PFO 05-84A:
Why Seoul Helps the North

Chung-in Moon, Professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul, writes, “Perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is that food aid does not exist within a vacuum. It is but one part of a complex and trying effort by the South Korean government to improve inter-Korean relations, reduce military tension and help its North Korean brethren.”

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PFO 05-83A:
Meeting the North's Demands

Ha Young-sun, Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University, writes, “If we were to have progress in the discussions on implementing the joint statement in the fifth round of the six-party talks … the key challenge is to make the contradictory relationship between the pillar of nuclear abandonment, which Washington prioritizes, and the pillar of safeguarding the regime, which Pyongyang ultimately wants, complementary.”

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PFO 05-82A:
You Say Okjeryok, I Say Deterrent; No Wonder We Don't Agree

Tong Kim, a recently retired State Department official and current research professor at Korea University, writes, “if there were something the North Koreans could choose to resolve first, it would be achieving a normal, friendly relationship of trust with the United States. After that, they believe, there will be no security threat to their regime … If there were something the Americans could choose to resolve first, it would be nuclear dismantlement. So in all agreements, the sequence of measures is an issue. Judging by its language, this deal will be no different.”

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PFO 05-81A:
North Korean Markets and the Reactivation of the Public Distribution System: Dialogue between a Pessimist and an Optimist

Ruediger Frank, a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Korea University, Seoul, writes, “aside from the possibility that this might either be a temporary measure or turn out to be a misunderstanding altogether, such a move calls for some attempts at an interpretation. Would the reintroduction of the 100% PDS coverage be a sign of failure, or of success? Should we be happy or concerned? Here is a fictive dialogue between a pessimist and an optimist to answer these questions.”

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PFO 05-80A:
Hide and Seek with Kim Jong Il

Henry Sokolski, the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C. and former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993, writes, “…the U.S. will not even discuss providing light-water reactors until Pyongyang completely disarms and rejoins the NPT. Still, the deeper negotiators delve into the endless issues that must be resolved to disarm Pyongyang, the clearer the dangers and costs of doing so are likely to become.”

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PFO 05-79A:
South Korean President Battles Lame Duck Status

Bruce Klingner, Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, the world's largest political risk consultancy firm, writes: “Pyongyang's actions will affect the public's perceptions of Roh's engagement policy. North Korea’s agreement to a joint statement of principles on 19 September might have offered a respite to Roh’s declining popularity had Pyongyang not followed with a provocative statement within 24 hours... Despite $3.5 billion in South Korean aid during the past decade, Seoul has achieved little change to North Korean behavior or the nature of its regime.”

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PFO 05-78A:
Light Water Reactors at the Six Party Talks: The Barrier that Makes the Water Flow

The DPRK took less than twenty-four hours to dispel any illusions that the Joint Statement Released at Six-Party Talks on September 19th, 2005 had resolved the nuclear confrontation between the international community and North Korea (hereafter DPRK). The media and American analysts in particular have suggested that North Korea’s declarations after the Joint Statement were made in bad faith. We suggest otherwise­that North Korea was simply following the formula suggested by the United States to clarify the issues that remain to be resolved. We also believe that there is a way past the LWR obstacle that may be acceptable to all parties. In essence, substituting Russian VVER LWR technology for American-sourced LWR technology may be the solution.

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Read discussion of this essay by Chaim Braun.

Read discussion of this essay by Georgy Bullychev.

PFO 05-76A:
The Process in Place

Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was responsible for nonproliferation policy at the Department of Energy from 1997 to 2000, Seoul, writes: “The point of the Sister Laboratory program is to build mutual confidence and transparency in a low-key way, without major transfers of funds, equipment or materials… This message should be very welcome to the North Koreans. The United States, in its turn, has been able to leverage the relationships to establish new joint work in the nonproliferation arena - exactly the goal that Washington seeks with North Korea.”

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PFO 05-75A:
Food Aid to North Korea or How to Ride a Trojan Horse to Death

Ruediger Frank, a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Korea University, Seoul, writes: “And so, it comes as no surprise to read in the Chosun Ilbo …that the World Food Program was asked to shut down its Pyongyang office…We know what happens next. The North Koreans will be accused of not being grateful, the South Koreans will be told that it is their fault, the already not-so united front of the five nations at the Six Party Talks will be further weakened, and the North Korean leadership will open a bottle of Champaign.”

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PFO 05-70A:
The Collision Between Nuclear Sovereignty and Nonproliferation

Cheong Wooksik, representative of CNPK, writes: “The six-party talks, which was primarily arranged to resolve the US-North Korean conflict, could serve as a good opportunity to make the idea of a nuclear-free Northeast Asia public.”

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PFO 05-68A:
Closing the Nuclear Loopholes

Jung-min Kang, a Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, writes: “Pyongyang also has to realize that South Korea, which operates 20 nuclear power reactors at present, has had no problem generating nuclear power without enriching or reprocessing uranium, in accordance with the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

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PFO 05-67A:
North Korea Six Party Talks: The Bad News May Actually Be the Good News

Karin J. Lee, Senior Fellow at the East Asia Policy Education Project of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, writes: “In the midst of round four, the six party process if finally off to a good start – but there is a long way to go. At an August 7th Press Conference, Assistant Secretary Hill reiterated his commitment to continue direct talks with North Korea during the recess. Such an approach will go a long way toward whittling away at the divisive issues and may result in more good news.”

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PFO 05-64A:
Bush Policy Backfiring in Asia

Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in New York and editor of The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Regional Perspectives, wrote: “far from isolating North Korea, the United States is itself becoming odd man out in the region. If this misguided course had a name, it would be hawk disengagement.”

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PFO 05-63A:
Rising Stakes in North Korea

Mitchell B. Reiss, Vice Provost for International Affairs at the College of William & Mary and former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department from July 2003 to February 2005, wrote: “[the] multilateral approach has helped bring North Korea back to Beijing, but Washington must now reassert its leadership and help shape a safer future for Northeast Asia.”

