US BMD PPROGRAM UNDER BUSH ADMINISTRATION:
ITS INFLUENCE ON ARMS RACE AND PROLIFERATION IN EAST
ASIA
by ZHU Mingquan(1)
ABSTRACT
East Asia is a region consisting of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear
weapon states with important nuclear potentials. Yet, a nuclear stability
has existed for a long time with both nuclear arms race among nuclear-weapon
states and nuclear proliferation in non-nuclear-weapon states restrained.
The US BMD program particularly under the Bush administration, even still
confronting various – above all, technological – difficulties, will violate
such nuclear stability, giving incentives to a new round of nuclear arms
race and proliferation. Believing their security are undermined by US BMD
program for real or mis-perceived reasons, and encouraged by US behavior
of annulling the ABM treaty, the relevant countries in East Asia will try
to readdress the unfavorable situation by expanding and improving its nuclear
capabilities or acquiring nuclear-missile weapons. Therefore, it is the
best if the Bush administration can abandon the BMD program, or at least
slow down the program. For all the above reasons, this will be a real blessing
to the global as well as East Asia stability and peace.
Geographically, East Asia consists of (east) Russia, Mongolia, China,
North Korea, South Korea and Japan. However, since it has forward-deployed
its troops into this region and formed military alliances with Japan and
South Korea, the United States can be regarded as a part of East Asia politically.
East Asia is the mot populous and highly armed region in the world,
even in terms of nuclear weapons. Among its seven political members, three
are declared nuclear states (the US, Russia and China) and three are states
with various potentials of developing nuclear weapons. For example, according
to some Japanese mass media, Japan can make its own atom bombs within 183
days. (2) The only exception is Mongolia. Nevertheless, for a long
time, nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation has been held in check
in East Asia. Such nuclear stability, however, can be gradually overturned
by the acceleration of US TMD and NMD programs under the Bush administration.
NUCLEAR STABILITY IN EAST ASIA
Even though nearly all of the states in East Asia are either declared
or potential nuclear-weapon states, a kind of nuclear stability has existed
in the region since the early 1970s, with both nuclear arms race and nuclear
proliferation restrained.
Nuclear arms race can only occur among nuclear weapon states. Fortunately,
this risk was controlled in East Asia mainly for two reasons.
1. A special game rule of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) was established
when the ABM treaty of 1972 was signed by the United States and Russia.
Since then, the two nuclear superpowers have continued negotiations on
limitation and reduction of their nuclear weapons, including warheads and
vehicles. Consequently their nuclear arms race was curbed by some mutual
agreements.
2. China declared a No-First-Use policy in the early 1960s and has factually
followed a doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence. It has neither capability
nor intention to participate in any nuclear arms race. As Mao Zedong stated
in 1961: “Nuclear weapons are something for frightening others and will
not be used … such a weapon will not be used, and the more they are produced,
the more nuclear wars can not be initiated.” (3)
While nuclear proliferation depends on both non-nuclear-weapon states
and nuclear-weapon states, some positive factors can also be found to prevent
its occurrence in East Asia.
1. The three nuclear-weapon states have not promoted nuclear proliferation
in this region. Furthermore, they have discouraged it. For example, US’s
pressure on Seoul led the latter to abandon its efforts of developing nuclear
weapons and to sign the NPT in 1975 although the country’s commitment to
the treaty was still a question until the end of 1970s. (4) Likewise,
the other two nuclear-weapon states in the region have adopted responsible
attitudes towards the issue.
2. The three non-nuclear-weapon states in the region have not intended
to pursue or have stopped pursuing active nuclear weapons programs. As
allies of the United States, Japan and South Korea have been placed beneath
the nuclear umbrella of the United States and its pressure of nonproliferation.
This means that they don’t need to develop their own nuclear weapons on
the one hand and will be opposed by the United States if they plan to do
so. As for North Korea, under the terms of the US-North Korean “Agreed
Framework” concluded in October 1994, it has pledged to freeze operations
at most of its facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which
is believed to be involved in its secret nuclear weapons program. (5)
In sum, a kind of nuclear stability has existed in East Asia even during
the latter stage of the Cold War. It is advanced and supported by the United
States. However, such stability has been challenged by US’s plans of developing
and deploying TMD and NMD, especially under the Bush administration.
