4. South Asian Nuclear Issues
Jasjit Singh, Director of the New Delhi-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, discusses India's nuclear command and control options, pointing out that options flow from India's choices on nuclear doctrine, strategy and force structure. Singh states that India's no-first-use policy means India must have a secure second-strike capability, but also does not need to maintain its nuclear forces on a hair-trigger alert. Singh argues that for constitutional reasons, command and control must be exercised by the Prime Minister. Further, a specific planning body should be the sole party to authorize targeting policy and force deployments, and Singh recommends the Defense Committee of the Cabinet be resurrected to serve this role. Below the ministerial level, Singh states, the there is a need to resolve operational command and control, such as through an Indian Air Force-led Strategic Air Command, though the scientific community will maintain the warheads and the Army should provide physical security for the warheads.
"Nuclear Command and Control"
P.K. Gosh, a Research Fellow with the New Delhi-based Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, argues that while missile defense deployments may reverse current trends, most nuclear states are now moving towards a minimalist deterrent force with implications for their force structures. Gosh argues states are increasingly dependent upon a second-strike capability, such as that possible with nuclear submarines, and are becoming less dependent upon bomber forces and land-based missiles. Gosh reviews the state of the nuclear triad (land, sea, and air-deployable nuclear forces) in Britain, France, the PRC, Russia, the US, Israel, India and Pakistan. Gosh states that India's and Pakistan's delivery capabilities are tactical or substrategic in nature. Gosh argues that the most distinguishable trend is towards a submarine-deployed, minimalist deterrent force.
"Emerging Trends in the Nuclear Triad"