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PFO 04-31: August 16, 2004
CONTENTS I. Essay by Ms. Marta J. Bailey, Dr. Michael Mazarr, Col David Lamm
II. Essay by Ms. Marta J. Bailey Therefore,
determine the enemy’s plans and you will know which
strategy will be successful and which will not. Sun
Tzu At the
conclusion of the six-party talks in Beijing last August, North Korea announced
that there was no reason for further negotiations and that its only option was
to continue its nuclear weapons development program.[1] The Beijing Summit was the first
multilateral diplomatic effort aimed at heading off a nuclear crisis that
became apparent in October 2002 when North Korea acknowledged restarting its
nuclear program in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In exchange for freezing the nuclear
program, North Korea wants energy assistance, an end to sanctions, and security
assurances from the United States through a nonaggression treaty.[2] The Bush administration regards these
demands as “blackmail” and is unwilling to make concessions unless North Korea
first dismantles its nuclear program.[3] More than six months later and after a
second round of talks in Beijing, there continues to be a standoff between the
United States and North Korea.[4] The stakes are high and now North Korea
claims to have begun making bombs out of spent nuclear fuel rods.[5]
The Bush
administration’s hard line approach is understandable given the post-9/11
atmosphere of heightened apprehension and increased efforts to keep weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) out of the hands of terrorists. As understandable as the approach may be, it
does not appear to be working. A
prolonged stalemate gives North Korea more time to develop its nuclear
capability and increases the risk the weapons will be used. The gravity of the situation demands a
thoughtful reassessment of the United States strategy toward North Korea within
the context of long-range strategic goals for Asia. A successful strategy must consider the motivation for North
Korea’s behavior and plan the next steps in a way that is most likely to elicit
responses that serve United States interests.
The following assessment considers the strategic context, the national
interests of each party, weighs risks and options, and proposes an integrated
campaign strategy that features conditional engagement. As distasteful as it may be to deal with Kim
Jong Il, the risks are too great to avoid him. Weigh the situation, then move. Sun Tzu The
Strategic Context This is not the
first time the world has held its breath in anticipation of the next move from
the North Korean regime. For nearly 40
years the Korean peninsula served as a microcosm of the bi-polar, ideological
struggle between communism and liberal democracies. Tensions met at the 38th parallel with the world’s
most concentrated array of military arms facing off under constant vigilance
lest one side or the other make a move that would turn the ideological battle
into a brutal confrontation. But the
Cold War is over, and Kim Jong Il is still playing the same old game. His former communist allies have turned to
market economies and some are making democratic reforms. Kim Jong Il is alone in the world, clinging
to a Stalinist economy and his Juche ideology of nationalistic
self-sufficiency with a totalitarian grip on his closed society and failing
economy. His nuclear threats could
almost be seen as comical were it not for the new strategic context which takes
his game to a much more dangerous level.
With the
complexities of the globalizing world and the asymmetrical threats arising from
clashes of civilizations and non-state terrorist actors, one may long
nostalgically for the good old days of the Cold War when at least we knew who
and where the enemy was. Since 9/11,
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has held center stage. But if terrorism is just a tool, then who
and where is the enemy we are fighting?
It is the very uncertainty of the answer to this question that makes
North Korea’s nuclear threat more than an issue of deterring North Korean
aggression against South Korea or its Asian neighbors. In addition to wrangling welfare from a
sympathetic world, Kim Jong Il engages in illegal activities such as drug
smuggling, counterfeiting, and weapons dealing.[6] Regime survival is supported economically by
offering commodities to the world’s bad actors making Kim Jong Il a prime risk
for proliferating WMD. His total
unreliability in keeping past agreements to verifiably halt his nuclear program
suggests that it will be difficult to develop a diplomatic package that will
cause him to give up his “ace” in dealing with the rest of the world.[7] Like
the unknown terrorists, the power that this one dictator of a small country has
over the world’s most powerful nation is most unsettling because it brings us
face to face with our vulnerabilities and fears. Nearly fifteen
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States remains the world’s
lone superpower. Through most of the
nineties, the United States struggled with this new role and how to use the
power and responsibility with hesitant forays into places such as Somalia and
Bosnia. The United States attracted
both supporters and detractors as America’s culture, politics, and values
permeated a world that became more interconnected through advances in
information technologies. The 9/11
wake-up call brought the post-Cold War United States role into much sharper
relief. Under the new Bush
administration, the previously hesitant superpower formulated a much more
active role in shaping the world by fostering universal values, democracy, and
free market economies.[8] Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the
world showed its empathy for the United States with an outpouring of
support for the United States led war on terrorism. The initial gambit into Afghanistan to
dislodge the Taliban regime was a direct and logical target that brought
support from many countries. In
contrast, the war in Iraq with its goal of regime change and halting the
production and proliferation of heretofore undiscovered WMD created a rift
among allies and caused many to question the United States’ wisdom in its use
force. The North Korean
nuclear crisis emerges against this backdrop of growing hostility against
western culture by Islamic fundamentalists, fear of further terrorist attacks
on United States soil, divisiveness among longstanding allies, extended
military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and wavering support for the
administration in the early phases of the presidential election season. There is an expectation that the United
States will demonstrate world leadership and facilitate a peaceful resolution
to the North Korean issue in a way that is favorable both to the United States
and Asia in the near term, but also in a way that lays the groundwork for
building on the United States’ long range strategic goals for Asia. The importance of the United States’
hegemonic status cannot be underestimated as this diplomatic effort is
considered. The world is watching and
taking cues from United States policy moves, formulating its own future
policies based on how the United States responds. One ignorant of the plans of neighboring states cannot prepare
alliances in good time. Sun Tzu The
Regional Players Since the end of
