Research Kiosk
thursday, may 2, 2002


Global Peace & Security

Nuclear Policy

CHU Shulong, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
U.S. and China in the Early 21ST Century: Cooperation, Competition or Confrontation?
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JIN Guangyao, Deputy Director, Center for Korean Studies, Fudan University
The Changing Situation of the Korean Peninsula and its Impact on Security Future
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    Great and positive changes have taken place on the Korean peninsula in the year 2000. The reconciliation, to a great extent, resulted from North Korea's positive response to an external environment favorable to it. The reconciliation influences not only the inter-Korean relations, but also geopolitics and the security situation in the region. The two Koreas have reached a mutual understanding about taking their destiny in their own hands and reducing the possibility of North-South conflict to a minimum. A new opportunity for multilateral cooperation is emerging and the Korea policies of China, Russia, the US, and Japan are being challenged. Since the beginning of improvements in inter-Korean relations, the security future on the peninsula has depended mainly on how the nuclear and missile issues between the US and North Korea is dealt with. North Korea has changed its fully close-door policy and expressed its will to resolve this issue through negotiation. Therefore, the position of the US, as a superpower with military presence in the region, is decisive in the future of inter-Korean peace and regional stability.

JIN Guangyao, Deputy Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University
Implications of the New U.S. Administration for East Asia: A Chinese View
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Xia Liping, Deputy Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS
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    Peace and economic development are still the main stream in East Asia. Regional strategic framework is continuing to develop towards multi-polarization. Growth of economic interdependence between countries and the end of the Cold War have made more countries accept the new security concepts. However, there are still some factors which can cause potential uncertainty and instability in East Asia. Relationships among major powers are in readjustment. The United States intends to establish a security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region based upon its military alliances and with it as the leader. This is contrary to the main stream of peace and development in the world since the end of the Cold War. NMD and TMD will complicate the major power relationships and may cause a new arms race in East Asia. The development of arms in some countries (or regions) have been too fast. The process of relaxation on the Korean peninsula has begun, but there are still many uncertainties in the future. In the long run, in East Asia, cooperative security mechanisms may take shape with multi-levels (including regional level, sub-regional level and bilateral level), multi-forms (official and unofficial), and multi-functions coexisting.

Zhu Chenghu, National Defense University
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    Following the end of the cold war, a lot of positive developments have been witnessed in the regional security in the East Asia. These developments include the continuous relaxation of the tension in the region, which resulted from the Soviet and Russian withdrawal from the region and the end of superpower confrontation; political solutions to the hot spots, positive development in the situation on Korean Peninsula in particular; sustained and rapid economic development; profound security cooperation at different levels and on different issues; and the emerging regionalism in both economic and security fields, etc.

    However, there are still some negative factors in the security future in the region. They are unstable relations among the major powers, structural problems in the East Asia, arms race and proliferation, non-tradition threats, etc. Therefore, a sound security situation in the future in the East Asia depends heavily on the establishment of new security concepts, enhancement of security cooperation, collective efforts in countering proliferation, a practical and feasible program for the ARF and the peaceful unification of the splitting countries.

ZHU Mingquan, Deputy Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University
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Bonnie Glaser *, Independent Consultant on Asian Affairs
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    American presidential transitions inevitably bring a degree of uncertainty to Sino-US. relations. George W. Bush’s accession to the presidency is no exception. Among the many challenges facing the U.S. and China, U.S. determination to deploy missile defense systems and handling the Taiwan issue are two of the potentially most divisive and dangerous. Both will demand high-level attention by Chinese and American leaders. It is important that the two sides approach these challenges with an open mind and a willingness to consider each other’s sensitivities and concerns. An agenda for progress in Sino-American relations this year should not be overly ambitious. Washington and Beijing should identify areas where real achievements can be made and seek to bring those to fruition. Both sides should focus on issues where bilateral interests overlap and cooperation is possible. Expectations should not be set too high on either side to avoid perceived failures and subsequent disappointment. The broad objective in bilateral relations this year should be to accomplish small, but concrete progress that contributes to building trust and confidence between the two sides. Important goals that Beijing and Washington should strive to achieve this year include: engage in substantive strategic dialogue; open a dialogue on managing the strategic transition, including missile defenses; make further progress in non-proliferation cooperation; complete Chinese membership in WTO; engage in constructive interaction on human rights; work jointly to ensure a successful APEC Summit and Bush-Jiang summit; and continue close coordination and consultation on the Korean peninsula.