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PFO 05-62A:
Why the Six Party Talks Should Succeed

Peter Van Ness, visiting fellow at the Contemporary China Centre and lecturer on security in the Department of International Relations at Australian National University as well as author of Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, wrote: “The outcome of the Six Party Talks is likely to transform the strategic relations of Northeast Asia and beyond. If they are successful and North Korea agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs in a verifiable way in return for security and economic assistance, there would be an opportunity to begin to build new security institutions in one of the most volatile regions in the world, thereby providing both strategic stability and economic opportunities for all six participant countries to advance trade and investment projects that would benefit them all.”

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PFO 05-61A:
A North Korean Visitor to the White House

Gavan McCormack, professor of social science at International Christian University, Tokyo and the author of Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink, wrote: “What has maintained the dictatorship in the North for so long has been above all the uncompromising hostility of its enemies, allowing the regime to capitalize on national pride and determination to remain independent. Rather than more intervention – to bring about “regime change” – what Korea needs is to be left alone to redress the long-continuing trauma caused by the massive interventions of the past.”

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PFO 05-59A:
Drifting into the Six Party Talks?

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and Scott Bruce, the Nautilus Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, wrote: “In short, bad intentions and bad faith can only breed further mistrust, accelerate nuclear proliferation in the region, and extend the frozen cold war in Korea indefinitely into the future. The DPRK case shows once again that strategic drift is not substitute for realistic policy when it comes to nuclear weapons.”

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PFO 05-57A:
Reframing the US-DPRK Conflict

Erich Weingartner, Editor-in-Chief, CanKor Virtual ThinkNet on Korean Peace and Security (www.cankor.ca), wrote: “Re-framing is not an escape from reality. It is a conscious effort to return to reality. It requires communication, dialogue, learning and teaching, refusing to walk away when the going gets tough, engaging without illusion for the purpose of influencing outcomes. These may be viewed as very small steps, but this is a very long-term problem. And as we have learned from the six-party process, any step is better than no step at all.”

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PFO 05-56A:
One Korea?

Charles Wolf Jr., a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation and Hoover Institution and the co-author of "North Korean Paradoxes", wrote: “How and exactly when unification may occur -- whether by system evolution or collapse, by internal dissidence, by fragmentation or by conflict -- is no less conjectural now than it was a decade earlier. At that time, such conjectures were rife, and we were surprised that none of the envisaged possibilities ensued. Now, when such conjectures are absent, and attention instead is pre-empted by North Korea's threatened or actual acquisition of nuclear weapons, we may be surprised again -- but this time in a reverse direction.”

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PFO 05-55A:
Korea's Slow-Motion Reunification

Selig S. Harrison, who has visited North Korea nine times, most recently in April, and is the author of "Korean Endgame", wrote: “For now the hard-liners are in charge in Pyongyang. Pending normalized relations, North Korea is unlikely to reduce its nuclear arsenal, if it actually has one, at any price or to permit the inspections necessary to call its bluff, if it is bluffing. Significantly, however, in my meeting with him, Kang Sok Ju proposed discussions on a new freeze agreement that would rule out further reprocessing of plutonium produced not only by the existing Yongbyon reactor but also by two much bigger projected reactors, linked to a formal North Korean commitment not to transfer fissile material to third parties.”

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PFO 05-53A:
Korea's Slow-Motion Reunification

John Feffer, author of ''North Korea, South Korea," and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, writes: "It's time for the United States to stop fantasizing about an imminent North Korean collapse. Let's support instead the Korean reunification happening right before our eyes."

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PFO 05-52A:
Should Nukes Bloom in Asia?

Walter Russell Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author, most recently, of "Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk", wrote: “A nuclear arms race across East Asia would be hugely dangerous and destabilizing. Far better that the Bush administration convince China that the wiser course is to prevent a nuke race by telling Pyongyang the time has come for a deal.”

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PFO 05-51A:
Finger on the Button

Bruce Klingner, Korea analyst for Eurasia Group, an independent research and consulting firm that provides global political risk analysis, wrote: “A test would remove the strategic ambiguity that allows Beijing and Seoul to avoid acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear state… A test would likely derail any potential diplomatic resolution to the nuclear impasse, encouraging a range of more aggressive US strategies.”

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PFO 05-49A:
Dealing With the North Korean Nuclear Threat

Don Oberdorfer, Distinguished Journalist in Residence and adjunct professor of international relations at the Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, wrote: “The United States didn't like the leaders of the Soviet Union -- but we found ways to engage them. We didn't like the Chinese in the era before the 1970s, but we found ways to engage them also. I believe that ways can be found to seriously engage the North Koreans, difficult as it might be. Whatever means are chosen to deal with it, the problem of nuclear weapons in the divided Korean peninsula is too dangerous to be left to fester.”

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Read comments on Dealing With the North Korean Nuclear Threat.

PFO 05-47A:
Same Bed, Different Nightmares: Diverging U.S. and South Korean Views of North Korea

L. Gordon Flake, Executive Director of the Mansfield Foundation, writes: "The U.S.-ROK alliance, however, was built on the foundation of a common nightmare, the threat from North Korea. How the two nations address that nightmare, and how the current crisis on the Peninsula is resolved, will ultimately determine what dreams Korea and the United States will share in the future."

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PFO 05-45A:
Speech at the Conference "Prospects for U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the Second Bush Administration"

This speech by U.S. Representative James A. Leach, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, was delivered to the CSIS and Chosun Ilbo Conference on "Prospects for U.S. Policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the Second Bush Administration" on May 17th, 2005. Representative Leach said, “A credible change in strategic direction away from isolation, repression, and nuclearization would put the DPRK’s international footing on a basis of amity and cooperation, with prosperity in close reach. One of our many tasks in the weeks ahead is to make that previously unthinkable possibility easier for the North Korean leadership to imagine.”

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PFO 05-42A:
North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?