the Cold War and again after 9/11, the dynamics of United States international
relations have changed. Of particular
importance in devising a strategy for North Korea are the changing
relationships with China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia --- the nations
involved in the six-party diplomatic negotiations along with North Korea and
the United States. The Cold War
enemies, China and Russia, are now allies with us in the GWOT and share our
concerns regarding North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. Japan, our post-World War II reconstruction
project, has become a world economic leader while maintaining a pacifist
military stance under a United States security protection guarantee that is of
questionable effectiveness against a North Korean nuclear threat. Surprisingly it is South Korea, the
traditional target of North Korean aggression, which feels least threatened by
North Korea’s nuclear program. It is
worthwhile to examine more closely the context each of these countries brings
to the North Korean problem since any strategy must balance near and long term
strategic regional goals. China. China shares an
800-mile border with North Korea and in many ways has the most at stake with
the emergence of a nuclear-capable North Korea. China would prefer to focus on its own economic development and
build a reputation as a nation with regional influence and global respect, so
North Korea is problematic for China in several ways. There is an historic alliance between the two communist countries
that has become strained as China moved toward free-market reforms and North
Korea lagged behind. The crisis puts
China in an unwanted dilemma of finding an acceptable diplomatic position
between an old ally and a new and valuable trading partner, with the goal of
alienating neither. Although China’s
priority is economic growth, this is being accomplished under the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) and they do not want to give up
power any time soon. The United States
is pressing China to use its influence over North Korea to bring them in line
with international standards of behavior.
China denies having sufficient power over North Korea to do this, but
also realizes accommodating the United States and playing a role in solving the
crisis would further its regional and global status goals. So far, China has served as host for the
six-party talks and may be more willing to exert influence over North Korea now
that the United States has shown more favor toward China in the Taiwan issue.[9]
In some respects,
China’s decision on how to proceed will set an important precedent for future
Sino-American relations. Since Nixon’s
historic visit to China in 1972, the relationship has vacillated between trust
and mistrust, engagement and containment, market openness and sanctions. China’s alignment with the United States in
the GWOT ushered in a new phase of cooperation and optimism, but Cold War
mistrust lingers in Washington over China’s long range goals. As China’s economy continues to develop and
it is able to develop its military force in parallel, what are China’s ultimate
aims? If China accepts a role of
responsible leadership in a multilateral setting and understands the importance
to its own well-being of maintaining these peacefully integrated ties, it would
give the United States cause to deepen the growing sentiments of trust. In addition to
the dilemma over the diplomatic role China can or will play is the impact of
the outcome of the crisis on China. If
North Korea will not give up its nuclear program, in addition to the increased
global terrorist threat, it is possible South Korea and Japan will be compelled
to develop nuclear arsenals adding an additional destabilizing regional factor
that could override the tremendous diplomatic gains being made on the economic
front. China also has a vested interest
in maintaining the North Korean regime in order to protect its border from
being flooded with refugees and so it sees little value in punitive measures that
would cause the regime to implode. They
already return a small but steady flow of refugees to North Korea and a massive
flow would be an economic burden China does not want.[10] South
Korea. South Korea, a
country we defended in the Korean War and have protected with United States
troops for over 50 years, is chafing against the dependent relationship with
the United Stares. A generation too
young to remember or appreciate the value of the longstanding United
States–South Korean relationship questions the relevance of United States
military presence and sees the United States as an obstacle to reunification
with the North. The Kim Dae Jung
Sunshine Policy and meeting with Kim Jong Il in June 2000 raised South Korean
hopes for the possibility of reunification.
North Korea is now being seen as a country to be pitied rather than
feared, and the idealistic nationalism of South Koreans may be obscuring their
perception of the real threat that remains.
In addition, they seem to consider North Korea their issue rather
than one of global concern. The depth of
their desire for a peaceful reunification with North Korea was exhibited in the
election of Roh Moo-Hyun who appealed to young voters on a platform that is
less suspicious of the North and more critical of United States presence.[11] Yet Mr. Roh seems to realize that much
like China, South Korea must weigh its allegiance to North Korea against the
negative impacts it could have on their relationship with the United
States. In his inaugural address, Mr.
Roh defined North Korea’s nuclear ambition as a “grave threat calling for a
choice between either nuclear weapons or a security guarantee and economic
aid.” He also spoke highly of the
“cherished” alliance with the United States and envisioned an alliance that
would mature into a “more reciprocal and more equal” relationship.[12] South Korea’s
request for a new formulation of the United States-South Korean relationship
has merit, and addressing this issue will be a critical step in developing a
synchronized strategy for North Korea.
To maintain influence and a military presence in South Korea as part of
a long-range Asian security strategy, and to keep a strong-alliance sentiment
alive among the South Korean people, the United States must establish a
relationship that eliminates any perceived vestiges of occupation or imperial
oversight. The respect South Korea
desires in a more equal relationship is well deserved. The United States is already taking steps to
reposition troops currently located on former Japanese imperial grounds in
Seoul to sites south of the Han River and pass security missions to the South
Korean armed forces.[13] South Korea’s
renewed interest in reunification comes at a time when it is economically
powerful enough and politically secure enough to assist North Korea but, like
China, fears a collapse of North Korea that would flood its borders with
refugees. A more gradual approach of
engagement, development of a federation, and eventual reunification is
preferred by the South, whose overtures of assistance have yet to be accompanied
by demands for reciprocal actions by North Korea.[14] Critics charge that Kim Jong Il is once
again on the take with no intention of letting the South draw him into a
reunification plan of their design that would jeopardize his absolute control. Japan.
