been completed at the Institute of Nuclear Research of the DPRK,
located in Yongbyon… For the time being, tests are planned in the interests
of hiding the fact of the DPRK’s production of an atomic weapon from the
world community and from international organizations responsible for nuclear
safeguards" (16).
In 1993, in its public report, Russian Foreign Intelligence service
maintained that while the DPRK’s applied military nuclear program is at
“an advanced stage”, it also expressed “serious doubts” that the DPRK has
made “any breakthrough” in developing its own nuclear weapons yet (17).
Another SVR report published in March 1995 maintained that “the present
scientific and technical level and the technological equipment of nuclear
facilities in the DPRK do not allow North Korea specialists to create a
nuclear explosive device applicable for field tests, even less so to model
a cold test of a plutonium-type military-purpose charge under laboratory
conditions” (18). In his interview to the author, head of the SVR Arms
Control and WMD Nonproliferation Department Lt.-Gen. Gennady Evstafiev
assessed North Korean nuclear weapons program as approaching the stage
of creating nuclear explosive device but failing to do so due to domestic
financial difficulties and a number of other problems (19).
Immediately after North Korean statement concerning its withdrawal from
the NPT, the Russian president signed a decree No. 249-RP banning all works
under the 1985 agreement. At that time, Pyongyang's debt was about $1.72
million (20) (later estimates spoke about $4.7 million (21)). At the same
time, according to Russian leading expert on North Korea Yevgeny Bazhanov,
"the Russian government… was too preoccupied with its various internal
crises to pay much attention to… obscure developments in the DPRK" (22).
To sum it up, one can presume that Russia had a vague picture of North
Korean nuclear program and could hardly understand whether signals concerning
rapid progress of the Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program proved that North
Korea had started technological implementation of corresponding political
decision, or it was a deliberate North Korean disinformation to be used
later for nuclear bluff and blackmail (23).
Russia's inability to affect the Korean nuclear program resulted in
a situation when Russian leadership and governmental experts put up with
the loss of Russia's role in solving North Korean nuclear problem, accepted
their helplessness and blessed the USA for negotiations with Pyongyang.
These talks ended with signing the Agreed Framework in October 1994. One
of the Russian leading experts then admitted, "There is no price that would
not be worth paying for refusal of any rogue state to acquire nuclear capabilities."
(24) As a result, Washington, Japan and South Korea willingly paid this
price.
In the late 1990s, Russia took several attempts to participate in the
nonproliferation dialogue in the region. All these endeavors have failed.
In nuclear area, Russia has missed the KEDO train, even the last car of
it. Russian initiative to build a nuclear power plant for North Korea on
the territory of Primorsky krai (the safest possible scenario as far as
nonproliferation is concerned) has got no response.
The North Korean nuclear weapons program was not the only headache for
Russia caused by the DPRK.
Sweeping development of the North Korean missile program, which started
from modification of the Soviet Scuds and continued by creating Nodong-1
(with foreign assistance) and Taepodong-1 (tested in August 1998 (25)),
led to three new challenges facing Russian military and political leadership.
Firstly, at the Russian eastern border, there emerged a state with an
advanced program of developing WMD launchers that may reach the Russian
territory. Russia cannot but interpret this as a direct threat to national
security and national interests. Test launch of a Taepodong-1 missile in
1998 caused painful reaction of the Russian media and experts, since the
first stage of the missile fell in the Sea of Japan close to the Russian
territory, whereas the Russian early-warning system failed to detect the
launch. Russian sentiments were clearly stated in the following headline
of a nation-wide newspaper "North Korea demonstrates vulnerability of our
defense" (26).
Secondly, North Korean missile export capabilities pose the threat of
secondary missile proliferation (27) and may pose potential threats to
Russia in other regions of the world neighboring its territory or the territory
of its allies under the Collective Security Treaty.