The International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, multinational organization, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, writes: “North Korea will not and should not receive significant international development assistance until it gives up its nuclear weapons, but it would be worthwhile trying already to develop a better understanding of the country's economy and what it will require in the way of help. Whether the regime survives or not, North Korea will need officials who are better versed in economic matters and have a greater exposure to the world.”

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PFO 05-41A:
U.S. Can't Act Alone in North

This editorial appeared in the Joong-Ang Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper. The editorial states: “The United States probably knows full well that in a real emergency, it would be impossible to act without South Korea. Nor could we cope with an emergency in the North without U.S. support. South Korea and the United States must wisely resolve this discord in a spirit of alliance.”

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PFO 05-40A:
The South-South Conflict and Korean Residents in Japan

Lee Jong Won, Professor at Rikkyo University in Tokyo, writes: “The most significant cause of continued confrontation surrounding policy toward North Korea is the DPRK's use of the nuclear card as a survival strategy and the tension Pyongyang still creates, thus, resolving these issues is of first priority.”

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PFO 05-39A:
DPRK Trip Report

Selig Harrison, author of Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement and director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy, writes: “Once again, Pyongyang is offering to negotiate a freeze that would prevent further reprocessing, as it did in June, 1994, leading to the Agreed Framework, and as it has repeatedly offered to do in the six-party talks. This is the good news emerging from my ninth visit to North Korea from April 5 to April 9. The bad news is that Pyongyang is no longer prepared to discuss the dismantlement of its existing nuclear weapons as part of the six-party process in Beijing.”

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PFO 05-38A:
President Bush’s Press Conference: Missing the Point!

Ralph A. Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, writes: “If the President truly wants a diplomatic solution he must surround himself with true diplomats . . . and he must speak and act diplomatically. Otherwise he will not only lose the diplomatic stand-off with North Korea but will lose the hearts and minds of the South Korean people as well.”

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PFO 05-36A:
What Should US Do About North Korea?

Jason T. Shaplen, Policy Adviser at the Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO) from 1995-1999, and James Laney, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea from 1993-1997, write: “In Iraq, we had the luxury of destroying the regime first to bring about the change we sought. In North Korea the opposite is true. We must engage the regime first to end and ultimately reverse its nuclear program. We must therefore hold our noses in seeking to bring the North into the world community, including securing its membership in security forums, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank etc.”

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PFO 05-35A:
A New Foreign Policy Paradigm: Perspectives on the Role of South Korea as a Balancer

Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, writes: “The recent efforts of South Korea’s president Roh Moo-hyun to establish the country not only as a mediator, but as a “balancing power in Northeast Asia to prevent possible disputes in the region” … are an expression of the dissatisfaction with the progress made under the current arrangement and could be interpreted as a change of the Status quo that benefits Beijing at the expense of the alliance with Washington, which will nevertheless not be given up. Quite remarkably, this position of being an independent actor in international relations corresponds very well with the North Korean position and opens one more field of possible future cooperation of both Koreas.”

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PFO 05-34A:
The Controversies of South Korean Society on the Issue of Human Rights in North Korea

Bohyuk Suh, an expert advisor at the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, writes: “The North Korean human rights issue should not be the only issue to be viewed, but rather, the general situation in and outside of Korea, and the task of settling for peace on the Korean peninsular, should be viewed together as a whole.”

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PFO 05-33A:
U.S. Tries New Tack in Pursuing Interests, Stability in East Asia

Bruce Klingner, an Asia analyst at Eurasia Group, an independent research and consulting firm that provides global political risk analysis, writes: “Pyongyang will calibrate its strategy to take advantage of the divisive political landscape and seek to further isolate the US from South Korea and Japan from South Korea...Such efforts collectively undermine US objectives to present a unified negotiating position to Pyongyang as well as any future attempts to garner international support for stronger measures.”

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PFO 05-32A:
"Military-First Politics" And Building A "Powerful And Prosperous Nation" In North Korea

Byung Chul Koh, Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois, Chicago, writes: “In sum, whether or not Kim Jong Il can continue to make progress, however small, in building a "powerful and prosperous nation" utilizing "military-first politics" will hinge to a striking extent on his ability to make pragmatic tactical adjustments to the changing strategic environment, thus helping to bring about a peaceful resolution of the nuclear standoff.”

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PFO 05-31A:
The EU Stretches its Foreign Policy Wings Over Korea

Dr. Soyoung Kwon, post-doctorate fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Centre of Stanford University, and Glyn Ford, member of the Korean Peninsula Delegation in the European Parliament, write: “The EU is increasingly showing a new independent stance on Foreign Policy issues as the logic of its industrial and economic integration plays out in the international arena. Now it has broken ranks over the Korean Peninsula, fed-up and concerned with the failure to resolve the ongoing crisis in North Korea.”

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PFO 05-30A:
What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime Change?

The following is part of a paper presented on March 31, 2005 by Haksoon Paik at the 2nd Korea-U.S. Security Forum, Hyatt Regency Cheju, Korea. Haksoon Paik, Ph.D. is the Director of Inter-Korean Relations Studies Program and the Director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute, an independent think tank in South Korea. Paik writes: “While the U.S. government does not have any leverage and control mechanism over North Korea’s nuclear-related activities, an inter-Korean channel could be an additional support channel for U.S. efforts to achieve the goal of nonproliferation in North Korea.”

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PFO 05-26A:
No Longer the 'Lone' Superpower: Coming to Terms with China

Chalmers Johnson, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, writes: “as a Hong Kong wisecrack has it, China has just had a couple of bad centuries and now it's back. The world needs to adjust peacefully to its legitimate claims -- one of which is for other nations to stop militarizing the Taiwan problem -- while checking unreasonable Chinese efforts to impose its will on the region.”

