EAST ASIA AND MISSILE DEFENSES:
RIGHT MILITARILY AND WRONG POLITICALLY?
by Alexander A. Pikayev*
ABSTRACT
Developments in East Asia represent, probably, the most intriguing
and challenging factor in shaping global security for the twenty-first
century. Despite the financial crisis that took place in late 1990s, the
super-region reemerged again as one of the most dynamic area in the world.
At the same time, economic problems in Japan, South Korea and South East
Asia temporarily halted the elevation of their role in international politics.
Developments in Indonesia demonstrated how fragile political systems in
many East Asian states can be and the risk that domestic political stability
might be broken suddenly by economic hardships. Prospects for internal
destabilization for many key regional players effectively prevent establishing
a regional collective security system based on economic integration and
common political values like the one emerging in Europe.
A decade long economic stagnation in Japan and the weakening of some
ASEAN countries sharply contrasted with the consistent growth in China,
which further consolidated its regional position as a result of the Asian
financial crisis. The return of Hong Kong and Macao in 1997 and 1999
respectively also considerably contributed to the Chinese economic and
political might. The task of integrating Beijing into a cooperative
environment in the Western Pacific is becoming an urgent task.
However, it is not possible to achieve because the environment itself has
not yet been formed.
Gradual but steady changes in the regional balance accompanied by periodic
tensions across the Taiwan Strait is slowly eroding a system of the US
led alliances in the East Asia. The US security guarantees cannot
provide the allies with a feeling of security like the one enjoyed by the
Europeans after the end of the Cold War. At the same time, there
is little prospect of establishing alternative security arrangements which
would be capable of adequately addressing the changing security environment
in the region.
An absence of a truly integrated area in the Western Pacific, difficult
political relations and mutual suspicions between some of key regional
players makes the continuing US geopolitical presence there an extremely
and increasingly important stabilizing factor. There is a critically
urgent need to halt further erosion of the US security guarantees, and,
hopefully, to reverse the process. In that context, anti-missile defenses
are widely considered not as a panacea, but a primary tool for preserving
the US presence and, thus, maintaining the fragile regional stability.
MISSILE DEFENSE RATIONALE
It is symptomatic, that both primary factors of the US commitment to
missile defense deployments originated in East Asia. Combination of the
1996 Chinese missile launches towards Taiwan together with Beijing minimum
deterrence capabilities against the North American targets challenged credibility
of the US security guarantees to its regional allies. The 1998 North Korean
launch over Japan question overall US military presence overseas already
in not too distant future.
Indeed, if the anti-missile defense provides the United States with
a feeling of invulnerability of its national territory, Washington might
be more willing to act decisively if its allies in the Western Pacific
were externally challenged. Not surprising, that the 1996 Chinese missile
launches into the Taiwan straight so considerably contributed to the US
anti-missile debates.
At that time, in a response to what was perceived by the Clinton administration
as a coercive strategy, the United States send aircraft naval groups closer
to Taiwan. That move allegedly triggered an overreaction in Beijing. An
authoritative military source said, that any US military involvement into
the Chinese domestic affairs might cost the Americans nuclear attack against
Los Angeles. The overstatement revived debates inside the Beltway on whether
Washington should permit itself to maintain minimum deterrence relationship
with China, or alternatively, it should looking for military and technical
means permitting to return back to situation of 1970s when Beijing did
not possess ballistic missiles capable delivering nuclear warheads to targets
located in North America.
Certainly, the Chinese argument was not the only rationale for shifting
the US domestic debates from accent on theater missile defenses (TMD) into
national missile defenses (NMD). Nor it was the main public argument. To
the contrary to late 1960s, when President Johnson used the Chinese threat
in order to promote the US missile defenses, thirty years later Washington
clearly preferred not to add oil into international criticism of its controversial
NMD plan by portraying China as its principal target. Moreover, John Holum,
an undersecretary of state, during his 2000 visit to Beijing said that
the United States remained comfortable with their deterrence relationship
with the Chinese. Nevertheless, the China factor is often mentioned by
both US analysts and media as an important reason to deploy the limited
US NMD.
In the United States, the domestic public opinion radically shifted
in favor of NMD deployments when North Korea launched its what might be
a medium range missile in August 1998. In a quite provocative way, the
missile flew over the Japanese territory and produced understandable anger
in Tokyo. In that case, Pyongyang simply repeated what the Chinese demonstrated
two years before by launching their missiles over Taiwan. One could however
argue, that from the viewpoint of an international law, Taiwan is no more
than the Chinese province, while Japan enjoys a different status vis-a-vis
the DPRK.