Dr. David M. Finkelstein*, The CNA Corporation
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Derek Mitchell, CSIS, International Security Program
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    Given a lengthy political transition process and a skeletal foreign policy team now in place in the United States, Asians and others will need to be patient in its expectations of Bush administration foreign policy. However, a general bipartisan consensus exists concerning commitment to U.S. alliances, maintaining U.S. military presence worldwide, promoting democracy and human rights, and supporting the trend towards globalization. The security/military background of the expected Bush Administration East Asia foreign policy team will lead to a less idealistic, more "results-oriented" approach to policy. The senior leadership will likely be more muted publicly in its diplomacy, preferring to consult quietly on issues of mutual interest or disagreement, while its instinctive aversion to U.S. military intervention worldwide will be challenged by the needs of U.S. leadership. The Japan-centered background of the East Asia team will be as much a challenge as a benefit to Japan due to expectations of greater bilateral cooperation, and relations with China will be based less on ideals of future partnership and more on hard assessments of its policies and intentions towards key U.S. interests, including peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. U.S. policy toward North Korea will undergo a similar review, although continuity is more likely than any profound change in approach. Dialogue on national and theater missile defense will continue with allies and others alike, but the new administration's commitment to development and deployment is clear and not negotiable. Finally, the role of Republican Party elders, a more robust vice presidential foreign policy staff, and Congress will remain wildcards in the conduct of U.S. policy in East Asia.

Brad Roberts *, Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses
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Lawrence Scheinman, Distinguished Professor of Monterey Institute of International Studies and Emeritus Professor at Cornell University
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    Reflecting on the state of nonproliferation and arms control at the beginning of the second post-cold war decade, one reaches a mixed conclusion. On the one hand, any review of developments in these arenas since the fall of the Berlin Wall shows a remarkable run of positive events, including the indefinite extension of the NPT, the strengthening of the safeguards system by the IAEA, a decision to extend the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) indefinitely in 1996, and a stream of bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives of the early 1990s. However, since the mid 1990s, the record both in non-proliferation and arms control has taken a downward turn. The contrast between the earlier and later 1990s reflects changes in the international environment and in national perceptions of security and threat. International relations turned out to be more complex and more dangerous after the cold war than during it. With the end of the cold war came the end of the disciplines that it had imposed on international politics and security. Decentralization replaced bipolarity, political relationships became more diffuse, and the nature and source of threat more diverse. Older solutions to older problems are being increasingly questioned in terms of their relevance to new threats. However, it must be understood that deterrence and defense forestall or defeat threats to national security; arms control works to remove the threats in the first instance. Maintaining and strengthening effective arms control that meets this criterion is and will remain a challenge as we move forward.

Mitsuru Kurosawa, Osaka University, Japan
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    The 2000 NPT Review Conference was held in April and May in New York and succeeded in adopting a final document. In the final document, some measures for future nuclear disarmament were listed. In this paper, I will examine what measures were agreed at the conference, what progress we can see on these measures, and what should be done to accomplish the goals.

    In general, the measures agreed at the conference were very ambiguous and not so direct or concrete. In spite of this weakness, they are very important because they are the benchmarks to which we should proceed and by which future progress will be assessed. However, in the real world, we can not be optimistic about the future progress in nuclear disarmament. The main reason resides in the U.S. program on the NMD to which Russia, China, France and other countries are opposed. It is necessary to find out a solution to this complicated issue.

Masahiro Matsumura, Professor of International Politics at St. Andrew's University, Osaka, Japan
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    This paper aims to make the above understanding more clear and explicit, and to inform the Chinese participants of potential disagreements and conflicts between the United States and Japan in creating a more militarily-effective bilateral alliance.

Satoshi Morimoto, Professor in the Faculty of International Development at Takusyoku University, Japan
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    Asia is now relatively peaceful and calm, although there is a broad consensus that the potential for uncertainty and instability is significant. The challenges to peace and stability in the region consist of two types. One is inherent sub-regional problems and the other comes from common regional issues of a transnational nature. The other aspect of dynamism in the region is the positive factors of opportunity and expectation, of which there are three elements. Northeast Asia is the only region in which the complexly interrelated interests of all four major powers overlap. On the other hand, each of the bilateral relationships between major powers has a different aspect and dimension. So far, the Korean Peninsula issue and the security in the Taiwan Strait are the most serious and common sub-regional concerns that involve the national interests and security of major actors. The Japan-US relationship will play a major role in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The Japan-US cooperation in the area of security must be considered not only from the bilateral viewpoint but, from the broader perspective of security in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The Japan-US Security Arrangements remains an indispensable precondition for the security of Japan even in the post-Cold War security environment and the range in which Japan and the US can cooperate for the security of Asia-Pacific is expected to widen.

