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1. US on DPRK Multilateral Security Pact
Agence France-Presse ("US SEEKS PARTNERS FOR MULTILATERAL SECURITY PACT WITH NORTH KOREA," Washington, 10/11/03) reported that the US wants other nations to join it in a multilateral security deal with North Korea that it hopes will satisfy the Stalinist state's demands for a formal non-aggression pact, Secretary of State Colin Powell said. "It would be something that would be public, something that would be written, something that I hope would be multilateral," he said in an interview with news agency reporters. Powell said his staff was drafting sample agreements based on what he called historical "models" of similar deals that he hoped would be acceptable to Pyongyang and ease the impasse over its nuclear weapons programs. He said the US would soon begin to share the language of the draft agreements with friends and allies with the expectation that they would agree to join Washington in pledging not to attack the DPRK. The idea is not entirely new as at least Australi! a and Russia suggested a similar concept earlier this year but until now, the US has balked at it. Now, though, Washington hopes the prospect of such an agreement will entice the DPRK to return to the Beijing-hosted "six-party talks" between China, Japan, the US, Russia and South Korea, Powell said. Conclusion of an agreement would be part of a package in which the DPRK would have agree to verifiably abandon its nuclear weapons development and destroy those it already has, he said. "We have been examining what one could present to them that would give them more of an assurance than the kind of assurances they received in the previous administration which were essentially letters and statements," Powell said. "There are many models from our history of how one can do this and we have been examining different models and so we have some ideas as to how we can proceed in this regard," he said. "In the weeks immediately ahead we'll start to explore these ideas with our friends," P! owell said without identifying the countries to which he was referring.
2. ROK-US DPRK Summit
Agence France-Presse ("SKOREA, US TO HOLD SUMMIT ON NKOREA ON SIDELINES OF APEC," 10/12/03) reported that ROK President Roh Moo-Hyun and his US counterpart George W. Bush will discuss the DPRK nuclear crisis on the sidelines of the APEC forum in Thailand next week. Roh will leave for Bangkok on October 19 to take part in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit on October 20-21, the presidential office said. He is due to meet Bush on October 20 and also hopes to have bilateral talks with other leaders, including from the PRC, Russia, Japan and Mexico, it said. "Through the bilateral meetings, President Roh is scheduled to exchange wide-range opinions on how to resolve North Korea's nuclear problem," it said in a statement. On his return, Roh is to make a state visit to Singapore until October 23 for talks with President S.R. Nathan and a summit with Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, it said.
3. PRC-Russia DPRK Talks
Agence France-Presse ("CHINA'S TOP NORTH KOREA HAND SET TO LEAVE FOR RUSSIA TALKS ON NKOREA CRISIS," Beijing, 10/12/03) reported that the PRC's top DPRK hand, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, will go to Russia for talks on the region's ongoing nuclear crisis, state media reported. Wang, the chief Chinese delegate to six-party talks on the issue in Beijing in August, will meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, who also took part in the Beijing negotiations, Xinhua news agency said. Wang is expected to stay in Russia until Tuesday, according to a previous report on Xinhua. In a telephone conversation on the eve of Wang's trip, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and his PRC counterpart Li Zhaoxing agreed six-way talks were an important step toward the peaceful resolution of the issue through dialogue, Xinhua said. The PRC's ambassador to the United Nations said Friday that December could be a good time for a new round of talks on the DPRK's nuclea! r weapons drive.
4. ROK Presidential Referendum
Agence France-Presse ("SKOREA PRESIDENT PUTS JOB ON LINE WITH REFERENDUM CALL," 10/13/03) reported that ROK President Roh Moo-Hyun said he would put his job on the line in a December 15 referendum and step down if the vote went against him. The 57-year-old former human rights lawyer, facing crumbling popular support, a hostile parliament and a critical media, said he needed a new mandate less than a year after his election to office for a five-year term. Roh's comments in a policy speech to the National Assembly came three days after he triggered a political crisis when he indicated that he had lost his legitimacy to rule. A day later, instability deepened when his entire cabinet offered to resign, claiming responsibility for Roh's troubles. The president rejected the offer. The left-of-center leader, in office for just over seven months, has seen his approval ratings crash from nearly 80 percent to less than 30 percent since he won election in December last year. A trac! k record of inconsistency has alienated voters who see Roh as ineffectual in dealing with the ROK's economic slowdown and the DPRK nuclear crisis. Roh's surprise call for a national referendum was sparked by the latest graft case affecting one of his closest allies. Roh, in his National Assembly speech, said that when he heard the allegations: "I felt darkness in front of my eyes ... I felt so miserable. We have no future without correcting the rampant corruption in political circles and moral indifference to this." Media polls conducted since Friday indicate that the president will survive a referendum.
5. Japan DPRK Export Suspects Arrest
Reuters ("JAPAN POLICE ARREST SEVERAL OVER N. KOREA EXPORT," Tokyo, 10/13/03) reported that police in southern Japan arrested several used car dealers on Monday over the export to the DPRK of a large trailer that could be used for launching missiles, Kyodo news agency said. A police spokesman in Fukuoka, 900 km (560 miles) southwest of Tokyo, said that he could not confirm the arrests, but that officers had searched premises and homes linked with Jipang, a used car dealership in the nearby town of Onojo, on suspicion of customs fraud. Company officials are suspected of falsifying customs documents to show the price of the trailer as less than 300,000 yen ($2,770), so that it would be exempt from strict export controls, Kyodo said. The real price of the trailer was more than 3.4 million yen, the agency said. The company also made several unsuccessful attempts to export large trailers to the DPRK via the PRC, Kyodo said.
