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2002
    Contents:
    Contending with a Nuclear North Korea December 23, 2002: PFO #02-28A
    North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy December 23, 2002: PFO #02-27A
    Reinventing North Korea December 20, 2002: PFO #02-26A
    Is the Axis of Evil Synchronizing its Asymmetric Offensive? December 20, 2002: PFO #02-25A
    Response to Alexandre Mansourov's essay "North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key" posted on NAPSNet of December 9, 2002. December 13, 2002: PFO #02-24A
    North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key December 9, 2002: PFO #02-23A
    All Deals Are Off? Contending with a Nuclear North Korea November 20, 2002: PFO #02-22A
    Tactically Smart, Strategically Stupid: The KEDO Decision to Suspend Heavy Fuel Oil Shipments to the DPRK November 15, 2002: PFO #02-21A
    Current Developments on the Korean Peninsula: Are There Grounds for Hope? November 5, 2002: PFO #02-20A
    Responding to North Korea's Surprises November 1, 2002: PFO #02-19A
    North Korea's Nuclear Program: An Assessment Of U.S. Options October 30, 2002: PFO #02-18A
    North Korea Back to the Future October 30, 2002: PFO #02-17A
    Deja Vu All Over Again? October 29, 2002: PFO #02-16A
    Can North Korea's Perestroika Succeed? October 25, 2002: PFO #02-15A
    Response to "Agreed Framework Is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding Is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis" October 25, 2002: PFO #02-14A
    Get the Message Right at APEC - North Korea's Last Gambit October 25, 2002: PFO #02-13A
    Agreed Framework Is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding Is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis October 24, 2002: PFO #02-12A
    Pyongyang's new strategy of 'Frank Admission' October 24, 2002: PFO #02-11A
    North Korea as the Ninth Nuclear Power? October 24, 2002: PFO #02-10A
    Pyongyang's Dangerous Game October 23, 2002: PFO #02-09A
    A Bombshell That's Actually an Olive Branch October 23, 2002: PFO #02-08A
    North Korea - Carrots or Sticks? October 22, 2002: PFO #02-07A
    The Kelly Process, Kim Jong Il's Grand Strategy, and the Dawn of a Post-Agreed Framework Era on the Korean Peninsula October 22, 2002: PFO #02-06A
    North Korea's Latest Nuclear Gambit October 21, 2002: PFO #02-05A
    The Agreed Framework is Dead: Long Live the Agreed Framework! October 16, 2002: PFO #02-04A
    Koizumi and Kim Jong-Il: Hope for the best, prepare for the worst September, 2002: PFO #02-03A
    North Korea - the Case for Micro Level Engagement February 19, 2002: PFO #02-02A
    Avoiding War on the Korean Peninsula February 19, 2002: PFO #02-01A

    Henry Sokolski
    Contending with a Nuclear North Korea
    December 23, 2002: PFO #02-28A

    PFO essay |

      Henry Sokolski, Executive Director The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, argues that now that North Korea has admitted that it has been secretly enriching uranium for nuclear weapons and insisted that it has a right to possess them, the United States and its allies are faced with three security problems. First, they limit the instability Pyongyang's nuclear program might cause. Second, they must prevent North Korea's example from encouraging other countries from proliferating. Third, they must encourage the current North Korean government to become one that is willing to self-disarm. Consequently, the U.S. and its allies must do all they can to encourage the tyrannical militaristic regime in Pyongyang to give way to a less hostile one by shoring up allied defenses and playing a far more active role in supporting North Korean human rights.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Leon V. Sigal
    North Korea Is No Iraq: Pyongyang's Negotiating Strategy
    December 23, 2002: PFO #02-27A

    PFO essay |

      In this essay by Leon Sigal, Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Research Council, argues that instead of trying to compel rightly reluctant allies to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea, President Bush needs to ask himself, Is the world's only superpower tough enough to sit down and negotiate in earnest with North Korea?

