Aidan Foster-Carter
Seoul's Secret Success
November 21: PFO #03-45A
PFO essay |

In his essay, Aidan Foster-Carter, honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University in England, asserts that the numbers regarding North Korean trade as reported by South Korea's Korea Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy are distorted. On the surface, it appears Japan and China are North Korea's main market, but closer scrutiny of the number reveals how much inter-Korean trade is in fact transpiring. In the first half of 2003, North-South Korean trade totaled US $269 million, comprising $112 million in Northern exports and $157 million in imports. South Korea is well on track to gain the pole position of Pyongyang's top market, and second place in trade overall. So why obfuscate it?

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Avery Goldstein
The North Korean Nuclear Challenge And American Interests: Getting The Priorities Right
November 7: PFO #03-44A
PFO essay |

The paper below is by Avery Goldstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Goldstein argues that while an agreement guaranteeing a "nuclear-free" North Korea would be desirable for the United States, there remain other strategic outcomes that fall short of that goal, but may nonetheless prove advantageous to US interests in reducing the risk of the spread of nuclear materials.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Peter Hayes
Bush's Bipolar Disorder and the Looming Failure of Multilateral Talks With North Korea
October, 2003: PFO #03-43A
PFO essay |

Peter Hayes, Executive Director for the Nautilus Institute, writes that in the mid-1990s, Ukraine-which had possession of approximately 1,900 former Soviet nuclear warheads-agreed to get rid of them all in exchange for security assurances, economic support, and energy assistance. Hayes argues that this model could be applied to North Korea as well. Through energy assistance, economic aid, and security guarantees, China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States could cooperatively engage North Korea in exchange for accelerated and verified dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear capability.

Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

Go to Hayes' essay.

This essay was originally published in the October 2003 issue of Arms Control Today: (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Hayes_10.asp).


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Nicholas Eberstadt
Diplomatic Fantasyland: The Illusion of a Negotiated Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
September 23, 2003: PFO #03-42A
PFO essay |

Nichoas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, argues that a negotiated settlement to the North Korean nuclear drama would be the most desirable outcome for all of the DPRK's neighbors. However, a diplomatic settlement resulting in a permanent and irreversible denuclearization is an exceedingly unlikely prospet. Eberstadt identifies three major obstacles to a peaceful diplomatic solution: Pyongyang's own nuclear intentions, the international precedents for other would-be proliferators that would be established by any deal that rewarded the DPRK, and Pyongyang's credibility as a negotiation partner.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Alexandre Y. Mansourov
Whither the Coast of Salvation: Navigating Troubled Waters in Northeast Asia Amidst North Korean Nuclear Crisis
August 22, 2003: PFO #03-41A
PFO essay |

Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that the international community has a rare historical opportunity to use the six-party talks in Beijing not just to settle old scores and pin down old enemies, but to advance the cause of Korean unification thereby finally resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, reuniting two Koreas in a peaceful and democratic manner, and bringing better governance and economic prosperity to the North Korean people. He believes the Beijing process may well become "the contrarian's dream come true," surprise everyone, and turn out to be much more productive, far-reaching, and momentous than any previous talks on the North Korean nuclear problem.

The views expressed in this article are personal opinions of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the APCSS or the U.S. government. Nor do they necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute.
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Peter Hayes
Plutonium Pineapples: Avoiding Awful Choices Over North Korean Nuclear Exports
August 20, 2003: PFO #03-40A
PFO essay |

Given the pressures that could lead to armed conflict between the United States and the DPRK in the near future, Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, outlines four scenarios that try to answer whether or not possibilities exist for a peaceful resolution between the United States and the DPRK before November, 2004. Hayes also addresses the questions: What are the strategic elements of such scenarios? What are the pitfalls? If the conflict spins out of control, in what ways could one push towards a peaceful outcome? This Op-Ed was based on the second annual Nautilus Institute US-DPRK Scenarios Workshop held in May 2003.
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Peter Hayes
Last Chance To Avert A Korean Krakatoa
August 11, 2003: PFO #03-39A
PFO essay |

Given the pressures that could lead to armed conflict between the United States and the DPRK in the near future, Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, outlines four scenarios that try to answer whether or not possibilities exist for a peaceful resolution between the United States and the DPRK before November, 2004. Hayes also addresses the questions: What are the strategic elements of such scenarios? What are the pitfalls? If the conflict spins out of control, in what ways could one push towards a peaceful outcome? This Op-Ed was based on the second annual Nautilus Institute US-DPRK Scenarios Workshop held in May 2003.