6. PRC on UN in Iraq
Agence France-Presse ("CHINESE FM TELLS POWELL UNITED NATIONS MUST PLAY BIGGER ROLE IN IRAQ," 10/12/03) reported that PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told US Secretary of State Colin Powell a new United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq should give the UN a bigger role. Li, who talked to Powell by telephone early in the day, said a UN resolution must help Iraq restore sovereignty as soon as possible, enabling the relevant parties to see the hope of "Iraqi people governing Iraq," Xinhua news agency reported. "China expects relevant parties to narrow their differences and reach consensus soon," Li said, according to the news agency. The trans-Pacific conversation took place one day after Li was on the phone with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. In the course of that conversation, Li and Ivanov agreed that the United Nations should be given a major role to play. Russia and the PRC "both feel that the draft (resolution) must include a precise plan for restori! ng the sovereignty of Iraq and give the United Nations a central role in resolving the situation" there, Russia said in a statement after the telephone conversation. Russia, along with Germany and France, are pressing the US to develop a clear timeline in a new UN resolution indicating when the Iraqi people will regain complete sovereignty and who would oversee the country's financial reconstruction.
7. Japan on Iraq Reconstruction Aid
Agence France-Presse ("JAPAN PM KOIZUMI TO PLEDGE IRAQ AID ON BUSH VISIT BUT SPECIFICS IN DOUBT," 10/11/03) reported that Japan's prime minister will pledge financial and personnel aid to the US-led reconstruction effort in Iraq during US President George W. Bush's visit to Japan next week, a Japanese foreign ministry spokesman said. But the lack of a stable Iraqi government and an uncertain security situation on the ground are clouding efforts to finalize an aid figure or the promise of troops, the spokesman said. "I expect that Prime Minister Koizumi would express his determination of a strong commitment ... that Japan would assist as much as possible financially as well as whatever means, which may include personnel," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima stated. Japan is racing to firm up its aid stance ahead of a planned visit to Tokyo by Bush on October 17, and before a major donors conference on Iraq reconstruction in Madrid October 23-24. The Asahi Shimb! un newspaper reported Saturday that Japan's foreign and finance ministries were working on providing 1.5 to 2.0 billion dollars in grant aid in 2004, with total aid reaching five billion dollars, mostly in loans, from 2005 to 2007. The final figure is likely to be announced before Bush's visit to avoid the appearance of caving in to US pressure, the paper said. But an unstable Iraqi government situation has put the question of loan aid in limbo, the spokesman said. "You have to have a viable borrower and you have to have the official and formal agreement ... and the terms and conditions of the repayment," said Takashima. "But at this moment, there is no such kind of viable governing body in Iraq."
8. PRC Media on Manned Space Mission
Agence France-Presse ("CHINA DRUMS UP NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT AS MANNED SPACE MISSION NEARS," 10/13/03) reported that the PRC began drumming up nationalistic sentiment with days to go before its maiden manned space flight, as leading officials said it was just the first step to greater achievements. The state-controlled media floodgates appear to have been opened by the PRC officially acknowledging late Friday that it would join the US and Russia in sending a man into orbit this week. Leading newspapers -- from the staid People's Daily to more lively tabloids -- have started carrying detailed reports and full-color photographs of preparations for the history-making event. The People's Daily joined the drive to boost the propaganda mileage from the launch in a chest-puffing commentary Monday. "A manned program can push the development of technology ... manned space technology is a symbol of the state's comprehensive national strength and is a great boost to the country's ! national prestige," it said. "It could rejuvenate the nation's spirit and enhance the cohesive force of the nation." It acknowledged there were military implications for the PRC. It cited late paramount leader Deng Xiaopeng as saying that without its space and nuclear program "China cannot have the status as a major power in the world."
9. PRC-EU Trade Relations
Asia Pulse ("CHINA EXPECTS EU TO BECOME ITS LARGEST TRADE, INVESTMENT PARTNER," Beijing, 10/13/03) reported that the PRC government said on October 13 in a diplomatic strategy document that it expects the European Union (EU) to become China's largest trading and investment partner. In "China's EU Policy Paper" the PRC government issued on October 13, the PRC urges the EU to properly address irrational restrictions and technical barriers, and ease restrictions on high-tech exports in line with the WTO rules. The PRC also calls upon the EU to grant it a "full market economy status" at an early date, reduce and abolish anti-dumping and other discriminatory policies and practices against the PRC, and apply the Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism (TPSSM) prudently. Currently the EU is the PRC's third biggest trading partner and vice versa. Statistics show the trade volume between the PRC and the EU hit US$86.76 billion last year. To achieve the objective of el! evating into the largest trading and investment partner, the document lists up a number of measures for PRC-EU economic cooperation over the next five years: Give play to the mechanism of the economic and trade joint committee and step up economic and trade regulatory policy dialogue; give attention to updating the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the PRC and the European Union at an appropriate time; and compensate the PRC side for its economic and trade losses which may arise due to the EU enlargement.