Thirdly, North Korean missile threat has become a key trump card for
those US policymakers who lobby deployment of national missile defense
(NMD) system. Russia regards NMD deployment as a major menace to its national
security. If implemented, the system will undermine the 1972 ABM Treaty
which Moscow considers to be the cornerstone of strategic stability.
In the late 1990s, many Russian experts agreed (regardless of different
estimates) that "particular role of the North Korean threat for Russian
national security and for security of other Asia-Pacific nations is determined
by aggravating political and economic instability in the DPRK, whose leadership
is notorious for its unpredictability and can undertake military adventures
to ensure overall victory of its … ideology, sacrificing the cause of peace,
the interests of the neighbors and its own people. Evidence of North Korean
efforts to develop missiles and arm them with nuclear warheads deserve
particular attention and endeavors to seek the solution to this dangerous
situation" (28).
Moscow made an attempt to improve relations and clarify the situation
with North Korean missile intentions during President Putin's visit to
Pyongyang in July 2000 (this was the first visit of the Soviet/Russian
leader to North Korea). The visit was supposed to have "external effect"
- to show the West that Russia was returning to its traditional spheres
of influence to get some economic and political dividends. In case of North
Korea, it was not the matter of economic benefits. Moscow did not hope
for political breakthrough either and therefore, none expected any significant
practical results from this meeting. On the eve of the visit President
Putin explained his mission: "The DPRK is our neighbor, we have a common
border. And it is crucial for us to be sure that peace and concord are
restored in the region, since this will directly affect Russia." (29) "We
know that the situation on the Korean peninsula is still dangerous and
Russia is interested to avoid any dangerously explosive situation near
its borders. This is our national, state interest. And my visit to Korea
is connected with these problems, with our direct national interests."
(30) After that Vladimir Putin specified a secret goal of the visit, which
was hardly connected with inter-Korean settlement. "In the course of discussion
on global security issues we heard an argument concerning various military
and missile threats, and the DPRK is more and more often mentioned in this
connection. Obviously, we want to get to the country for a field study
of the problem"(31).
Mr. Putin himself made a moderate assessment of his visit to Pyongyang
and reminded everybody of his intelligence past. "In my opinion, the fewer
blank pages we have the better. In order to understand what is going on,
one should have contacts, ties, information. If we hear that there are
some apprehensions concerning missile programs being developed by North
Korea, we should know what these programs are, what their scale is and
what the scale of the threat is. Strategic stability issues are chiefly
discussed by the USA and Russia, but fate of other nations depend on how
adequate our vision will be and how thoroughly we will prepare the decision.
Thus, to obtain a high-quality solution to these problems, we should possess
credible information." (32)
"I'm content with the results of the visit," he continued, "Naturally,
one can hardly make any global and final conclusions as a result of two-day
negotiations and meetings. However, without contacts and additional information,
it is impossible to make any conclusions at all. (…) I have an impression
that the Korean leader can listen and hears what he is told. He has adequate
reaction to arguments in the course of discussion. And he can be a partner
at negotiations, he is the person you can have dialogue with." (33)
Moscow noticed that Kim Jong-il used Putin as a messenger for North
Korean peace initiative, while he himself wanted to talk to those who have
money and real influence on entire complex of processes in Northeast Asia,
i.e. with Americans. North Korea, like in 1994, does not accept Russia
idea of internationalization of inter-Korean process (the only way for
Russia to be involved in all settlement processes). Like in 1993-1994,
Pyongyang prefers to solve the problems (now not nuclear, but missile)
with those who pay and, unlike in 1994, plays the Russian card for that
purpose: if the USA does not want to buy the glory of peacemakers, this
glory will be offered to Russia with a discount (34).