The full report can be found: ../DPRKBriefingBook/scenarios/DPRKscenarios2003.pdf
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Leon V. Sigal
N. Korea: Fibs versus Facts
August 5, 2003: PFO #03-38A
PFO essay |

Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, asserts that the Bush administration has been misleading in its portrayal of North Korea by spreading three "inexactitudes" concerning North Korea's nuclear intention, role in the Agreed Framework, and the possibility of its collapse. Moreover, a U.S. strategy of strangulation cannot be effective unless all of the North's neighbors are willing to join in. However, none are willing to, as they all realize that pressure without negotiations won't work with Pyongyang.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Paul O'Sullivan
Chairman's Statement: From Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) meeting in Brisbane on 9-10 July
July 16, 2003: PFO #03-37A
PFO essay |

This statement by Paul O'Sullivan, the Chairman of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) at their meeting in Brisbane on 9-10 July

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Peter Hayes and Jon Wolfsthal
Verifying North Korean Nuclear Disarmament - A Technical Analysis
June 2003: PFO #03-36A
PFO essay |

The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula continues to pose the most serious security threat to U.S. interests and friends in East Asia. North Korea's nuclear activities include both an active plutonium production capability and a still-under-construction uranium enrichment capability. This program presents a critical security challenge for the United States, countries in East Asia, and, through North Korea's potential to sell nuclear materials abroad, the entire world. All of the states engaged with North Korea agree that the goal of international efforts should be the complete elimination of North Korea's nuclear program and the firm establishment of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. To achieve this worthy goal, both political and technical agreements will need to be negotiated and implemented to ensure that any commitments are sustainable and reliable. On the technical side of this equation, at the very least, there are viable options for verifying a complete freeze and dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities and its nuclear capabilities.
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Brad Glosserman
A Verification Regime for the Korean Peninsula
June 18, 2003: PFO #03-35A
PFO essay |

Brad Glosserman, director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, asserts that any real solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis will ultimately be a "Grand Bargain" with military, economic, political, and diplomatic components. Fashioning that deal will require aggressive and creative thinking. One possibility is the formulation of a Korean Peninsula Nuclear Verification Regime

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views.
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Mindy Kotler
Interdiction May Not Just Modify North Korea's Behavior
June 13, 2003: PFO #03-34A
PFO essay |

In this essay, Mindy Kotler, Director of the Japan Information Access Project, argues that the interdiction of North Korean ships is the right thing to do. Slowing the export of illicit arms, currency, missiles, and drugs from North Korea is the most direct way to get the attention of the DPRK's elites. We need to hit hard North Korea's leaders in a place they understand: their own pocketbooks. Interdiction, however, may potentially have a number of dramatic, unintended consequences for which the US policy officials need to be prepared. The most important is the likely revelation that some "legitimate" elements among our Chinese and Japanese "allies" also benefit from this trade.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Su-Hoon Lee and Dean Ouellette
Tackling DPRK's Nuclear Issue through Multilateral Cooperation in the Energy Sector
May 27, 2003: PFO #03-33A
PFO essay |

In the paper below, Su-Hoon Lee and Dean Ouellette of Kyungnam University argue that given the breakdown in U.S.-DPRK relations, a viable alternative to avoid possible catastrophe on the Korean peninsula is urgent. The authors assert that energy sector cooperation may provide the most sound and politically acceptable solution to the problem we now face in Northeast Asia. This paper examines Northeast Asian regional energy cooperation by briefly reviewing North Korea's energy situation, the problems associated with KEDO, and regional positions toward North Korea and energy sector.