Hideshi Takesada, Professor, The National Institute for Defense Studies
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    The ballistic missile defense (BMD) issue is attracting attention in Northeast Asia. Why is BMD necessary? Is BMD worth spending so much money on? These are some of the questions asked so far. This paper aims to provide some answers to these questions by addressing additional questions such as: how have DPRK and Chinese deployment and development of ballistic missiles proceeded? I will focus especially on the backdrop to which Pyongyang has developed ballistic missiles. This paper also discusses what implications the DPRK’s missile development has for Japan in relation to the regime’s intension and how Japan and the ROK have perceived and dealt with the US-led missile defense initiative. Last of all, this paper will point to the reasons for China’s opposition to the US-led missile defense plan and conclude by spelling out what Japan should do to deal with ballistic missile threat in the (Northeast Asian) region.

Chung Oknim, Fellow, Sejong Institute
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Chung-in Moon *, Professor, Yonsei University Center for International Studies
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    Despite the global trend toward dismantling Cold War structure since the late 1980s, North and South Korea have been trapped in a vicious cycle of mutual distrust, negation, and protracted military confrontation. However, the first inter-Korean summit talk that was held in Pyongyang in June 2000, and the adoption of the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration have brought about revolutionary changes in inter-Korean relations, and has give a new hope for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Although the historic summit was instrumental for reviving and expanding economic, social, and cultural exchanges between the two nations, it failed to produce concrete measures to resolve security problems surrounding the Korean peninsula. In order to ensure stability, both Koreas should more actively engage in negotiations on inter-Korean tension reduction, confidence-building measures, and arms control. At the same time, issues of weapons of mass destruction and missiles should be resolved. There must also be new discourses on the status of American forces in South Korea in particular and the ROK-US alliance in general. Otherwise, American forces in South Korea could become another major barrier to peace-making and peace- building in Korea. In view of this, transforming the armistice treaty into a viable inter-Korean peace treaty and forging a peaceful reunification of Korea could take a much longer time than expected. Until such goals are realized, the Korean peninsula is likely to face the perennial question of insecurity.

Vladimir Orlov (1), Director, PIR-Center for Policy Studies in Russia
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Alexander A. Pikayev*, Scholar-in-Residence, Non-Proliferation Program Co-chair of Carnegie Moscow Center
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Wade Huntley and Robert Brown, The Nautilus Institute
Missile Defense and U.S.-China Relations
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Wade Huntley and Hans Kristensen, The Nautilus Institute
NATO Nuclear Policy: Back to the Future
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Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution
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    This essay reviews the state of various U.S. programs, including those theater-missile defense (TMD) systems designed to counter short-range or medium-range missiles, and national missile defense (NMD) against threats to the American homeland, with considerable focus on the implications of missile defense for the East Asian theater. It concludes with several observations, informed partly by the China-Japan- U.S. discussion in Tokyo of June 24-25, 2000 sponsored by the Nautilus Institute and United Nations University at which I was a participant.

David C. Wright and Eryn MacDonald (1)
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WANG Qun, Director, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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    The TMD joint development by the United States and Japan now stands out as a most prominent sticking point in East Asian security in the wake of Japan's September 1999 agreement with the United States on TMD joint development. Some argue that it is a stabilizer, whereas many more argue that it destabilizes, not only constraining the relationship among the major powers in Asia, but also affecting the region, especially the East Asian security. I am grateful to the Nautilus Institute and the United Nations University in Tokyo for sponsoring this workshop and giving me the opportunity to share my personal views with our colleagues from the US and Japan on this issue. I hope that such exchanges will help all interested parties towards a better understanding on each other's concerns. I will, on a personal basis, first zero in on the strategic goals of the US and Japan in their TMD joint development endeavor before looking into its implications on various fronts.