10. Japan DPRK Abductees
Associated Press (Hans Greimel, "N. KOREA ABDUCTEES MARK RETURN TO JAPAN," Tokyo, 10/13/03) reported that she stepped off the plane from the DPRK shy and reclusive, keeping her comments short and simple in rusty Japanese. "Very good" was all Hitomi Soga could muster about being back in Japan for the first time in nearly a quarter-century. A year later, however, Soga pours out her despair as she marks the homecoming's first anniversary this week with a soul-searching series of forlorn writings about the American husband and two daughters she left behind in Pyongyang. "It is the second autumn since I have returned to Japan. I used to love fall, but I do not like fall this year. ... I hate being alone," Soga writes in an essay titled "The Second Autumn." "If only I were a bird, I'd fly there to pick them up," she says in a poem called "Sky." For Soga and four other kidnapped Japanese held hostage in the DPRK and sent home last year, their Oct. 15 return date is a bitterswee! t reminder of newfound freedoms and the heartbreak of families still fractured. Hopes for reunions with loved ones living incommunicado in the DPRK are all but shattered by the global standoff over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. And growing frustration over the families' fates has fueled a backlash against the Tokyo government that won their freedom, but now stands accused of going soft. "Basically, there has not been change in the situation," Ryutaro Hirata, a spokesman for the abductee support group, complained Monday. "We want tough action. ... North Korea is not a country that responds to negotiations." Angered at the lack of progress in bringing the families to Japan, hard-liners want Tokyo to level economic sanctions against Pyongyang, an act the DPRK equates with war. And supporters of the abductees now hope to make sanctions a focus of Nov. 9 national elections by asking all parliamentary candidates to fill out questionnaires recording their stance on the issue! .
11. Op-Ed: Pritchard on DPRK Diplomacy
The Financial Times (Charles L. Pritchard, "A GUARANTEE TO BRING KIM INTO LINE," 10/10/03) carried an Op-Ed by Charles L. Pritchard that read in October 2002, James Kelly, US assistant secretary of state, led a delegation to Pyongyang to confront DPRK officials on America's knowledge of their secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. At first, Kim Gye-gwan, vice-minister for foreign affairs, denied the existence of the program. He said it was another false accusation, like the charge the US had made in August 1998 that North Korea had a secret underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ri. In a brief meeting with Kang Sok-ju, first vice-minister for foreign affairs and Mr. Kim's boss, a different line emerged. Mr. Kang defiantly acknowledged the HEU program. He indicated that if the US recognized North Korea's system of government, concluded a peace agreement pledging non-aggression and did not interfere in his country's economic development, Pyongyang would seriously! discuss US concerns about the HEU program. The request for security assurances was not new. North Korea sought them during the negotiations that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework. But what North Korea means by security assurances has undoubtedly evolved in the past 10 years, as its economy has deteriorated and America's military pre-eminence has become clearer. I am struck by what Kim Jong-il, North Korea's leader, said to Madeleine Albright, former US secretary of state, in October 2000. He told her that in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able to conclude that China faced no external security threat and could accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With the appropriate security assurances, Mr. Kim said, he would be able to convince his military that the US was no longer a threat and then be in a similar position to refocus his country's resources. In a cash-strapped country that devotes, by some estimates, 34 per cent of its gross domest! ic product to its military, there is little left for economic development. Yet Mr. Kim cannot change course overnight. He needs to be able to convince his power base_the military_that the US is no longer a threat that warrants a nuclear program or such a large expenditure on conventional forces. Make no mistake, Mr. Kim is not motivated by a desire to improve his people's standard of living. He simply wants his regime to survive. But whatever the motivation, the US should be encouraging any change that moves North Korea away from military belligerence and towards enhancing citizens' economic well-being. The security assurance that Pyongyang has requested and the security assurance that is possible and appropriate are two different things. Since last October the conditions Mr. Kang laid down have evolved into a request for a legally binding non-aggression treaty approved by the US Senate. That is neither possible nor appropriate. While I advocate giving Pyongyang a multilater! al security guarantee, America should work out the details bilaterally with North Korea. Do we really want China and Russia_with Japan and South Korea, the other parties to the six-nation talks with North Korea_crafting the language of a security guarantee that binds the US? The purpose of any guarantee must be to remove obstacles in the search for a solution to the current nuclear crisis and for a more permanent resolution of the unhealthy situation on the Korean peninsula. If it also provides Mr. Kim with the rationale he needs to persuade his military to support economic reform, so much the better. Ideally, the guarantee would be conditional, at least at first. North Korea would have to commit verifiably to give up its entire nuclear program and immediately freeze its plutonium program_currently the US's greatest concern. The guarantee would remain conditional and in force as long as North Korea maintained the freeze and was actively dismantling its nuclear program. It wo! uld become permanent on satisfactory compliance with the terms established by the six parties for a complete and verifiable end to the North's nuclear program. As a multilateral instrument, the guarantee would commit China and Russia to a resolution of the nuclear problem. If Pyongyang failed to terminate its nuclear program satisfactorily, all the nations that really matter to its ultimate survival would impose punitive measures. This approach would put North Korea on notice that the US is serious about dealing with its concerns and expects Pyongyang to come to the next round of six-party talks prepared to commit to ending its nuclear program. Such a commitment, together with a freeze on North Korea's current nuclear activities, must be the minimum acceptable outcome for those talks. Anything less would be a failure. Giving North Korea a multilateral security guarantee will move us in the right direction. Charles L. Pritchard is a Visiting Fellow at Foreign Policy Studies.