      This essay originally appeared in the December 2002 issue of Arms Control Today and was reprinted with permission.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Will B. Weaver
    Reinventing North Korea
    December 20, 2002: PFO #02-26A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below by Will Weaver makes the case that North Korea is undergoing a profound transformation that the rest of the world is unaware of. Consequently, North Korea must be given the chance to nurture its economic and political development through the support of the US and other nations. North Korea has nothing to lose. Therefore, the world must offer them something to gain. Will Weaver presently resides in China and has visited North Korea three times. Will Weaver is a pseudonym.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    David S. Maxwell
    Is the Axis of Evil Synchronizing its Asymmetric Offensive?
    December 20, 2002: PFO #02-25A

    PFO essay |

      This essay by David S. Maxwell asserts that North Korea's announcement of their nuclear development program may be a synchronized action among members of the U.S.-designated "axis of evil." The announcement potentially relieves pressure on Iraq, attacks US credibility, and further erodes the focus of US anti-terrorism efforts. While not advocating direct military confrontation, Maxwell argues that a visible commitment to South Korea is necessary and could be demonstrated by the re-start of such exercises as Team Spirit. David S. Maxwell is a U.S. Army officer with service in various command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Europe for 22 years.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army or the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Timothy Savage
    Response to Alexandre Mansourov's essay "North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key" posted on NAPSNet of December 9, 2002.
    December 13, 2002: PFO #02-24A

    PFO essay |

      Below is commentary by Timothy Savage on Alexandre Mansourov's essay "North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key" posted on NAPSNet of December 9, 2002. The original piece can be found here.
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    Alexandre Mansourov
    North Korea Goes Nuclear, Washington Readies for War, South Korea Holds Key
    December 9, 2002: PFO #02-23A

    PFO essay |

      Dr. Mansourov argues that North Korea is going nuclear, while the United States seriously considers using force to disarm and even dismantle the North Korean regime. Pyongyang and Washington are dead set on a head-on collision course. Whether war will erupt on the Korean peninsula or not will ultimately depend on the choice of the South Korean people. The December 19, 2002, presidential elections will indeed be a watershed event, which may decide whether there will be war or peace on the Korean peninsula after the conclusion of the Iraqi operation next year.
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    Henry Sokolski
    All Deals Are Off? Contending with a Nuclear North Korea
    November 20, 2002: PFO #02-22A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below is by Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Sokolski asserts that given recent events reviving the 1994 Agreed Framework is unwise, and rather North Korea must pay a price for its violations. Moreover, North Korea must also hand over to the IAEA all the nuclear technology and hardware it illicitly imported. Finally, the United States and its allies should give up the idea of renewing or retaining the 1994 deal, and apply more direct pressure to North Korea.

      This piece was originally published in the National Review On-line on November l9, 2002.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Peter Hayes
    Tactically Smart, Strategically Stupid: The KEDO Decision to Suspend Heavy Fuel Oil Shipments to the DPRK
    November 15, 2002: PFO #02-21A

    PFO essay |

      Peter Hayes argues that the KEDO decision to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK was imprudent. He suggests that the United States has lit a very short fuse to nuclear proliferation in North Korea. He argues that the DPRK should declare a unilateral freeze on its uranium enrichment activity and invite the international community to inspect this freeze pending the resumption of US-DPRK dialogue to resolve the enrichment imbroglio.
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    Han Sung-Joo
    Current Developments on the Korean Peninsula: Are There Grounds for Hope?
    November 5, 2002: PFO #02-20A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below is by Professor Han Sung Joo, President of Korea University and former ROK Foreign Minister (1993-94) when the US-DPRK Agreed Framework was negotiated. Han argues that North Korea must be further embedded into relationships of deeper dependence upon the outside world, particularly South Korea, the United States and Japan. Similar to the 1994 "carrot and stick" approach by South Korea and the United States that led to the Agreed Framework, a similar strategy must be employed today, but with greater multilateral coordination.

      This essay was originally presented as a speech given by Han Sung-Joo at the University of British Columbia on October 30, 2002.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    John Feffer
    Responding to North Korea's Surprises
    November 1, 2002: PFO #02-19A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below by John Feffer, author of numerous articles on Korea, and editor of the forthcoming "Power Trip: U.S. Foreign Policy after September 11," asserts that North Korea is keen to win a deal with the United States that will allow it to pursue economic reform, but the Bush administration has largely ignored the DPRK's attempts to engage the world. At the same time, North Korea fears that the Bush administration, after dislodging Saddam Hussein, will apply its regime-change policy to Pyongyang. The recent nuclear revelations are North Korea's latest attempt to shock the United States into negotiating a package deal that would include security guarantees. Pyongyang's policy of nuclear deterrence and Washington's policy of preemptive strikes are inextricably linked, and a solution to the current crisis requires a rethinking of both policies.