LI Bin, Institute of Science and Public Affairs, China Youth College for Political Science
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GU Guoliang, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
NMD, TMD, Arms Control
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CHU Shulong, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
TMD And East Asian Security
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DUAN Hong, China Institute of International Studies
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Ryukichi IMAI, Institute for International Policy Studies
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    This article is a new version of my paper at the Workshop and attempts to discuss that the fundamental balance of terror remains as delicate as ever between smaller number of WMD missiles and similarly smaller number of ground based direct hit-and-kill vehicles of TMD or NMD. The level of terror may be less because people are talking about smaller scale nuclear and other attacks, but for those directly targeted it matters less whether they die as a part of the nuclear Third World War or a less noticed regional nuclear conflict. The definition of rogue states is becoming less clear with European and American major oil companies getting more interested in cutting deals with Iran, and with the sudden opening of dialogue between the North and South Korea in June, 2000.

Mitsuru KUROSAWA, School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
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    This paper examine the debates on the issue at the conference, showing how strong the opposition to the U.S. program was and how negative the issue was for the conference .

Shinichi OGAWA, National Institute for Defense Studies
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    The rationale for Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in East Asia is to ensure military cooperation among U.S. allies by reducing the risks of intimidation from ballistic missiles and to secure America's ability to intervene in regional conflicts where the potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exists. An effective TMD can dissuade countries from expanding their ballistic missile arsenals and thus contribute to non-proliferation and reduction of the number of missiles equipped with WMD.

    China and North Korea criticize East Asian TMD as accelerating the arms race and destabilizing the strategic environment in East Asia. However, China and North Korea should realize that it is their missile expansion programs that are the prime movers of the arms race in the region, and TMD is simply a response to such a buildup. Having said that, and since TMD is politically divisive, deployment of TMD in East Asia should proceed in a highly cautious manner, possibly after comprehensive dialogues and discussions among regional states concerning the significance of missile defense.

UMEMOTO Tetsuya, Shizuoka Ken-ritsu University
NMD, TMD, and Nuclear Arms Control
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    The assumption that large-scale missile defense is incompatible with nuclear arms control has been premised on an intensely hostile relationship between the hypothetical attacker and the defender, and the ability of the former to readily enlarge its strategic forces if their penetrability should be perceived to decline due to the latter's defenses. While it cannot be denied from a technical standpoint that the US NMD program (independently or in combination with the TMD program) has the potential of undermining the retaliatory capabilities of Russia and China, its deployment would not necessarily spell the end of nuclear arms control if appropriate political initiatives are taken to ensure that this potential will not be brought to reality. To ensure the prospects for nuclear arms control, however, serious efforts should also be made to adapt the concept of "strategic stability" to the nature of today's major power relations so that it will no longer rest primarily on the mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack.

Bruce Larkin, Professor of Politics, University of California at Santa Cruz
Nuclear Abolition Scenarios
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    This paper is a comparison of five proposals for denuclearization. The object is to illuminate the characteristics of any nuclear abolition design: prerequisites, initiators, participants, negotiation (original and ongoing, forum and decision processes), timing (stagings and simultaneities), removals, verification, assurances, and post-ZNW security provisions. Throughout it should be borne in mind that denuclearization is a political project in which technical facts must be carefully considered, but not a technical project. Thus each of the characteristics of designs is embedded in a political context. Negotiation, dispute formulation and resolution, popular recognition and support, and politico-military security requirements will be continually central topics in ongoing politics.

Joe Cirincione, Director, Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The Political and Strategic Imperatives of National Missile Defense
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    This paper outlines the decreasing missile threats to the United States, the technical weaknesses of proposed missile defense systems and details the political divide at the root of the missile defense debate.

Lisbeth Gronlund, Senior Staff Scientist, the Union of Concerned Scientists
Countermeasures to the Proposed US NMD System
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Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute
British Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament and NMD
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David L. Paldy, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc
National Missile Defense and US Domestic Politics
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Eric Arnett, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Nuclear testing and stability in Asia
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    This paper summarizes the reasons the tests were carried out, then goes on to consider the possible implications of the tests for stability. It concludes with a brief reflection on the contrast between the Indian and Pakistani tests and China's last tests in 1996.

Francesco Calogero, Professor of Theoretical Physics, Rome University I, and Chairman, Pugwash Council, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
The Future of Nuclear Weaponry and Our Civilization
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    We speculate on the future, on the time scale of one-two decades. We argue that catastrophic use of some kind of nuclear weaponry is likely, unless drastic measures towards the total and effectively enforced prohibition of such devices are undertaken by international society. It is therefore mandatory to plan for such a global regime and to advocate forcefully its introduction. But it is unlikely this will be fully realized before nuclear weaponry are indeed used with catastrophic effects. Hence it is important to prepare for the aftermath of such a catastrophe, at which moment it might become feasible to institute a global regime which will make the repeated use in anger of nuclear explosive devices sufficiently unlikely to be compatible with the preservation of our civilization.