US BMD UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
On January 20, 1999, William S. Cohen, US Secretary of Defense, declared
that DoD planned to allocate additional funds to NMD and TMD programs to
meet the growing ballistic missile threats from “rogue” states against
US territory, US forces deployed overseas and its allies. Also, Secretary
Cohen announced that the United States will negotiate with Russia over
an amendment to the ABM Treaty if ncecessary: “While our NMD development
program is being conducted consistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty,
our deployment may require modification to the treaty and the Administration
is working to determine the nature and scope of these modifications.” (6)
Under the Bush administration, the United States has been more vigorous
in promoting the BMD program than his predecessor. Even before ascending
the throne of US President, Mr. Bush repeatedly advocated building a more
expansive defensive system than the one President Clinton proposed first
and deferred last September. On Jan. 8, 2001, Mr. Bush told some senior
lawmakers in Austin, Texas, that he strongly supported moving ahead with
a national missile defense, despite acknowledged opposition at home and
abroad to such system: “It’s a sensitive subject for leaders of different
countries around the world. On the other hand, I think it’s our obligation
to do everything we can to protect America and our allies from the real
threats of the 21st century.” (7)
For the purpose, he formed a national security team consisting of BMD
supporters. In particular, as Steven Lee Myers pointed out, in nominating
Rumsfeld as his Secretary of Defense, President Bush has signaled that
“the politically and diplomatically divisive goal of building a shield
against nuclear missiles will be at the core of the new administration’s
national security agenda.” (8) For over two years, his name, more
than any others, has driven the debate over whether to build an NMD. In
July 1998, a congressional commission chaired by Rumsfeld issued an unclassified
report that led the Clinton administration to propose its own limited version
of an NMD. “The Rumsfeld report was the main reason that the debate was
gradually turned around,” said Senator Jon. Kyl, Republican of Arizona
and an advocator of BMD. (9) In fact, while picking Mr. Rumsfeld,
Mr. Bush stressed his prominence on the issue of BMD: “We’ll have a person
who is thoughtful and considerate and wise on the subject of missile defense.”
(10) In addition, other major members of President Bush’s national
security team, including Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell,
also share the dream of building the sort of shield against nuclear ballistic
missiles that President Reagan envisioned in the 1980s. With these people
on the national security team, it is reasonable to anticipate that the
Bush administration will be more rightward on the BMD issue.
When their nominations as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense
were announced respectively on December 16 and 28, 2000, Powell referred
to a defensive shield as “an essential part” of US security, and Rumsfeld
stated that he would not rule out defenses based on the ground, as President
Clinton proposed, or at sea and in space. The latter also said, “The proliferation
of WMD and the delivery systems for them is extensive across the world.”
(11) These remarks indicate that his assessment of the threat of
a ballistic missile attack on the US has not changed.
Since the presidential inauguration on January 20, 2001, the Bush administration
has confirmed its determination to move quickly ahead with its BMD program
with both words and actions. The following are merely two examples:
In late January (beginning from Jan. 22), the possibility of war in
space turned from pure scientific fiction to realistic planning by the
Space War Center at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. The simulation
was based on a scenario with growing tension between the United States
and China in 2017, while country “Red” massed its forces for possible attack
on its small neighbor, “Brown”, which then asked “Blue” for help. Both
Red and Blue possessed microsatellites capable of maneuvering against other
satellites, blocking their view, jamming their transmission or even frying
their electronics with radiation. They also had ground-based lasers that
could temporarily dazzle or permanently blind the optics of satellites,
and the ability to attack each other’s computers – in military parlance,
“official information warfare capabilities”. In addition, the Blue side
had a national missile defense system as well as reusable space planes
that may be employed to launch new satellites into orbit or repair and
refuel those already there. Not surprisingly, the war game proved that
many weapons owned by US air force – missile defense, anti-satellites lasers
and “reusable space planes” – could have a useful role in deterring future
wars by discouraging adversaries from thinking that they can preemptively
knock out the United States. (12)
On Feb. 3, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld spoke at the Munich Conference
on Security Policy, an annual meeting attended by a score of defense ministers
and 200 other specialists: “The United States intends to develop and deploy
a missile defense designed to defend our people and our forces against
a limited missile attack and is prepared to assist friends and allies threatened
by missile attack to deploy such defenses.” (13)
Understandably, while underlining the new approach in Washington, Senator
Joseph Lieberman, the Democratic nominee for vice President last year,
commented that US missile defense under the Bush administration involved
“not a question of whether, only when and how.” (14)
NEGATIVE INFLUENCE OF US BMD PROGRAM ON
NUCLEAR STABILITY IN EAST ASIA
If we turn to the question of when and how to advance the BMD program,
a few factors can be found that will impel the Bush administration to go
ahead promptly. These include the harsh weather condition in Alaska (15)
as well as the pressure from proponents of NMD (16). Generally speaking,
nevertheless, the Bush administration is restrained and contained by financial,
political and technological difficulties in its efforts to move forward
rapidly with the BMD program.