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PFO 05-25A:
The Folly of Forcing Regime Change

Kenneth Lieberthal is a professor of political science and of business administration at the University of Michigan, and is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was special assistant to the US president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, 1998-2000. Kenneth Lieberthal writes: "North Korea is both morally repugnant and a maddening adversary in negotiations. But simply going through the motions of negotiation in the hope that regime change will somehow happen enhances Kim Jong-Il's opportunity to develop and proliferate nuclear capabilities."

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PFO 05-24A:
The North Korean Crisis

The following is text of a speech given on March 8, 2005 by Desaix Anderson at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Desaix Anderson writes: “Kim Jong Il has repeatedly claimed, again last week, that North Korea seeks a solution that would eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs in exchange for ending U.S. hostility. Given the stakes, the U.S. is irresponsible not to test Kim’s real intentions by serious negotiations.”

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PFO 05-22A:
Allow Two Nukes For North Korea

Hy-Sang Lee, emeritus professor of the University of Wisconsin and author of North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress, writes: “Under a settlement allowing a two-bomb scarecrow strategy… Pyongyang would be committing suicide if the bombs would be used in a first strike (inviting an obliterating retaliation), and this scarecrow strategy would be rendered precarious if one of the bombs would be sold. Hence, the two-bomb settlement is a second best option which still would respect the red line of the United States.”

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PFO 05-21A:
Restore US Nukes to South Korea

John Parker, is a freelance writer based in Thailand, writes: “The nuclear cat is well and truly out of the bag, which means that the military option for reunification has slipped from Seoul's fingers for good; and will only be possible for Pyongyang if the US pulls out of South Korea completely without leaving any nuclear weapons behind - still a very unlikely scenario, recent force cuts notwithstanding…That leaves the other option: restore nuclear weapons to the South in full awareness that this could start an arms race which might lead to the collapse of the DPRK.”

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PFO 05-20A:
The North Korea Nuclear Issue and Inter-Korean Relations: Prospects and South Korea's Corresponding Strategy

Yang Moo-Jin, Professor at Kyungnam University’s Graduate School of North Korea Studies, writes: “Peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula depend primarily on the efforts of the two Koreas. The situation could be positive or negative according to how they manage it. The year 2005 is very meaningful for both South and North, since it is their 60th year of Independence, and the 5th year of the June 15 Joint Declaration. This year, I expect that we will be able to settle peace on the peninsula more firmly through economic development, improvement of the South-North relationship, and resolution of the North Korea nuclear problem.”

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PFO 05-19A:
The U.S. Congress and North Korea Policy: What’s Next for the 109th Congress?

Adam Miles, staff member at the East Asia Policy Education Project for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, writes: “concerns about North Korea’s nuclear proliferation and human rights abuses will be better addressed through policies that promote engagement. After years of resistance to negotiating with North Korea, it may be up to Congress to help get the situation back on track.”

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PFO 05-18A:
Reading North Korean Ruins

Dr. Soyoung Kwon, post-doctorate fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Centre of Stanford University, and Glyn Ford, member of the Korean Peninsula Delegation in the European Parliament, write: “security and the economy are North Korea's two top priorities. All of which seems to indicate that Kim Jong Il is firmly behind and committed to the economic reform process. For those who favor a changing regime rather than regime change the message is clear. Now is the time to engage.”

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PFO 05-17A:
Pyongyang Raises the Stakes

Ralph A. Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, writes: “North Korea has effectively played a “divide and conquer” game throughout the nuclear stand-off. If it receives conflicting signals from Washington, Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow in the face of this latest provocation, it will be encouraged to continue this tactic. The time has come for the other five finally to begin speaking with one voice to Pyongyang, to hold it accountable for its own words and actions.”

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PFO 05-16A:
The Six-Party Failure

Aidan Foster-Carter, honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds University, writes: "the Dear Leader has trouble at home too. Six-party fixations have also distracted us from internal North Korean politics: a murky area, but one where hidden eruptions begin to ruffle the bland theatrical veneer. Last year Kim purged his brother-in-law and ex-right-hand man Chang Song-taek. Three sons vie to be dauphin, with rumors of murder plots (in Vienna, even). This struggle may be over policy - hawks versus doves - or simply power. Either way, stability can no longer be taken for granted."

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PFO 05-15A:
Caught in the Muddle-Round Two of Bush vs. North Korea

John Feffer, author of “North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis”, writes: “The new team at the State Department should consider how a more flexible U.S. negotiating position­which would deal with the plutonium program first and provide incentives throughout the dismantlement process rather than just at the end­could solve one of the world’s most pressing problems and, improbable as it might seem at the moment, provide George W. Bush with a positive legacy when he retires.”

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PFO 05-14A:
North Korea's Tactics

Leon V. Sigal, director of the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York and author of "Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea", writes: “North Korea is the embodiment of evil to some Americans, who object to making a pact with the devil. Why they prefer to bluff and bluster while watching North Korea adds to its nuclear might instead of disarming it through give-and-take is a mystery of their faith.”

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PFO 05-11A:
Failure or success of a hybrid system?

Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, writes: “those who regard a strengthened market system in North Korea as beneficial are well advised to increase the total supply of food. Here, THEY can catch two birds with one stone: improve the humanitarian situation AND support a gradual transformation – with the goal of regional security and stability, not regime change per se.”

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PFO 05-10A:
China's Worsening North Korean Headache

Kosuke Takahashi, a former staff writer at the Asahi Shimbun and a freelance correspondent based in Tokyo, writes: “Chinese intellectuals suggest that North Korea is increasingly becoming a downright troublesome ally for China in its strategic and political relations. The more Pyongyang delays nuclear talks, the more Beijing loses face in the eyes of the international community as host nation, especially when China strives to promote proactive diplomacy in Asia and elsewhere as a rising economic and political power.”