1. U.S Mentioned Security-Guarantee Plan to DPRK
Chosun Ilbo (Joo Yong-jung, "U.S. TALKS SECURITY-GUARANTEE PLAN", 10/12/03) reported that U.S. is drafting a sample agreement designed to be acceptable to DPRK in regard to its security concerns, and will soon discuss the draft with other allies, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Friday at a press conference. Powell said that the sample agreement would be multilateral and written and made public. The announcement may be interpreted as a U.S. response to DPRK's request for security guarantees with something formal yet something that still falls short of a peace treaty. U.S. is seeking different methods that would promise a stronger guarantee than the letters and signatures that past U.S. administrations have given DPRK, Powell said. Powell was reluctant to say which specific model of past negotiations U.S. would base this sample agreement on, although he did say that the other models were studied in the draft-making process. He said that several models, some from U.! S. and others from other countries, were under consideration. He said that cases had been found in which "interesting agreements" solved problems with formal agreements but no treaty. Powell will soon be in touch with U.S. allies and other countries to set up the second round of six-way meetings to eliminate DPRK's nuclear threat, and is contacting DPRK through other channels.
2. Ethnic Korean with PRC Citizenship Vow To Give up their
Citizenship
Joongang Ilbo (Kim Pil-kyu, "CHINESE VOW TO TURN IN THEIR PASSPORTS", 10/12/03) reported that A group of ethnic Koreans with PRC citizenship staying here illegally said yesterday they would give up their PRC nationality to avoid deportation. ROK government had warned that it would crack down on illegal immigrants starting next month, particularly those who have been here illegally for several years or those who entered the country illegally rather than by overstaying their visas. But the Ministry of Labor has said it would give work permits to some undocumented workers who can prove their employment. Twenty Korean-Chinese said yesterday that they would renounce their PRC citizenship at the PRC Embassy on Tuesday. By becoming stateless, the group seeks to avoid forcible deportation, although international law is not on their side. The Reverend Lee Eun-gyu of the Seoul Korean-Chinese Church, a church for ethnic Koreans from PRC, said yesterday none of the 20 wish to return to ! PRC. "They are giving up their PRC citizenship in protest of an irresponsible government." The church, which has been championing illegal immigrants here, will collect applications from the group for ROK citizenship after they renounce their PRC citizenship. The church will submit the papers to the Ministry of Justice on Nov. 7, it said. "ROK society has matured to the level that it could support ethnic Koreans from PRC," the Reverend Lee said. But considering current diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul, observers said, it is unlikely that the PRC Embassy would allow the ethnic Koreans to give up their citizenship. Even if it did, that would not bar the ROK government from deporting them to the nation whose citizenship they voluntarily renounced. In order to qualify for ROK citizenship, immigrants must have been in ROK legally for five years, be self-supporting and speak ROK. There are exceptions for some spouses of ROK citizens.
3. Silent Energy War Between PRC and Japan over Oil in Siberia
Donga Ilbo (Kim Ki-Hyun, "SILENT 'ENERGY WAR' BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN", 10/12/03) reported that Kawaguchi Yoriko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, visited Russia in June quickly. She visited Vladivostok in the far eastern area of the country rather than Moscow, and met Economic Deputy Minister Viktor Khristenko instead of Igor S. Ivanov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Kawaguchi suggested a surprising offer, saying, "If Russia chooses the far-eastern line as the way through which the oil pipes from Siberia go, for Japan's benefit, Japan would provide $5 billion for the development of the oil fields and the construction of the pipe lines. "Kawaguchi's offer was stimulated by PRC's one, suggested by PRC's leader Hu Jintao in Moscow this May, that it would offer support of $17 billion for the direction of the lines for PRC's benefit, although it was even bigger this time. Initially, the Siberian pipe lines were planned by PRC and expected to start th! e oil flow by 2005. But after Japan's recent proposal, things became messy. Even the direction of the lines is not decided yet. Russia, in a strong position due to the two countries aggressive courtship, suggested an alternative plan compromising the two countries' offers, but this is not an easy solution. This is because keeping the oil field all to oneself is much more attractive than sharing it due to the finite oil reserves. PRC now depends upon about 80 percent of its oil imports from the Middle-East and Africa. Japan also depends upon approximately 80 percent of its oil imports from the Middle- East, therefore Siberia's oil reserve is an "oasis" to both of the countries. The competition for the "energy" between the Northeast Asian countries is so fierce that it can be called a "silent war for the energy." On October 7 in Vladivostok, a seminar for the international cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries in securing the stable energy sources! was held. Officials from businesses, including the world's biggest gas producer Gazprom of Russia, major energy company Royal Dutch Shell, BP (British Petroleum), Korea Gas Corporation (KGC), and academic institutions met together. Kim Myung-nam, the director of KGC's foreign bureau, said, "The conflicts between the Northeast Asian countries are the confusion of the cooperation in energy." Lee Sang-gon, the head of the Institute for the Research of Energy Economics, suggested resolving the quarrel about the leadership in energy development, saying, "Energy cooperation in Northeast Asia is indispensable." International majors are joining the race for the Russian energy market. Exxon-Mobil is trying to acquire 40-50 percent of shares of Yukos, Russia's biggest oil company. Experts said, "Because Yukos already took over Sibneft, Russia's 4th largest oil company, in the first half of this year, if Exxon-Mobil succeeds in the acquisition, it would be able to se! cure the throne of the energy industry." Earlier, BP took over THK, Russia's 3rd biggest oil company, resulting in BP-THK. BP-THK is the major shareholder of the Russia Petroleum (RP), the managing company of the Kovykta gas reserve development plan which ROK is pushing forward with Russia and PRC. Yukos is the managing company of the Siberian oil fields which PRC and Japan are competing to get. If Japan's wish comes true, that is, the pipe lines from Siberia to Nakhodka in the far eastern Asia area, ROK would be able to expect to import oil from Siberia. Therefore now it's absolutely wrong that ROK is out of the picture when the international majors compete fiercely around Russia.