In the technological field, above all, the Bush administration has to
solve several key issues before it can push the BMD program ahead vigorously.
One is what kind of NMD system that the US should focus on first: A Clinton
model system with 100 limited interceptors in Alaska and North Dakota to
shoot down warheads in space; Or a system with a much wider range of technologies,
including, most notably, sensors in space – an element banned by ABM Treaty
– and boost-phase interceptors that would shoot down enemy missiles before
they reach space as they are easy to locate and present large targets?
(17)
Another major issue facing the Bush administration is how to find a
way to defend the allies. The Clinton’s anti-missile system would protect
the United States but not its allies. From Rumsfeld’s terse description
in Munich, the Bush administration appears to intend creating something
equivalent to a global defense system – probably a mobile one – that could
defend the United States, its overseas armed forces and allied nations
in Europe and Asia. For that goal, a ship-based interceptor system as well
as an airplane- or space-based laser system may be needed. But, as
Stephen W. Young said recently, “It will be extremely difficult, however,
to deploy any of these systems, even if Mr. Bush wins a second term. The
sea-based option would require major changes to an existing, shorter-range
system, itself years from deployment. While the space-based option is more
than a decade away from its first test flight, and is sure to cause a storm
of international criticism.” (18)
Even so, the US BMD program under the Bush administration has produced
and will produce some major negative influences on the nuclear stability
in East Asia.
First, it will cause strategic instability especially between Russia
and the United States, drawing them into a new round of arms competition.
As a fact, NMD that the United States currently intends to deploy will
violate the strategic nuclear balance between the two nuclear superpowers
because it runs against the ABM treaty they signed in 1972. This treaty
is the basis upon which all their agreements for limitation and reduction
of nuclear weapons were founded. With offensive capabilities in their hands,
both sides are afraid of nuclear retaliations, and, thus, the “balance
of terror” is shaped. US BMD program, especially NMD program, would weaken
this strategic relationship of “Mutual Assured Destruction”. Russia will
try to improve its security by developing and deploying its own BMD systems
or enhancing its own arsenals of strategic offensive weapons to remedy
the emerging imbalance. In other words, the direct result brought about
by Bush’s program of BMD is a new cycle of nuclear arms race between the
US and Russia.
Second, the BMD program of the United States, especially its cooperative
research and development with Japan and its intention to extend the TMD
system or transfer the relevant technology to a Chinese island – Taiwan
– will encourage ultra-nationalism in Japan and separatism in Taiwan, encroaching
upon China’s sovereignty and hurting the feelings of Chinese. General PENG
Guangqian, a senior research fellow in Chinese Military Academy warned
that “it is not different from establishment of a paramilitary alliance
and violates fundamentally the political basis of the Sino-US military
relations” if the United States brings the Taiwan area into its TMD system.
(19) SHA Zukang, Chief of Arms Control Department in China’s Foreign
Ministry, declared on Feb. 20, 2001 that China must possess necessary and
sufficient self-defense means. It will not sit back and watch these means
weakened or deprived in any form. (20)
Third, the BMD program of the Bush administration will provide a stimulus
to nuclear proliferation in East Asia. In fact, a cooperative TMD system
between the US and Japan (or any other non-nuclear-weapon member in the
region) implies proliferation of missile and, at least, missile technologies.