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PFO 05-09A:
Chinese Cell Phone Breaches North Korean Hermit Kingdom

Rebecca MacKinnon, Research Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and founder of "North Korea zone," a weblog on North Korea, at: www.NKzone.org, writes: “Granted, many Koreans - on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone - have mixed feelings about China's growing commercial and political power in the region. Still, commercial and technological trends point to the development of a Northeast Asian telecommunications landscape in which the United States and the rest of the West will play little role - and in which the Chinese role will be key. This telecommunications landscape, in turn, will shape the way in which Northeast Asians relate to each other and the rest of the world.”

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PFO 05-08A:
Boycott or Business?

Aidan Foster-Carter, honorary senior research fellow in sociology and modern Korea at Leeds, writes: "The current stasis in inter-Korean ties partly reflects the fact that right now North Korea is no mood to talk seriously to anyone about anything. But there are also specific aspects to this always distinctive relationship between two halves of a divided land... One is the refugee issue... The other is the one field of cooperation that Pyongyang is still keen on, doubtless because there is money in it. The first goods made by an ROK firm in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ) - saucepans, as it happens - hit the stores in Seoul just in time for Christmas, and sold out in two days. So maybe an otherwise bleak New Year is not wholly without hope after all."

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PFO 05-07A:
Waiting Game

Scott Snyder, Senior Associate, Pacific Forum CSIS/The Asia Foundation, writes: It is still premature to say that the six-party process is dead, but the lengthy pause raises some dilemmas for all parties concerned. The challenges for Chinese diplomacy may be the most interesting and complex.

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PFO 05-05A:
Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.ROK Relations

Balbina Y. Hwang, Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foun­dation, writes: The United States has much to gain from maintaining its formal alliance with the Republic of Korea, as well as the broader bilateral relationship. However, to do so, both sides must work to overcome the serious gap in public perception that has emerged in recent years.

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PFO 05-04A:
2004 Was a Difficult Year. Will 2005 Be Any Better?

Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director for Non-Proliferation at Carnegie, writes: "North Korea's nuclear program cannot be eliminated, then the other members of the six party talks will have a difficult 2005and beyond. Can South Korea accept a nuclear neighbor to the North and if not, what will it do to respond over the long term? This is the questions that will increasingly occupy the minds of American experts in the years to come unless 2005 surprises many and leads to a negotiated end to North Korea's nuclear program."

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PFO 05-03A:
Korea: Forgotten Nuclear Threats

Bruce Cumings, history professor at the University of Chicago and author of several books on the DPRK, writes: "What was indelible about it [the Korean war of 1950-53] was the extraordinary destructiveness of the United States? air campaigns against North Korea, from the widespread and continuous use of firebombing (mainly with napalm), to threats to use nuclear and chemical weapons, and the destruction of huge North Korean dams in the final stages of the war."

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PFO 05-02A:
Fiddling While Pyongyang Reprocesses: Bush Administration Folly and the Emergence of Nuclear North Korea

Wade L. Huntley, Program Director at the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, writes: We cannot know whether a peaceful non-proliferation solution in Korea has already become impossible. We can know that, at this late stage, such an outcome will require bold innovation, tough engagement, and a sense of urgency in negotiations.

Go to the essay.

PFO 05-01A:
Welcome to Capitalism, North Korean Comrades

Andrei Lankov, senior lecturer at the Australian National University, writes: "the North Korean economy has indeed come a long way from its Stalinist ways. Now the government has neither money nor support nor the political will to revive the Stalinist-style central economy. There is no way back, only forward. Stalinism is dead. Welcome to capitalism, comrades!"

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-58A:
North Korea: 2005 Outlook

Brent Choi, a North Korea Specialist at the the Joongang Daily in the ROK, writes: By the end of 2005 Kim [Jong-Il] must improve ties with the U.S. through resolving the nuclear crisis and induce Japanese capital to his state. At home he must re-organize his ruling party and establish a strong basis to revive its economy by promoting investment from Japan and other countries. But if Kim fails to address those problems in timely manner he will not only be heir-less but also under serious military threat from the outside. Time is definitely not on his side.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-56A:
Runaway Ally Joins the Axis of Evil: One More Neocon Target: South Korea

Gary Leupp, Professor of History at Tufts University, and Adjunct Professor of Comparative Religion, writes: the neocons only want to cooperate in a scenario that destroys the North Korean regime, discredits forever anyone in the South who feels any sympathy with it, and suppresses the anti-American attitudes of those who want to negotiate with someone they label a tyrannical dictator.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-55A:
The Second Bush Administration and the Outlook on Its North Korean Policy: "Odd Man Out?"

David Kang, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and co-author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, writes: if the current Northeast Asian countries' policy of economic cooperation and trade were to bear fruit, then it is not inconceivable that the US itself -- not North Korea -- may become the odd man out.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-54A:
Soft Landing: Opportunity Or Illusion?

Andrei Lankov, senior lecturer at the Australian National University, writes: in the long run the system appears doomed. Sooner or later the gradual disintegration of the police and security apparatus, increasing access to unauthorized information along with manifold social changes will bring it down, probably, in a chain of dramatic, even cataclysmic events.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-52A:
What to Expect on the Korean Peninsula from a Second Bush Administration

Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies at The Heritage Foundation, writes: President Bush has made it clear on several occasions that he wants a peaceful, negotiated settlement on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention of initiating the use of force against North Korea.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-51A:
Strategy for Solving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Future of Six-Party Talks: U.S. Policy for 2005

Charles Pritchard, Visiting Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and former Ambassador and Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea, writes: The U.S. presidential election is behind us. President Bush will lead the United States for the next four years. He faces many challenges, but none more dangerous than the situation in North Korea.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-49B:
The New Image of Kim Jong-il: The First Step towards a New Leadership Model

Ruediger Frank, Professor of East Asian Political Economy at the University of Vienna, writes: by reducing his own role for the ideological stability of the system, Kim Jong-il might be resolving one of the most pressing issues in North Korean domestic politics: his succession.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-49A:
Why APEC Still Matters

Edward J. Lincoln, Senior Fellow, the Council on Foreign Relations, writes: pursued carefully with a dose of leadership by the U.S. government, APEC can continue the process of nudging the Asia Pacific region closer together economically and helping the poorer members to put themselves on a path to rapid economic growth and development.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-48A:
Mongolia's New Strategic Vision

Steve Noerper, vice president of Intellibridge and a Nautilus Institute Associate, writes: "Given its NWFZ status, transition from a Stalinist economy, and 'low frequency broadcast' of democracy, Mongolia is seeking to position itself as a more relevant regional player."

