‘KOREA’
Peter Hayes
April 20, 2004
The learning objectives for your
presentation are for course members to:
- Understand
the half century crisis on the Korean Peninsula;
- Appreciate
the internal and external drivers of contemporary dynamics;
- Assess
the policy options for resolving the current nuclear crisis.
1. ORIGINS OF FIFTY YEARS OF KOREAN CRISIS
The Korean crisis has deep historical origins ranging back
to Japanese imperialism in East Asia and colonialism in Korea specifically; the
division of Korea at the end of World War II by the United States; the eruption
and suppression of a civil war by a Soviet-backed regime in the North and a
US-backed counterinsurgency campaign and regime in the South; the catastrophic
eruption of the Korean War; and the overlay and deep imprint on both Koreas of
the Cold War superpower standoff and the introduction of nuclear deterrence
into Korea by the United States.
Readings:
B. Cumings chapter
from E. Abrahamian et al, Inventing the Axis of Evil, New Press, 2004.
P. Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, Part 1, Bonus Fear, pp. 3-88 in
American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea, on line at: http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/PacificPowderkegbyPeterHayes.pdf
2.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DRIVERS OF CONTEMPORARY
DYNAMICS
The North Korean nuclear proliferation threat is a classic
example of a complicated, over-determined global problem. Like a badly tangled
pile of ropes, each aspect of the Korean security dilemma is intertwined: the
on-going division of the Peninsula and inter-Korean reconciliation, threat of
nuclear proliferation and war, domestic downward spiral of North Korea,
relations of the great powers to the Peninsula and to each other, weight of
history and culture, and North Korea's barrier to regional economic
integration. The more you tug on one strand to undo the tangle, the more other
knots in the pile tighten.
The issues can be framed as geopolitical, that is,
what are the driving national interests of the great powers that intersect in
the Korean Peninsula and what capabilities can these great powers bring to bear
with respect to each other via their Korea policies? Conversely, what opportunities does this flux of great power
force swirling around the Peninsula offer to the two Koreas in terms of small
power diplomacy and alliances to obtain offsetting balances of power both with
respect to each other and with respect to external insecurities arising from
enduring great power interests in Korea.
Alternately, the issues may be framed as primarily inter-Korean,
that is, as the result of competition between the two Koreas for legitimacy and
power in a divided nation. In this
view, the DMZ represents best the mutual lethal intent of the two Koreas with
respect to each other. As this conflict
is complete and antagonistic, inter-Korean cooperation is purely tactical and
the underlying competition constrains any geopolitically imposed or derived
resolution in Korea. In the short-term,
rapprochement and reconciliation can postpone the eventual day of reckoning
between the two Koreas, but eventually one or other of the two Koreas must
dominate.
Finally, the issues may be framed
as intra-Korean, that is, the domestic dynamics of power and control in
North and South Korea make geopolitical or inter-Korean conflict resolution
difficult or even impossible. In this
view, the rigidity of the DPRK regime is contrasted with the inevitability of
transition on the one hand; and the roller coaster ride of the rising social
forces of the “386 generation” that collide with the conservative “old guard”
in South Korea is viewed as a critical “alliance management” problem for the
United States in the context of global nuclear non proliferation and the war on
terrorism, on the other.
Readings:
Patrick
Norton, partner in law firm Alston & Bird, March 1997. Legal
Issues of Ending Armistice Agreement
Marine
Corps Intelligence Activity, Dept. of Defense, May 1997. North Korea Country Handbook
Jonathan
Pollack, Naval War College Review, 2003. The
End of the Agreed Framework
Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, 1999, Report
Critical of Clinton's DPRK Policy
Alexandre
Mansourov, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003. Challenge
of Modernity for Kim Jong-Il
J.
Wit et al, “Seven Lessons for Dealing With Today's North Korea Nuclear Crisis,”
Arms Control Today, April, 2004, on-line at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_04/GoingCritical.asp
Congressional
Research Service, 2003. Anti-Americanism in South Korea
3. ASSESS THE POLICY OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE CURRENT NUCLEAR
CRISIS
The
international community and the United States in particular confronts several
contingencies in the next weeks and months: that the DPRK deepens its nuclear
opacity, declares itself a nuclear state (and maybe tests a weapon or two), or
shifts back to sustained ambiguity as to its weapons capacities and intentions.
The possibility remains that the regime could collapse altogether, thereby
altering the tangle very quickly.
How
has such a tiny state held out for so long against international trends toward
globalization on the one hand and sustained American pressure on the other? The
DPRK's strategic goals vary diametrically from those of the United States. The
two antagonists align only in putting Korean reconciliation last in priority.
DPRK:
Kim Jong-Il's goals
|
US:
George Bush's goals
|
regime
survival
|
de-linkage
of WMD and terrorism
|
strong
military
|
de-nuclearization
of the DPRK
|
nuclear
weapons procurement
|
stability
(non-war) on the peninsula
|
economic
recovery
|
Korean
reconciliation
|
Korean
reconciliation
|
|
American
and North Korean political cultures are mirror images of one another. In the
DPRK, political power is personalized, centralized, and absolute. In the United
States, however, political power is bureaucratic, relative, devolved by
constitutional design, and legal in foundation. These antagonistic, overarching
goals and profound cultural antitheses are driving the two countries into a
collision.