      This essay was originally published in Foreign Policy in Focus on October 24, 2002. It can be found:
      http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0210nk.html

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Steve LaMontagne
    North Korea's Nuclear Program: An Assessment Of U.S. Options
    October 30, 2002: PFO #02-18A

    PFO essay |

      The analysis below is by Steve LaMontagne, senior analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC. LaMontagne notes that the Bush administration faces the same set of policy options as did the Clinton administration in the early 1990s when North Korea threatened to pull out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: War, Isolation, or Diplomacy. While war and isolation entail considerable risks, diplomatic negotiations may find little support on Capitol Hill and among administration hawks who bristle at the thought of being blackmailed by Kim Jong Il. The key test of the administration's commitment to a diplomatic solution to the North Korea nuclear problem will be whether or not it abandons diplomacy at the first sign of stubborn, erratic, or objectionable behavior by North Korea. If this happens, diplomacy could eventually give way to the threat of military action.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Glyn Ford
    North Korea Back to the Future
    October 30, 2002: PFO #02-17A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below is by Glyn Ford, member of the European Parliament representing South West England. He has visited North Korea five times. Ford argues that any possible resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue falls squarely on the shoulders of South Korea and Japan. Potentially, the EU and China could help supply the political impetus to overcome US opposition, while South Korea and Japan could provide the bulk of the financial resources in exchange for the normalization of relations with North Korea.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Ralph A. Cossa
    Deja Vu All Over Again?
    October 29, 2002: PFO #02-16A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below is by Ralph A. Cossa President of Pacific Forum CSIS. Cossa asserts that what President Bush needs to do during his summit meeting with ROK President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro is to clearly spell out his preconditions for a resumption of US-DPRK dialogue. Moreover, President Bush should also reiterate his administration's pledge to engage in constructive dialogue, once Washington's immediate security concerns are satisfactorily (and verifiably) addressed. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi should make it clear in his own statement that, while dialogue will continue, there will be no real progress toward normalization until the nuclear issue is resolved. Finally, South Korean President Kim, instead of pressuring Washington to resume talks with Pyongyang, must also endorse Washington's preconditions and announce that further progress in North-South relations, and especially hard currency payments that could easily be diverted to pay for a nuclear weapons program, will also hinge on Pyongyang removing this clear and present danger to the people of South Korea.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Wada Haruki
    Can North Korea's Perestroika Succeed?
    October 25, 2002: PFO #02-15A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below is by Wada Haruki, Emeritus Professor of the University of Tokyo and a specialist in Russian and Korean history and politics. Haruki notes that while North Korea's recent Japanese abduction admission and apologies are significant, North Korea must make much more clear how the people were abducted and how they died, punish those responsible for carrying out the crimes. They must search out the remains and hand them over, and make it possible for families to visit the graves of the deceased and to meet with survivors, and for the survivors to return to Japan. Despite all this, it is extremely important that agreement was reached at the Japan-North Korea summit to reopen the normalization talks and that basic principles were agreed for the deadlocked diplomatic negotiations. This is profoundly significant for the peace of Northeast Asia.

      This essay was originally written for Sekai (Tokyo).
      It was translated by Gavan McCormack and the English version appeared on Znet (http://www.zmag.org/weluser.htm).
      The original text can be found at http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=2484§ionID=40

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Hugo Wheegook Kim
    Response to "Agreed Framework Is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding Is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis"
    October 25, 2002: PFO #02-14A

    PFO essay |

      Below is commentary by Hugo Wheegook Kim and Peter Hayes on Kim Myong Chol's "Agreed Framework Is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding Is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis" posted on NAPSNet of October 24, 2002. The original piece can be found here.
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    Victor Cha
    Get the Message Right at APEC - North Korea's Last Gambit
    October 25, 2002: PFO #02-13A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below, by Professor Victor D. Cha, Director of the American Alliances in Asia Project at Georgetown University, argues that President Bush's meetings with Asian leaders at the APEC summit in Mexico this weekend provide the opportune moment to get the message right with regard to North Korea's surprise admission of a secret nuclear weapons program. Over the past week, a debate has raged inside the US government and among outside experts about how to respond. Many moderates have argued that this new nuclear revelation is North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il's perverse but typical way of creating crisis to pull a reluctant Bush administration into serious dialogue. Before the world accepts the North's confession as a cry for help, Bush must convince his counterparts at Los Labos to see Pyongyang's actions for what they are -- a serious violation of a standing agreement that will in effect be North Korea's last gambit at peaceful engagement with the United States and its allies.
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    Kim Myong Chol
    Agreed Framework Is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding Is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis
    October 24, 2002: PFO #02-12A

