NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL
by Lawrence Scheinman
ABSTRACT
Reflecting on the state of nonproliferation and arms control at the
beginning of the second post-cold war decade, one reaches a mixed conclusion.
On the one hand, any review of developments in these arenas since the fall
of the Berlin Wall shows a remarkable run of positive events, including
the indefinite extension of the NPT, the strengthening of the safeguards
system by the IAEA, a decision to extend the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) indefinitely in 1996, and a stream of bilateral and multilateral
arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives of the early 1990s.
However, since the mid 1990s, the record both in non-proliferation and
arms control has taken a downward turn. The contrast between the
earlier and later 1990s reflects changes in the international environment
and in national perceptions of security and threat. International
relations turned out to be more complex and more dangerous after the cold
war than during it. With the end of the cold war came the end of
the disciplines that it had imposed on international politics and security.
Decentralization replaced bipolarity, political relationships became more
diffuse, and the nature and source of threat more diverse. Older
solutions to older problems are being increasingly questioned in terms
of their relevance to new threats. However, it must be understood
that deterrence and defense forestall or defeat threats to national security;
arms control works to remove the threats in the first instance. Maintaining
and strengthening effective arms control that meets this criterion is and
will remain a challenge as we move forward.
POSITIVES
Reflecting on the state of nonproliferation and arms control at the
beginning of the second post-cold war decade, one reaches a mixed conclusion.
On the one hand, any review of developments in these arenas since the fall
of the Berlin Wall shows a remarkable run of positive events. In nonproliferation,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which had an initial term of
twenty five years was, in 1995, extended indefinitely. By 1998 only four
states (India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba) remained outside the treaty,
making it the most widely subscribed to arms control treaty in history.
France and China, for many years non-parties, joined in 1992. The
breakup of the Soviet Union created a situation of instant proliferation
with nuclear weapons in the hands of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. All
three, however, relinquished control over nuclear weapons on their territory,
repatriated them to Russia, signed the NPT and negotiated full-scope safeguards
agreements with the IAEA. South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, other
important hold-out states also became parties, the former after having
acknowledged construction and subsequent dismantlement of a half dozen
nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and making a full accounting of all of
its nuclear material to the satisfaction of the IAEA.
In the wake of revelations of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons
program, the member states of the IAEA moved to strengthen the safeguards
system to substantially increase the probability of detecting clandestine
nuclear activity in safeguarded states in the future. And by giving unanimous
backing for severe and far-reaching disarmament measures for all weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq, the members of the United Nations Security
Council demonstrated the will to take enforcement action in support of
non-proliferation norms. The Council’s subsequent assertion that proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction would be regarded as a threat to international
peace and security laid a foundation upon which collective enforcement
of compliance actions could be built if the political will to do so could
be maintained.
Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were concluded
in 1996 as called for by the decision on Principles and Objectives agreed
by the parties to the NPT in conjunction with the decision to extend the
treaty indefinitely, and opened for signature that September.
This was only the latest in a stream of bilateral and multilateral arms
control agreements and unilateral initiatives of the early 1990s including
the START treaties negotiated by Washington and Moscow, the reciprocal
withdrawals by the two superpowers of tactical nuclear weapons to their
national territory (to be reduced by half and two-thirds respectively),
the abatement or cancellation of a number of nuclear weapon development
programs by most of the nuclear weapon states, the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) and its follow-on, and the Chemical Weapons
Convention of 1993 which filled in the gaps of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
by foreclosing development, production, transfer as well as use of chemical
weapons. As well negotiations started on a verification protocol
for the BTWC to be concluded before the end of 2001.
Complementing these treaties and conventions were a number of other
novel type arrangements (the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program
and more recently the US-European Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Cooperative
Initiative) aimed at assisting the Russian Federation and other former
states of the Soviet Union in the safety, security and dismantlement of
nuclear, chemical and other weapons including strategic delivery vehicles.
Achieving agreements to ensure that cold war residues such as nuclear materials,
technology or expertise not fall into the wrong hands, and that strategic
arms reduction agreements not end up creating proliferation problems,
has been a continuous and positive aspect of arms control/ nonproliferation
efforts over time.