For Japan, the
North Korean threat is real. In 1998
North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over Japan that demonstrated
Pyongyang’s capability to deliver conventional, chemical, biological and now
potentially nuclear warheads to the Japanese mainland. Japan would like a peaceful and stable
Korean peninsula, but is constrained in its ability to directly impact
change. According to its constitution,
it is committed to a pacifist military position and relies on United States
security protection.[15] The threat posed by North Korea, however,
brings the effectiveness of this security arrangement into question and has
caused Japan to reassess its national security arrangements and consider a more
assertive policy. Japan has an interest
in acquiring a ballistic missile defense system, and a few observers have gone
as far as to suggest that nuclear weapons could be considered if Japan is
sufficiently provoked. An expansion of
its military scope is already taking place as Japan shifts form a purely defensive posture to accept an
international role in fighting terrorism by assisting in the GWOT with
logistical and other non-combat support.[16] Japan has tried
to influence North Korea through diplomatic and economic means, but even these
efforts have stalled. Japan was a major
financial contributor to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) project that was part of the now-defunct 1994 Agreed Framework. Over 600,000 ethnic North Koreans live in
Japan and are an important source of financial support to
Pyongyang. In an historic meeting
between Japanese and North Korean leaders in September 2002, the signing of the
Pyongyang Agreement seemed to signal a shift toward increased engagement, but
progress was derailed when North Korea admitted to abducting Japanese
citizens. The North returned some of
them but the Japanese public became obsessed with this issue and it has
overshadowed further engagement. The
Japanese public wants action on the abduction issue and this causes a dilemma
for Japanese negotiators in setting priorities.[17]
Historically,
the Korean peninsula has been viewed as a “dagger aimed at the heart of Japan.”[18] Japan remains supportive of United States
policy and an important participant in multilateral diplomatic efforts. Even as the United States-Japanese
relationship matures and evolves both sides agree that the ties that bind the
United States and Japan are critical to maintain. Japan’s security and our influence in the region depend upon it. Russia.
Russia was one
of North Korea’s key communist allies and a primary source of economic aid
until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, Russia’s power and influence has diminished
considerably. There was a sharp
deterioration in Russian relations with North Korea after Moscow normalized
relations with Seoul in 1990. Still,
their shared history and common border give Russia a role and their
participation adds additional legitimacy to the multinational diplomatic efforts
to influence North Korea through the six-party talks. Although they still have some influence, it has been suggested
that they may be reluctant to overplay their hand. [19]
Thus,
what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Sun
Tzu What Does
North Korea Want? North Korea’s
closed society has always posed a challenge to those looking for clues to guide
the development of an effective foreign policy strategy. We know that North Korea is a highly
militarized society that devotes 20-25% of its GDP to maintaining the world’s
fifth largest military,[20]
an indication that regime security is an extremely high priority. North Korea is the “world’s last remaining
unreformed Stalinist state” and has survived the death of Kim Il Sung, its
beloved leader of 50 years, and a three-year famine that left the country on
the verge of economic collapse.[21] To the surprise of some, Kim Jong Il held the regime together. The “Dear Leader” is an enigma to the western world. He reportedly has a “xenophobic insistence on total national self-reliance” and his bizarre behavior has caused some to question his mental stability, while other intelligence reports suggest he possesses a brilliant and cunning mind.[22] What is most puzzling in the current situation is that the nuclear program was initiated just as Kim Jong Il was taking unprecedented steps that seemed to indicate North Korea was finally emerging from its isolation. In the past few years, Kim Jong Il met with neighboring country leaders, sent 600 athletes to the Asian Games in South Korea, and made credible economic market reforms. First, North
Korea’s nuclear program could be a legitimate reaction to what it perceives as
a serious threat. In the January 2002
State of the Union address, President Bush referred to North Korea as a member
of the “axis of evil” along with Iraq and Iran. The September 2002 National Security Strategy focused on
terrorism and announced the intent to use preemptive force when the United
States perceives a potential terrorist threat.
In early 2003, the United States acted on this strategy by invading Iraq
to oust Saddam Hussein. Kim Jong Il may
believe he is another target for regime change. Second, North
Korea could be using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to gain
desperately-needed economic aid. The
collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in a significant loss of economic aid, an
economic catastrophe that was exacerbated by the famine and created a sense of
desperation. Kim Jong Il’s chances of
staying in power would presumably be improved if the basic needs of his constituency
are met. Third is the
possibility that Kim Jong Il’s nuclear program is part of an aggressive
military strategy. North Korea’s
primary goal has always been the reunification of Korea on its terms and this
remains “the supreme national task.”[24] The North’s offensive military capability is
designed to liberate South Korea from the occupation of United States
imperialists and overthrow the “puppet” government in Seoul.[25] “Kim Jong Il’s Military Strategy for
Reunification” outlines a highly provocative and detailed reunification
strategy based on manipulation, deceit, and aggression.[26] North Korea’s perceptions are so clouded by
their reunification obsession that it even apparently views the “sunshine
policy” as South Korea’s symbolic acknowledgement of Pyongyang’s legitimacy.[27] It is possible
that all of the hypotheses play a role in North Korea’s motivation to develop
its nuclear program; however, the third hypothesis presents the most
challenge. A strategy built around
easing security fears or feeding the hungry is simple compared to challenging
the deeply held nationalist beliefs of an isolated, well armed country. Kim Jong Il knows that South Korea’s notion
of reunification poses as much of a threat to his regime as current United
States policies. All of the resources
necessary for his regime’s survival are just below the 38th
parallel. Know
the enemy and know yourself. Sun
Tzu What Does the United States Want? The most obvious
and immediate desire of the United States in the context of the North Korean
nuclear crisis is to achieve a nuclear-free North Korea and eliminate the
threat of Pyongyang proliferating WMD that could advance the goals of
terrorists. In addition, the United
States has longstanding concerns about the plight of the North Korean people
under the totalitarian regime of Kim Jong Il.