    PFO essay |

      This essay was contributed by Kim Myong Chol, Executive Director of the Center for Korean-American Peace, Tokyo, and the former editor of People's Korea. Kim is also author of "Kim Jong Il's Reunification Strategy," a book published in both Seoul and Pyongyang. Kim asserts that the Geneva Agreed Framework is "brain dead" by Western standards. North Korea is not to blame, but rather it is the United States that is responsible for the virtual collapse of the nuclear deal. A package settlement, which addresses North Korean security concerns, will go a long way to defuse the crisis.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

      *Editorial Note*: Tomorrow, the Nautilus Institute will begin running commentaries in response to our recent reports on the developing situation in North Korea. Nautilus invites you to respond to this forum, including any responses to this essay. Please send all commentary to: napsnet@nautilus.org
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    Jekuk Chang
    Pyongyang's new strategy of 'Frank Admission'
    October 24, 2002: PFO #02-11A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below is by Jekuk Chang, a Tokyo based attorney-at-law and Visiting Fellow at Keio University in Tokyo, who is currently working on a book on "Clinton's policy toward North Korea, 1993-2000. Change asserts that Pyongyang's recent admission of secret nuclear program has to be viewed as an effort to build up its credibility with the United States, although the burden of proof lies squarely with North Korea. At the same time, however, Washington must also be prepared to give Pyongyang some breathing space if it hopes to achieve its ultimate objectives involving North Korea.

      The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or positions of the U.S. government or the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, nor do they necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Victor Gilinsky
    North Korea as the Ninth Nuclear Power?
    October 24, 2002: PFO #02-10A

    PFO essay |

      The essay below is by Victor Gilinsky, an energy consultant who has written on US-DPRK nuclear relations since 1993 and former commissioner of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Gilinsky argues that The North made its admission about a uranium enrichment program to serve its security interests and create more opportunity for economic blackmail while, in their view, risking little. It reflects a DPRK assessment of Western, Japanese, and South Korean weakness. They very likely have one or more plutonium-based nuclear weapons, and apparently have the prospect of many more and think they can get the world to accept that. We have to prove them wrong. This puts us in a tough spot in Korea and more generally in enforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty, whose future is in the balance. As an immediate first step, the US should close out the KEDO LWR project.

      The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or positions of the U.S. government or the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, nor do they necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Timothy Savage
    Pyongyang's Dangerous Game
    October 23, 2002: PFO #02-09A

    PFO essay |

      The following essay is by Timothy Savage, Nautilus Associate and Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Seoul. Savage draws on a previous Nautilus workshop on scenarios for the future of US-North Korean relations ( ../security/Korea/index.html) to examine the security situation following North Korea's revelation of a clandestine uranium enrichment program. He notes that all four scenarios developed at that workshop postulated some sort of crisis with the Agreed Framework, but the outcome of the scenarios differes greatly depending on how the various countries respond. He argues that we have reached a crossroads on the Korean peninsula, and that the scenarios can provide a helpful roadmap of where the future might lead.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Leon V. Sigal
    A Bombshell That's Actually an Olive Branch
    October 23, 2002: PFO #02-08A

    PFO essay |

      In the essay below, Leon Sigal, Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Research Council asserts that unlike Iraq, by acknowledging its nuclear program, North Korea is opening the door for negotiations with Washington. Moreover, Sigal argues that the US has little choice than to respond diplomatically, if it wants to avoid a nuclear-armed North Korea.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

      This article originally appeared in the Los Angeles Times on Friday, October 18, 2002. It can be found here:
      http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-oe-sigal18oct18.story
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    C. Kenneth Quinones
    North Korea - Carrots or Sticks?
    October 22, 2002: PFO #02-07A

    PFO essay |

      Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones short essay offers an alternative approach to dealing with North Korea. Abandoning the narrow rubric of "carrots" or "sticks," Quinones argues for a reminder and re-visitation of the over-arching objective of peace and stability. After all, complete US disengagement from North Korea will only further isolate North Korea, while straight-up appeasement will only encourage North Korea to continue its history of coercive diplomacy. Therefore, cooler heads must prevail and calm and collected multilateral engagement free of pre-conditions must be pursued on both sides.