NEGATIVES
If, as is the case, the CTBT (characterized by former President
Clinton at the time of its opening for signature as the ‘longest sought,
hardest fought-for treaty in history) was a major achievement of the last
decade, it was also the last significant agreement to be reached in arms
control and non-proliferation. Nor has it entered into force. Several key
states needed for that to occur have yet to sign, and more ominously,
failure of the U.S. Senate to give its advice and consent has precluded,
for now, U.S. ratification. Although implementation of most agreements
continues, others languish, caught in a labyrinth of competing political,
security and economic interests and agendas driven in part by perceptions
of increasing complexity in the post cold war political/security
environment. For example, START II which was ratified by the
U.S. Senate in 1996 was not acted upon by the Russian Duma until
May, 2000. For Moscow, however, entry into force was conditioned
on U.S. Senate approval of protocols to START II agreed in 1997 including
a memorandum of understanding regarding successor states to the Soviet
Union for purposes of the ABM Treaty (ABMT). Duma ratification legislation
also provided that if the United States withdrew from ABMT, Russia would
have the option to withdraw from START II. The Clinton Administration did
not submit the 1997 agreements to Senate consideration because of the virtual
certainty that they would be rejected because the ABM treaty was
seen to impede development of a missile defense that many in the
Senate favor.
Indeed, since the mid 1990s the record both in non-proliferation and
arms control has taken a downward turn much like the U.S. stock market
in the last half year. Not only the events mentioned above, but also the
collapse of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq with the refusal
of Baghdad to continue cooperating with the inspection system (replaced
with UNMOVIC which, however, still has not been able to become operational
in Iraq) and differences emerging among the P5 on how to deal with Iraq,
and the conducting of nuclear tests in May, 1998 by India and Pakistan
took the bloom off the rose of arms control and non-proliferation successes
earlier in the decade. The question is whether and what functional
equivalents to interest rate reductions, lowering taxes and other measures
used to combat financial market doldrums exist to address this challenging
situation. We will return to that question below.
As indicated, although cooperative threat reduction activities, including
a plutonium production reactor agreement in 1997 and a plutonium disposition
agreement in 2000, as well as agreements on strategic stability and on
a Joint (Missile) Data Exchange Center have been concluded between
the United States and the Russian Federation, there have been no further
major bilateral arms control agreements reached between them since START
II despite an effort to jump-start the process at the 1997 Helsinki summit
where the parameters of a projected START III were outlined. Domestic developments
in both states, not conducive to further arms control, were largely to
blame for this turn, as were heightened threat perceptions in Washington
regarding WMD/ballistic missile proliferation and deepening concern in
Russia regarding that nation’s slide into inferiority and isolation in
the face of NATO expansion , U.S. air strikes against Iraq, and NATO
bombing in the Kosovo campaign.
The international community’s sole multilateral forum for negotiating
arms control and disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has fared
no better and perhaps even worse. Since completing negotiation of the CTBT
in 1996, it has been unable to agree a work program which is the basis
upon which the CD operates. Pursuant to a 1993 General Assembly resolution
calling for the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons or other
explosive devices, the CD appointed a special coordinator to develop an
appropriate negotiating mandate for a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).
This was done in March 1995 and an ad hoc committee to negotiate was established,
but did not begin to function because it was unable to agree on a chairman.
The NPT Extension Conference called for immediate commencement and early
conclusion of a cut-off treaty, regarding it as second in importance only
to completion of a CTBT. The NPT parties well understood the arms
control and disarmament significance of such a treaty being agreed and
that along with the CTBT an FMCT would be a critical building block on
the road to eventual nuclear elimination.
Implementation of the mandate has been thwarted as a consequence of
linkages made by a few member states between opening FMCT negotiations
and agreement on agendas they wish to pursue – in particular, establishing
ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament and on outer space. India was
a principal mover on the former issue, China on the latter. China’s position
is that cut-off, outer space and nuclear disarmament are all related to
security and are, therefore, inseparable; that missile defense systems
currently under development pose a serious danger of outer space weaponization
and a new arms race in outer space. Underlying the Chinese position is
concern about the implications for Chinese security and the integrity of
its deterrent capability of U.S. determination to pursue missile defense.