Goals specific to North Korea must be integrated within broader foreign
policy goals, however. United States
foreign policy strategy in the Bush administration is based on the fundamental
belief that an interdependent world comprised of states with democratic
governments and market economies is inherently more peaceful and best serves
our long term national interests for security and prosperity.[28] This grand vision outlined in the National
Security Strategy seizes the opportunity provided by this “unipolar moment” to
shape a world more favorable to freedom, stability, and the advancement of
human rights. The post-Cold War world
is both more dangerous and more unpredictable with threats arising from both
state and non-state actors. Devising
strategy requires a nuanced approach to regions and actors that achieves
immediate objectives for stability and security, but also lays a foundation for
longer-term stability goals. The
strategist must examine the current situation in view of the historical
context, cultural biases, and complex interactions between the players to
devise a progressive series of steps that will most likely lead to the desired
end. In his book, The
Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski offers a thorough analysis of these
contextual factors and outlines regional goals that will facilitate achieving
the United States global vision. For
Asian countries to move progressively closer to a vision of democratic
governments, free market economies, and an environment that values basic human
rights of freedom and liberty, the United States must remain involved. The strains that are becoming evident with
longstanding allies and the evolving relationship with China must be closely
monitored and cultivated with a primary strategic goal of insuring the United
States remains a player and has an anchor in the region.[29] To do this requires a carefully balanced
relationship between the three primary players: the United States, China, and
Japan. The long standing relationship
with Japan must be maintained while simultaneously engaging China’s development
without engendering animosity or destructive competitiveness between them. Both countries have strong cultural beliefs
in their own exceptionalism and see their destiny as one of importance and
influence. Both self-perceptions can be
supported, but each needs to achieve its desired status in different
realms. One way to achieve this balance
is to encourage the emergence of China as a regional economic and
military power, with Japan maintaining its status as a global economic
power and increasingly participating in global peacekeeping responsibilities.[30] China may have grander aspirations, but
realistically will not be ready for a globally dominant position for several
decades. The pivotal
player is China with its remarkable economic development and growing
relationships with its neighbors. China
poses a greater potential future threat than the dying North Korean regime, so
it is critical for the United States to keep the fragile relationship with
China on track. The North Korean
nuclear crisis threatens the evolving relationship between the United States
and China because it puts China in the awkward position of being the reluctant
ally of the world’s worst rogue state.
With their shared history of communist ideology, the remnants of the
protective alliance between China and North Korea put constraints on China’s
options to influence the situation. The
United States should not expect China to use a heavy-handed approach to
influence North Korea with threats or sanctions and it may be unwise to put
China in the position of making a veto decision at the UN Security Council.[31] The United States should respect China’s
perceived limitations in order to continue progress toward long-term strategic
regional goals. The crisis can
be seen as an opportunity to enhance China’s regional status by encouraging
China to continue leading the multilateral diplomatic negotiations. China would like
to insure North Korea’s continued existence in order to avoid being overrun
with North Korean refugees if the country fails economically, or having the
United States on its doorstep if the South leads a successful reunification.[32] In the near to mid-term, North Korea serves
as a necessary buffer. South Korea’s
increasing nationalism and desire for reunification conflicts with both China’s
and North Korea’s goals. Reunifying
Korea may be a long-term goal for Asia, but near-term reunification and removal
of United States’ troops from South Korea and Japan would not be in the best
interest of any of the players. The
United States military presence in the area needs to be managed in a way that
will allow South Korea’s ambitions to unfold at a pace acceptable to the other
players in the region. China would
“prefer a reconciled rather than a unified Korea in which the South could
bankroll and otherwise facilitate the rejuvenation of the North without
controlling the entire peninsula.”[33] Building a
strong foundation for future stability in the Asian region requires a
multilateral approach among players whose histories include lingering
animosities and mistrust. The six-party
approach can be seen as a litmus test for building effective regional
cooperation.[34] The United States’ goals for Asia can in
part be shaped by the process that has been adopted to deal with the North
Korean nuclear crisis. He
who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious. Sun
Tzu What Is
The Current Strategy For North Korea? Since the end of
the Korean War, the United States strategy has been one of deterring the spread
of communism by containing North Korea within its boundaries with a strong
United States military presence in South Korea and throughout the region. Economic sanctions provided an extra bargaining
chip that combined with deterrence were an effective strategy in meeting the
United States strategy goals.[35]
When North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions became apparent in the early 1990s, the United States
reportedly removed its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea to eliminate
any justification for North Korea’s program, but left a significant
conventional force to continue to contain the North through deterrence. Eventually, the United States and North
Korea developed the 1994 Agreed Framework which began a policy of conditional
engagement. Blame for the
failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework can be placed on both sides. The light water reactor plants due for
completion last year were not expected to be operational until at least 2006. North Korea hindered progress with petty
bickering and the United States stalled, while Japan and South Korea shouldered
the financial burden.[36] The United States never provided promised
formal written security assurances to the North.[37] The October 2002
announcement that North Korea was pursuing their nuclear program came as an
unwelcome distraction as the United States prepared for the impending war with
Iraq. The administration’s strategy
toward North Korea has been characterized by shallowness that seemed to signal
a desire to avoid dealing with the issue.