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-47A:
We Had Power to Prevent N. Korea from Going Nuclear

Peter D. Zimmerman, professor of science and security at King's College London and a former chief scientist of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, writes: While Bush looked for nonexistent nuclear weapons in Iraq - as Condoleezza Rice suggested, to ensure that the next warning did not come as a mushroom cloud - the capability to generate plenty of mushroom clouds was being acquired by North Korea.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-46A:
Koizumi's Japan in Bush's World: After 9/11

Gavan McCormack, professor in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University and (2003 to 2005) visiting professor at International Christian University in Tokyo,writes: the Japanese convention of serving the empire loyally and unquestioningly has been sanctified by a half-century of evolution as an affluent imperial dependency. In the 20th century, the benefits were large and the costs acceptable. However, the blueprints for the 21st century call for a new level of subjugation.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-45A:
Migration

G. Pascal Zachary, the author of The Diversity Advantage: Multicultural Identity in the New World Economy, writes: the influence of migrants is not limited to themselves. In short, migrants have a multiplier effect and it is only by understanding the broader social reality of migrants that we can begin to understand their actual influence.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-43A:
Colin Powell's Agenda in China

John J. Tkacik Jr, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., writes: "In these important foreign-policy matters, a candid, clear dialogue between Washington and Beijing is essential if both sides are to avoid stumbling into a crisis."

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-42A:
Japan, Heisei Militarization and the Bush Doctrine

Richard Tanter, Nautilus Institute Associate, writes: given the degree of incoherence and even irrationality of US policy under the Bush administration, the acceleration of the process of Heisei militarization by the Bush Doctrine has diminished rather than increased Japanese security.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-42B:
North Korea: Consider What We Don't Know

Daniel Poneman, member of the National Security Council staff under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, writes: ifwe defer tackling the plutonium threat while waiting for the North Koreans to admit to the world that they have been lying about their uranium program, the odds are that we will confront tragedy before we receive truth.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-41A:
Debaters Bungled Korea

Ralph Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute writes: if the situation on the Korean peninsula is serious as both candidates seem to agree and if nuclear proliferation is the greatest threat that America faces another common point of agreement then you would think the two candidates could at least get their facts straight and understand their own stated positions prior to an internationally televised debate.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-40A:
Policy Recommendations For Japan: Unification Of The Korean Peninsula

This is an except from a paper by Hideki Yamaji, 2003-2004 Japan Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Mr. Yamaji writes: Japan will need the U.S. military presence for a long time in order to build a lasting trust with the ROK, but definitely not forever. Some day in the future, Japan and the ROK will be able to form an axis of freedom and democracy in East Asia.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-39A:
The North Korean Human Rights Act and other Congressional Agendas

The following is a paper by Karin J. Lee, Senior Associate at the East Asia Policy Education Project at the Friends Committee on National Legislation Education Fund. Mrs. Lee writes: Congress should certainly be commended for raising human rights concerns about North Korea. There are, however, other practical actions that would ultimately enable the U.S. to address human rights more effectively and also address security and other concerns. Its up to Congress to widen the agenda.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-37A:
The Transformation Of South Korean Politics: Implications For U.S.-Korea Relations

This is an except from a paper by Sook-Jong Lee, Korea Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Dr. Lee writes: Under these circumstances, it is imperative for the leadership in the U.S. and South Korea to take a long term view of the alliance. By avoiding excessive politicization, both governments should be able to redefine their alliance relationship in a way that suits their individual as well as mutual national interests.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-36A:
Bush's Hardline Approach to NK is Producing No Results

The following is a paper by Harry Sterling, a former diplomat and Ottawa-based commentator. Sterling writes: "It's important for President Bush to face up to the fact that he too must be willing to be more pragmatic in dealing with North Korea if the nuclear controversy is to be resolved peacefully."

Go to essay.

PFO 04-35A:
Seoul Should Call Pyongyang's Bluff

The following is a paper by Ralph A Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Cossa writes: "North Korea's attempt to blame Seoul for the lack of progress in the six-party process is disingenuous and insulting. It's time to call Pyongyang's bluff."

Go to essay.

PFO 04-34A:
Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

The following is an excerpt from the annual report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom dealing with religion in the DPRK. The report states "there is no evidence that religious freedom conditions have improved in the past year. The Commission continues to recommend that North Korea be designated a "country of particular concern," or CPC, which the State Department has done since 2001."

Go to essay.

PFO 04-34B:
Threatening Gestures as Cries for Help? Questioning an Overly Fixed Image of North Korea

The following is an essay by Lutz Drescher. Drescher, lived as an ecumenical worker in the ROK from 1987 to 1995. Since 2001, he works for the Association of Churches and Missions in Southwest Germany (EMS) as liaison secretary for East Asia. He has participated in numerous meetings with representatives of the North Korean Christian Federation. He coordinated the first official Visit of an EKD (Evangelical Church Germany) delegation to the DPRK in May 2002. The essay states "there is thus freedom of religion, and yet it is a restricted freedom insofar as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not a democratic country with individual rights of liberty in the Western sense. One can say that the members of the church in North Korea live out their faith under particularly harsh conditions. For precisely this reason, they depend on our intercessions and visits."

Go to essay.

PFO 04-33A:
The North Korea Nuclear Issue: The Road Ahead

The following is a paper by Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation in 1999 to August 2001. Einhorn writes: "if the North Koreans have decided they must have a substantial nuclear weapons capability whatever we may do (hardly a remote possibility), they would likely reject a reasonable offer. In that event, the next U.S. administration would have little choice but to turn to a longer-term strategy of pressure, containment, and eventual rollback. But having made a proposal that North Korea's neighbors considered fair and balanced, we would be in a stronger position to gain multilateral support for that strategy."