The authors would like to thank Han Dae Won, Heo Jun Kyu, and Timothy Savage for their participation and contribution in "DPRK's Energy and Environment" study project conducted during the fall semester, 2002 at the Graduate School of North Korean Studies.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Moon Chung-in
A Letter to President Bush: Come Up With Mutually Acceptable Solution to NK Issue
May 12, 2003: PFO #03-32A
PFO essay |

Moon Chung-in is professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul. In his open letter to United States President George W. Bush, Moon refutes the notion that South Koreans are willing to tolerate a nuclear North Korea. However, Moon urges that the most effective way of transforming the North is not through invoking ultimatums, but by recognizing and engaging it. Unless earnest negotiations are first attempted, South Korea cannot support punitive measures against North Korea for its failure to comply with inspections and dismantling.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Ruediger Frank
North Korea: 'Gigantic Change' and a Gigantic Chance
May 9, 2003: PFO #03-31A
PFO essay |

The essay below is by Ruediger Frank, Visiting Professor at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute of Columbia University. Based on research done on the DPRK's extraordinary 1998 ideological switch and quantitative analysis of its 2002 price reforms, Frank argues that the DPRK is on the brink of profound and meaningful economic reforms. Moreover, Frank concludes that by allowing the DPRK a fair chance to reform themselves would produce a much more sustainable result than a change induced from the outside.

This essay is an abridged version of a much longer and detailed academic paper which is to be submitted for publication in May 2003.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Alexandre Y. Mansourov
North Korea Is Poised To Cross The Nuclear Rubicon: Will The Canary Die In The Mine?
April 24, 2003: PFO #03-30A
PFO essay |

Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues Kim Jong Il's game plan in Beijing includes a) treating the Chinese intermediaries as a pro-American party at the talks, which are best approached as a two against one boxing match; b) giving both, the PRC and the United States, an advance notice about pending initiation of reprocessing operations; c) tying down Washington at the negotiation table and buying time for military build-up at home; d) watching for the "canary in the mine" to die as an early warning signal about possible American attack; and e) framing the United States up in a way delegitimizing any U.S. unilateral military action against the North in the eyes of the international community. He further argues that the trilateral talks offer the United States a venue to present a real ultimatum to North Korea in the presence of Chinese witnesses - disarm and open up or else, with China's tacit support behind the scenes for further enforcement action in case of the North Korean non-compliance. Dr. Mansourov concludes that the Beijing trilateral talks are likely to end up with a spectacular diplomatic disaster and may lead to further escalation of nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The views expressed in this article are personal opinions of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the APCSS or the U.S. government. Nor do they necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute.
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David Wolff
A Role For Russia In Korean Settlement
April 10, 2003: PFO #03-29A
PFO essay |

This paper was originally prepared for the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy sponsored by the Center for International Policy and Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago, Brookings Institution, Washington, January 9, 2003. The 28-member panel included Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., former Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff; two former U.S. ambassadors to South Korea, Donald P. Gregg and James T. Laney; Lee H. Hamilton, Vice-Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States; Ambassador Robert L. Gallucci, who negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea; and Selig S. Harrison, Chairman of the Task Force, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy and a leading Korea expert; and the directors of research institutes specializing in Korea and East Asia at ten leading Universities. The Task Force convened on three occasions between November 2002 and January 2003. It was co-sponsored by the Center for International Policy and the Center for East Asian Studies of the University of Chicago. Funding was provided by the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the Center for East Asian Studies. For more information on the task force: http://www.ciponline.org/asia/

David Wolff, Senior Scholar, Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, asserts that US-Russia cooperation can play a significant role in settlement of the Korean Peninsula, as it will provide security assurances to Pyongyang from a source it trusts more than the US, while providing a stepping stone on the way to expansions and improvements in US-NK ties and renewed cooperation with the IAEA. It points the way toward regional discussions that will not automatically turn into a reprise on Cold War alliances with the US-Japan-SK triangle opposing the Russia-China-NK side.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Mindy L. Kotler
Toward An 'Asian' North Korea
April 8, 2003: PFO #03-28A
PFO essay |

Mindy Kotler, director and founder of the Japan Information Access Project in Washington, DC, asserts that the Bush administration must examine its three fundamental assumptions of North Korea: 1) Kim Jong Il is a gangster and not a legitimate head of state; 2) North Korea is a client state of the People's Republic of China; and 3) North Korea's neighbors are not concerned with another Asian nuclear power. By failing to analyze these assumptions, the Bush administration has hindered a creative response to North Korea's nuclear program.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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William C. Potter and Phillip C. Saunders
Double Trouble?
April 4, 2003: PFO #03-27A
PFO essay |