Also, US BMD program is a kind of moral encouragement to others’ proliferation.
They will justify to themselves: “While the US can tear up the ABM treaty,
why can’t we follow its example?” Another likely scenario resulted from
such possible stimulus on proliferation is that North Korea, worried of
revival of Japanese militarism under protection of US TMD, will drawback
from the “Agreed Framework” and seek security by arming its own missiles
with nuclear warheads. In turn, this will bring about a vicious circle
of nuclear proliferation in the region.
CONCLUSIONS
East Asia is a region consisting of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear
weapon states with important nuclear potentials. Yet, a nuclear stability
has existed for a long time with both nuclear arms race among nuclear-weapon
states and nuclear proliferation in non-nuclear-weapon states restrained.
The US BMD program particularly under the Bush administration, even still
confronting various – above all, technological – difficulties, will violate
such nuclear stability, giving incentives to a new round of nuclear arms
race and proliferation. Believing their security are undermined by US BMD
program for real or mis-perceived reasons, and encouraged by US behavior
of annulling the ABM treaty, the relevant countries in East Asia will try
to readdress the unfavorable situation by expanding and improving its nuclear
capabilities or acquiring nuclear-missile weapons.
Therefore, it is the best if the Bush administration can abandon the
BMD program, or at least slow down the program. For all the above reasons,
this will be a real blessing to the global as well as East Asia stability
and peace.
------------------------------------------
(1) The author is a professor in the Department of International
Politics and Senior Fellow in the Center for American Politics, Fudan University.
(2) Exposed by Japanese Mass Media, Japan Can Make Its Atomic
Bombs with 183 days, see
http://www.long-net.com/index.htm.
(3) Edited by the Foreign Ministry of PRC & Achieves Institute
of Central committee of CCP, Selection of Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong,
Beijing, Beijing: Press of Achieves Institute of Central committee of CCP,
1994, pp476-477.
(4) Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, Boulder: Westview
Press, 1990, p.122
(5) Leonard S. Spector et et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation,
A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1995, p. 103.
(6) Cohen’s National Missile Defense Statement: What did it mean?
by John Issacs, Council for A livable World, Jan. 21, 1999,
http://www.clw.oprg.
(7) International Herald Tribune, Jan. 10, 2001, p. 1.
(8) International Herald Tribune, Dec. 30-31, 2000, Jan. 1, 2001,
p. 1.
(9) International Herald Tribune, Dec. 30-31, 2000, Jan. 1, 2001,
p. 1.
(10) International Herald Tribune, Dec. 30-31, 2000, Jan. 1,
2001, p. 4.
(11) International Herald Tribune, Dec. 30-31, 2000, Jan. 1,
2001, p. 4.
(12) International Herald Tribune, Jan. 30, 2001, pp. 1, 4.
(13) International Herald Tribune, Feb. 5, 2001, p. 1.
(14) International Herald Tribune, Feb. 5, 2001, p. 1.
(15) Under a timetable drafted by the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization in Pentagon, it has to be decided by coming March whether
to authorize initial construction of a sophisticated new radar station
at Shemya Island during the relative short summer season this year. The
radar station is a part of the limited ground-based system that President
Clinton declined to approve last September. If the construction can not
start soon, it will mean at least a year’s delay. This outcome would in
turn postpone completion of the whole system.
(16) They argue that President Bush “will be making a major mistake
if he lets his administration subject missile defense to a lengthy policy
review” because “it will give opponents time to organize and inevitably
entangle the issue in the 2002 congressional elections”. Instead waiting,
they conclude, the Bush administration should seize the moment. See International
Herald Tribune, Jan. 27, 2001, p. 6.
(17) International Herald Tribune, Jan. 27, 2001, p. 6.
(18) International Herald Tribune, Feb. 6, 2001, p. 6.
(19) Guoji-zhanwang (World Outlook), no. 12, December, 2000,
p. 5.
(20) Xin-min-wan-bao (New People Evening), Feb. 22, 2001, p.
16.