The United States stated it would not be blackmailed,
would not reward the North’s misbehavior, would not negotiate until the nuclear
program was verifiably halted, and transferred responsibility to the countries
that have the most at stake.[38] North Korea’s neighbors conveyed their
disapproval of the nuclear program to no avail. At the six-party talks in August, the United States continued to
place responsibility on the international community hoping North Korea would
respond to collective pressure. North
Korea maintains that the issue is with the United States and would prefer to
deal directly with the United States. [39]
Reports on the
second round of six-party talks in February hint that some progress was made
although no settlement was reached. The
United States achieved success with its multilateral strategy when five nations
reportedly agreed that “nuclear weapons have no place on the Korean Peninsula
and they must go.”[40] The United States continues to insist that
there will be no concessions without a “comprehensive dismantling of the
North’s nuclear program” and that the program must be abolished and not just
frozen as has been suggested by Pyongyang.[41] North Korea indicated its readiness to give
up its weapons program when the United States gives up its “hostile policy”
toward North Korea. The United States
denies hostile intent and offers a multilateral, rather than bilateral,
assurance of security as part of an agreement to dismantle the nuclear program. So far, no deal. And
therefore those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him. Sun
Tzu What Are
the Risks And Options? The means with
which the United States pursues policy options for North Korea have some
limitations and risks. A precision
strike to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear development facilities is a tempting
idea for a culture that likes quick solutions, lacks confidence in multilateral
diplomatic efforts, and is increasingly annoyed with North Korea’s
posturing. But the risk is too high
that war would erupt on the Korean peninsula and then escalate. Forced regime change would be too extreme,
unacceptable to China, and create a nation building task the United States
cannot afford while engaged in the Middle East. Economic sanctions may not work because North Korea is accustomed
to extreme hardship and may not respond.
Both China and South Korea would likely provide aid that would
counterbalance any sanctions the United States applied in order to avoid
unacceptable refugee problems. What North Korea
seems to want is another engagement strategy that would generate economic
assistance and security assurances while allowing them to make vague gestures
toward compliance on the nuclear weapons issues and keeping a nuclear “ace” for
future blackmail. The1994 Agreed
Framework was successful in averting what appeared to be an imminent start of
hostilities, but ten-years later we are in virtually the same situation. Many seemed to believe the regime would not
last this long, but now it appears capable of hanging on with minimal support
indefinitely. Another engagement
package appeals to North Korea’s neighbors who are loath to deal too harshly
with North Korea, but the risk is that we support the survival of a bad regime
and a bad actor. Kim Jong Il’s
desire for aid has been thwarted by the Bush administration’s strategy of
demanding full disarmament prior to negotiating an aid package. This is not the reaction Kim Jong Il was
looking for and it does not conform to his apparent belief that he can
manipulate the world. President Bush
has not given him the upper hand he expected to have. Nevertheless, there are risks to a tougher approach. It is still unlikely Kim Jong Il will
completely disarm regardless of the aid package dangled in front of him. This strategy further alienates him from the
world and pushes him into a corner that may trigger undesirable
consequences. The Bush strategy may
have actually helped create a more favorable negotiating climate by
neutralizing Kim Jong Il’s leverage, but the question is how long to wait
before a meaningful move is made. The
present situation still presents a stalemate that gives Kim Jong Il time to
continue developing weapons and potentially develop links with terrorist
networks. There are no
easy solutions. What seems clear is
that an engaged North Korea is a more secure option than an estranged and
isolated North Korea. Obtaining an
agreement from North Korea to freeze and begin dismantling its nuclear program
gives the international community more leverage over future behavior and would
reinstate an active International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection
process. Even if there is an unspoken
acknowledgement that no agreement will be completely honored, engaging with
North Korea should serve to delay and contain the expansion of its nuclear
program. If conditional engagement is
only a method to keep our foot in the door, an integrated campaign strategy with
short and long range goals accompanied by direct and indirect activities is
needed. With an overt conditional
engagement strategy in place, indirect efforts should focus on hastening regime
change. To
subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Sun
Tzu United
States Strategy Goals For North Korea The first and
most immediate goal is to prevent North Korea from using either nuclear or
conventional weapons. The North has
military power sufficient to invade South Korea and target Japan with ballistic
missiles. North Korea’s history of
belligerent rhetoric suggests this is unlikely, but the threat must be taken
seriously given its nationalistic desires combined with severe economic
hardships which could result in a willingness to act out of desperation. It is possible Kim Jong Il believes time is
running out. A second goal is
to insure that North Korea does not proliferate WMD to either state or
non-state actors. There are reports of
links between North Korea and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq related to sharing
nuclear technologies. North Korea may
continue to use its reported nuclear capability as a tool of negotiation, but
in the hands of terrorists the threat becomes more unpredictable. Third, use
subtle methods aimed at facilitating a regime change in North Korea. The momentum of globalization is
transforming many Asian economies and governments; were it not for the obstacle
presented by Kim Jong Il’s closed regime, it seems likely North Korea would be
swept along in the trend toward free market economies and democratic reform. In the process
of negotiating a conditional engagement plan with North Korea, strategic
regional goals must be kept in mind.