III. People's Republic of China
1. Relations Across Taiwan Straits
People's Daily (CHEN DENOUNCED FOR 'TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE' REMARKS," Beijing, 10/09/03, P4) reported that a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office, under the Chinese State Council, denounced on October 8 Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan in response to his recent remarks about "Taiwan independence," including his allegation "one country on each side". Proceeding only from the electoral standing of himself and his party, Chen Shui-bian had constantly made speeches in recent days rejecting the "one-China" principle, and deliberately heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait, which was seriously immoral and extremely dangerous, the spokesman said. "We respect the aspiration of Taiwan compatriots to be masters of their own destiny," the spokesman noted, "but are in firm opposition to the any remarks of Taiwan authorities aimed to challenge the 'one-China' principle." The spokesman went on to say that separatist activities for "Taiwan independence" had become the biggest sc! ourge affecting social stability and economic growth in Taiwan and malignant tumor detrimental to the steady development of cross-strait relations. Safeguarding the unity of China comply with the fundamental interests of the people across the Taiwan Strait, and anyone going in for seeking "Taiwan independence" would never succeed, the spokesman stressed in the report.
2. PRC-Japan Relations
China Daily (Hu Xiao, "ACTIVISTS JOIN FORCES TO DEFEND ISLANDS AS CHINESE LAND," 10/10/03, P1) reported that ten activists from the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan joined forces earlier this week to sail to the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, claiming PRC's sovereignty over the islands. It is the first time activists from the mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan have joined forces together to set foot on the islands, according to group leader Leung Kwok-hung. Asked to comment, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said on October 9 that the Diaoyu Islands and adjacent islets have been an integral part of Chinese territory since ancient times. Also at the briefing, Zhang asked the Japanese Government to "strengthen education of its citizens" and to "abide by the law" in reference to an allegation that hundreds of Japanese tourists, including 288 people related to an Osaka-based construction firm, hired Chinese prostitutes at a Chinese hotel last month! . Turning to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's expressed intent to revisit the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, Zhang said PRC hopes Japan can adopt a correct point of view towards history and develop Sino-Japanese relations with a spirit of "taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future."
China Daily (Sun Shangwu, "WEN URGES KOIZUMI TO TACKLE WEAPONS CASE," Bali, 10/08/03, P1) reported that during his separate meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on October 7, Premier Wen Jiabao urged the Japanese Government to deal "appropriately" with the issue of chemical weapons left by the Japanese army at the end of their invasion of PRC. Both Wen and Koizumi are in the Indonesian resort of Bali to attend a meeting involving their two countries, ROK and the 10 members of the ASEAN. Wen emphasized that the key issue for the smooth development of Sino-Japanese relations is to understand and deal with history correctly. Koizumi said the Japanese Government will adopt "sincere attitudes" and deal appropriately with the issue of the abandoned chemical weapons, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman. Koizumi added that Japan will continue to develop friendly and co-operative relations with PRC in all fields.
3. PRC-US Relations
China Daily ("LEADERS MEET EX-PRESIDENT BUSH," 10/10/03, P1) reported that PRC is ready to make joint efforts with the US to maintain and carry forward the good momentum of Sino-US ties and push for further growth of the constructive partnership between the two nations, President Hu Jintao said on October 9 in Beijing. During a meeting with George Bush, former president of the US, Hu appreciated the former leader's prolonged attention and dedication to improving and developing Sino-US relations. Jiang Zemin, chairman of the Central Military Commission of China and Premier Wen Jiabao also held talks respectively with George Bush. As the proper handling of the Taiwan question was crucial to the steady growth of the Sino-US ties, Hu stressed that PRC hoped that the US side would abide by its commitments. He added he hoped the US would adhere to the one-China policy and the three joint communiques, oppose "the independence of Taiwan," and avoid sending out any erroneous ! signals to "Taiwan-independence forces" or doing anything that is detrimental to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits. Concerning the Korean nuclear issue, Hu noted, a peaceful resolution of the Korean nuclear issue was in the interests of all parties concerned.