Fortunately for the US NMD advocates, the North Korean missile launch
took place literally few weeks after unclassified version of the Rumsfeld
Commission report was published. In that report, it was claimed that earlier
intelligence estimates that missile threat for the US national territory
was not expected in the foreseeable future were wrong, and such threat
could unexpectedly emerge already in the short term. The North Korean launch
became sudden and dramatic confirmation of the conclusions made by the
Rumsfeld Commission.
The DPRK launch was a psychological shock, which fall on already fertile
soil. The United States not immediately and quite painfully accepted their
vulnerability for the Soviet and then Chinese missiles. Washington was
clearly unprepared adopting to vulnerability from the North Koreans and
other unpredictable “rogues”. That process, if continued, could put under
risk not only American troops stationed abroad, but the US soil itself
and thus question the overall US military presence overseas. Given
tremendous American sensibility to human losses, any dictator could calculate
that if he possessed missiles capable reaching the US territory, Washington
would have to refrain from adversarial military involvement into a regional
war with his participation. Therefore, the Americans feared, several important
regions might become sanctuaries for aggressions, and Washington will be
deprived from freedom of interventions.
NORTH KOREAN MISSILE THREAT?
It is widely assumed that the North Korean ballistic missile launched
on August 31, 1998, represented a modernized version of the Soviet short
range Scud missile. The original Scud R-17 ballistic missile with range
at 300 kilometers and throwweight of 1000 kilograms was developed at the
Soviet Mashinostroyeniye design bureau located in the city of Miass, the
Urals. It was a single stage missile with liquid fuel (geptyle with nitrogen
acid oxydizer) engine. The missile weight was 5.8 tons and it was road
mobile system. Serial production took place at Votkinsk machine building
plant, where SS-27s ICBMs are recently produced. The Soviets produced it
in numbers far exceeded quantities of other types of guided surface-to-surface
missiles constructed elsewhere.
Since mid-1970s it was exported under title R-17E (see Table 1). For
some countries, like Iraq, the Soviet Union sold hundreds of such missiles.
Until 1988 they were inter alia delivered to Libya, Syria, Egypt, Warsaw
Pact states. Under the contracts, the recipients were normally prohibited
from the missiles’ modernization and re-export. But the importers, especially,
after the Soviet collapse, often - both openly and covertly - violated
these provisions. As a result of re-export, the Scuds appeared in the countries,
where they had never been exported by the USSR. DPRK was among them.
It should be mentioned that the Scud possessors attempted to modernize
the missiles together, by financing each other projects and exchanging
by technological data. Some of them were capable to produce their own systems
based on Scuds, and exported them as well. Reportedly, some of the possessors
received technical assistance from China.
The North Korean missile program started in 1981, when it purchased
several Scuds ? from Egypt. Pyongyang was capable to organize its own production
of the missile modification - Scud A, and then modernized it into more
capable Scud B system. It was produced serially with a monthly rate of
8-12 missiles. In July 1987 DPRK sold 100 missiles to Iran and, probably,
helped Tehran to start its own Scud production. Since 1991 the North Korea
initiated full scale production of a new Scud C modification.
Table. North Korean Scuds with their Soviet parent system
Scud Project |
Producer |
Maximum range, kilometers |
Production started (year) |
Other classifications |
Scud F |
USSR |
300 |
1975 |
R-17: Soviet name
SS-1 - NATO Clssification |
Scud A |
DPRK |
300 |
1984 |
Modernized version of the Soviet R-17E |
Scud B |
DPRK, Iraq, Iran |
320 |
1985 |
Insignificant Sucd-A modification |
Scud C |
DPRK, Iran |
500-650 |
1991 |
In Iraq classified as Al Hussein |
Scud D |
DPRK |
~1000 |
1993 |
Nodong-1 |
Scud E
(Scud X) |
DPRK |
? |
? |
Nodong-2 |
Source: Gennady Khromov. On the question of so called missile threat
from Iran and DPRK. - Yadernoye rasprostraneniye, # 29-30, April-June 1999
(in Russian)
According to official Russia’s data, on August 31, 1998 the North Korea
launched a new two stage missile. In its statement from September 4 Pyongyang
claimed that it made a satellite launch to celebrate the 50th anniversary
of founding the DPRK. Experts agreed that the new missile used Nodong-2
system. Nodong-1 and Nodong-2 represent the second generation of Scud based
missiles. Under some estimates, Nodong-1 range can be approximately 1,000
kilometers, if the warhead weights 1,000 kilograms. The Iranian Shahab
3 missile also tested in 1998 is perceived to be a version of the Nodong
1. The longer range of the Nodong-2 at 1,300-1,500 kilometers was reportedly
reached by increasing length of fuel tanks. It led to higher weight of
the system by 2-3 tons and decreasing the warhead’s weight to 700 kilograms.