William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Phillip Saunders, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, argue that given the current war in Iraq, North Korean efforts to potentially escalate the crisis carry a high risk of misperception and unintended consequences. The potential for major miscalculations by both the United States and the DPRK is compounded by lack of agreement in Washington about what the United States seeks from North Korea and what it should be prepared to pay. The administration's failure to draw "red lines" about proscribed behavior means that North Korea can only guess what actions might prompt a forceful U.S. response.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Kimberly Ann Elliott
The Role of Economic Leverage in Negotiations with North Korea
April 1, 2003: PFO #03-26A
PFO essay |

In this essay, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Research Fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C. outlines the strategy and potential efficacy of economic sanctions on North Korea. Consequently, Elliott concludes, multilateral cooperation and negotiation are critical to peacefully resolving the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. While North Korea's closest neighbors are again resisting the sanctions option, if economic sanctions were part of a carrots and stick strategy to negotiate a resolution to the crisis, they might choose to cooperate-especially if the principal alternatives are continued instability or a military strike.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Desaix Anderson
Crisis in North Korea: the U.S. Strategic Future in East Asia
March 27, 2003: PFO #03-25A
PFO essay |

The following is text of a speech given on March 20, 2003 by Desaix Anderson at the Croft Institute of International Studies University of Mississippi Oxford. Anderson asserts that success through bi-lateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea was attainable last fall and might still be attainable if our diplomacy were flexible and deft. But time has become very short and it may already be too late. We may now be faced with only two options: catastrophic war or a nuclear-armed North Korea. Desaix Anderson served for thirty-five year as a Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Department, working in and on Asian issues, was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-92) and executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for over three years until April 2001. He currently writes on Asian issues and paints in New York City.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. State Department, KEDO, or the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Markku Heiskanen
A Multilateral Scenario For Korea; The Role Of The European Union
March 25, 2003: PFO #03-24A
PFO essay |

Markku Heiskanen is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Nordic Institute of Asia Studies in Copenhagen. Heiskanen asserts that the European Union will undoubtedly produce an official response to the proposed ideas for a multilateral scenario on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, including the conference idea proposed by the European Parliament. If such a conference were successfully organized, it may be the first step on the way to a larger and deeper multilateral process on the Korean Peninsula, and in Northeast Asia, with the eventual participation of the European Union.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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AKim Seung-kuk
Let's send human shields of anti-war and peace to North Korea: Proposal to peace activists and NGOs of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan
March 21, 2003: PFO #03-23A
PFO essay |

Kim Seung-kuk, Chairperson of the Solidarity of Korea Reunification Peace Committee in South Korea, asserts that the most visible way of preventing war on the Korean peninsula is to deploy human shields in potential areas of conflict to disrupt attackers from bombing the area. As severe international denunciation will be directed at any U.S. attack endangering the lives of U.S. or Japanese activists, they can really be a "shield" against a U.S. attack on North Korea.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Moon Hayong
Korean Nuclear Crisis: Benefits of a Multilateral Approach
March 20, 2003: PFO #03-22A
PFO essay |

This paper was presented on March 14, 2003 at a meeting of the North Pacific Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Delegates from both the DPRK and the ROK were in attendance, along with 40 international officials or academic experts who attended as private citizens.

Moon Hayong is Director-General for Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea. This article represents his own personal views as expressed at the 10th CSCAP North Pacific Working Group meeting at UC Berkeley, March 13, 2003.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Kim Sam Jong
US Policy Toward the Korean peninsula and its Implication for northeast Asia
March 20, 2003: PFO #03-21A
PFO essay |

This paper was presented on March 14, 2003 at a meeting of the North Pacific Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The DPRK ambassador to the United Nations and two delegates from a Pyongyang defense think tank attended the meeting, along with 40 international officials or academic experts who attended as private citizens.

Kim Sam Jong is a Senior Researcher at the DPRK Institute for Disarmament and Peace in Pyongyang. This article represents his own personal views, as expressed at the 10TH CSCAP North Pacific Working Group meeting at UC Berkeley, March 14, 2003.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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David C. Wright
Assessment of the North Korean Missile Threat
March 18, 2003: PFO #03-20A
PFO essay |

David Wright, Co-Director and Senior Scientist for the Global Security Program at the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, provides a brief assessment of North Korea's long-range missile program and capability. Wright argues against the belief that North Korea possesses long-range nuclear missile capability or even has the ability to rapidly acquire one. In reality, a more likely threat is short-range missiles launched from ships, which uses simpler technology and appears far more feasible for a country like North Korea.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Michael Levi
JASON's Tactical Lessons
March 14, 2003: PFO #03-19A
PFO essay |