The contrary U.S. view is that as there is no arms race in outer space
and no prospect for one, outer space issues are not ripe for negotiation,
and that while organized discussions, but not negotiations,
on outer space and nuclear disarmament could be conducted, the already
mandated negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty should
be pursued without further delay. The main point is that the linkage of
issues and holding progress on one hostage to agreement to make progress
on another has led to the result that nothing gets accomplished.
CHANGING CONDITIONS
The contrast between the earlier and later 1990s reflects changes in
the international environment and in national perceptions of security and
threat. International relations turned out to be more complex and
more dangerous after the cold war than during it. With the end of
the cold war came the end of the disciplines that it had imposed on international
politics and security. Decentralization replaced bipolarity, political
relationships became more diffuse, and the nature and source of threat
more diverse. The scope of proliferation concern expanded from the
acquisition of nuclear capabilities to include chemical, biological and
missile capabilities as well, while the sources of proliferation concern
broadened beyond states to also include sub-state actors and terrorist
groups.
Suppressed rivalries surfaced along with new tensions and gained increased
salience not only in terms of regional stability and security but,
given increasing interdependence among states and regions,
in more global terms as well. Growing access to dangerous technologies
and equipment associated with weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery, in particular missiles, compounded the problem. This has led
toward greater rather than lesser instability, and a sense of more
rather than less risk that weapons of mass destruction may actually be
used. As one observer has commented, with the end of the cold war we may
have moved away from the threat of global annihilation but closer to the
actual use of weapons of mass destruction. (Cite A. Sands)
Older solutions to older problems are being increasingly questioned
in terms of their relevance to new threats. In the United States
politically relevant forces who never were enthusiastic about arms control
in the first place and always skeptical about the efficacy of multinational
regimes and institutions, have gained influence. More comfortable
with deterrence and defense than with arms control and regimes, and anxious
to unshackle American power from the constraints of these uncertain
institutions and arrangements partisans of this view have lobbied for missile
defense and against treaties that would constrain the United States, in
particular the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the ABMT.
Although the policy review process is still in train and final strategies
not yet determined, the disposition of the current Administration in Washington
seems to be inclined to focus less on formal arms limitation agreements
anchored in binding instruments with strong verification measures, and
more on determination of what is required to meet defined national security
interests and to then unilaterally take steps to support those interests.
The difficulty, of course, is that unilateral measures are not legally
binding, can be altered at will, and entail none of the verification arrangements
that can serve to build confidence and stability. This approach to security
discounts the adage that arms control is defense by other means; that its
purpose is to augment security and is undertaken to serve that end and
not as an act of altruism; and that it is not a substitute for all other
means of seeking security – deterrence, defense, regime development – but
a complement to them – a complement that can in the longer run return
greater security dividends and greater confidence than can arms racing
or more defenses. It also makes a questionable assumption that one
can decouple arms control/ disarm-ament and non-proliferation
without impairing the latter whereas the correlation between these two
may in fact be stronger than appreciated. In this respect the traditional
arms control agenda remains more relevant to the current international
situation than one might think.
The Russian Federation for its part has backed away from its ‘no first
use’ posture while also putting increased emphasis on tactical nuclear
weapons to compensate for perceived conventional force inferiority,
reversing a course earlier adopted in the context of the Bush-Gorbachev
reciprocal unilateral measures of the early 1990s. At a minimum this
demonstrates the limitations of informal, non-binding agreements from which
any party can withdraw at will and even without notification. Slippage
in meeting its obligations under the CWC for economic and related reasons
to eliminate its substantial chemical weapons stockpile on the treaty-defined
schedule that was set is another area of concern. There is also concern
over alleged continued existence of elements of the former Soviet biological
weapons program.