For this reason, the fourth priority is to facilitate the evolution of a
positive relationship with China and maintain alliances with South Korea and
Japan along with the United States military presence. Finally, the
United States should use this challenge to enhance credibility and legitimacy
as the world’s leader. In the
prosecution of the war in Iraq, the administration created the perception of an
imperialist bully wielding power unilaterally to pursue self-interests, rather
than the goal of creating a better world.[42] The United States’ behavior must be
scrupulously ethical and honest so any manipulation or deceit on the part of
North Korea is clearly to their disadvantage.
The United States must be willing to share power with multinational
partners, keep promises, and show respect for others. To a surrounded enemy you must
leave a way to escape. Sun
Tzu The Ways
To Achieve Strategic Ends An integrated
approach requires simultaneous actions on several levels. The most visible feature of this approach is
negotiating another engagement strategy, but other actions described below
should also be pursued in order to establish security, shape the future
environment, and sustain influence. Never Let
Your Guard Down. Kim Jong Il’s
formidable military capabilities and stated desire for reunification on his
terms must continue to be deterred through a strong military presence and
credible threat from United States and South Korean forces. The deterrence strategy has worked and can
be expected to continue to work. Even
with the readjustment of United States and South Korean troop missions and
positions, North Korea must continue to be convinced that we will maintain
constant vigilance and respond with quick and decisive force to any aggressive
actions on his part. Making
Engagement Pay. Another
engagement strategy is the most realistic approach, most acceptable to North
Korea’s neighbors, and portrays a judicious use of power and influence on the
part of the United States. The actions
to carry out this engagement strategy are best continued through the six-party
talks in an open forum. Going into
these negotiations, it is important to remember that Kim Jong Il does not want
to reform, but seems to be willing to offer himself for sale for the right
price. In this kabuki dance of
negotiation, it will remain to be seen who can more cleverly manipulate the
other. The intent is to be the superior
manipulator so the price paid achieves the desired endstate. Realistically, near term success may only
buy time by freezing nuclear activity, adding international inspections,
developing a level of transparency, and providing leverage against future
actions such as WMD proliferation. The primary
concession to North Korea’s demands on the United States is to set up bilateral
talks as a prelude to continued multilateral six-party talks. Part of North Korea’s behavior is attention
seeking and the attention it craves is from the United States. North Korea will not be satisfied with lower
level diplomats negotiating in a multilateral setting without first being
assured the United States takes them seriously. The individual selected to meet directly with Kim Jong Il must be
of sufficient stature and credibility to satisfy his need for high level
attention without directly engaging administration officials at this
stage. One possibility is to ask former
President Bush to serve as elder statesman; much like Carter did in 1994. The oriental tradition of respect for elders
and the dynastic parallel between the elder Bush and Kim Jong Il’s father may
provide a potent combination for success.
In these discussions, the United States should agree to provide a
conditional security assurance to North Korea in exchange for an immediate
verifiable freeze on the nuclear program and continuation of multilateral
negotiations. The next
multilateral talks need to build on the consensus achieved at the last round of
meetings so that Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow present a consistent
strategy for the future of North Korea.
Key to this strategy is the exchange of minimal aid for verifiable steps
toward disarmament by North Korea.
Without appearing to abandon our current hard line approach, the United
States can play the “bad cop” while facilitating North Korea’s neighbors
ability to be “good cops.” The United
States must maintain an unwavering demand that North Korea verifiably eliminate
its nuclear program without being the primary agent to deliver aid and support
in order to avoid the interpretation that the United States has given in to
blackmail. North Korea will attribute
symbolic significance to negotiators’ actions and so it will be most effective
to have the Asian countries take the lead in designing and executing an aid
program. The United States should
contribute no more than a fair share of resources, but may need to indirectly
facilitate the ability of the Asian neighbors to provide aid. The goal of the aid package should be to
develop an industrial capacity so North Korea can give up its dependence on
world welfare and weapons dealing. It
will be necessary to continue to develop a source of energy to support industry
either through KEDO or an alternative program. Bringing Them
Down While Propping Them Up. Another
engagement strategy will not break the cycle of nuclear threats by itself. Ultimately, it will require regime change to
set North Korea on a path of democratic free market reforms that will release
its people from oppression. A “soft
landing” has been discussed for a number of years in anticipation of North
Korea dissolving under the weight of its own ineptitude. Yet they survive. While a “soft landing” can still be considered a preferred
alternative to implosion, some prodding may be necessary to speed the
process. There are a number of soft
power tactics that should be pursued. Although the
North Korean people have been cut off from the world for years, it is more and
more difficult for Kim Jong Il to be the sole dominator of information and
propaganda. In a globalizing world,
information is permeating boundaries and “the days when governments could
isolate their people from understanding what life was like beyond their borders
or even beyond their village are over.” [43] North Koreans reportedly prefer to listen to
Voice of America and Radio Free Asia rather than South Korean radio stations
because the latter does not criticize their government.[44] Information infiltration should be a focused
effort of an overall campaign plan. The United
States and its allies should track and, where possible, seize North Korean
funds.[45] Resources are closely concentrated in the
ruling elite and a blow to their comfort and well-being could foster discontent
with the current regime. Intelligence
sources should track funds gained through international crime activities,
weapons dealing, and drugs. We should also
make use of international organizations to keep pressure on North Korea by
exposing their idiosyncratic behaviors and human rights violations on a regular
basis.[46] Judgments from organizations such as the UN
would be more legitimate and credible than from the United States. We should insist on letting international
aid teams inspect the distribution of food and supplies in the same transparent
manner as other aid recipients. Another priority
is to establish a better process to deal with North Korea’s refugees rather
than simply returning them to an uncertain fate in North Korea.[47]
China and South Korea’s reluctance to open their borders to a flood of refugees
is understandable, and so a broader international strategy should be devised so
these political refugees can be settled in accepting locations around the
world.[48] When the trickle becomes a flood, the regime
will weaken. Positioning
for the Long Term. The strategy
also requires simultaneous diplomatic engagement with South Korea, Japan and
China. The United States-South Korean
relationship is showing signs of strain that could jeopardize progress with
North Korea. Immediate steps need to be
taken to synchronize goals. The United
States must continue to assure Japan’s security from a North Korean threat by
augmenting defense capabilities as needed.