Some
analysts argue that the United States is currently heading for a major failure
in its nuclear non-proliferation and security policy in the Korean Peninsula.
The Bush Administration holds the DPRK solely responsible for the failure of
the October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, and states that the DPRK must
dismantle all its nuclear activities with IAEA monitoring and verification
before the US will negotiate. As a result, for better or worse, the DPRK is now
hurling itself across the nuclear red line.
Many
who engaged the DPRK and wrestled it to the ground in 1994 believe in
straightforward solutions that can cut through the interconnected knots. For
example, the United States should open a direct dialogue with the DPRK to
settle the nuclear issue contingent upon the DPRK taking the first, unilateral
steps: freezing and refreezing its enrichment and plutonium fuel cycle
activities (including those that are currently being activated or reactivated)
and allowing the establishment and re-establishment of monitoring of its
uranium and plutonium activities, respectively.
In
contrast, the Bush Administration's North Korea policy rejects this
"narrow" approach. In fact, the Administration's policy eludes
concrete identification, short of President Bush's January 2003 statement:
"I believe the situation with North Korea will be resolved peacefully. As I
said, it's a diplomatic issue, not a military issue and we're working all
fronts."
This
policy goal relies on various general principles applied to North Korea:
- "Verifiable
dismantlement of DPRK nuclear capacities before negotiations"
- "No rewards for
bad behavior."
- "All options are
on the table."
Some cynics describe this policy
as an attitude; almost daily leaks and counter-leaks in Washington reveal the
different policy currents. Despite the public rhetoric, the essence of the Bush
Administration's position appears-at least in Pyongyang-as "regime
transformation" and delay-not engagement and rapid resolution of the
nuclear issue.
For its part, in late
February-early April 2003, the DPRK made strident reference to a
"military-first" policy built around a "massive physical
deterrent." In June, the DPRK explicitly declared that if the United
States did not engage it and address its economic concerns, then the DPRK would
rely on nuclear weapons. In 2004, the
regime virtually begged the United States to accept that it has nuclear weapons
whereas the United States resisted admitting such a possibility.
Further, critics such as former
Defense Secretary William Perry argues against the Administration's complacency
about the possibility of DPRK's export of fissile material or other WMD-related
weapons to possible state and non-state actors. Some policymakers in the
Administration, however, appear relaxed about this trend, including the
possibility of near-term nuclear tests-partly because such tests would reduce
the fissile material available to North Korea. Policymakers in the hardline
current appear to believe the following:
- The more the DPRK plays with
nuclear fire, the more it will hurt itself by alienating China and Russia.
- The Kim Jong-Il clique is
irrevocably committed to its corrupt economic base and to obtaining
nuclear weapons at any cost, even of having an economy. Therefore, the
only US policy options are either to induce a coup, squeeze it to
collapse, or ratchet up pressure to force capitulation.
- If the DPRK goes nuclear,
then the US, allies, and friends will contain the DPRK until it disarms or
collapses.
- The only way to contain the
DPRK, regardless of nuclear capacity, is for other states to share the
burden and to maximize US leverage over Pyongyang, by architecting a
global coalition-a building whose construction will require a lot of time
and effort. This building is based on the principles of anti-terrorism, no
criminal exports (drugs), non-proliferation, human rights, etc. and until
its creation, the exact principle that will lead the engagement of the
DPRK remains unknown.
Far from preparing to engage,
therefore, the hardliners focus on blocking pragmatic moves by the State
Department, specifically those that would engender an urgent bilateral deal (e.g.
put a refreeze of plutonium first, followed closely by a freeze of enrichment).
Provided that President Bush is not driving engagement from the top, if the
hardliners succeed in maintaining the status quo, then they will win the policy
battle by default.
Readings:
Nautilus Institute, 2003, DPRK Scenarios 2003 Report
(summarized in Peter
Hayes
Last Chance To Avert A Korean Krakatoa, August 11, 2003: PFO #03-39A,
on-line at: http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0339_Hayes.html
Watson Institute at Brown. 2003 North Korea
and Nuclear Weapons - Policy Options.
Center for International Policy and Center for East Asian
Studies at U. of Chicago, 2003. Report of the Task Force on US-Korea Policy
Peter Hayes, "Kim Jong Il Should Read George Bush's
Lips,” PFO 04-20, April 30, 2004, on-line at:
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0420_Hayes.html O 04-20: April 30, 2004
Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute, November 18, 2003. Seven
Step Policy to Solve the North Korean Nuclear Problem
Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute, February 20, 2004 The
Multilateral Mantra And North Korea
Peter Hayes, Arms Control Today, October 2003 Looming
Failure of Multilateral Talks
Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute, 2003. DPRK Energy
Security Without Rewarding Bad Behavior
Peter
Hayes, Plutonium Pineapples: Avoiding Awful Choices Over North
Korean Nuclear Exports, August 20, 2003: PFO #03-40A on-line at: http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0340_Hayes.html
Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute, February
12, 2004. The
Illusion of North Korean Diplomacy
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & Nautilus
Institute, 2003. Verifying DPRK Nuclear Disarmament
Benjamin Friedman, Global Security Institute, September 4,
2003. Legal
Challenge of PSI
Balbina Hwang, Heritage Foundation, August 25, 2003. Curtailing
DPRK Narco-Trafficking with the PSI