Frank Ronald Cleminson, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada
Multilateral On-going Monitoring and Verification (OMV) of Compliance: Nurturing Cost-Effectiveness
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Thomas B. Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc
Disposition of Fissile Material from Nuclear Weapons
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    The United States and Russia have now both agreed that each country will dispose of limited amounts of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) declared to be in excess of military needs. Below we review the status of these programs.

Richard T. Cupitt, Associate Director, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia
Nonproliferation Export Controls
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Marco Di Capua Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Technology Innovation in China
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William H. Dunlop, Program Leader, Proliferation Prevention and Arms Control, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Nonproliferation through International Lab-to-Lab Technology Cooperation
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Christina Filarowski, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Joint US/PRC CTBT OSI Simulation Exercises
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Richard L. Garwin, Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations
Nuclear Weapons and International Security
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Gert G. Harigel, Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI) & International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES)
Military Sales and Nuclear Proliferation, Disarmament and Arms Control
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Hong Yuan-Eng, Institute of World Economics & Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (INES)
The Implication of TMD System in Japan to China's Security
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    In the preliminary stage of a war in the future, both air force attack-defense capability and land-based, sea-based medium and long range missiles are necessary for destroying enemy’s air force and other crucial strategic infrastructures. The TMD, therefore, will be a key element for a future war and regional conflicts. More and more countries have been trying to develop new defense systems against all kinds of missile attack, or are thinking to set up their own TMD projects. This development has gradually stimulated the proliferation of the TMD. A new confrontation and competition between missile offense and missile defense have appeared to the international arena.

Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute
Engaging the Five Nuclear Powers in Disarmament Talks
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    With the exception of the multilaterally negotiated comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), nuclear arms control from 1987 has either been bilateral, between the United States and Russia/Soviet Union, or unilateral, such as the voluntary withdrawal of US, British and French tactical nuclear weapons systems undertaken during the 1990s. In view of the current impasse in the START process, the persistent calls (from NPT States Parties and from international public opinion) for more progress on nuclear disarmament, and the need for collective initiatives to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and diminish the risks associated with potential use and possession, this paper considers the case for five power (P-5) talks, as a complement to the bilateral process and the multilateral negotiations just beginning in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a fissile materials treaty (FMT). In discussing P-5 talks, I make a distinction between ‘quantitative’ approaches, such as arms reduction, and ‘qualitative’ initiatives, which affect operations, nuclear use policies and doctrines. These approaches are not in conflict, but they are different. While it is necessary to bring the numbers down, such steps are likely to be thwarted unless the role of nuclear weapons is also being addressed. Measures in quantitative and qualitative disarmament can reinforce each other in a complementary relationship of confidence-building and concrete achievements. While recognising the difficulties of engaging in nuclear reduction talks among the five nuclear weapon States (NWS), this paper argues that several issues of qualitative nuclear disarmament are ripe for consideration in the five-power context.

Li Bin, Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
An Immediate Step in Global Nuclear Arms Control
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Li Zhimin and Li Feizhi, Science & Technology Information Center of China Academy of Engineering Physics
Impact of South-Asia's Nuclear Tests upon CTBT
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    After long period’s worldwide negotiation, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) finally opened for signature on Sept. 24th, 1996. The treaty stipulates that it may come into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all of the specified 44 states. So far, except India, Pakistan and North Korea, all of the other ones have signed on the treaty. However, the nuclear tests conducted respectively by India and Pakistan have seriously shaken the CTBT. It is feared that the regional nuclear arms race would be triggered as a sequence of the test events and all these factors would eventually render the treaty effect-less and damage the efforts to promote arms control. The nuclear test events in South Asia have indicated and confirmed that there exist some technical flaws as well as political faults in CTBT. People should delve into the existing problems within CTBT to assure the effectiveness and function of CTBT when entering into force.

George Lindsey, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
Arms Control in Space
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    This paper describes some of these problems which must be taken into account in any serious attempt to design a program for arms control an space.

Liu Gongliang, Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
Nuclear Materials and International Security
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Ming-Shih Lu, Brookhaven National Laboratory
The IAEA Strengthened International Safeguards Systems
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    This paper describes the differences between the traditional international safeguards system based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), the Part 1 measures of the 93+2 Program, and the measures described in the additional Protocol.