To let them flying, more Scud engines were placed on them.
Although the Nodong project is on its early phase of implementation,
the North Koreans already working on the Scuds’ third generation - Taepodong
missile. It consists of two stages, which might permit to increase range
up to 3,500 kilometers. The first stage is based on Nodong-2 technology,
the second one - on Scud C or even Nodong-1. Since the missile could be
too heavy - with the weight at several dozens of tons, Pyongyang might
be incapable to maintain its mobile basing.
The main technical problem for the North Korean missiles is represented
by their engines still based on the 9D21 system designed in the Soviet
Union for original Scuds in early 1960s. It was specifically designed for
a tactical missile with the weight at 5.8 tons, and would be insufficient
for much heavier medium range missiles. For instance, 10 such engines would
have to be installed on the first stage of Taepodong missile with its weight
at 50-70 tons. However, this technical challenge might be solved if the
Chinese agreed to deliver more powerful engines, say, from Dong Fang 3
(CSS-2) missiles.
Technical experts arguing, that if old engines used - a common problem
for all Scuds possessors, - a need to increase range usually leads to diminishing
throwweight, and thus payload which can be delivered to the target. The
guidance system, originally designed for a tactical missile, also cannot
provide reasonable accuracy for longer range missiles. Thus - the longer
range, the lower payload and accuracy of a missile system based on quantitative
modification of the Scuds. Another argument is that both the United States
and the Soviet Union, before deploying new missiles, made few dozens of
their flight tests, usually, several per year. The North Koreans clearly
lack test support facilities, and historically they were capable making
just one flight test per several years.
Obtaining missile capabilities per se does not represent significant
security risk for potential target. The real challenge is whether the missile
possessor gained WMD technology, and if yes, whether it has technological
ability to weaponize it and place on missiles as warheads. In a case of
North Korea, it would took probably decades until it would develop nuclear
warhead small enough to be delivered by a domestically produced missile
at intercontinental distances. Regarding chemical and biological weapons,
which would likely require much smaller throwweight, Pyongyang has been
never accused in their developing and production.
North Korea is a small country. Although surprising 1998 test could
be considered as an argument supporting inefficiency of technical reconnaissance
means, that might be likely result of lack of attention paid for Pyongyang’s
missile program by international intelligence community. It is not inconceivable
that if sufficient resources could be concentrated on electronic as well
as space based optical reconnaissance, heavy ballistic missile might be
timely detected during its preparation for start and destroyed at its launch
pad.
Neither North Korean missile possesses strategic intercontinental range.
Its interception during flight trajectory requires not strategic,
but capable theater missile defenses (TMD). Such defenses are not prohibited
by the US-Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed in 1972. In
fact, unlimited tests of the US TMD systems were permitted by the US-Russian
demarcation agreements concluded in New York in September 1997. Furthermore,
the ABM Treaty itself permits limited anti-missile tests under certain
restrictions.
In 1990s Pyongyang demonstrated relatively cooperative approach in nuclear
field. It helped to move forward initiatives reached under the 1994 Framework
Agreement. In 2000 the DPRK broken its self imposed isolation from the
South agreeing on historic visit of South Korean president to the North.
It dramatically changed political environment around Pyongyang, and raised
hopes that North Korean missile problem could be solved by political means.
Under few occasions, the DPRK leaders also made clear that under certain
conditions, they could be ready to halt their further missile tests.
Anti-missile defenses remain doubtful in terms of security on the Korean
peninsula as well. Significant short-range North Korean missile capabilities
and short distances between the demilitarized zone and some vital South
Korean urban centers like Seoul raise doubts on whether TMD could provide
additional security for the South. Likely, attempts to develop and deploy
it would provoke North Korean tactical missiles build up - and they have
already demonstrated their capabilities to produce more than a hundred
of such systems annually. As a result, Pyongyang could increase its offensive
deployments up to a point, when they might saturate initially modest defenses.
Political price for such offense-defense arms race could be also too high,
putting under risk prospects for rapprochement between two Koreas, which
recently look reasonably promising. In that context, dialogue between Pyongyang
and Seoul, which started in 2000, has significantly undermined TMD perspective
in the peninsula.