Michael A. Levi, Director of the Strategic Security Project at the Federation of American Scientists, asserts that today we again find the Bush Administration speaking loosely of tactical uses for nuclear weapons, in Iraq or in future contingencies. The enormous power of nuclear weapons often tempts military planners to inevitably view bigger as better. But the central lesson of the 1966 JASON study, echoed throughout fifty years of thinking about nuclear weapons, is that the wider the context in which nuclear weapons are viewed, the narrower their appeal.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Willis Stanley
From Vietnam to the New Triad: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Korean Security
March 11, 2003: PFO #03-18A
PFO essay |

Willis Stanley is Director of Regional Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. In this essay, Stanley argues that while the JASON 1966 study of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia sufficiently concludes that in 1967, tactical nuclear weapons were not the tool most appropriate for the job of closing the supply routes between North and South Vietnam, it does not provide any universal truth about the utility of tactical nuclear weapons in 2003, in locales other than Vietnam. The US should not limit itself to assessing the utility of the Cold War nuclear force for the post-Cold War world-we should focus on how to best adapt and transform that force to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. Today's situation on the Korean peninsula is indicative of trends that will shape how we approach the future utility of nuclear weapons.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

Go to the original 1966 JASON Study.
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Peter Hayes and Nina Tannenwald
A Bad Idea in Vietnam, an Even Worse Idea Today
March 9, 2003: PFO #03-17A
PFO essay |

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute and Nina Tannenwald of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University argue that the 1966 JASON study on the first use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam is a stark warning that using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against Iraq, North Korea or transnational terrorists would make more likely increase the risk of nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies.
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Steven Weinberg
Making the Case Against Calamity
March 9, 2003: PFO #03-16A
PFO essay |

In the essay below, Weinberg recounts his participation in the 1966 report that urged against the first-use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Vietnam war. Weinberg concludes that today the US should beware of moving beyond nuclear deterrence by developing low-yield weapons for attacking underground facilities. Steven Weinberg won the Nobel Prize for physics in 1979 and present teaches at the University of Texas at Austin.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Alexandre Y. Mansourov
The Reagan Solution to the North Korean Puzzle: Strategic Benign Neglect and Back-breaking Arms Race
March 3, 2003: PFO #03-15A
PFO essay |

Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that Kim Jong Il is engaged in a two-level game whereby his domestic political and economic considerations are as important to him, if not more, as the signals, which he sends to and receives from the international community. The author believes that at the current stage of confrontation, Kim Jong Il is not interested in any sort of negotiations with the United States. Kim wants the Bomb, and North Korea will do its utmost to become a nuclear state, whether it will officially declare it outright or not. On its part, Washington refuses to negotiate with Pyongyang because it pursues a Reaganesque strategy, reminiscent of the old Cold War days, of mounting international isolation and an escalating arms race that will hopefully lead to an implosion of the bankrupt North Korean state. The author argues that the real danger from such an uncontrolled escalation of tensions is an accidental outbreak of hostilities contrary to the real intentions of all the parties concerned. Mansourov outlines the initial steps to be required to jump start constructive negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington at the time of total mutual distrust, zero credibility, and personal enmity among leaders. Mansourov is Associate Professor of Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

The views expressed in this article are personal opinions of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the APCSS or the U.S. government. Nor do they necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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John Fetter
Gas Fired Electrical Generation, Catalyst for DPRK Security and Development
February 25, 2003: PFO #03-14A
PFO essay |

This essay is by John Fetter, President of FSI Energy, a consulting organization specializing in energy and environmental improvement. Fetter asserts that a gas fired electrical generation strategy would benefit the DPRK for several significant reasons. Gas fired electric generation would provide the DPRK with clean, technologically appropriate, available generation capacity in a reasonable time frame. Gas would also supply industrial fuel and excellent power quality without relying on a limited transmission grid.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Marcus Noland
North Korea and the South Korean Economy
February 21, 2003: PFO #03-13A
PFO essay |

This essay is by Marcus Noland, Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics. Noland asserts the following three arguments: (1) engagement with the aim of transforming North Korea is a desirable policy from the standpoint of South Korea; (2) collapse and absorption along German lines would not be catastrophic for South Korea; and (3) regardless of South Korea's stance toward the North, it remains economically vulnerable to the vagaries of North Korean behavior. This paper is to be presented to the Roh Government Transition Team in Seoul, Korea on February 24, 2003.