      The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Alexandre Y. Mansourov
    The Kelly Process, Kim Jong Il's Grand Strategy, and the Dawn of a Post-Agreed Framework Era on the Korean Peninsula
    October 22, 2002: PFO #02-06A

    PFO essay |

      This essay highlights the major parameters of the Kelly process and discusses the possible outlines of Kim Jong Il's grand strategy vis--vis the United States. It argues that the North Korean leadership used the "Kelly moment" to send a dual message of nuclear deterrence and cooperative engagement to the Bush administration. The author believes that whereas in the short run, the ongoing "chicken hawk engagement" between Pyongyang and Washington is likely to bring to an end the agreed framework era on the Korean peninsula, in the long term, it is likely to lead to a quiet burst of the DPRK's "nuclear bubble" and eventual "friendly co-optation" of the DPRK's nuclear assets by the ROK "white knight."

      The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or positions of the U.S. government or the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, nor do they necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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    Andrew Mack
    North Korea's Latest Nuclear Gambit
    October 21, 2002: PFO #02-05A

    PFO essay |

      This essay focuses on the consequences and future implications of relations between North Korea and the United States given the North Korea's surprise admission of a clandestine nuclear weapons program via enriched uranium. It argues that the United States is in a lose-lose foreign policy situation due to potential accusations of hypocrisy (vis a vis its foreign policy with Iraq) and accusations of wrongful appeasement. While it remains unclear why North Korea chose now to reveal its nuclear weapons program, the essay asserts that Pyongyang stands to gain much potential political leverage over the United States, as war is not an option, and neither is permitting Pyongyang to continue its uranium enrichment program.

      Andrew Mack is Director of the Human Security Center at Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia and author of the study, Proliferation in Northeast Asia (Stimson Center, Washington DC, 1996).
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    Peter Hayes
    The Agreed Framework is Dead: Long Live the Agreed Framework!
    October 16, 2002: PFO #02-04A

    PFO essay |

      This essay analyzes breaking news that the United States holds the DPRK to be in "material breach" of its promise to not develop nuclear weapons. It reviews what the DPRK might be doing with uranium enrichment and concludes that there is no innocent explanation. It speculates that the DPRK might have aimed to force the United States to resume dialogue. Alternately, it might have been developing a clandestine nuclear weapons capacity for long run strategic value in the face of its degraded conventional military forces. Finally, the essay states that the Agreed Framework has been dead for some time, but that short of war, it is inevitable that eventually the DPRK and the United States create a new cooperative framework.

      Peter Hayes is Director of the Nautilus Institute and author of Pacific Powderkeg, American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea.
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    Victor Cha
    Koizumi and Kim Jong-Il: Hope for the best, prepare for the worst
    September, 2002: PFO #02-03A

    PFO essay |

      This short piece on the meaning and implications behind Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi's upcoming historical trip to North Korea is by Professor Victor Cha of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Cha asserts that while Koizumi's trip to North Korea this month appears to be a positive development aimed at reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and a step toward convincing the Bush administration's skeptics to press forward with engagement, the mission could end up reinforcing hawk perceptions in Washington that engagement with the DPRK is a necessary, albeit, fruitless exercise, doomed for failure. Professor Cha is also director of the American Alliances in Asia Project at Georgetown University
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    Bryan Port
    North Korea - the Case for Micro Level Engagement
    February 19, 2002: PFO #02-02A

    PFO essay |

      The following article was contributed by Bryan Port who is presently a graduate student at Georgetown University and an analyst with SAIC supporting a military client. Port asserts that the present Sunshine Policy is incapable of dealing with a politically deteriorating North Korea and ineffective in terms of threat reduction and reunification. Consequently, Port argues that micro-projects must be put in place to prepare for the inevitable collapse of North Korea. Port offers pragmatic examples of micro-engagement such as North-South joint reforestation programs, information technology, infrastructure improvement, and municipal management.
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    Peter M. Beck
    Avoiding War on the Korean Peninsula
    February 19, 2002: PFO #02-01A

    PFO essay |

      The following article was contributed by Peter M. Beck, Director of Research at the Korea Economic Institute of America. Beck argues that the Bush administration's current campaign against North Korea has more to do with political convenience than it does with combating terrorism. Consequently, Beck asserts that if the Bush administration has decided to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution, then it is ultimately up to the North and the South to determine the fate of the Korean Peninsula.
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