Indeed, the North Korean missile program poses certain challenges for
the US and regional security. However, recently prospects for their political
solution has considerably enhanced. Nevertheless, some kind of non-provocative
military responses would be also workable and even desirable (like those
in transparency area). It is doubtful, however, that significant, costly
and futuristic NMD deployments represent an adequate response to the threat
which might never materialize. Even in the missile defense field, solutions
could be found without jeopardizing existing arms control agreements, notably,
the ABM Treaty.
CHINA FACTOR
The China factor could be considered as much more serious argument in
favor of the US large scale missile defense deployments, or against them.
The main question here is whether the anti-missile defense would
really consolidate the US security alliances in the Western Pacific and
thus deserve support, or, quite oppositely, it would trigger a chain
of undesirable consequences.
The NMD debates demonstrated new intriguing development in global interaction
between nuclear powers. While the post Cold War environment brought situation
of unique security to Europe, traditional nuclear related risks shifted
to North East and South Asia. Emerging China is clearly playing growing
role in national security calculations of both the United States and Russia.
Possible Beijing’s reaction on potential US NMD deployments could be considered
as one of main challenges not only for regional but global security developments.
So far China pursued very restrained nuclear policy. By early 1980s
it obtained technological feasibility to hit targets located in North America.
Since that, it reportedly deploys two or three dozen missiles capable to
fulfill that mission. In fact, during last two decades of the XX century,
the Chinese sent a clear message to Washington on their reluctance to move
beyond minimum deterrence relationship with the United States, and thus
on their desire to avoid nuclear arms race with them.
Under certain circumstances, even initially limited US NMD might intercept
all the Chinese missiles. As a result, if China maintains its intercontinental
nuclear deployments at their recent levels, Washington could effectively
deprive Beijing with keeping its minimum deterrence option. Consequently,
already in next decade China might strategically find itself in a situation
it faced in mid-1970s, when it was unable delivering warheads to the US
national territory. However, the geostrategic environment could be very
different: since the Cold War Washington clearly demonstrated that it was
not willing anymore to adjust its regional interests to Beijing’s sensitivities,
especially on Taiwan issue. Due to that, some Chinese analysts might perceive,
that maintaining minimum nuclear deterrence in relations with the United
States could be a vital element guaranteeing American restraint if something
happens around the Taiwan straight.
Until now, the Chinese abstained from publicly announcing their military
reaction on possible US NMD deployments. However, it is not inconceivable
that they would try to maintain their recent minimum deterrence capabilities
in their relationship with the United States they have achieved two decades
ago. If Beijing develops MIRV technology, it might be assured from negative
impact on its deterrence forces, which could be inflicted by the American
anti-missile deployments, by initiating relatively modest missile production
program already in coming years. By producing, say, 10 to 15 ballistic
missiles per year each capable to carry 4 to 6 warheads, the Chinese would
be able to increase size of their intercontinental nuclear forces up to
around 1,000 warheads within next twenty years. In other words, one could
imagine a realistic scenario when Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities
would increase by two orders of magnitude already in the foreseeable future,
probably, before the United States could deploy effective anti-missile
defense system.
This policy does not mean initiation of the US-Chinese arms race in
a type took place between the Soviet Union and the United States during
the Cold War. To the contrary to Moscow, Beijing evidently does not seek
numerical strategic nuclear parity with Washington. The ballistic missile
deployments could force it to start significant nuclear build up in order
to preserve recent nuclear status quo. Given uncertain technological prospects
of missile defenses, in the near future, time would work for offense rather
than defense.
This nuclear build up would affect not only the US-Chinese relations:
Moscow might face difficult choices as well. Recently, the Chinese conventional
predominance vis-a-vis vast but under-populated Russian Far East is balanced
by Moscow’s superiority in nuclear weapons. Along with China’s nuclear
build up, this superiority might be considerably eroded, and Russia’s positions
in the Far East would further weaken.
Those developments could be contained by additional Russian non-strategic
deployments and could create a motivation to abandon the INF Treaty. Due
to shrinking strategic forces, Moscow would need a substitute for maintaining
its nuclear leverage in the Far East, which might be very difficult to
achieve by remaining inside the existing INF restrictions. Beijing is not
a party of the INF Treaty and deploying dozens if not hundreds delivery
vehicles with a range between 500 to 5,000 kilometers, which enable him
hitting the whole Russian territory including the vital targets located
in European Russia.
In other words, in quite unpredictable way the US-Chinese disagreements
over the NMD deployment might pose under threat bilateral US-Russian nuclear
arms control regime - the INF Treaty. Given Russia’s position in both Europe
and Asia, possible Moscow withdrawal from that agreement might affect nuclear
developments to the west from its borders and revive debates on the continuing
US nuclear presence in the continent.