4. Russian Security Measures
China Daily ("PUTIN: RUSSIA RESERVES RIGHT TO STRIKE FIRST," Moscow, 10/10/03, P12) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin said on October 9 Russia opposes the use of preventive military attacks but will reserve the right to carry out such strikes if the practice continues to be used by other countries, speaking during meeting with German leaders in the city of Yekaterinburg, the Interfax news agency reported. Putin's comment also echoed Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's statement last week that Russia would not rule out the preventive use of force if its interests or alliance obligations demanded it. While not statements of a significant change in policy, the comments reflect Russian concerns about the military clout of the US, said the report.
5. ASEAN 10+3 Talks
China Daily (Wu Yixue, "BUILDING GREATER REGIONAL TRUST," 10/10/03, P4) reported that on October 8, leaders of PRC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Bali, Indonesia. The document was significant not only for PRC, but for the ASEAN countries because it means PRC has become the first strategic partner of ASEAN and ASEAN has also become the first regional group with which PRC has forged a strategic partnership. Politically, the two sides expressed wishes to further enhance mutual trust in the spirit of the agreements and documents they have reached. Concerning security, PRC and the ASEAN countries expressed willingness to further enhance mutual trust through high-level contacts and setting up consultative mechanisms at various levels to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea and the region as a whole. In the document, the two sides reached a consensus to co! ntinue pushing for bilateral co-operation in various international and regional multilateral mechanisms and develop their strategic partnership for non-aligned, non-military, and non-exclusive purposes. The milestone document not only reflects the past achievements China-ASEAN ties have achieved, but demonstrates their willingness to make bigger strides in advancing bilateral ties, said the report.
China Daily (Sun Shangwu, "NORTHERN NEIGHBORS KNOCK ON ASEAN DOOR," Bali, 10/09/03, P1) reported that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) wants Japan and the ROK to follow the lead of PRC and India and accede to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC), said Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri on October 8 here. Megawati, also ASEAN chairperson, said the association believes accession to the treaty would enhance the two countries' co-operation and partnership with the group. ASEAN yesterday held separate meetings with PRC, Japan and the ROK as well as a summit with India. The association signed a Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Japan, which aims to minimize barriers and deepen economic linkages between the two. In a meeting with ROK President Roh Moo-hyun, ASEAN leaders discussed the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Japan and the ROK plan to set up a Free Trade Area with the 10-member group, said the report.
6. DPRK-Japan Relations
China Daily ("PYONGYANG SAYS JAPAN UNWELCOME AT TALKS," Seoul, 10/08/03, P1) reported that the DPRK said on October 7 it would not allow Japan to take part in future talks on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Japan, responding swiftly to DPRK's surprise announcement, said it would not accept the notion that Pyongyang could decide who attends mutually agreed multilateral talks. A statement from the Foreign Ministry in Pyongyang, published by the official Korean Central News Agency, said Japan had made itself an untrustworthy negotiating partner by linking other bilateral problems to the talks, such as the alleged past abduction by the DPRK of Japanese nationals. The North has since said it is not interested in more talks. Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima said: "The nuclear issue is not a bilateral issue between Japan and North Korea (the DPRK) but is of serious consequence to the region and the international community. The DPRK's statement i! mplied there was the possibility of further multilateral talks - a significant if subtle shift from its earlier stated intention of avoiding more negotiations. However, Pyongyang kept up its tough rhetoric, denouncing the US on October 7 for deploying new pilot-less mini spy planes on the divided Korean Peninsula.
7. DPRK-ROK Relations
China Daily ("NEW ROAD LINKS KOREANS IN NORTH, SOUTH," Dorasan, ROK, 10/07/03, P1) reported that hundreds of ROK citizens drove to the DPRK through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by bus on October 6, using a new road for the first time in such large numbers. It was the biggest group thus far to visit the North, but had significance beyond its size because of tensions over the DPRK's nuclear arms ambitions. The ROK favors engaging the DPRK as much as possible to try to ease those tensions, and break down half a century of mutual suspicion. The aim of the trip was to increase the South's understanding of the North, and help DPRK to return to the international community, said the report.
8. PRC's Commentary on ASEAN Talks
China Daily (Wu Yixue, "WEN'S ROLE KEY IN ASEAN TALKS," 10/09/03, P4) carried a commentary on Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's participation in meetings of leaders of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), PRC, Japan, and the ROK, saying that it has the potential to inject new vitality into the already booming economic and trade relations between PRC and the region. Wen met with these leaders in the summit between ASEAN, China, Japan, and the ROK, which has been known as the 10+3 group, as well as the summit between the ASEAN and PRC, known as 10+1, held in Bali, Indonesia. He also took part in the fifth summit meeting between leaders of PRC, Japan, and the ROK. During the meetings, Wen put forward some concrete proposals on the deepening of regional economic co-operation, such as exploring the feasibility for establishing a free trade region, and pushing for co-operation in the financial and investment realms. He also discussed security and non-! traditional security co-operation, the article commented. The 10+3 and 10+1 summit meetings have already become a regular mechanism for PRC and ASEAN members to discuss issues of common concern and are significant events for the region. PRC has always attached importance to its co-operation with ASEAN members, and follows a consistent policy of establishing friendly and good relations with its neighbors, said the article. The policy has also produced fruitful achievements, and ASEAN has become PRC's fifth largest trade partner, while the latter serves as the former's sixth largest trading partner. The increasingly close ties between PRC and ASEAN and the fruitful results of the mechanism are an inevitable result of the East Asian regional co-operation and fundamental demand. The fruit-bearing mechanism also demonstrates that the development of a country does not pose as a threat to others, the article commented at last.