Moscow’s cooperation with states along its southern tier involving
not only nuclear assistance to Iran, but also missile
cooperation; its shift in attitude on dealing with Iraq, and its
interest in nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes with India despite
India’s rejection of full-scope safeguards which the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, with Russian support, endorsed as a condition precedent to new significant
nuclear transactions, serve to weaken the foundations of nuclear non-proliferation
laboriously constructed over the past several decades.
China presents a mixed picture. In arms control terms it sees
itself as a junior nuclear weapon state and is reluctant to enter into
arms reduction negotiations until the two major nuclear states have made
very significant progress in their own disarmament process. At the same
time China has been pursuing a program to modernize an aging nuclear
force structure largely developed in the 1960s. It stands out, however,
as the only nuclear weapon state that is increasing the size and scope
of its arsenal. The extent of the modernization program will undoubtedly
be a function of U.S. missile defense plans and how China evaluates the
impact of those plans on its security. Indicative of how missile defense
concerns can affect Chinese action in arms control related areas is its
policy of linkage of FMCT negotiations to negotiating on preventing
an arms race in outer space (PAROS) in the CD. It does not
support, at present, transparency measures either with respect to its nuclear
doctrine or the anticipated size and composition of its growing strategic
nuclear force. An incipient arms control/non-proliferation dialogue
begun with the United States in the mid 1990s was suspended after the bombing
incident of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 until the fall of 2000
when an informal meeting sponsored on the U.S. side by the Monterey Institute
of International Studies involving non-governmental and government participants
in their private capacity was held, and at which government to government
contact was renewed.
China became much more centrally and constructively involved in multinational
non-proliferation regimes in the last decade, joining the NPT, the CWC
and the CTBT, embracing the normative assumptions of nonproliferation,
and institutionalizing its undertakings through the adoption of national
export control legislation and regulations. In the missile realm, however,
while committing to abide by the parameters of the Missile Technology Control
Regime, it is not a member and has continued to engage in international
transactions seen by others as inconsistent with MTCR guidelines in particular
through cooperation in dual use missile-related technologies with
Pakistan and Iran. There is also a sense that in China’s view nonproliferation
is more of a problem for the United States as a country with global interests
than for itself as a regional power and that it can use nonproliferation
practice and behavior to leverage US policy on issues such as Taiwan or
missile defense. The U.S. views such temptations as misguided and as overlooking
not only the implications of interdependence for security and stability
generally, but also the consequences for China of proliferation in the
Middle East on whose oil exports it depends, or the costs to its security
of militant separatists on its western borders acquiring access to nuclear
weapons. At the very least, inconsistency in nonproliferation policy can
raise questions about how reliable a nonproliferation partner China really
is.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Despite the skepticism of some, the contributions of negotiated, legally
binding and effectively verified arms control agreements to security and
stability are widely understood. These need not be only means of
arms control as both the unilateral reciprocal arrangements of the early
1990s and the cooperative threat program attest. But where possible
legally binding and verified agreements ought to be preferred for the added
value they provide. It is a given that the purpose of arms control
is to further the achievement of national security, that it is not an end
in itself or a moral good to be pursued for its own sake, and that it should
not be seen isolation from other tools of foreign and security policy.
Deterrence and defense forestall or defeat threats to national security;
arms control works to remove the threats in the first instance. Maintaining
and strengthening effective arms control that meets this criterion is and
will remain a challenge as we move forward.
The contribution of multinational regimes to security and stability
is also widely understood. If it were otherwise it would be difficult to
account for the fact that 187 of a possible 191 states have adhered to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which legally and politically commits
the 182 of them that are non-nuclear weapon states to remain so while at
the same time establishing a legal obligation for the five nuclear weapon
state parties to end the nuclear arms race and negotiate in good faith
on nuclear disarmament. Or for the fact that 174 states have signed
the Chemical Weapons Convention outlawing use, possession or development
of chemical weapons and destruction of all existing stockpiles or produced
weapons; and that more than 160 states have signed the Biological Weapons
Convention. Each of these instruments puts constraints on national
behavior and more importantly contributes to establishing a normative base
for collective response to violations.