Possible Chinese nuclear build up might provoke nuclear chain reaction
to another direction. Rightly or wrongly, India clearly links its own nuclear
capabilities with China, and increase of the Beijing’s forces could stimulate
New Delhi to accelerate and expand its own weapons programs. If that happens,
Pakistan - India’s regional archrival - would unlikely stay indifferent,
and would proceed forward with its nuclear forces as well. In its turn,
Islamabad possesses delicate relations with its western neighbor - Iran,
which also might find difficult to abstain from that arms race indefinitely.
(1)
In more positive developments, an understanding that the Chinese nuclear
plans could become central in determining future global nuclear interaction
should motivate both Washington and Moscow to occupy more creative and
cooperative approach in their nuclear relations with Beijing. In that case,
vis-à-vis the Chinese, Russia could find itself in the same position,
like the United States found themselves vis-à-vis Russia. The Kremlin
might seek transparency over the Chinese stockpiles in order to guarantee,
that their possible nuclear build up is concentrated in intercontinental
capabilities and does not affect a part of the Chinese substrategic nuclear
forces directed at Russian targets. From its part, Washington should also
take into account prospects of the Chinese nuclear build up and, probably,
adjust its NMD plans in a way, which would help to limit destabilizing
consequences of that build up. Furthermore, if the United States and Russia
develop mutually acceptable exit from their recent nuclear arms control
impasse, they would have to elaborate mutual or parallel strategy aimed
at alleviating Beijing’s legitimate security concerns.
Potential significant TMD deployments in the region would likely affect
the Chinese missile posture as well. Debates of mid-1990s on TMD deployments
in Taiwan has already provoked manifold increase in the Chinese missile
deployments on the continental coast of the Taiwan straight. Beijing clearly
wanted to preempt potential Taiwanese TMD by deploying missiles in quantities
far exceeding any expected interception capabilities of the defenses in
the foreseeable future. As a result, there are indications that Taiwan
is gradually loosing interest to anti-missiles. What happened on the coast
of Taiwan straight, might provide a clue on developments, which could emerge
in the US-Chinese strategic interaction.
Like in North Korean case, accent on predominantly military means in
dealing with really emerging security challenges might be counterproductive
in the Chinese case. More likely, they add problems rather than bring solutions.
Relations with China are so important for shaping future of the Asia-Pacific
and the world in general, that they deserve much more creative treatment,
than simply relying on magic military technologies, especially since they
have to confirm their miraculous impact yet.
JAPAN’S DILEMMA
Tokyo could be considered as a capital, which found itself amidst negative
developments without provoking them. The developments directly affect its
security, but Japan has few tools in its disposal for dealing with them,
since they take place largely beyond its control. Tokyo clearly faces unpleasant
choices, and might have to use all its diplomatic art in order to avoid
further complications.
Among powers in the region, Japan probably pursues the most pacifist
foreign and security policies. Despite all debates and external pressures,
Tokyo still avoids any detectable remilitarization, and its prospects,
at least, for the time being, remain slim. It seems, that the country enjoys
strong domestic commitment for continuing that policy. Under those circumstances,
Japan is vitally interested in and strongly dependent on the US security
guarantees. If so, it has also to support everything, which would help
to maintain American presence in the Western Pacific, including anti-missile
defenses.
On the other hand, Tokyo is much closer to Beijing than Washington -
in both geographic and cultural terms. From the Japanese Isles it is better
seen that large scale TMD deployments might provoke the Chinese, at least,
to retarget dozens if not hundreds of their medium range missiles to the
north-east. It faces the same risks by hosting elements of the potential
US NMD on its territory, especially weapons systems, like future boost
phase and early mid-course interceptors. If tensions further grow, Japan
might find increasingly difficult to accommodate its allied obligations
and loyalty with a desire not provoking emergence of more militarized regional
environment.
However, to the contrary to South Korea, Japan might pursue less self
restrained attitude towards TMD. The 1998 North Korean missile launch looked
clearly offensive vis-a-vis Japan, although Pyongyang geographically lacked
alternative azimuths for launching its Taepodong (maybe, except politically
much riskier option to fire it towards Sakhalin). This provides Japan with
legitimate security rationale to develop a limited TMD designed exclusively
for intercepting few North Korean missiles. At the same time, if the task
is not provoking China, Beijing will have to be provided with guarantees,
that the system is not aimed at its missiles.
-----------------------
* Draft. Not for quotation and distribution without the author’s
permission
(1) More details about possible reaction in Asia on the US NMD
deployment see: Joseph Cirincione, Asian Nuclear Chain Reaction, Foreign
Policy, Wash., DC, Spring 2000.