It was originally posted on the Institute for International Economics website: http://www.iie.com/papers/noland0203.htm

A more detailed analysis of the North Korean economy can be found: http://www.iie.com/papers/noland1002.htm

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Phar Kim Beng
Can Japan Go Nuclear In Months?
February 12, 2003: PFO #03-12A
PFO essay |

The essay below is by Phar Kim Beng. Beng asserts that living next to North Korea, a threatening neighbor that has the means and intent to go nuclear, Japan has every reason to follow suit. However, there is a whole gamut of issues, political, strategtic, psychological, and even technical, that Japan has to overcome before it can adopt a nuclear deterrent. Consequently, Japan cannot be a nuclear power in the foreseeable future. Beng is a Malaysian and former Asian Public Intellectual fellow attached to the United Nations University.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Peter Hayes
Charging The Nuclear Red Line
February 10, 2003: PFO #03-11A
PFO essay |

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, argues that unless the Bush administration initiates talks directly with North Korea immediately, the United States will end up with a nuclear-armed North Korea, no military option to exercise, and a ruptured alliance with South Korea who will go-it-alone.
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Alexandre Y. Mansourov
Security Dilemma, War Trap, and the South Protectorate over the North
February 10, 2003: PFO #03-10A
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Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that as the security dilemma facing the United States and North Korea in the current nuclear standoff aggravates, they increasingly fall into the war trap. Although Pyongyang and Washington talk peace, neither side has the interest nor will to negotiate at the present time. Instead, they are both stuck in the escalation mode and actively prepare for war. Dr. Mansourov suggests that perhaps, in the long run, a South Korean protectorate over the North Korean state, encompassing the areas of national security and foreign policy, can bring about peaceful resolution of the escalating nuclear crisis and guarantee peace and stability on the nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

The views expressed in this article are personal opinions of the author and do not reflect the official positions of the APCSS or the U.S. government. Nor do they necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute.
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Chung-in Moon
ROK-DPRK Engagement and US- ROK Alliance: Trade-off or Complementary
October 23, 2003: PFO #03-09A
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The following paper is by Chung-in Moon. Moon outlines several cooperative schemes to aid the ROK and US in coping with North Korean uncertainty. Concurrently, they also serve as confidence building measures between the ROK and US. Chung-in Moon is professor of political science at Yonsei University and vice president of the International Studies Association (ISA) in North America. This paper was presented at the US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop, organized by Nautilus and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 27, 2003, Washington, D.C.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Jon B. Wolfsthal
Getting Back to Go: Re-establishing a Freeze on North Korea's Plutonium Fuel Cycle
January 31, 2003: PFO #03-08A
PFO essay |

This paper by Jon B. Wolfstahl, Director, Non-Proliferation project at the Carnegie Endowement for International Peace, analyzes how North Korea could "unfreeze" its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, especially at the pond that stores plutonium in spent fuel rods. The paper explains the operations that may be underway according to news that American spy satellites over North Korea have detected trucks moving fuel rods at the Yongybon nuclear facilities. These rods could be spent fuel from the storage pond en route to the reprocessing plant (or new fuel headed for the research reactor, or both). Whichever, the DPRK may be crossing a "red line" for the Bush Administration. It also outlines what would need to be done to "refreeze" these facilities as part of the Bush Administration's diplomatic search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear confrontation with the DPRK. The paper was presented at the US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop in Washington DC on January 27, 2003, an event co-sponsored by Nautilus Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

More information on the US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop can be found:
../security/workshop/index.html

Accompanying this paper is a visual presentation by the US Department of Energy on the spent fuel rods at Yongbyon that the North Koreans may be moving by truck. The Department worked with the DPRK to put these radioactive rods containing plutonium that can be used to make rods into sealed cans at Yongbyon. This presentation (in PowerPoint) provides the first published images of the actual rods and canning process that is now being undone by the DPRK.