This being said, it remains that the considerations discussed above
under the heading of CHANGING CONDITIONS factor into state thinking regarding
the reliability of regimes, the value of formal arms control arrangements,
and the merits of focusing more on missile defense and if need be on the
dismantling of agreements that would prohibit moving in that direction.
This puts pressure both on multinational regimes and on traditional arms
control strategies to demonstrate their credibility as means by which to
sustain and strengthen national security. Multinational regimes in
particular face a number of challenges five of which are briefly mentioned
here: political commitment; prioritization; leadership;
universality; and dealing with non-compliance. Whether these challenges
are seen as reasons to eschew regimes in favor of alternative security
strategies or as opportunities to strengthen existing instruments will
determine the contours of the future.
POLITICAL COMMITMENT:
At a time when proliferation issues are becoming more complex and more
challenging, an even higher level of political commitment to multinational
regime institutions, rules and processes is needed. Inconsistency of support
by major states and indication of absence of determination and differences
among them regarding the salience of nonproliferation rules and norms can
and will be exploited by those seeking to avoid or to circumvent their
regime undertakings with costs to international stability and security.
The strength of the regime depends to a significant degree on the perception
of states about the determination and resolve of the international community
and especially the states upon whose shoulders compliance measures would
fall (in particular the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council)
that the norms and rules of the regime be fulfilled. Proliferation
is an ubiquitous problem and in the long run cannot be managed by individual
state action. It is a collective problem requiring collective response.
PRIORITIZATION:
All states face the common problem of competing political, security,
econ-omic and other interests in national policy-making. As much as nonproliferation
may be extolled as critical to national security and international stability,
there are inevitably situations where other items on the national agenda
threaten to trump nonproliferation. If nonproliferation regimes are to
deliver the kind of security outcomes for which they were established,
governments need to ensure that policy decisions supporting nonproliferation
and the regimes take precedence in the absence of an overwhelming compelling
reason to act otherwise.
LEADERSHIP:
Regimes are fragile institutions requiring constant vigilance and support
to effectively provide the outcomes expected of them. Leadership
of course depends on the existence of political commitment and a willingness
to prioritize the nonproliferation agenda. The United States
has long played the predominant leadership role in the nuclear nonproliferation
regime but with the complexities of the contemporary political, and technological
mentioned earlier, there is an increasing need for collective leadership.
Russia and China in particular need to join with the United States in asserting
that leadership. As the key members of the P5 in the Security Council they
have a stewardship responsibility, and a responsibility for exercising
a mutually reinforcing leadership for nonproliferation.
UNIVERSALITY:
Universality of commitment has many virtues, among them that it consolidates
the underlying norm, increases the probability of compliance, and provides
increased legitimation of collective action against violations. The 1995
decision on Principles and Objectives identified universalization as an
urgent priority in pursuit of which all parties were called upon to make
a major effort. Universality is not a guarantee of compliance or
against proliferation but it raises the barrier and the costs to would
be proliferators and provides solid ground for international response.
In its absence the constraints on international confidence are correspondingly
increased.
DEALING WITH NON-COMPLIANCE:
There are two aspects to compliance relevant to the future efficacy
of multinational regimes. One is how states fulfill their commitments.
Avoidance of undertakings without directly challenging regime norms and
rules (e.g. failure to enact requisite administrative or legislative provisions
to establish legal obligations within the state consistent with international
obligations) is one thing; conducting clandestine activities in defiance
of solemn undertakings is another. Non-compliance in the former sense weakens
the foundations of the regime to the extent that it demonstrates that the
rules and norms are not taken with the seriousness they require, and this
gives cause to question the staying power of the regime if it comes under
pressure. Non-compliance in the latter sense is a direct challenge
of the regime and calls for a response that halts non-compliance and takes
steps to reinstate compliance. This is the more difficult challenge, one
that has been addressed in the case of Iraq and North Korea. Neither case
has been brought to conclusion but the international community has taken
steps to deal with non-compliance Trying to address non-compliance
and failing is one thing; not having the consensus and will to meet it
in the first place is another. In the former case states may reach the
conclusion that security requires additional or other measures than regimes;
in the latter, that outcome would be assured