Go to essay.

PFO 04-32A:
The Geopolitics of Energy in Northeast Asia

The following is a paper presented by Kent Calder, Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University, at the joint Korean Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) and International Energy Agency (IEA) workshop "Northeast Asia Energy Security and Regional Cooperation" in Seoul, Korea from May 17-18, 2004. In this paper Professor Calder argues that energy security is closely tied to political stability in Northeast Asia and that the DPRK is the center of this congruence. He discusses the importance of the Korean Economic Development Organization. (KEDO) and the need for a new or reissued group that includes representatives from the entire region and centers on natural gas and electricity interconnection projects.

Go to essay.

PFO 04-31A:
Another Engagement Strategy For North Korea

This paper by Marta J. Bailey, was initially written for a National War College course titled Fundamentals of Strategic Logic taught by Dr. David Auerswald and COL Dave Knack. The expanded version of the paper won the ?National War College 2004 Dean of Faculty and Academic Affairs Award for Excellence in Research and Writing.? Bailey argues that, ?keeping North Korea coming to the table and maintaining a cohesive alliance with the regional partners is in itself important. Ultimately, it is the parallel passage of time, North Korea?s continued interactions with other countries, and eventual change in leadership that will facilitate the achievement of long term goals. The key is not to let North Korea disrupt our overall strategic regional goals for Asia.?

Go to essay.

PFO 04-30A:
Moody's Parallel Universe on North Korea's Nukes

This policy forum essay is by Ian Bremmer, the President of the Eurasia Group and Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute. Bremmer argues that, ?far from being aligned in a strategy to put pressure on Kim's rogue regime, unilateral initiatives by the U.S.'s two allies at the negotiating table are undermining the prospects for a diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.?

Go to essay.

PFO 04-29A:
U.S. Troop Withdrawals and Self-Reliant Defense

This essay by Taik-young Hamm, Professor of Political Science at Kyungnam University and Advisor to the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, discusses the US troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula and its implications for the ROK. Prof. Hamm writes, ?the current asymmetric ROK-U.S. alliance structure is excessive, as is the South Korean mentality of dependence on the United States for security. South Korean citizens and government alike need to overcome this latter neurosis, while the government additionally must foster self-reliant defense posture and doctrine, diplomacy skills, and an effective indigenous ?crisis management? system rather than undertake simple arms buildups with an enlarged defense budget.?

Go to essay.

PFO 04-28A:
US Economic Diplomacy Toward North Korea

This essay by Mark Noland, Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, argues that ?the US conditions its international economic diplomacy on a variety of political concerns that redound to the detriment of the DPRK.? Thus as long as ?the trend is toward adding more such conditions to US policy, and absent significant changes in North Korean behavior, these considerations will remain relevant for the foreseeable future.?

Go to essay.

PFO 04-27A:
Options For Rehabilitation of Energy System & Energy Security & Energy Planning in DPR of Korea

This report by the DPRK delegation was presented at the Nautilus Institute?s Asian Energy Security Workshop in Beijing, China from May 12th to the 14th, 2004. The report states, "the most important task for the sustainable development of the economy is to realize the rehabilitation of existing energy systems and to ensure its long-term safety in the DPRK." The overall objective of the energy sector - an increase in production of domestic resources with improved demand side management and environmental sustainability - is subject to a lack of funding and technology. Policy priorities focus on the establishment of "an efficient, stable and sustainable system."

Go to essay.

PFO 04-25B:
?Conference Diplomacy?, All Over Again

Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute, compares the recent six-party talks in Beijing over the DPRK nuclear issue with ?Conference Diplomacy? in the 1930s. Eberstadt writes that ??Conference Diplomacy? only came to an end when the escalating provocations of dictators awakened the sleepers, and shredded the last remaining illusions of the would-be appeasers.?

Go to Eberstadt's essay.

PFO 04-26A:
Six-Party Talks: Round 3

The following is a paper presented by B. C. Koh, Director of the Institute for Far-Eastern Studies. In this paper Mr. Koh argues that the change in both the US and the DPRK?s position at the workshop was a repositioning, not a softening, of each countries stance. The United States is still looking for CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling) even if it is not using that specific term. The DPRK is likewise still unwilling to acknowledge the existence of a HEU or compromise on the distinction between a peaceful and a military nuclear program.

Go to Koh's essay.

PFO 04-25A:
Notes From Ground Zero: Power, Equity and Postwar Reconstruction in Two Eras

The following paper by Mark Selden closely examines the American occupation of Japan following the Second World War. He compares it to the current US role in Afghanistan and Iraq. Selden argues that post-war reconstruction in both cases takes a similar form, especially in regards to the use of US military bases and assets. But, he suggests, the dependency built into the Afghani and Iraqi governments by the United States leaves them lacking in legitimacy. It has also weakened the very institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan that bolstered and supported the US occupation of Japan decades ago.

Go to Selden's essay.   Go to the Discussion

PFO 04-24A:
Lessons From The Agreed Framework

In a NAPSNet policy forum essay entitled "Lessons Learned: The Road Ahead," Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci lay out seven lessons from the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations that bear directly on the current six party talks in Beijing.

Go to the essay.

PFO 04-23A:
Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Normalization and Northeast Asia Peace

The following is Wada Haruki's analysis of the larger stakes in the recent Japan-North Korea negotiations. Setting off the emotional issues of the kidnapping of Japanese against the record of Japanese colonialism in Korea, Wada examines the prospects for negotiating an agreement that could become the basis for defusing the range of contentious issues that continue to swirl around a nuclear North Korea facing acute problems of starvation and isolated from its powerful neighbor and historic antagonist, Japan. Wada Haruki is Emeritus Professor of the University of Tokyo.