After his return from Pyongyang, President Putin admitted, "We hope
that the results of my visit will serve all parties concerned. We do not
want to monopolize these results." (35)
Russia's realistic approach accounts for the fact that several weeks
after Moscow's "missile settlement" victory in North Korea Russia ceded
the initiative to the USA, although this success might have helped Moscow
to solve the ABM/NMD issues. The US-North Korean negotiations in Kuala
Lumpur, visit of a North Korean top-ranking official to Washington and
finally, Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000 - all
this demonstrated Pyongyang's consent to settle the missile issue with
Washington only, without giving key to this problem to Moscow, Tokyo, Beijing
or Seoul.
However, with the new, republican, administration in Washington in office,
the situation is likely to change. Top U.S. politicians have no plans to
go to Pyongyang. Instead, they talk more in “stick” terms rather than in
“carrot” ones. In this new context, Russia’s increasing contacts with Pyongyang
may play a positive and important role.
CONCLUSIONS
Summing up Russian policy during the North Korean missile and nuclear
crises, one can make the following conclusions:
* At the governmental level, Russia has never had political intentions
or practice of promoting nuclear-weapon programs of the states of concern,
including the DPRK. Any attempts of the lobbying groups and individuals
to circumvent these restrictions have been always immediately prevented.
There were only some efforts of enterprises and smugglers to make unauthorized
supplies, but in nuclear area all these endeavors have failed.
* On the contrary, Russia has always feared even gossip about
possible emergence of nuclear instability near its borders. When these
rumors are proved with information, Russia exclaims such magic words as
"NPT" or "IAEA inspections" to protect itself from any new headache.
* Russia has no sufficient information resources to get an adequate
vision of the situation with new possible proliferation risks, especially
in East Asia, and prefers to play safe proceeding from the worst-case scenario.
* Russia has neither financial resources nor political instruments
to affect the policy of the states of concern, although sometimes Moscow
deliberately bluffs.
* Russia's declared foreign policy priorities do not enable Moscow
to recognize in public some of its concerns about nuclear-weapon programs
of other states. Absence of public statements does not mean that there
are no concerns and fears.
* The US persistent pressure and meddling in Russian affairs causes
growing irritation in Moscow, although the Kremlin realizes that this pressure
is a showoff for the US domestic audience and lobbying groups. At the same
time, Moscow has no opportunity to make efficient steps aimed at preventing
proliferation risks.
* One cannot preclude that Putin's pragmatic approach may mean
Russia's willingness to develop nuclear cooperation even if there is a
danger of violating or non-complying in full scope with international commitments.
However, this is true only with respect to the states that are regarded
as Russian long-term strategic partners and not as potential sources of
threats to Russian security. This is why even if Russia had capabilities
and willingness to meet the demands of the states of concern it would provide
nuclear assistance neither to East Asia (China and North Korea) nor to
the Middle East (Iran, Syria, and Libya). The only exception for deep cooperation
would be India.
(1) Dr. Vladimir A. Orlov is the founding director of the Moscow-based
PIR Center – Center for Policy Studies in Russia. Views expressed in this
paper do not necessarily represent views of his institute. Contact email:
orlov@pircenter.org Web site: www.pircenter.org
(2) The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation. January
2000. Diplomatichesky Vestnik, No.2, 2000, p.4.
(3) Yaderny Kontrol. No.5, 2000. September – October, p. 40.
(4) Dmitry Evstafiev and Vladimir Orlov, Editors. Export Controls in
Russia: Policies and Practicies (in Russian). M., PIR Center, 2000, pp.
143-156.
(5) Ibid., p. 184.
(6) Ibid., pp. 26, 29.
(7) Roland Timerbaev and Vladimir Orlov. Concerted Action Needed on
Nonproliferation. Moscow Times. April 19, 2000, p.9.
(8) Katahara Elichi. Japan’s Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Non-Proliferation.
The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol.5, No.1, Fall 1997, p.57.
(9) During the 1960-1980s, Taiwan was conducting extensive nuclear
research and developed a mighty nuclear energy sector. One may also presume
that Taiwan was implementing imitative nuclear weapons program, which had
no chances for success, bearing in mind Taiwan's dependence on the USA.
