15. Indian Policy Choices
The Indian navy turned back nearly all boats that attempted to carry refugees from Sri Lanka to India. The navy is now considering how, if asked, it would assist in a sealift evacuation of Sri Lankan government soldiers from Jaffna.
"Indian ships take position, ebb in refugee inflow"
"Navy put on 72-hour alert"
The U.S. and France both stressed the importance of India assuming a "responsible" role in the resolution of the Sri Lankan war.
"India has a key role in Sri Lanka, says Inderfurth"
"India, France discuss strife in Sri Lanka"
Even as Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes reiterated that India would not become militarily involved in Sri Lanka, many reports suggested that an Indian diplomatic role is beginning to emerge. Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar said that events might force India to mediate. The BJP said that India could engage the LTTE even though the Indian government has banned that organization. Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee said that India was ready for a role in Sri Lanka, but that the LTTE as well as the Sri Lankan government must seek Indian involvement. The Indian Express reported that Sri Lankan General Rohan Daluwatte took a four-day unpublicized visit to Bangalore, where he met "senior Indian military officials" and "may have" asked New Delhi for logistical support.
"Fernandes reiterates stand"
"'Ban on LTTE will not affect offer of mediation'"
"'Role will thrust itself on India'"
"India ready for 'role' in Sri Lanka: PM"
"Sri Lankan general on 'secret trip' to India"
Analysis: Nirupama Subramanian offers three reasons for Sri Lanka's support of Indian involvement now, compared with widespread opposition to the Indian peacekeeping force that entered Sri Lanka in 1987 at the request of the Sri Lankan government. First, Subramanian suggests that the Sinhalese community believes that India is opposed to the LTTE and that actions by the Indian government would lead to a reduction in the LTTE's influence in Sri Lanka (Subramanian argues that many Sinhala leaders still believe that western countries continue to support the LTTE both diplomatically and militarily [this is not a change, according to Subramanian. Subramanian argues that western countries were relatively pro-LTTE in 1987 as well]). Second, Subramanian argues that India has a greater interest in stopping separatists movements now, compared to 1987, when its interest was less intense in this regard. The difference is that India is host to many separatist movements that might view LTTE success as an example and might, in response to an LTTE victory, attempt to secede from India and enforce their secession through force of arms. Third, in Subramanian's view, Tamil communities view India as a more honest broker than the Sri Lankan government on its own, Norway, or the United States. V. R. Raghavan argues that an Indian-supported military solution is not feasible. Even without Indian military intervention, argues Raghavan, no reasonable scenario would lead to the destruction of either the Sri Lankan army or the LTTE. All scenarios point to some kind of ceasefire, which could be guided through Indian political coordination.
"A tiger by its tail" Nirupama Subramanian
"Intervention in Sri Lanka" V. R. Raghavan