Yuzo Murayama, Associate Professor, Osaka University of Foreign Studies
China's Export Control Policy in East Asian Context: Implications from Economic Perspectives
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    The purpose of this paper is to find out specific characteristics of China's export control policies by comparing it with the ones in other East Asian countries. Special attentions are paid to differences of perceptions of export controls regarding the linkages between national security and economic factors. In the next section, export control policies of East Asian countries are briefly reviewed and the driving forces behind the implementation of policy measures are discussed. It is argued that economic interpretation of national security issue is adopted for justifying the implementation of export controls. Characteristics of China's export control policies are discussed in the second section and it is pointed out that the driving force for China's export control policy is different from other Asian countries. China tends to put more emphasis on treaty obligation aspect of export controls and implement measures accordingly. In the last section, implications of this difference on China's technological development is discussed, especially from the perspective of technology transfer from foreign countries.

Robert S. Norris, Natural Resources Defense Council
India and Pakistan, At the Crossroads
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    India and Pakistan’s demonstration of their nuclear capabilities in May of 1998 has raised many questions about the countries’ plans for their forces, doctrines, and policies. In the first part of the paper I examine certain evidence about the Indian and Pakistani tests to try to determine what may have transpired. In the second part of the paper I raise several fundamental questions that each nation will have to answer if they decide to become full-fledged nuclear powers.

Lester G. Paldy, Center for Science, Mathematics, and Technology Education, State University of New York at Stony Brook
A Code of Ethics on Arms R&D for Scientists and Engineers
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    Scientists and engineers make significant contributions to the technical monitoring of arms control agreements. International organizations and professional scientific and engineering societies can now make another contribution by formulating an ethical code requiring individual scientists and engineers to refrain from taking part in any research and development activities that violate international law or arms control agreements between nations. International organizations and professional societies should publicize the code, create objective review processes, and implement measures to protect individuals who report possible violations of international law.

Mu Changlin and Pan Tao, China Institute for International Strategic Studies
International Nonproliferation Regimes after the Cold War
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    It is always one of the main concerns of international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the end of the Cold War, international nonproliferation regimes have been enjoying continuous improvement and reinforcement, and promoted international security and regional stability in general. But some states strive to dominate the regimes and adopt double-standards, which leads to the intensification of various contradictions. At present time, the regimes are facing severe challenges because several countries are still outside the regimes and continue to develop WMD.

Dingli Shen, Center for American Studies, Fudan University
Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Chinese View
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    This short article addresses recent Chinese Attitude toward nuclear nonproliferation. In particular, it discusses China's policies and efforts on nuclear export control, stance toward fissile cut-off treaty, consistent call for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, unconditional provision of both positive and negative security assurances, etc.

Frank Von Hippel, Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Chairman of the research arm of the Federation of American Scientists
De-alerting Nuclear Missiles
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    The U.S. and Russia each still maintain on launch-on-warning alert missiles carrying thousands of nuclear warheads. Given that each country has hundreds of survivable warheads, such "hair-trigger" postures should be stood down by: removing to storage U.S. "silo-killing" warheads; keeping Western attack submarines away from the deployment areas of Russia's ballistic-missile submarines; reducing deployed missile-warheads to START III levels; immobilizing all missiles in silos, in dockside submarines, and on garaged mobile-missile-launchers; and maintaining missiles in submarines at sea and mobile-missiles in the field in a launch-unready condition. Britain has recently announced that it has adopted a de-alerted posture for its submarine-based ballistic-missiles. France and China probably keep their missiles at a low level of alert as well. However, the de-alerted status of the nuclear missiles of all countries must be made more transparent.

Wu Jun, Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics
On No-First-Use Treaty
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    With the end of the cold war, the risk of catastrophic damage on the world caused by nuclear weapons has dramatically reduced. But the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the initiation of nuclear war by error or by accident have not been ruled out. Nuclear force reductions would decrease these dangers and enhance global security and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. I believe that the conclusion of a No-First-Use treaty will be a key step in the deep nuclear disarmament.

Zhuang Jianzhong, Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies
The Future of Nonproliferation
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    After the first wave shock of the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests, people all over the world are now having the 2nd thought of the questions of the future nonproliferation: Why did the efforts of stopping the nuclear tests of these two countries fail? Will there be more nuclear threshold countries tests? Will the world with more nuclear countries become more unsecured after the cold war? We should study these questions and seek the right answers.


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