(10) Georgy Kaurov. A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear
Relations. In: The North Korean Nuclear Program, p. 18.
(11) Ibid., p. 19.
(12) David Reese. The Prospects for North Korea’s Survival. Adelphi
Paper 323. L., IISS, 1998, pp. 43-44.
(13) North Korean plutonium estimates can be found in: David Albright
et al. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. World Iventories, Capabilities,
and Policies. Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 282-308.
(14) Mikhail Morozov. Atomnuyu bombu v tyomnom podzemelye nayti poka
ne udalos’ (No clandestine atomic bomb has been found yet). Komsomolskaya
Pravda, July 13, 1994.
(15) See: Denisov, p.26
(16) Izvestia, June 24, 1994.
(17) Novyi vyzov posle kholodnoy voyny: rasprostraneniye oruzhiya massovogo
unichtozheniya (The New Post-Cold War Clallenge: Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction). SVR Report. M., 1993, p.92-93.
(18) Dogovor o nerasprostranenii yadernogo oruzhiya. Problemy prodleniya.
(Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Problems of Extension.). SVR Report.
M., 1995, p. 26.
(19) Interview with the author. November 1994.
(20) Ibid., p. 19
(21) Alexander Zhebin. A Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear
Cooperation. In: The North Korean Nuclear Program, p.33.
(22) Evgeniy P. Bazhanov. Military Strategic Aspects of the North
Korean Nuclear Program. In: The North Korean Nuclear Program, p. 105.
(23) About nuclear blackmail see: Reese, p. 47. See also conclusions
of the article by Vladimir Belous "How much plutonium did Kim Il Sung have
in its pocket?". Segodnya, August 26, 1994.
(24) Gennady Evstafiev. Nine questions concerning nuclear nonproliferation.
Yaderny Kontrol, No. 1, 1995, p. 13.
(25) The missile traveled 1,646 km across the Sea of Japan and
released a small satellite which failed to achieve orbit. The first two
stages of the missile were liquid-fueled but the third stage was reportedly
a solid-fuel booster. Although it appears that the third stage failed,
the accomplishment of the first two stages was impressive enough. Western
experts have speculated that the missile has a potential range of some
2,000 – 2,500 km and could lead to the development of the Taepodong-2 missile.
Russian military experts are more skeptical of North Korea’s capabilities
to move quickly beyond the August 1998 test to longer-range systems. –
Evgeniy P. Bazhanov. Military Strategic Aspects of the North Korean Nuclear
Program. In: The North Korean Nuclear Program, p. 104; Terese Delpech.
Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’: Early Warning from Asia? Survival,
Winter 198-99,vol. 40, No.4, p. 64; The Proliferation Primer. A Majority
Report to the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and
Federal services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, January
1998, pp. 32-35; Author’s interview with Gennady Khromov, a Glavkosmos
expert, November 2000.
(26) Victor Litovkin. North Korea demonstrates vulnerability
of our defense. Izvestiya, September 2,1998, p. 3.
(27) Gennady Evstafiev. It's naive to expect easy solutions.
In: Export Controls in Russia: Policy and Practice, p. 188; Bazhanov, p.
105.
(28) Yaderny Kontrol, No. 3, May-June 2000, p.84.
(29) Interview of Russian President Vladimir Putin to correspondents
of ORT, Japanese TV-company NHK and Reuters news agency. July 11, 2000.
www.gov.ru/president
(30) Press conference in the International Media Center concerning
results of the G-8 Summit. July 23, 2000, Okinawa
(31) Ibid.
(32) Ibid.
(33) Ibid.
(34) According to Russian journalist Alexander Platkovsky, "in the
coming years, full-scale efforts at exploiting the differences among the
major powers active on the Korean peninsula is the main field where Pyongyang
will attempt to reap its harvest". – Platkovskiy, p. 100.
(35) Ibid.