9. DPRK Nuke Talks
China Daily ("NETWORK: PYONGYANG WANTS DECEMBER TALKS," Seoul, 10/11-12/03, P7) reported that a DPRK envoy at the UN has said Pyongyang wants the next round of six-party talks on the Korean nuclear crisis to take place in December, Seoul's Korean Broadcasting System television network reported on October 10. KBS, a state-funded broadcaster, said the unnamed senior official expressed Pyongyang's preference for December talks in a telephone interview with Washington-based ROK correspondents. The report gave no explanation or details.
1. Japan Iraq Troop Deployment
The Japan Times ("SDF COULD JOIN U.N. MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN IRAQ, ABE SAYS," 09/29/03) reported that Japan should consider having the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) join a multinational force in Iraq if such a force is created under a US-proposed UN resolution, the LDP Secretary General Shinzo Abe said. "Although it is called a multinational force, it is designed to maintain peace and stabilize security," Abe said on a TV Asahi program. "The SDF will not use force, but there must be something it can do." Abe said he believes the SDF can take an active part in the mission within the bounds of Japan's war-renouncing Constitution "if it is for a UN peacekeeping force that is of a character different from military forces for combat." The SDF can rebuild roads, water systems and oil-refining facilities, and provide logistic support to US forces in Iraq, among other activities, Abe said. He said the extent to which SDF troops will be allowed to use weapons will be a "political dec! ision." "They cannot use weapons to carry out their duties, but we have to discuss it," he said. "A political decision is necessary." A senior leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition force, did not rule out Abe's idea during an appearance on a different TV program. "There is room for us to consider (participation in a UN multinational force) if it is based on a request by a new transition government of the Iraqi people," DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada said on Fuji TV. "Although work within the limits of the Constitution is our precondition, a dispatch of the SDF can be an option," Okada said.
2. Japan Antiwar Diplomat
The Japan Times ("DIPLOMAT SAYS ANTIWAR STANCE LED TO HIS FIRING," 10/01/03) reported that a senior Japanese diplomat who left the Foreign Ministry on Aug. 29 is planning to challenge the ministry as he believes he was "virtually fired" due to his opposition to Japan supporting the US-led war on Iraq, the ex-diplomat told Kyodo News in a recent interview. Naoto Amaki, who was the ambassador to Lebanon until August, said he was told to retire "apparently as a virtual punishment for my opinions," which he presented to the ministry before and after the war began March 20, an allegation dismissed by ministry officials. It is rare for a career diplomat to take issue with Foreign Ministry affairs. The former ambassador said that on March 14 he sent an official telegram arguing, "The launch of a war on Iraq without a UN resolution will undermine the framework for international peace. Japan should strongly urge the United States not to wage war." He also sent a telegram on March! 24 after the war began, charging that the outright support expressed by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi for the US war policy was "going in the wrong direction." He sent both messages to all the other overseas establishments as well as Tokyo in an attempt to get fellow ambassadors to join him in raising issue with the government's support of war, he said. Shortly after that, he received a call from Deputy Vice Minister Shinichi Kitajima and was asked if he was intending to call it quits. Kitajima was also quoted as telling Amaki that sending telegrams to all diplomatic missions would lead to disclosing secrets. Sometime around June, Kitajima, the official in charge of personnel affairs, ordered Amaki to return to Tokyo and then to retire, he said. "I got fed up with the Foreign Ministry's predisposition to adhere to the US," Amaki said. The foreign ministry officials said it only suggested that Amaki, 56, voluntarily retire in view of the end of his term in the Lebanon pos! t and in line with ministry reforms promoted following recent power-abuse and money scandals.
3. Japan New Finance Minister
The Japan Times (Hiroko Nakata, "TANIGAKI PLEDGES TIGHT FISCAL POLICY, EFFICIENCY," 09/26/03) reported that facing a ballooning government debt and a still-fragile economy, newly appointed Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki hopes to pursue a tight fiscal policy and allocate the budget effectively. The 58-year-old lawmaker and former minister in charge of industrial revitalization acknowledged that walking the fiscal tightrope will be hard. "For one thing, the country needs fiscal discipline, and general outlays for the next fiscal year will be limited," he said. On the other hand, the government should spend on initiatives that seem to be effective and promising, he said. He did not elaborate on which sectors he is considering. Tanigaki added that he is prepared to tackle the issue of reforming central government tax grants awarded to localities. "We cannot avoid the reform of tax grants. They have played a big role, but they have also helped promote local governments' f! iscal looseness," he said. Tanigaki said he would adhere to Koizumi's policy of not raising the consumption tax, which stands at 5 percent, during his tenure. He added, however, that the country must discuss the pros and cons of a tax hike, which he suggested would be unavoidable in the future. Regarding the yen's recent surge against the dollar, Tanigaki said, "We need to be extremely cautious about currency trade after the G-7 (meeting)." He was referring to weekend calls by finance chiefs of the Group of Seven major economies for more flexible exchange rates for major countries or economic areas. Tanigaki also issued a warning over the yen's recent surge against the dollar, saying his ministry is ready to intervene to counter speculative currency-trade maneuvers.