Diplomatic efforts with China should encourage Beijing’s economic
development but postpone focusing on contentious issues such as human rights
and Taiwan. One
able to make the enemy come of his own accord does so by offering him some
advantage. Sun
Tzu Anticipating
Consequences An engagement
strategy optimistically presumes North Korea is willing and able to reform, and
yet history cautions us to undertake this approach only with clear, verifiable,
and enforceable conditions. Kim Jong Il
is still a despicable character who is guilty of human rights atrocities,
proliferating weapons technologies, and taking advantage of the generosity of
others without reciprocating. One of
North Korea’s most renowned defectors and the creator of the Juche ideology, Hwang Jang Yop credits
the North Korean dictator with the utmost of skill in maintaining control and
says outsiders are naïve to believe Kim Jong Il is ready to open his country:
“A considerable number of people are being fooled, including the United
States.”[49]
Kim Jong Il may
be savvy enough to detect an underlying plot to open his regime, but he is
likely to accept a conditional engagement strategy accompanied by security
assurances because it satisfies his primary concerns of regime survival. The gradual provision of aid must be linked
to clearly articulated reciprocal actions that lead to dismantling the nuclear
program under the scrutiny of inspection teams. Multilateral pressure and clear expectations may not be enough
and Kim Jong Il may still prove to be the superior manipulator using aid to
survive without fully complying with demands.
Every opportunity should be pursued to break into the closed society
with information and aid programs in an effort to use soft-power to hasten internal
change. More
problematic, and something not directly addressed by this strategy, is the
North’s reunification ambition. A
conditional engagement strategy may serve to limit its military leverage by
managing the nuclear program, but it does not eliminate its nationalistic
desire to bring South Korea under its control.
From a cultural perspective, Koreans are not inclined to believe in a
“win-win” philosophy. Instead, the only
possible outcome in the ideological battle between the North’s communist Juche ideology and the South’s
Western-oriented, free market, democracy is a zero-sum game with a winner and a
loser.[50] One proposed solution is to make an effort
to shift the North’s perspective so it can envision the possibility that both
sides could win.[51] Kim Jong Il knows his economy is failing and
reportedly wants to make reforms, but is held back by his unwillingness to
relinquish his ideological position.[52] He has already made some free-market reforms
and if he could associate regime survival with making further reforms, as China
has, there is a chance for gradual progress in recognizing a win-win solution. The upcoming
United States election may either hinder or help progress with North Korean
negotiations. If the election motivates
the administration to break the stalemate and it can arrange an agreement in
another round of six-party talks before the election, this success could offset
what appears to be political damage surrounding the rationale for invading Iraq
and the difficulties being faced in the stabilization and reconstruction phase. A more likely scenario, and one more
consistent with the administration’s past approach, would be to continue to
hold the line, refuse concessions, and leave the heavy lifting to the
multilateral allies. The risk is that
meaningful negotiations may be delayed until well after another administration
is in place, if the current team is not reelected. The choice may
not be the administration’s to make because North Korea may not be willing to
make concessions according to the administration’s timeline. Multilateral negotiations may go on for an
extended time given North Korea’s style of bickering, belligerence, and
grandstanding. If a freeze can be put
on the nuclear program as further negotiations for an aid package continue and
if the WMD proliferation risk is kept low during the negotiations, then the
talks will have achieved some interim success.