The Powerpoint presentation can be found: ../security/workshop/Mohr.ppt

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Mitchell B. Reiss
Negotiating with North Korea: Lessons Learned (and Relearned?)
January 30, 2003: PFO #03-07A
PFO essay |

The essay below is by Mitchell B. Reiss, Dean of International Affairs College of William & Mary Williamsburg, Virginia and was presented at the US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop in Washington, D.C. January 27, 2003. Reiss asserts that based on history and recent events, constructive diplomatic relations with North Korea are possible, so long as the United States pays mindful attention to nine guiding principles.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Seongwhun Cheon
North Korea's Nuclear Problem: Political Implications and Inspection Formats
January 24, 2003: PFO #03-06A
PFO essay |

The paper below is by Seongwhun Cheon, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification in South Korea. It will be presented at the U.S.-DPRK Next Steps Workshop on January 27, 2003, in Washington, D.C. The workshop is co-sponsored by the Nautilus Institute and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In his paper, Cheon outlines interim and final solutions to feasibly inspecting North Korea's uranium and plutonium programs, as well as offers his insight on the short and long term political implications of the present North Korea nuclear stand-off.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Emily Landau
US-North Korean Brinkmanship: Relevance To The Middle East?
January 23, 2003: PFO #03-05A
PFO essay |

Emily Landau is director of the Arms Control Regional and Security project at JCSS. In her essay below, Landau argues that the current nuclear stand-off between North Korea and the United States is an exercise in brinksmanship. More importantly, if the US ultimately adopts policies that reflect a lack of confidence in the present global arms control and non-proliferation regime, and relies more heavily on coercive or offensive measures, this will significantly affect how threats are viewed and dealt with throughout the Middle East.

This essay was originally published for Tel Aviv Notes by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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Markku Heiskanen
Eurasian Railways - Key To The Korean Deadlock?
January 22, 2003: PFO #03-04A
PFO essay |

Markku Heiskanen is Chairman of the Finland - Northeast Asia Trade Association and presently a visiting senior fellow at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) in Copenhagen. In the essay below, Heiskanen argues that the reconnection of the trans-Korean railway could serve as a strong confidence and security building measure for North and South Korea. Further connecting the trans-Korean railway with the Eurasian railways networks through China and Russia may ultimately open up prospects for the Eurasian railways to become an important multilateral confidence and security resource, not only on the Korean peninsula, but for the entire Northeast Asia region.
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Gavan McCormack
Putting Pressure on Rogues
January 15, 2003: PFO #03-03A
PFO essay |

North Korea is accused of many things, often encapsulated in the term "rogue state." Steps are now being taken to apply pressure to bring it back in line with its international obligations, especially those under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even Australia has become involved, dispatching a three-man mission to Pyongyang. This short paper considers the question of roguishness in international behavior, the appropriateness of international pressure to resolve the problem, and the implications of the widening rift between Washington, persisting in its Cold War policies of containment and Seoul, where confidence in the efficacy of engagement grows.

Gavan McCormack is research professor of East Asian History at the Australian National University. He is co-author of Korea since 1850 (New York, St Martin's Press, 1993). Other recent essays of his on North Korea may be found in New Left Review, November-December 2003, in The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 January 2003 and Z Magazine.
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Peter Hayes
DPRK Energy Security Without Rewarding Bad Behavior
January 13, 2003: PFO #03-02A
PFO essay |

The following article was contributed by Bryan Port who is presently a graduate student at Georgetown University and an analyst with SAIC supporting a military client. Port asserts that the present Sunshine Policy is incapable of dealing with a politically deteriorating North Korea and ineffective in terms of threat reduction and reunification. Consequently, Port argues that micro-projects must be put in place to prepare for the inevitable collapse of North Korea. Port offers pragmatic examples of micro-engagement such as North-South joint reforestation programs, information technology, infrastructure improvement, and municipal management.
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Fred McGoldrick
The DPRK Enrichment Program: A Freeze and Beyond
January 10, 2003: PFO #03-01A
PFO essay |

In the essay below, Fred McGoldrick responds to North Korea's January 10, 2003 announcement of their intended withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by outlining what concrete steps the DPRK could take to implement a freeze of its uranium enrichment activities. McGoldrick also attempts to answer the following questions: What enrichment activities should the DPRK "freeze"? Who should verify such a freeze? How should such a freeze be verified?

McGoldrick has been involved in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and international nuclear cooperation for over 25 years. He has served in the U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Energy. McGoldrick retired from the State Department in 1998. McGoldrick is currently a principal and manager in the consulting firm, Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, an international consulting firm.

The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.
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