4. DPJ on Japanese New Cabinet
The Japan Times (Reiji Yoshida, "KAN WANTS SOME SPECIFICS FROM KOIZUMI," 09/27/03) reported that Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's policy speech to the Diet was full of wishful goals but lacking specifics, said Naoto Kan, the head of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) said. He said that during the Diet session, the DPJ will propose specific policies that it would pursue if the party manages to unseat the Liberal Democratic Party-led coalition in the coming Lower House election. The LDP Secretary General Shinzo Abe meanwhile said his party wants to hold "constructive discussions" with the opposition camp during the Diet session, calling for their cooperation for smooth passage of a government-sponsored bill to extend a contentious antiterrorism law by two years. The bill would extend the mandate for the Self-Defense Forces' logistic support for the US-led military operations in Afghanistan. The original law expires Nov. 1.
5. Japan Spy Satellite
Kyodo ("LAUNCH IS AGAIN SCRUBBED FOR SECOND PAIR OF SPY SATELLITES," Tanegashima, 09/28/03) reported that the launch of a second pair of spy satellites was called off again due to trouble with the H-IIA launch vehicle. Originally set for Sept. 10, the launch had already been put off twice. In Tokyo, officials at the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry said the decision to postpone was made as a precaution after irregular signals were emitted from the rocket's position control device. The first pair was launched March 28 amid domestic concerns that the move marked a major turnaround in Japan's space development policy based on the principle of peaceful and nonmilitary use of space. The Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center will operate them and is currently test-running the first pair and training officials on reading downloaded images.
6. US Bases in Okinawa
The Japan Times (Kanako Takahara, "MOTEGI SAYS HE WILL ADDRESS OKINAWA-SOFA ISSUE," 09/29/03) reported that Toshimitsu Motegi, the new minister in charge of Okinawa and affairs related to the Northern Territories, says he will review what Japan can do to improve implementation of the accord that governs US military activities in the country. "The people of Okinawa Prefecture may wonder what the government means when it says it will 'improve the implementation' of the agreement," said Motegi in a recent interview. "I intend to consider seriously what and how much improvement (Japan) can make to wipe out Okinawa's concerns," said the 48-year-old Lower House member of the Liberal Democratic Party, who served as senior vice foreign minister until he was appointed to his new ministerial post last week. The Japanese government is reluctant to revise Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and has promised instead to deal with Okinawa's complaints through talks with the US to improv! e rules for implementing the accord. Motegi said he plans to visit Okinawa to meet with Gov. Keiichi Inamine and visit the US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station, which the US promised in a 1996 accord to return to Japan in exchange for a substitute facility elsewhere in Okinawa. The minister also vowed to promote a plan to build a new institution in Okinawa in 2007 to provide graduate-level education as part of the national government's efforts to assist the prefecture's development. He said such an institution will help attract students from other Asian countries, due to Okinawa's location.
V. CanKor E-Clipping Servce
1. Issue #137
Canadian authorities deny refugee status to a former DPRK trade diplomat hiding in the country, because of his "complicity with a government guilty of crimes against humanity". Meanwhile, the volume of North Koreans taking refuge in the ROK consular mission in Beijing cause the office to close temporarily. This week's FOCUS introduces recent efforts on behalf of the DPRK dispossessed, including plans for a transit camp in Mongolia, and an effort by US officials to negotiate the settlement of up to 20,000 refugees to the US. ROK President Roh, dealing with the controversy over the dispatch of ROK troops to Iraq, names his price: a results-oriented approach by the US to resolve the nuclear standoff with the DPRK. A spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry issues a statement barring Japan from participating in "any form of negotiations for the settlement of the nuclear issue", blaming the dispute over abductees, Japan's participation in the "blockade against the DPRK" and har! assment of Korean residents in Japan. Asian and US diplomats debate the credibility of Pyongyang's assertion that it had reprocessed spent fuel rods into a cache of weapons-grade plutonium, noting the DPRK's history of bluffing and the difficulty in verifying the claim. One hundred cattle, donated via the ROK National Red Cross, accompany over a thousand South Koreans across the DMZ to participate in the opening ceremony of a multi-purpose indoor gymnasium built by DPRK in partnership with Hyundai Asan. This is the first Seoul to Pyongyang bus tour via the Gyeongui land route in the 50 years since the division of the Korea. The DPRK depreciates its currency to 900 won per US dollar, up from 150 in July 2002. The Bank of Korea sees this as a sign of further economic reforms. Other experts see it as an attempt to absorb dollars traded on the black market. Matsuzawa Noritas, the Canadian businessman who last year sponsored a DPRK trade delegation at the Canadian National Exhibi! tion (CNE), is promoting a number of commercial initiatives with the DPRK. His company, Miyakoshoji Co., has launched a new website devoted to DPRK tourism, and the sale of DPRK products. The Pyongyang office of the UN agency UNICEF launches a website devoted to its DPRK program.
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BK21 The Education and Research Corps for East Asian Studies
Department of Political Science, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
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