Go to Haruki's essay.

PFO 04-22A:
Nuclear Dominos: Will North Korea Follow Libya's Lead?

In his essay, Mark Caprio, a specialist on Japan-Korea Relations and professor at Rikkyo University, asks the question "Will North Korea follow Libya's example and renounce its nuclear weapons programs?" Consequently, Caprio proposes that the United States must take the initiative to create the conciliatory atmosphere needed to nurture peaceful change rather than anticipate North Korea following the path of Libya. A plan that addresses the needs and interests of the North Korean state and by extension the peace and security of Northeast Asia, offers a better chance of securing North Korean cooperation in disclosure and disarmament of its nuclear arms programs, if, in fact, these weapons do indeed exist.

Go to Caprio's essay.

PFO 04-21A:
Kim Jong Il's April 2004 Visit To China

In this essay, Byung Chul Koh, director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, asserts that Kim Jong Il's recent visit to China is a significant event with meaningful implications beyond just North Korea-China relations. Rather, it potentially impacts the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, as well as all of Northeast Asia. However, the single most important outcome of Kim's visit was North Korea's reaffirmation of their commitment to the continuation of six-party talks. What is not known, however, is whether the North has agreed or intends to display "patience and flexibility" in a true sense.

Go to Chul Koh's essay.

PFO 04-20A:
Kim Jong Il Should Read George Bush's Lips

This piece by Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, argues that the recent offer by the United States to send assistance to North Korea to aid in the recovery of Ryongchon reveals a significant shift in US policy. Never before in the lead up to nuclear talks has the Bush Administration ever made a proactive offer to assist the DPRK. More importantly, Kim Jong Il must recognize this subtle yet profound shift, and not let the opportunity slip away.

Go to Hayes's essay.

PFO 04-19A: April 7, 2004
Memorandum on Areas In Which US/DPRK Joint Recovery Operations Have Been Conducted
By Ashton Ormes

PFO 04-18A:
North Korea: Guns or Butter?

By analyzing recently reported economic data and citing public statements by Minister Pak Pong-ju, Aidan Foster-Carter of Leeds University argues that at the macroeconomic level, Kim Jong-il cannot put off forever his choice between a military-first policy or a viable North Korean economy. Kim's Songun (military-first) policy is a direct and indirect barrier to economic recovery and Prime Minister Pak cannot deliver economic progress while shackled by Songun.

Go to Foster-Carter's essay.

PFO 04-17A: March 30, 2004
EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason
By Ruediger Frank

PFO 04-16A: March 26, 2004
Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy
By Raphael F. Perl

PFO 04-15A: March 24, 2004
The Proliferation Security Initiative: The Legal Challenge
By Benjamin Friedman

PFO 04-14A: March 24, 2004
Curtailing North Korea's Illicit Activities
By Balbina Hwang

PFO 04-13A: March 19, 2004
North Korea's Economic Reforms and Security Intentions
By Victor Cha

PFO 04-12A: March 15, 2004
North Korea's Legacy of Missed Opportunities
By Mitchell Reiss

PFO 04-12A: March 5, 2004
Korean Civil Society Expects Forward-Looking Six-Party Talks Towards the Resolution of the Crisis Surrounding the Korean Peninsula
by Gyung-Lan Jung

PFO 04-11A: February 23, 2004
The Six-Party Talks: Keeping Diplomacy Alive
by Balbina Y. Hwang

PFO 04-10A: February 23, 2004
Prospects for the Second Round of Six-Party Talks: The Role of South Korea
by Cheong Wooksik

PFO 04-09A: March 12, 2004
The Reality Behind South Korea-US Alliance
By Koo Kab-woo

This essay is by Professor Koo Kab-woo from Kyungnam University. Koo argues that the intervention for dismantling the unbalanced South Korea-US alliance is essential and could be done through the solidarity of the South Korean civil society with the civil society in other East Asian countries. East Asia must be re-discovered as a new space for action. Changing the historical structure of global politics in East Asia can only be possible with the intervention of the civil society

Go to Kab-woo's essay.

PFO 04-08A: February 5, 2004
Violence, Legitimacy and the Future of Japanese and American Multilateralism
By Yoshikazu Sakamoto

The essay below is by Yoshikazu Sakamoto who is Professor Emeritus at Tokyo University. Sakamoto argues that the United States occupation of Iraq is not true democratization. Democracy in Iraq will only take root through autonomous opposition to the occupation. Postwar democracy in Japan was not a direct consequence of democratization from above but through spontaneous opposition to the policy of the anti-communist occupation force. The administrations of the U.S. and Japan need to learn from this paradoxical lesson.

This is a slightly revised version of the article appeared in The Japan Times, January 1, 2004.

Go to Sakamoto's essay.

PFO 04-07A: February 11, 2004
The Multilateral Mantra And North Korea
Peter Hayes

PFO 04-06A: February 11, 2004
North Korean Political Stability in Play with Enormous Implications for South Korea
Marcus Noland

PFO 04-05A: February 11, 2004
Providing Security Assurances to North Korea
Peter Hayes

PFO 04-04A: February 6, 2004
Requisites for Resolving the Nuclear Issue
Ambassador Li Gun

PFO 04-03A: February 5, 2004
Don't Misunderstand Firing of South Korean Foreign Minister
Brent Choi

In this brief essay, Brent Choi, North Korea specialist for the Joongang Daily, argues that the recent dismissal of South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yoon Young-kwan has been grossly misinterpreted by the U.S. media as an outgrowth of the struggle between pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. factions within the Roh administration. Instead, Yoon's dismissal must be interpreted through the socio-cultural prism of South Korea's bureaucratic society.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

Go to Choi's essay.

PFO 04-02A: February 3, 2004
The Six-Party Talks Can Succeed
Leon Sigal

PFO 04-01A: January 23, 2004
The North Korea Deadlock: A Report from the Region
Briefing by Charles Pritchard