Keeping North Korea coming to the table and maintaining a cohesive
alliance with the regional partners is in itself important. Ultimately, it is the parallel passage of
time, North Korea’s continued interactions with other countries, and eventual
change in leadership that will facilitate the achievement of long term
goals. The key is not to let North
Korea disrupt our overall strategic regional goals for Asia. Patience is required. Keep
him under a strain and wear him down. Sun
Tzu ENDNOTES
[1] Joseph Kahn with David E. Sanger, “North
Korea Disdains More Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, 30 August 2003,
1.18. [2] Donald G. Gross (Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld), U,.S. – Korea Relations: Now You See 'Em, Now You Don't: Elusive Six-Party
Talks , Columbia International Affairs Online, January 2004, [3] Sam Howe Verhovek and Barbara Demick,
“Beijing Summit on North Korea Lives Up to Low Expectation” Los Angeles
Times, 30 August 2003, sec. A. [4] Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Six Party Talks End (29/02/2004),
http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/xw/t69626.htm
. [5]David E. Sanger, “Intelligence
Puzzle: North Korean Bombs,” New York Times, 14 October 2003, A.9. [6] Mitchell B. Reiss, North
Korea Must Alter Behavior or Face Continued Isolation, Remarks by the
United States Department of State’s Director of Policy Planning to the Heritage
Foundation, 12 March 2004, http://usinfo.state.gove/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=March&x=. [7] Sung-Joo Han, “The
Koreas’ New Century,” Survival (Winter 2001/2002), 85-95. [8] The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America,
September 2002. [9] Gross. [10] “Asia: Report from the
Icy Frontier: China and North Korea,” The Economist Newspaper, Ltd.,
London, 7 December 2002. [11] Boem Chul Shin, et al.,
“Balancing American Alliance and North Korean Issue: South Korea’s Emerging
Security Challenge,” Kida Papers, No. 1 (April 2003), 1-8. [12] Shin. [13] These plans are still
being negotiated and have generated some controversy. The overall idea however, is consistent with goal to reframe the
U.S.-South Korean relationship. General
Leon Laporte, “Changes in United States Force Structure to Enhance South Korean
Security,” Remarks by the Commander of the UN Command and Republic of Korea-United
States Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea to the House
Armed Services Committee, 31 March 2004. http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?=washfile-english&y=2004&m=April&x=2. [14] Seongji Woo, “South
Korea’s Search for a Unification Strategy,” Orbis (Summer 2003) pp.
511-525. [15] Yoriko Kawaguchi, “A
Foreign Policy to Consolidate Peace,” Japan Echo (April 2003), 24-29. [16] Ken’ichi Matsumoto, “Is
This War?” (Nakasone Yasuhiro, Miyazawa Kiichi interviewed), Japan Echo
(February 2002) 24-29. [17] Katsu Furukawa,
“Japan’s View of the Korea Crisis,” Monterey Institute of International
Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 2003. http://cns.mils.edu/. [18] Furukawa. [19] Shin. [20] “North Korea Country
Profile 2003,” The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2003. [21] “North Korea Country Profile 2003,” The Economist
Intelligence Unit Limited 2003. [22] Linda Rothstein,
“Knowing/Not Knowing Mr. Kim,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no.
2 (2003), 11. [23] James T. Laney and
Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2003. [24] Homer T. Hodge, “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters
33 iss.1 (2003): 68. [25] Hodge, 68. [26] Kim Myong Chol, “Kim
Jong Il’s Military Strategy for Reunification,” Comparative Strategy 20
no.4, (Oct 2001): 303. (Although the author is a Japanese citizen with dubious
links to North Korean leadership, his work has gained an audience and is
remarkably detailed and seemingly authoritative.) [27] Han S. Park. “North
Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy Choices.” Pacific
Affairs 73, no. 4 (Winter 2000/2001): 503. [28] The National
Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. [29] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The
Grand Chessboard; American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New
York: Basic Books, 1997), 151-193. [30] Brzezinski. [31] Howard M. Krawitz, “Resolving
Korea’s Nuclear Crisis: Tough Choices for China,” Strategic Forum no.
201 (August 2003). [32] David Shambaugh, “China
and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term,” The Washington
Quarterly 26.2 (2003): 43-56. [33] Andrew Scobell, “China
and North Korea: The Close but Uncomfortable Relationship,” Current History,
(September 2002): 282. [34] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The
Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Basic Books, New York,
2004, 122. [35] Paul VanVagenen,
“United States Economic Sanctions—Non-traditional Success Against North Korea,”
Law and Policy in Internal Business 32, no. 1 (2000): 239. [36] David C. Kang, “The
Avoidable Crisis in North Korea,” Foreign Policy Research Institute 47
no. 3 (2003): 506. [37] Kang, 505. [38] Ralph A. Cossa, “Regional
Overview: Diplomacy Fails with Iraq, Is North Korea Next?”, Pacific Forum
CSIS, April 2003, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/cpc/cpc_apr03a.pdf [39] Jane Morse,
“Multilateral Talks Offer North Korea Important Opportunity,” Bureau of
International Information Programs,
U.S. Department of State, August 2003 < http://usinfo.state.gov> (25 September 2003). [40] Mitchell B. Reiss, North Korea Must Alter Behavior or
Face Continued Isolation, Remarks by the United States Department of
State’s Director of Policy Planning to the Heritage Foundation, 12 March 2004, http://usinfo.state.gove/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=March&x=. [41] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China, Six Party Talks End (29/02/2004), http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/xw/t69626.htm
. [42] Zbigniew Brzezinski,
“The End Game,” The Wall Street Journal, 23 December 2003, sec. A. [43] Thomas Friedman, The
Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, (New York, Random
House, 2000) 67. [44] Henry S. Rowen, “Kim
Jong Il Must Go,” Policy Review, no. 122, (Dec 2003 – Jan 2004). [45] LTG Michael Dunn,
President of the National Defense University, interview, 12 Jan 04. [46] Rowen. [47] Rowen. [48] East-Asia-Intel, “Groups Urge
Preparations For 'Massive Flow Of North Korean Defectors,“ December 9, 2003. [49] Peter Maass, “The Last Emperor,” The New York Times Magazine, October 19, 2003, 38-47, [50] Park. [51] Park. [52] Maass.
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